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BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT POLICY TO REDUCE 
INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH:
RESPONSES IN AN INNER-LONDON BOROUGH 1997-2003
ABSTRACT
The stimulus for this research was the publication of the Green and White papers: Our 
Healthier Nation (OHN) -  Saving Lives (DoH, 1998/9).
The aim was to ascertain factors affecting the pattern and speed of local reactions to 
the new policy. These factors were predicted to be similar to those found in analysis 
of pre-1997, Conservative government, public health policy. However, the particular 
hypothesis of the thesis was that tensions in the Labour Party and government 
concerning aspects of the wider determinants of health would also play a role in 
affecting local implementation. Of specific importance was the equivocal determinant 
o f ‘income inequalities’.
A case study of one inner-London borough was undertaken. Data collection was by 
way of in-depth interviews, participant observation and a review of local and national 
policy documents.
Findings based on fieldwork are:
1. The implementation process was protracted. Delays need to be distinguished 
from policy failure.
2. Staff views did influence the pattern of implementation. However, some 
widely-held beliefs did not affect local work developed in response to the 
policy. This was primarily because no permission had been granted by central 
government for local staff to act on these opinions.
3. Local NHS staff needed clear guidance on how to prioritise work, this was not 
provided until 2003.
4. Unresolved anomalies exist in NHS and local authority public involvement 
work relating to health inequalities reduction. This is because the policy 
highlights the wider determinants of health, including income distribution. The 
latter is a politically partisan subject. The ‘neutral’ state bureaucracy is less 
adept at facilitating ‘citizen’ influence over the issue than political parties have 
been. However, sections of the Labour Party itself appear to have some 
interest in directing involvement away from party organisation.
Keywords: health inequalities; public health; Labour Party; trade unions.
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INTRODUCTION
Foreword
On the morning of the 2 o f May 1997, the dawn of Britain’s first Labour 
government in eighteen years, Mustapha Bello introduced to the speakers’ platform 
“Mr Blair, Mr T. Blair.
The dingy, low-ceilinged room in a South London NHS health promotion unit was 
packed with representatives of the capital’s African voluntary organisations, as well 
as managers and staff from the health promotion unit. A universal cheer went up. 
Claps and laughter followed. Terry Blair, the sexual health team leader of the unit, 
then proceeded to get back to the topic of HTV prevention work within South 
London’s African communities. The audience, many of whom were suffering from 
lack of sleep and sore heads, tried to concentrate on the immediate tasks of the day.
These NHS and voluntary sector staff were all openly satisfied with the change of 
government. As ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) working in and around the 
NHS, one of the largest state bureaucracies on the globe, they had been, on this 
occasion, prepared to let slip political neutrality and revealed themselves as ‘street- 
level politicians’.
The new government was considered by local NHS staff to herald the possibility of 
important policy changes. Indeed, a swathe of new health-related Green and White 
Papers quickly emerged. The complex relationships between the Labour government, 
the Labour Party, local people whom policy was intended to affect, and the local NHS 
and voluntary sector staff charged with implementing new policy, provides the 
backdrop to this thesis. In particular, the author focuses on the local implementation 
of policy to reduce health inequalities, outlined in the Public Health Green and White 
Papers of 1998 and 1999, Our Healthier Nation, (DoH, 1998); Saving Lives, (DoH, 
1999).
Just as NHS staff have their own divided political affiliations, opinions and history, so 
too do members of the Labour Party (Rose, 1984: 147; Seyd et al, 1996:7). The two
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groups may of course overlap, as they did in this study’s geographical research area. 
The hypothesis presented is that broad political considerations, issues and tensions in 
the party and government, evident in the first term, played a part in affecting the 
pattern and speed of local public health policy implementation. The aim is to address 
the consequent research question: did broad political considerations, issues and 
tensions in the Labour Party and government, evident in the first term of office, play a 
part in affecting local policy implementation? The thesis analyses local responses to 
the national policy to reduce health inequalities, taking into account national and local 
political dimensions.1 The tensions particularly discussed are those concerning 
income distribution. ‘Centralisation’ versus ‘decentralisation’ of power and 
responsibility is also considered.
In order to contextualise the role of the tensions referred to in the hypothesis, the 
thesis also aims to describe the main and most immediate influences on local 
reactions to the policy. These are predicted to be among those identified in The Health 
o f the Nation (HOTN): a policy assessed (Universities of Leeds and Glamorgan and 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, hereafter LSHTM, 1998: 13- 
15,83,147). In general, the HOTN assessment highlights the impact of both 
institutional arrangements and local staff views. The extent to which the assessment’s 
recommendations were adopted may also be expected to affect local implementation.
Setting the scene
The remainder of this introduction takes the form of a short precis outlining the 
study’s interest in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) and the subsequent chapters’ contents.
1 ‘Health inequalities’ may be defined as the gap in health status between different social groups. 
Saving Lives shows, in graphic form, mortality trends by social class, in men of working age, between 
1930-32 and 1991-93. “During the 1980s and 1990s the gap between rich and poor widened and the 
health gap grew wider.” (DoH, 1999: 44, Figure 4.2).
2 ‘Tension’ is taken here to be demonstrated by inconsistencies, disputes or sidelining. It may operate at 
a number of different government levels and there are various ways in which it is thought that wider 
government tensions concerning income inequalities may affect local health inequalities policy 
implementation. Some of these effects are clearer and more significant than others. They include the 
following -  1. directly influences income distribution policy (which in turn may affect health 
inequalities). 2. affects organisations wanting to, or able to influence income distribution. And may 
affect relations between central government and localities. 3. affects policy processes or administration 
of policies, relating to income inequalities (e.g. health inequalities policy) because these policies are 
expected to be consistent and ‘joined-up’ with wider government policy (Powell, 2002: 245). 4. affects 
staff perceptions and incentives, which may in turn impact on local implementation.
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Research issues arising from the public health White Paper of 1999
Saving Lives links the population’s health status to the ‘broader determinants of 
health’3 (DoH, 1999: 3) and to involving local people in plans affecting health (DoH, 
1999: 126). The document is clear that there is a connection between income and 
health. It sees poverty as a breeding ground for poor health and says that health 
inequality is widespread: the most disadvantaged having suffered most from poor 
health (executive summary: 10). Its aim is to “..improve the health of everyone and 
the health of the worst off in particular.” (executive summary: 8). The opinions of 
those involved in local implementation of the public health policy, regarding these 
issues, are described in the thesis.
In Saving Lives ‘people, communities and government’ were given clearly defined 
and different roles, listed in tables in the report’s appendix 1 (DoH, 1999: 145-152). 
National government was to address national issues and local people, local issues. The 
links between local people and national issues were not mentioned, as indeed they are 
not in the much-reproduced ‘social model of health’ diagram (Dahlgren and 
Whitehead, 1991).4 This again is precisely the approach adopted by Acheson in the 
Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health (1998).5 This thesis sees as an 
important area for research, issues concerning the influence communities have over 
the broader determinants of health.
The relationship between political organisation and income inequalities reduction is 
highlighted in the thesis. This is because, not only does a wide body of opinion 
consider, as Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) does, that income inequalities affect health 
inequalities,6 but also, government policy may affect the character of political
3 Defined as ‘general socioeconomic, cultural and environmental conditions* (for example, see: 
Acheson, 1998: 6).
4 Popay et al (1998) and Wainwright (1996) provide critiques of this model.
5 The inquiry was commissioned by the new government to provide public health policy 
recommendations. Acheson (1998: 7-8) recommends ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ policies to reduce 
health inequalities. Upstream policies are those that deal with the wider influences on health 
inequalities, such as income distribution. An example of a downstream policy is - improved local 
provision of facilities for taking physical exercise. Acheson (1998: 30) stresses the need for policy 
development that favours the less well off (those on below average income).
6 Opinions along these lines were expressed in submissions to the DoH following the publication of the 
Green Paper, Our Healthier Nation (1998). For example, the submission of The Public Health 
Alliance, among other suggestions: “....recommended developing a wealth ratio index and setting 5-
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organisation, including trade union organisation (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1994; 
Heffeman, 2001: 34-35). Evidence from political science indicates the importance of 
political parties and trade unions in influencing levels of income inequality (Mule, 
2001; Castles, 1982; Rose, 1984; Atkinson, 1983: 131-137). The Labour Party and 
other European social democratic parties have been traditionally associated with 
policy to reduce income inequalities (for instance: Tawney, 1964: 202-210). So it 
was felt to be important to make contact with local leaders in these two labour 
movement fields. Their perspectives were compared with views from staff working in 
the voluntary sector, some of whom were found to be influenced by a ‘social capital 
for health’ approach to health inequalities reduction (Swann and Morgan, 2002).8 
Therefore, in looking at wider political considerations pertaining to health 
inequalities, it is important to take into account how post-1997 government policy 
may have influenced involvement in local political organisations. As Parry et al 
suggest:
“The extent and direction of citizen activity is not simply the product of 
individual and group initiative. It is affected by structural opportunities and by 
the extent of the encouragement offered by elites.” (Parry et al, 1992: 416).
The research process and chapter contents
The study has observed the actions and opinions of staff in response to the new 
policies in one borough, within one health authority area. The health authority chosen 
was Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham, which was given overall responsibility for
year targets to reduce the gap between the wealth of the richest and poorest in society.” (The Public 
Health Alliance, 1998:11). In 1999 a goal was set by the Labour government of halving child poverty 
by 2010 and a relative definition of poverty was adopted. However, on the basis of analysis up to 2002, 
it is not certain that the target will be achieved (Piachaud and Sutherland, 2002: 28).
7 “Despite a veritable explosion of charitable activity in Victorian England, the heyday of ‘good 
works’ evangelism passed without making a noticeable difference to the scale of the problem [that of 
mass working class poverty].... The appearance in virtually every European country of a social 
democratic party in the period 1870-1914, many of them Marxist, mid of increasingly powerful trade 
unions with close connections to such parties, must be considered as of cardinal importance in 
[initiating action through the state to address this ‘social question’]. Here was an important lobby for 
‘the right to work’, free education, old-age pensions, restricted hours of labour, national insurance, 
workingmen’s compensation, the minimum wage, a national health service, family allowances....” 
(Callaghan, 2000: 3-4).
8 “Social capita] can be broadly described as the resources within a community that create family and 
social organisation....Key constructs within the concept...include social relationships, group 
membership, shared norms, trust, formal and informal social networks, reciprocity and civic 
engagement.” (Swann and Morgan, 2002: 4).
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local health inequalities policy implementation and development in 1997. Over a five 
year period from this time, accountability for public health was gradually moved to 
NHS primary care trusts at borough level and the investigation centres on Lewisham. 
The borough, being one of the most deprived in the country, is an area where policy to 
reduce health inequalities is highly relevant.
Through a process of participant observation, semi-structured in-depth interviews, 
informal questioning and documentary analysis the author has observed, or received 
accounts of, all the key stages in work to address health inequalities in Lewisham over 
the course of six years. Interviewing and observations covered a wider range of staff 
and related personnel than might ordinarily be expected in an NHS-centred policy 
implementation study. This is because of the broad layer of issues considered to 
influence levels of health inequalities, - income inequalities being the main cause 
considered in this thesis.
In the first chapter a brief review of literature on ‘the policy process’ situates the work 
in this theoretical context. Then concepts from political science that are relevant to the 
research question are looked at. Chapter 2 gives a historical background to public 
health initiatives and looks in more depth at the policy issues under investigation. 
Chapter 3, ‘The research plan and process’, provides a description of the methods 
used in the work.
It is found that progress in implementing health inequalities policy was distracted by 
national policy primarily intended for more acute services. The way in which current 
and new NHS institutions responded to Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) is discussed in 
detail in chapter 4, ‘Institutional change’. The key institutions being: the new Primary 
Care Groups and Trusts (PCGs/PCTs);9 the Healthier Lewisham partnership; the 
Health Action Zone (HAZ); The NHS Plan (DoH, 2000); the Health Improvement and 
Modernisation Programme (HimP); and the target setting apparatus.
9 North and South Lewisham PCGs were formed on April l ri 2000. They were merged to create 
Lewisham PCT on April 1st 2002. Most of the interviews took place before this date, but data continued 
to be collected for another 15 months. Therefore the titles PCG and PCT are both found in the thesis 
text.
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Central government was clear in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) that it had its own 
particular role to play, including work on income redistribution, and that local 
workers had other roles. But if central government was not seen to be doing its bit, 
and local workers felt that income redistribution was a key element of the policy, then 
for them, the importance of local work might be called into question. Again this was a 
factor highlighted in the HOTN assessment (LSHTM, 1998). Chapters 5 and 6, on 
‘values’, investigate the extent to which local work was in fact distracted by these 
issues. Having reviewed the effect, on new public health policy implementation, of 
both local institutional changes and staff views, this is contrasted with the role of 
broader tensions. Unresolved problems in the development of political participation at 
the local level are considered in chapter 6, ‘The participatory framework’.
Conclusion
Placement of some powers and responsibilities into local hands by central government 
may be a process calculated to retain other important powers at the central level. In 
particular, the author seeks to show that research in political science on power 
relations should be brought to bear on developments in ‘local democracy’ associated 
with new policy to reduce health inequalities. Drawing on Lukes’s (1974) view of 
power, it is posited that the public involvement aspects of policy to reduce health 
inequalities may be disguised to look as if they are meeting an agenda demanded by 
others and not those ‘in power’. However, as the subsequent discussion and 
conclusions unfold, it will be clear that specified nuances and caveats to these 
propositions are required.
The influence and powers of implementers in the local arena can be usefully 
compared with the findings of Lipsky (1980). He does not find them able to convert 
policy to make it chime with their own ideals. Instead, through individual 
compromises they find themselves creating a social programme that is counter to their 
strategic wishes.
Research in this field is part of, what has been coined, “the health inequalities 
industry” (Klein, Health Equity Network conference, 2002 (www.ukhen.org) and 
correspondence). However, this investigation takes a broad perspective that integrates
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developments in government policy towards democratic participation with 
developments at the local level to address health inequalities. Thus, the author hopes 
to shed light on the long-term prospects for health inequalities reduction. These will, 
however, be closely tied to the character and fortunes of the Labour Party. The party’s 
direction, in turn, is in part connected to its relationship with its local members and 
their relations with the community.
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Chapter 1 
A POLITICAL SCIENCE FRAMEWORK 
Introduction
Be they civil servants, NHS staff or local government managers, ‘state officials’, as 
well as elected politicians, have a pivotal role in the processes investigated here. In 
order to analyse the part played by each, and the outcome of their activities, there is a 
need to locate the research in a theoretical context that highlights the character of the 
state in which they operate and of which they are a part. Theories of the policy 
process and, in particular, ‘implementation’, also need to be analysed in order to 
further situate local ‘policy responses’. The purpose of this chapter is to locate local 
activity in all these complexities. This is achieved through undertaking a review of the 
theoretical approaches to policy-related actions and political power, and by looking at 
the implications of these for local work aimed at reducing inequalities in health.
First, a summary definition is required. Like ‘the market’, the modem British state, 
with which this research is concerned, is not one entity, but is composed of numerous 
institutions and undertakes many different functions. The executive, the legislature 
and the administrative arms are key components of the state. The branches are said in 
constitutional legal theory to embody the separation of powers, thus guaranteeing the 
neutrality of the decision making process. Welfare services controlled by state 
departments are significant within the contemporary British context. As Hill distils it: 
“The basic definition of the state is as a set of institutions with superordinate power 
over a specific territory.” (Hill, 1997a: 10). See also Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) 
and Self (1977).
Firstly, the chapter looks at theories of the policy process. A description is provided of 
the concept of ‘stages’ and, in particular, the implementation phase. Also outlined are 
the perspectives of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ theorists. Secondly, features of the 
state and its internal and external relations are crucial to understanding this policy 
implementation process. The concepts of democracy, class and power are defined, as 
they help in analysing the interests of the state and its officers. Then the state -
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portrayed as both a neutral body and as a biased driver of local activity -  is analysed. 
The final section of the chapter focuses on political parties, and Labour in particular, 
as parties can affect policy on income differentials.
1. The policy process in the modern state10
Policy stages
Hill (1997a: 6-10) discusses the meaning of the concept of ‘policy’ and looks at 
various definitions. For instance, he quotes Friend, Power and Yewlett’s (1974: 40) 
definition that -  ‘policy is essentially a stance which, once articulated, contributes to 
the context within which a succession of future decisions will be made’. This 
definition alerts us to the idea that policy is an active process taking place through 
time and is not the consequence of value free debate. In this thesis the author accepts 
a schema recommended by Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 10), deLeon (1999: 25), Hill 
and Hupe (2002: 6) and Parsons (1995: 80-81). This means, firstly, that for practical 
purposes the policy process may be regarded as divisible into a number of stages 
which are passed through in order. Hogwood and Gun (1984: 4) provide a list of nine 
stages.11 But, secondly, some cautions must be sounded. Hill (1997a: 24) cites various 
issues to take into account and Sabatier (1999: 7) is even more sceptical. A brief 
amalgam of their warnings may be set out as follows: (1) policy is part of a
continuous process and initiation can start anywhere in the system, (2) stages in this 
process may be of differing length and import and various feedback loops, along with 
the interjection of other influences, may operate to blur the sequence of stages. Thus, 
the process is more complex than the framework indicates, (3) to identify a 
progression of stages does not provide information on causal processes.
Wolman (1981) also divides public policy programmes into stages. These are, 
broadly, ‘formulating’ and ‘carrying out’. Within these two parts there are ten sub­
groups and various categories below these. The purpose of breaking the process down 
is to identify, at each stage, issues that may determine programme success and failure.
10 The heading is taken from Hill’s title (1997a).
11 These are: “(1) Deriding to deride (issue search or agenda-setting) (2) Deriding how to deride (or 
issue filtration) (3) Issue definition (4) Forecasting (5) Setting objectives and priorities (6) Options 
analysis (7) Policy implementation, monitoring, and control (8) Evaluation and review (9) Policy 
maintenance, succession, or termination” (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984:4).
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Going through Wolman’s stages in order, a critique is provided in appendix 1.1 of 
issues relevant to this study.
By breaking down the policy process into stages, but at the same time recognising a 
blurring of the ‘stages’ formula, particular features in the process that are of relevance 
to the thesis can be discerned. This thesis has not attempted to offer a final assessment 
of programme success or failure in relation to outcomes, i.e. it has not measured the 
extent to which work led to health inequalities falling. Therefore, Wolman’s 
hypotheses on determinants of policy success and failure have not been fully tested. 
However, at the same time perspectives on his observations have been provided.
Adopting a ‘qualified stages approach’ means that the unique elements of the research 
can be more clearly highlighted. The policy under investigation lends itself to an 
approach that focuses on particular feedback and links between stages in the policy 
process. It is posited that the policy is itself impacting on the terms of the policy 
process, because it concerns factors that can affect the political involvement of social 
groups in influencing policy. “[The] state can effectively dictate and shape the policy 
agenda by its own decisions on who shall and shall not be incorporated into the policy 
process, a good example being the [1980s] attack on trade union and local authority 
representation on health authorities in Britain.” (Mohan, 1990: 80).
And as Hill notes:
“There is an interesting tendency for journalists to exaggerate the political 
aspects of the policy process and for political scientists to play them down. 
The latter is partly a recognition of the complexity of the policy-making 
process -  the long transforming process from initial goals to final outcome, a 
process in which the party political input inevitably becomes watered down. 
The model used here acknowledges the importance of this, but it is suggested 
that the party political or ideological element in the policy process should not 
be given too little attention.” (Hill, 1997a: 112)
Other work suggests that government may produce policy in order to be ‘seen to be 
doing something’ (Edelman, 1977). A version of this might be the deliberate setting
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of targets for health improvement that are very easy to achieve. This was widely 
considered by NHS staff to have been a ‘trick’ in implementation of The Health o f the 
Nation (1992). At least one senior figure working in public health in Lewisham 
believed the tactic had continued into the 21st century.
Implementation
Although the fieldwork addresses the implementation stage, that is, Hogwood and 
Gunn’s stage 7 (1984: 24), the thesis’s proposition is that the pattern of local 
implementation activity is affected by government concerns that relate to wider issues 
than those immediately associated with the public health policy. Thus, the present 
author has agreed with Sabatier’s later work (1999: 7) and others who critique the 
‘stages’ model.
Furthermore, as the extent of the links between health inequality, income inequality 
and poverty are not precisely spelt out in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) there is scope for 
diverse interpretation both within government departments and at the local level 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 204).
Many of the best and most thorough implementation studies make good use of 
comprehensive criteria checks to assess how far policy is likely to move from opinion 
as to what legislation would be desirable, to enactment. For instance, Exworthy and 
Powell (2000) and Exworthy, Bemey, Powell (2002) use Kingdon’s (1995) three 
‘streams’ - problems, politics and policies. These streams may, or may not, converge 
to provide, or block out, ‘windows’ for successful policy development and 
implementation (Exworthy, Bemey, Powell, 2002: 83). Exworthy et al (2002) show 
that some convergence in policy streams has increased the extent to which health 
inequalities work is ‘on the agenda’ nationally and locally. But blocks caused by 
deficiencies in performance management, insufficient integration between policy 
sectors, and contradictions between health inequalities policy and other policy 
initiatives have hampered implementation. Hall et al (1975) analyse a number of case 
studies to build up a set of criteria for policy introduction and modification. Sabatier 
(1986: 276) cites at least 21 studies that have used six conditions for effective 
implementation, as developed by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1986: 273-4).
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This research has simply used the HOTN assessment (LSHTM, 1998, referred to in 
the introduction) as a benchmark against which to judge OHN implementation, but 
there has been no systematic adoption of theoretical criteria checks to assess the 
success or failure of implementation. Therefore, the work should be regarded as a 
study of aspects of implementation at the local level, rather than as a standard 
implementation study.
A strong justification for interest in the research topic under investigation is provided 
by the evaluation of Conservative government public health policy (LSHTM, 1998). 
In it one of the key factors said to influence implementation was government 
‘acknowledgement of the socio-economic determinants of health’. This was needed in 
order to gain credibility with local staff. The assumption was that local implementers’ 
views on the credibility of policy affects their work. Specifically, views on socio­
economic policy issues and government action in this field will affect implementation 
in this way (LSHTM, 1998: 147). Thus, the author of this thesis wished to assess and 
track the way in which staff views on an aspect of the socio-economic determinants of 
health - income inequalities - might affect implementation.
Furthermore, the HOTN assessment was chosen as a benchmark for the research for 
the following reasons. Firstly, it was produced by respected academic sources, 
employs an acceptable methodology, and its research is well resourced, with, for 
example, data collected from 256 face-to-face interviews in total, covering 8 health 
regions. Secondly, this thesis starts at one point in a policy process; the HOTN 
assessment and its object of study can be seen as part of a developing picture of policy 
to improve health and reduce health inequalities, and thus it gives some historical 
perspective to the particular point of departure made here. Given that it assesses 
Conservative government policy, it also helps in considering those elements of 
contemporary British public health policy that remain unchanged under differing 
complexions of governing party and those that may shift (Parsons, 1995: 603-13).
As mentioned, the thesis concentrates on analysing processes unfolding at the local 
level rather than the larger issue of assessing the likely outcome or success of the
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policy.12 However, cross-referencing is made to the factors found to have influenced 
the implementation of the Health of the Nation policy (LSHTM, 1998: 147). Among 
these are: resources, support from central government, organisational structures, 
partnerships, commitment of organisations and individuals, acknowledgement of the 
socio-economic determinants of health, along with local demographic features, and 
finally, local authority cultural and political features. It was predicted here that the 
uptake or discarding of the assessment’s recommendations for public health policy 
would affect Saving Lives 's implementation.
Moreover, given some of the responsive alterations made to the policy within the last 
five years, and improvements in local implementation, the present author concurs 
with analysts of policy development and implementation who take the view that a 
long-term perspective on policy success is needed. Examples of academics providing 
this view are Parker (1975: 371-407), who describes the long struggle for clean air 
policy change, Hill (1981: 271) and Sabatier (1986).
‘Top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on implementation
Of relevance to this work is the ‘top down -  bottom up’ debate and links, or feedback 
loops, between state and party activity within pre-implementation stages and ‘bottom 
up’ responses (Parsons, 1995: 463-470; Hill and Hupe, 2002: 41-56; Hill and Hupe, 
2003: 473-474).
Put simply, the top-down approach can be characterised as stressing the perspective of 
legislators and the distant government authors of policy decrees. The observations of 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) are pertinent here, since their study showed that local 
actions might translate policy aims into unsought outcomes.
Hjem (1982) and Hjem and Porter (1981) draw attention to the complexity of 
organisations’ involvement in policy implementation and to the normative democratic 
issues involved. Hjem (1982) takes a ‘bottom-up perspective’. He suggests that
12 Don Nutbeam has highlighted “the difficult decisions facing the DoH in identifying specific public 
health programmes that will have an impact on health inequalities because of the paucity of evidence 
concerning effective interventions. This has made decisions on priorities very difficult” (HEN 
conference, 2002 and correspondence). Again, due to the focus of this thesis, this very real and 
important area has not been addressed in a systematic way.
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negotiations between local implementers and local people affected by policy should 
influence its development. However, Sabatier (1986) seeks to shore up the democratic 
legitimacy of government policy making. He suggests that local staff should 
implement the policies of elected government and not have undue autonomy and 
freedom to influence policy (Hill, 1997b: 214). The present research is concerned to 
identify where policymaking is taking place and to show any changes in the site of 
policymaking and attendant powers. This challenge relates to the main aim, since 
policy may be shaped and reformed by local staff or it may be more influenced by 
wider political tensions.
Lipsky (1980) is also associated with the ‘bottom up’ perspective. He argues that the 
aggregate of individual behaviour among front-line public service staff can effectively 
become policy. Here, as referred to in the introduction, the author investigates how 
the opinions of local staff might affect delivery of a policy that is tied to one of the 
most fraught of political questions, that of income distribution.
To summarise, it has been shown that an analysis of ‘stages’ in the policy process is 
useful in unpicking and referencing local responses to policy to reduce health 
inequalities. At the same time, one should not expect to see policy-related actions 
neatly mapping this schema. The political process of policy development and 
implementation is more complex, and as is shown in the next section, is related to the 
context of the modem state.
2. Theories of the modern state
The various branches of the state, referred to in this chapter’s introduction, control or 
co-ordinate, to a greater or lesser degree, the policy process. The state is seen as a 
neutral arbiter of competing interests or demands in some models and as a biased 
player in others: putting its own policy interests, or the interests of particular classes 
and groups, above those of others. Certain key concepts immediately arise in analysis 
of British state activities, namely, democracy, class, power and pluralism, and these 
are therefore discussed. Using these concepts the role of the state is looked at, firstly, 
as a neutral body, and secondly, as an interested party acting as a partisan player and 
directing policy on behalf of certain classes or groups. A description of these
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theoretical concepts is required in order to attempt to apply them to, and thus increase 
understanding of, activity and causal processes in the local area under investigation.
Democracy
The concept of democracy is intertwined with that of the state. Let us take a simple 
definition of the democratic principle, offered by Arblaster: “..that people should, as 
far as possible, make or participate in making the decisions that affect them most 
closely”. It is Arblaster’s opinion that “this principle could beneficially be applied far 
more widely in modern societies than it presently is.” (Arblaster, 1994: 102). As he 
points out, for many centuries democracy had a pejorative and negative meaning and 
it is only in the twentieth century that it became more widely accepted. The reason for 
reticence was, in part, fear of redistribution. The attitudes of higher and lower income 
groups towards rules governing democracy have a divergent history. If the poor could 
choose, then, as they out-numbered the rich, surely they would vote for movement of 
funds from the latter to the former group?
Nine different ‘models of democracy’ are provided by Held (1987). These are
outlined in appendix 1.2. It is possible to select from Held’s models those that are
most relevant to this study’s findings. Of particular importance (see chapter 6) are*
four forms of democracy: (i) representative (Held’s type 3b); (ii) direct (Held’s type 
4); (iii) legal (Held’s type 7); and (iv) participatory (Held’s type 8). Elements of 
Held’s models were encountered in the aspirational values of different local staff, in 
the rationales cited by both the Department of Health and local staff as underpinning 
current institutional change, and in institutional arrangements that were present in the 
borough at the time of the research.
The study found that a number of staff tended to blend elements of Held’s models and 
switched between models when discussing different issues. Motivations for 
supporting different features within the models ranged from the view that population 
health would be improved by the development of the particular democratic principles, 
through to the view that the current system was corrupt and did not enable decisions 
to be taken that the majority of residents supported. What was aspired to (the ‘ought’) 
and what was in reality being developed (the ‘is’) at times became merged in 
interviewees’ responses and clarification was then sought. While staff thought some
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features of Held’s typology ought to be strengthened, suggested below are the models 
whose elements actually existed in Lewisham at the time of this research.
It is suggested that Lewisham residents mainly experienced a combination of Held’s 
‘developmental democracy’ (representative, type 3b) and ‘legal democracy’, although 
other features of different models may apply. Both models incorporate representative 
mechanisms. Representative democracy has many different overall forms, depending 
on a blend of elements. Elections indicate one aspect of its operation. The main 
elections, forming one part of the system of representative democracy in Lewisham, 
consist of:
• election by all the borough’s electorate of MPs, MEPs, councillors and more 
recently the London and borough mayors
• selection and election of these candidates to stand for the Labour Party by 
Lewisham Labour Party members
• election of representatives of the voluntary sector to sit on the new Local Strategic 
Partnership
• election of tenants representatives within tenants associations
• election of professional representatives to sit on PCTs
• election of representatives to sit on the community council (N. Lewisham area)
• internal election of voluntary sector officers who do not necessarily then act as
organisational reps
• internal election of union representatives
• non-elected representation also forms part of the representational structure of
organisations in Lewisham. For instance, chairs and non-executive members of
the new PCTs are appointed by the Secretary of State for Health.
However, the system is changing because of a number of new developments, which in 
turn have various causes. Recent changes in Lewisham’s system of representation and 
democracy include: the formation of a community council; a decrease in participation 
by Labour Party members and a decrease in their powers; a rearrangement of the 
responsibilities of councillors and a planned decrease in their numbers; the formation
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of ‘Hubs’;13 the formation of a ‘citizens’ panel’; and, increased investment by 
statutory services in public involvement workers,14 who are either based in the 
statutory or voluntary sector. Previous changes, such as the demise of local 
representation on national wages councils, are also pertinent.
Staff showed preferences for particular models and indicated a variety of assessments 
of current democratic practices. There was found to be little consensus on the overall 
real, and ideal, direction of change. Given, as is argued here, that the application of 
different democratic rules will affect income inequalities, this lack of consensus is of 
significance to the present research. The effects on the worse off, arising from 
changes to democratic structures, need to be considered.15
Class
Before theories of the state are examined it is necessary to give a very brief definition 
of ‘class’ since ‘population groups’ have already been referred to. For the purposes of 
this research two definitions of class are taken, suited to different analyses. The first is 
the sociological definition, used in many studies of health inequalities. Here class 
relates to type of employment, as assessed by the National Statistics Socio-Economic 
Classification (NS SEC),16 or may be analysed on the basis of title of newspaper read 
and other sociological characteristics (socio-economic status groups). Thus, the author 
would concur with Baldwin: “Classes may be defined by more than their relations to
13 ‘Hubs’ were renamed ‘Area Forums’ in May 2002. There are 6 in Lewisham covering 3 wards each. 
They are regular meetings open to all residents in the area to meet with councillors and council 
officials. “They are not decision-making bodies but can serve as consultative mechanisms and make a 
vital contribution to the work of the council.” (Lewisham council website, September, 2003:
w ww.lewisham .gov.uk/Pcrform nncePlans/B V PP2003/govcrnancc.htm  )
14 The term ‘public involvement work’, in the context of this thesis, covers state funded initiatives to 
support public influence over a range of issues. While some NHS staff may associate public 
involvement only with patient involvement, the thesis takes the latter term to be one aspect of the 
former, generic, term. The thesis is concerned with public involvement that may affect the broader 
determinants of health, rather than with feedback mechanisms that aim to improve the patient 
experience. It is argued, later in this chapter, that non-state funded public involvement, in the form of 
participation in the labour movement, should also be taken into account when considering the public’s 
influence on upstream health determinants.
15 It is the author’s view that national and local democratic structures are still assessed for their impact 
on longer-term power relations and the ability of certain groups to accrue resources. A recent example 
has been debate on the pros and cons of elected mayors. Here, negative campaign literature highlighted 
the business interest in acquiring a single person with whom to liaise, while the pro-mayor lobby 
emphasised more power for residents and less for local elites (for example, Baker, 2001; Freeman, 
Trimingham, Baker, 2001; Bassam, 2001; Burch and Holliday, 2000: 75).
16 A new system of classification was introduced in 2001. “NS SEC has forty categories that can be 
aggregated....into fourteen operational categories, which in turn can be aggregated into eight, five or 
three analytical classes.” It is based on occupation, employment status and size of organisation (Rowan, 
2003: 34, 33).
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the means of production; their political behaviour may therefore not be immediately 
determined by economic evolution.” (Baldwin, 1990: 48).
However, a second way of looking at class, associated with a Marxist position, also 
has explanatory value in relation to analysing health inequalities policy. This is the 
relationship of different groups in global society to the means of production. Owners 
and controllers of capital used to secure the means of production may have different 
interests in relation to income inequalities from those employed and paid by wages. It 
is also the case that owners of the ‘means of production, distribution and exchange’ 
are, as well, controllers of employment. Because of this they are able to influence 
governments in a way that employees cannot. This is a reason for challenging 
assumptions of the benefits of interest group politics over party politics for people on 
lower incomes. Business will normally have more resources and leverage to lobby 
government than interest groups composed of lower income populations. Lower 
income groups may instead achieve more through forms of democracy that rely less 
on financial resources and more on the legal authority of votes. Within the binary 
formula of the Marxist position further distinctions can be made. For instance, 
Poulantzas (1973) outlines a class schema that differentiates the interests of state 
employees and their families from private sector employees and their families.17 Some 
local interviewees employed the second definition. One respondent for example, saw 
the owners of media outlets wielding significant power to control politics. Others felt 
that the control of owners of capital over employment implied that income 
differentials would never change.
Social stratification beyond class is also important in understanding the context of 
policies to address health inequalities and access to influencing policy. The mass 
entry of women into the labour market, which accelerated from the 1960s, has had 
huge social ramifications that are still developing. Similarly, over the last 40 years, 
the migration of populations, particularly from the Caribbean and Africa, to South 
London, increases the need for health inequalities to be analysed in relation to race as 
well as class.
17 Debates between Wilkinson (1999) and Muntaner, Lynch and Oates (1999) highlight the importance 
of the second general formulation of class.
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As Verba et al (1978) seek to show: “In general, political and socio-economic
stratification hierarchies are likely to be closely aligned The economically and
socially better-off dominate politics. Government policy, in turn, maintains and 
reinforces the position of those who are better off.” However, their findings indicate 
that through political organisations and institutions the ‘have nots’ can gain more 
involvement. “In the absence of explicit contestation on the basis of social class the 
haves in [US] society, came to play an inordinate role in political life.” (p.307). But, 
strong institutional constraints can result in a more representative activist population 
with, in turn, more egalitarian socio-economic ramifications (p.295). It is for this 
reason that the institutional arrangements for political participation are considered to 
be of relevance to the topic of this thesis.18
Power
A typical starting point for a discussion on power in contemporary society is with the 
pluralist tradition, discussed further under its own heading below. In the work of Dahl 
(1957), for instance, the use of power is visible - winners and losers can be identified, 
because the latter act as the former decides. At the same time, access to decision­
making arenas is open. Active and legitimate groups in society can all participate in 
the formation of policy. Schumpeter (1943 : 269-273) sees widespread public 
participation in democracy as tied to competition between party leaders for votes. 
Here the principal function of the public is to ‘produce’ a government. However, 
Benn and Peters (1959: 289) see a wider variety of different relations between the 
state and associations in society, with the state sometimes controlling or competing 
against social groups or service providers.
Developments in the theory of power consider the possibility of suppression of 
observable conflict (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 1974). In the ‘three 
dimensional’ view of power, not only may agendas be ‘rigged’ to prevent particular 
groups raising their interests (the two dimensional view), but also interests themselves 
may be shaped by the context. Lukes gives an example where, if workers are 
dependent for employment on a factory that is polluting their town, then they may
18 A comparison can be drawn with Tudor Hart’s ‘inverse care law’ referred to in the next chapter. 
Here the worse off, most ‘in need’ of political representation, are least likely to acquire it, without 
explicit assistance from political organisations.
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then not feel interested in reducing pollution levels, because they know this may 
affect employment (presentation by Stephen Lukes at LSE, 7.3.02). For Lukes, open 
conflict is not necessary for power. The most effective use of power is hidden and 
prevents conflicts from starting.
Lukes’s detractors, for example, Polsby (1980), Hindess (1976) and Benton (1981), 
argue that, among other problems with this analysis, Lukes finds himself in the tricky 
position of needing to ascribe interests to actors who are unaware of such interests. 
Benton, for example, suggests the emphasis on hidden interests, or ‘false 
consciousness’, is a means of explaining away the failure of the working class to live 
up to intellectuals’ expectations.
In Lukes’s model, power may be hidden; therefore, in order to study situations where 
it may operate, a comparative approach, such as that used by Crenson (1971) is 
helpful. This research is, in part, concerned to identify possible factors affecting the 
ability, or inability, of different local interests to influence the distribution of income, 
since this is considered to affect health. As part of this assessment the thesis looks at 
what factors might inhibit income and health inequality from becoming issues of local 
importance. It considers whether ‘democratic goal posts’ might be moved in order to 
keep the issue of income inequalities off the agenda. The research seeks to find out if 
NHS work is, through unintended consequences or chance, influencing the ability of 
some groups to raise issues of income inequality. Different forms of involvement 
might favour different interests. Public health and NHS practice clearly supports some 
forms of public involvement and is not involved with others. This issue is returned to 
in chapter 6.
Crenson, in his famous study of air pollution legislation, believes that: “Air pollution 
....is not the only urban problem that has been a victim of political neglect. Poverty 
and racial discrimination ....have been present in American cities for some time but 
provoked little in the way of political action...The decisions that we fail to make often 
seem to be more critical for the life of the nation than the ones that we do make.”
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(Crenson, 1971: preface vii).19 Certain people and institutions, and certain 
combinations of people, policy and institutions, his study held, had the power to 
enforce inaction (p.33). Some towns, it was found, acted more decisively to address 
air pollution than others. Both Crenson’s and Lukes’s view of power provides an 
important theoretical framework for the present research and analysis. Tawney 
(1964), Anderson (1974), Gramsci (1957, 1971), Le Grand, 1982: 142-51 and others 
also describe the ways in which demands for increased equality may be damped 
down. This thesis generally considers - particularly in chapter 6 - the local factors that 
lead to inaction and act as barriers to political and social organisation that might be 
associated with upstream income redistribution.
The neutral state
The main theories associated with a conception of the state as predominately ‘neutral’ 
are those of rational-legal authority, stemming from the work of Max Weber (1864- 
1920), and pluralism, as exemplified by Robert Dahl (1915-). Both do, however, 
incorporate an acknowledgement of openings for potential state biases. The 
importance of these perspectives for the current research will be explained.
Rational-legal authority
Weber describes one method of legitimating authority as being on ‘rational’, non- 
arbitrary grounds:
“...resting on a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the 
right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.... In 
the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established 
impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office 
only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the 
scope of authority of the office.” (Weber, 1947: 323).
Weber distinguishes rational-legal authority from charismatic and traditional 
authority.20
19 Lukes considers Crenson’s study to contain certain “elements of the three-dimensional view of 
power” (Lukes, 1974: 60).
“The march of bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no rational 
character...” (Weber, in Gerth and Wright Mills, 1991:244).
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While some of the details of Weber's bureaucratic system may appear arcane,21 a 
respect for the ideals of this system of authority can still be found to permeate through 
NHS staff thinking and practice.22 Four points are listed to show the relevance of 
Weber’s theory of rational-legal authority to the thesis. Firstly, it may affect the extent 
to which staff situated in a bureaucratic system feel able or confident to pursue then- 
own notions of the most effective route to achieving the policy goals as set by higher 
authority. The particular health policy of concern here can be associated with 
politically highly charged redistributive elements. The economic policy of the 
government has been less clear in relation to income inequality than to health 
inequality, leading to perceived inconsistencies in policy and uncertain 
implementation. The extent to which ‘street-level bureaucrats’ may be willing and 
able, to follow their own agendas is particularly interesting in these circumstances 
(Lipsky, 1980). It is assumed that staff espousing values that respect rational-legal 
authority will perceive boundaries in their ability to take an independent approach to 
implementing policy.23 These values and norms are reported in chapter 5.
The hierarchical nature of NHS structures is also of relevance to the implementation 
process. To the extent that a hierarchy exists, it is not a single entity but is fractured 
by loyalty to professional groups and ‘competing baronies’. Nevertheless, some 
deference to the norms of the bureaucracy is assumed to exist and to be of relevance 
to this research. Political leaders appear to regard the National Health Service as too 
hierarchical and it has been posited that local staff should be given more flexibility in 
order to carry out effective work. Commands from the higher centralised levels of the 
NHS are now seen as too broad-brush to apply to variations in local needs: “..a one- 
size-fits-all nationalised industry monopoly approach -  must change”, said Alan 
Milbum, Secretary of State for Health (Milbum, 5.2.03).24 However, as will be seen,
21 See for example Weber on Bureaucracy in Gerth and Wright Mills, 1991:1%.
22 A most obvious example being local staff handbooks, which in the case of new Primary Care Trusts 
formed in Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham entail at least 50 different staff policies.
23 “The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed...the 
professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material ...existence.” (Weber, in Gerth 
and Wright Mills, 1991:228). Bureaucracy, in Weber’s words, is an ‘iron cage’.
24 The reasons Milbum gave for the new drive for ‘localism’ were fourfold. The first reason, which 
ignores issues of economic migration, was that: “...the uncertainty engendered by globalisation is 
driving people to take refuge in what they know -  in their families, their communities, their regions. 
People find shelter in the very local because the local can be influenced even if the global cannot”. The 
national has of course been ignored here. The next three reasons are more orthodox: different 
communities have different needs; health services are delivered locally and local staff should be trusted
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in this case study attempts to allocate various responsibilities to local public health
^  25departments proved unsuccessful in the early years of Labour’s return to office.
Secondly, it could be said that, as the policy under investigation itself takes a non- 
neutral position towards the status quo of health and income distribution, an ethic of 
bureaucratic neutrality might mean that local institutional responses stagnate. As 
Weber says, “Discipline in general, like its most rational offspring, bureaucracy, is 
impersonal. Unfailingly neutral, it places itself at the disposal of every power that 
claims its service...” (Gerth and Wright Mills, 1991: 254). While Weber’s formula 
appears clear, it needs to be seen in the context of somewhat confused directions, 
mixed views on which power does legitimately claim authority and the desire of the 
post-1997 British Labour government to represent the whole nation. Given this 
environment, the bureaucrat’s aspiration to follow orders neutrally might gravitate to 
the most conservative position, that is, one that does not encourage partisan pressures 
for income redistribution.
Aside from direct work to reduce health and income inequalities, it will be argued in 
chapter 2 that political self-organisation of affected groups has, in the past, assisted 
reduction in health inequalities. It is the local state’s attitude towards encouraging 
citizens’ political self-organisation that, it is argued here, provides particular problems 
for bureaucrats working within a ‘neutral’ framework. This is because state officials 
would be using the cover of the neutral state to pursue policies that may affect the 
future fortunes of partisan interests. However, as will be discussed in chapter 6, the 
activities of state officers can be interpreted as undermining the work of minority 
political parties and Labour Party organisation in Lewisham. The Labour leadership 
can be seen to ‘subcontract’ the building of formerly party-based democratic 
structures to council and voluntary sector officials, who construct non-party
to innovate locally; and finally, “In a consumer society more people are demanding public services that 
are responsive to their own needs and offer greater personal choice”. Stringent national rules on the 
use of the NHS logo are one example of contradictions in this drive for ‘localism’ (DoH, 2000:15).
25 The rational bureaucratic account of authority is not simply concerned with the state, it may be 
applied to political parties as in the work of Michels (1915).
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substitutes.26 To summarise, officials’ uncertainty might be predicted regarding - what 
it means to be neutral in the context of a policy that in some respects requires biased 
work, that is, work aimed at supporting particular sections of the population. Any 
contradictions in policy will add to this insecurity.
Thirdly, Weber allows that bureaucrats might develop self-serving tendencies and this 
is also relevant to a study focused on NHS orientated systems. An NHS executive and 
budget-holder earning £60,000 might, for instance, be unenthusiastic in advocating 
that NHS pay structures be flattened, even if evidence suggested that this would help 
health inequalities reduction.27 It is also the case that state employees may work in 
ways that promote bias because of unconscious prejudices. This applies in respect to 
definitions of ‘local’ and ‘national’ within health inequalities policy and practice. A 
local state employee may tend to consider local issues to be those that they have 
control over, and national issues to be ones that national government has control over. 
However, pensions policy, highlighted in the Acheson report as being of significance 
to health inequalities, is an example of the somewhat random categorisation of issues. 
For many local residents, pensions are an important issue, possibly more important 
than increasing provision of fruit in schools. But for local NHS staff the issue is one 
they cannot do much about, and therefore it is not a ‘local’ issue.
Finally, another dimension of the relationship between state bureaucratic interests and 
health and income inequalities policy is the role of the state as employer of lower 
income workers. Different levels of state enterprise are considered in some of the 
literature to benefit different sections of society. State sector employment was used as 
a bulwark in certain countries against increasing income inequalities caused by 
unemployment from the mid-1970s and income inequalities were found to be higher 
in states with lower state employment (Duncan, 1989). Thus further scope for 
conflicts of interest arise since state managers may be required both to promote 
efficiency and to provide employment opportunities.
26 Boundary confusion between the role of the state and the role of the party is considered by, for 
example, Mair (1997).
27 Within an ‘evidence* culture, referred to in chapter 2, the availability of research to support a variety 
of different responses to health inequalities (Carlyle, 2001), increases the bureaucrat’s ‘room for 
manoeuvre*.
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At this point we should note that fierce debate has raged as to the proper functions of 
the state. Hayek (1944)28 is associated with a view advocating a minimal state. His 
position is that it is impossible for one set of bureaucrats to hold the knowledge 
required for planning industrial production and for complex services such as the NHS. 
The market is better placed to respond efficiently to needs through a huge number of 
adjustments made by managers at local sites. The NHS internal market - whose 
development in the early 1990s was in part influenced by this thinking - remains 
largely in operation and, as will be seen in chapter 4, affects the context of the policy 
implementation under investigation.29 30
The Managerial State (Clarke and Newman, 1997) emphasises the ‘New Right’s’ 
drive, in the Britain of the 1980s and 90s, to depoliticise decision making through the 
dispersal of power to managerially controlled organisations in both the private and 
public spheres. The weakening of trade unions and the decline of collective 
bargaining, the impact of which was unevenly distributed, mainly affecting working 
class occupations, is coupled with an at times paradoxical attempt to ‘capture’ the 
customer and use them to legitimate managerial control. At the same time ‘public 
choice theory’31 is used to raise suspicions about self-interested vested interests and 
the inefficiency of distribution systems not based on price mechanisms (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997: 144, 70, 107, 84, 52). However, some realignments have taken place
28 Following J.S. Mill in On Liberty (1859).
29 The effects of the ‘internal market’ context on the subject of this investigation relate to, firstly, 
implications for the siting of public health departments in relation to other NHS services; secondly, the 
status and powers of the medical profession to influence local spending decisions which may or may 
not favour public health objectives; thirdly, its effect on NHS wages and income inequalities; and 
finally, the institutional changes made post-1997 were, in part, to address problems with the operation 
of the internal market, and as will be seen, affected implementation of policy to reduce health 
inequalities.
30 The relationship between public health concerns and wider market provision is most apparent in 
areas where production and distribution is considered damaging to health, an obvious example being 
tobacco sales. However, a deeper critique of market relations is implicit in three areas of work relating 
to health inequalities research: firstly, in work that suggests the market will not allow income 
differentials to fall far below their current levels (Muntaner and Lynch, 1999); secondly, ‘health impact 
assessment’ work (Taylor and Blair-Stevens, 2002) is implicitly critical of the ability of market 
relations, on their own, to produce good decisions; thirdly, the increase in communicable diseases such 
as diphtheria and conditions such as ‘stress’ in states of the former communist bloc has been 
documented by Wilkinson (1996). The states of Cuba and of Kerala in Indian are lauded in the health 
inequalities literature, and at the same time their political cultures are among the most unsupportive of 
decision making via capitalist market relations in the world
31 Public choice or rational choice derives from economic theory. The premise is that rational agents, be 
they public bodies or individuals, will choose to maximize or optimise benefits to them, given 
constraints. Decision-making behaviours such as voting are analysed from this perspective. The 
perspective has also influenced social capital theory (Coleman, 1994).
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since 1997 and it can be said, using evidence from health inequalities policy for 
example, that it is now easier to articulate concerns over inequalities and 
egalitarianism. Although, Heffeman (2001) and others alert us to continuities between 
Conservative and, post-1997, Labour programmes.
Pluralism
As has been referred to in the discussion on power, for Dahl, government agencies 
may pursue their own preferences, but external interest groups have freedom to 
successfully influence policy and control the excesses of political leaders. 32 Support 
for these arrangements and encouragement of a proliferation of diverse pressure 
groups is associated with the pluralist position.
For Latham, the state, as portrayed by the ‘official groups’ of the US Congress and 
White House, replicates in legislation the majority opinions of a plurality of different 
organised and incipient groups in society, be they trade unions, churches or business 
associations. The system described is also praised by Latham and other pluralists for 
acting as a bulwark against totalitarianism (Latham, 1952: 223-5, 47).
An example of local work informed by pluralist values is the commitment by the 
‘local state’ to support community development work aimed at promoting health. This 
state-funded work in urban Britain supports voluntary agencies and community 
groups. In Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham community groups are funded by the 
health promotion department, via small grants schemes, in order to provide health 
promotion activities and to develop organisational infrastructure. The prime 
motivation for this relationship is that the groups are seen as being closely engaged 
with local and diverse sections of the population, such as relatively small populations 
of various African communities, which statutory sector workers may find ‘hard to 
reach’. A vibrant community group culture tends to be generally supported among 
public health and health promotion staff. For some staff, as will be seen, public 
involvement in groups is thought to bring health benefits simply through the process 
of participation. However, for others, echoing pluralist sentiments, involvement will
32 “Citizens are very far indeed from exerting equal influence over the content, application, and 
development of the political consensus. Yet widely held beliefs by Americans in a creed of democracy 
and political equality serve as a critical limit on the ways in which leaders can shape the consensus.” 
(Dahl, 1961: 325).
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also help to influence policy and to develop ‘social capital’. Chapters 4 and 6 will 
look in more detail at the range of staff opinion on the role of voluntary and 
community groups.
It is an assumption of this thesis that the local ‘democratic system’ is geared towards 
control via political parties and is biased against effective policy control via pressure 
group participation. In the words of one Lewisham MP, ‘Politics in this country is 
arranged along party lines’ (Joan Ruddock, July 2000). To this one might add: “...the 
centrality of political parties in structuring political campaigns, controlling legislative 
debates, and directing the actions of politicians gives parties many venues in which to 
represent the interests of their supporters.” (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000: 8).
Thus, if democratic control within parties changes and party political participation is 
not encouraged, routes to influence will be curtailed. Political parties control access to 
legislative arenas. Yet it is suggested that a significant change is taking place in 
public-party relations: “...we are witnessing a broad and ongoing decline in the role of 
political parties for contemporary publics...” (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000: 23). This 
thesis finds an urgent need for clarity on how local people are expected to influence 
upstream issues, such as pensions. Conflicting messages, supported by differing 
interests, are currently likely to mean that lower income people have diminishing 
access to influencing government policy.34 This is discussed further in the section on 
the Labour Party below.
The partisan state
The idea that the state may act to support the interests of particular classes, social 
groups, and particular types of business, has been developed in a number of 
alternative ways within different theories of the state. The possibility that the state 
might act in a biased manner is of great importance in the analysis of health and 
income inequalities policy. Examples as to why this is so, based on three different
33 Dahl notes the differences in analysis between English, American and European writes (Dahl, 1961: 
5-6).
34 At the same time local populations may be gaining more influence over downstream issues such as 
traffic calming schemes. The current local model of democracy and the new structures being 
introduced should not, in the author’s opinion, be regarded as the only formulas capable of increasing 
the influence local residents have over these downstream issues. Different models of democracy can 
produce similar types of changes to the local environment For example, public sector trade unions 
have, in the past, influenced issues such as the timing of bus services.
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theoretical approaches, are therefore set out below; i. a rational-choice variant, ii. the 
Marxist perspective and, iii. an ‘elite theory’ viewpoint (one elite theory type, can also 
be connected with a Marxist perspective). Under this last category is included a brief 
discussion on the power of the medical profession.
Rational choice variant
Firstly, if, the state is self-serving and state employees may arrange their functions in 
such a way as to enhance their own interests, as is suggested by Weber (Gerth and 
Wright Mills, 1991: 226; Dunleavy, 1991) then we might suspect that work conducted 
at the local level to address health inequalities could be arranged more efficiently. 
Indeed, we might question whether any of the work is worth doing at all since much 
of the lobby for policy creation prior to 1997 came from local staff, who, it might be 
argued, now benefit from being employed to carry out the work. From a ‘rational 
choice’ perspective, the possibility that local state workers might organise their work 
so as to suit their own purposes, for example, to demonstrate the need for their 
employment, should be taken into account. An assessment of the efficiency and cost- 
effectiveness of delivery structures is made in chapter 4.
There is potential for increasing or decreasing the functions of the state and 
reorganising relations between state workers and service users, as suggested in the 
previous discussion on democracy. It is reasonable to speculate that some sectors of 
society would benefit from a decreased role of the state in the provision of health care, 
for instance, and that other groups would lose out. Indeed, the relationship between 
the growth of state spending up to the early 1980s, followed by a subsequent ‘reining 
in’, and, the increase in income inequalities from that point in time, is of significance 
to health inequalities policy.35 36
A M arxist interpretation
Secondly, if the structure of the capitalist system of production requires that the state 
ensure that certain inequalities, including those of income, are maintained, then 
perhaps addressing the effect (health inequalities) rather than the cause (the needs of
35 Data provided by Dr James Banks, Institute of Fiscal Studies, University College London (UCL), in 
a health inequalities seminar organised by the public health department, UCL, 13.3.02.
36 “By the 1980s public sector spending in OECD countries accounted for 45 per cent of all economic 
activity.” (CMECD, 1986, Table R8: 163, in, Duncan, 1989).
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the capitalist system) is bound to lead to failure. The Marxist case might take issue 
with Wilkinson (1996) for only attending to the fact that income inequalities exist, 
rather than looking at their cause -  the mode of production (Muntaner et al, 1999; 
Fine, 2001: 106-8).37 The fact that the International Monetary Fund recently 
recommended that Sweden increase its income inequalities in order to assist its 
economy could be used as an example to lend weight to this suspicion (Artus, IMF 
press briefing, 3.4.2000).
A concern that has absorbed governments since the National Health Service’s creation 
in 1948, has been how to obtain ‘value for money’ (Abel-Smith, 1978). A political 
benchmark for efficiency is required. The state, it might be argued from a Marxist 
perspective, is only interested in ensuring that working class populations remain 
healthy in order that they join the workforce and act efficiently as employees. Thus, 
the state functions in order to promote the long-term sustainability of the capitalist 
system.
One strand of thinking within the current health inequalities debate does seem to be in 
the tradition of direct economic determinism (see chapter 2, conclusion). Shaw et al 
(1999) exemplify this in mapping every increase in income inequality directly to an 
increase in health inequality. This perspective, as the findings here show, is prevalent 
at the local level. The author’s view is that while the pattern may, or may not, be so 
clear cut, political organisation influencing a demand for redistributive policy needs to 
be taken into account.38
37 Wilkinson's theory (1996) is referred to in the next chapter.
38 It has also been argued by Katz and Mair (1995) that political parties might exploit the state as an 
alternative source of funding. Here an argument is made, on the basis of evidence from the case study, 
that exploitation of the local state by professional parties goes beyond simple financial benefits. Hie 
state is being used to substitute for population mobilisation, because of a reticence among the party 
elite to allow local party control. The dangers of this process are highlighted by Dalton and 
Wattenberg: “When parties make fewer and fewer efforts to mobilize citizens they worsen inequality of 
participation. ....the lade of response by parties in government to the changing realities of dealigned 
politics [may be seen] as further increasing the gap between the governors and the governed.” (Dalton 
and Wattenberg, 2000: 284). If, as was argued above, there remains some loyalty towards rational-legal 
authority within the NHS staff group, local staff are then not well positioned to challenge these 
developments. They may also be unwise to, from the perspective of preserving and enhancing their 
own role in public paitidpation work.
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Elite theory
Thirdly, if an elite group of better educated, politically conditioned people who also 
have business acumen, will always exist, then there is not much point in worrying 
about whether non-elite people are more likely to die, say, 7 years younger (this view 
might be associated with Pareto (1966), cited in Hill, 1997: 45). On the other hand if 
it is this elite group of individuals who are blocking progress because their privileges 
were acquired by means of luck or force, then we might wish to emphasis the 
importance of equal opportunities laws, education and inheritance tax. An 
‘instrumental’ Marxist perspective as exemplified by Miliband in The State in 
Capitalist Society (1969), might apply. This could point to the ability of the elite, for 
reasons of their personal networks and contacts, coupled with finances, to use the 
state ‘instrument’ for their own purposes.
Of relevance to the particular policy under investigation is the role of medical doctors 
in influencing the direction of health policy and acting as a professional network. 
“Professional networks are characterized by the pre-eminence of one class of 
participant in policy making: the professions. The most frequently cited example of a 
professionalized policy network is the National Health Service (see Ham, 1981).” 
(Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 13). Alford (1975) is associated with a view that places 
(non-public health) doctors at the forefront of controlling the implementation of new 
health policies (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 35; Parsons, 1995: 263; Ham, 1999: 206). 
However, this under represents the complexity of Alford’s position. In Health Care 
Politics (1975) he is discussing the power of the medical profession in the US. Within 
this particular context he believes: “The efforts o f ... diverse individuals and groups, 
whether aimed at specific or general [health] reforms, are likely to fail.” (1975: 218). 
Therefore, the medical profession is able to dominate the health policy process. 
However, his understanding is that within the European setting the situation is 
different.
In Alford, the role of political parties, as distinct from a plurality of ‘community and 
user interests’, in controlling the provision of health care, is appreciated, for example:
39 Cohen provides recent illustrations of elite networking, as described by Miliband (Cohen, 1999: 
236).
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“The stronger and more centralized states in European societies, coupled with 
much larger socialist and communist parties and movements, have [led to] to a 
deeper critique of the role of the state in society. Issues of ...socialized 
medicine...have become important in many European countries, whereas they 
remain peripheral debates in the United States. Such issues spark abstract 
discussions of vague possibilities in the United States; they have been the 
immediate focus of mass political demands in Europe.” (Alford and Friedland, 
1985: 423, italics added)40
Thus, Alford can be interpreted as giving credence to this thesis’s interest in the 
‘distribution’ of public involvement, between political parties of the left and disparate 
community groups, as a factor affecting health policy.
A caution against applying Alford’s work to non-US settings is also provided by 
Wistow (1992: 52) and Harrison (1988: 74-5). Harrison’s view is that the role of 
government vis-a-vis the medical profession, in controlling the activity of the NHS, 
has been strengthened, in a small part, by the cooption of NHS management, but also 
because of political imperatives to control both costs and organised labour.41 Doctors 
can be useful to government in helping to ration spending, but threats to their clinical 
freedoms have also resulted in increased attempts to practice ‘evidence based 
medicine’ (Harrison, 1988: 54, 125, 129-30). Salter (1998) also emphasises the 
political problem of balancing expectations with costs. “The translation of health care 
rights into demands upon the political system is influenced by the interaction between 
the ideology of the welfare state and the characteristics of party politics in an electoral 
democracy.” (Salter, 1998: 210). Even Ham (1999), who can be most associated with 
a view that emphasises the importance of the medical lobby in directing NHS activity, 
recognises that in some specialisms this is of less significance: “While it is difficult to 
overemphasise the strength of medical interests, it should be noted that in some areas 
of service provision other interests may also be important. For example,.... 
community health services and prevention..” (Ham, 1999: 174). Public health has
40 See also, Alford, 1964:12-13.
41 Harrison (1988: 52-3) provides a graphic example of the changing concerns of NHS 
administrators/managers. In 1982, 4 out of 14 ‘typical problems’ for this group were directly union 
related, and a further 5 out of 14 problems were indirectly union related. By 2003, following the a 
series of controls and reorganizations, legitimate speculation suggests, that less managerial time was 
spent on these union related issues, although this has not been a focus of this study.
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generally been considered to be the poor relation of acute medicine and even family 
practice (Lewis, 1986).42
The power of the medical profession, acting en bloc, is an element in a hierarchy of 
influences that can legitimately be taken into account when considering the pattern of 
responses to policy to reduce health inequalities. This power is considered within this 
research in relation to, for example, the tendency for general practitioners to 
emphasise secondary over primary prevention. But, the thesis has not focused on the 
power of the medical profession for the following reasons: (1) the profession 
generally had no, or little, relationship with many of the services and planning 
arrangements associated with the policy under investigation and referred to in chapter 
4;43 (2) there was no evidence of any professional hostility to the principle of 
attempting to ensure that different population groups were receiving services on the 
basis of ‘equal need’, or, equity audit; (3) there was evidence, reported in chapter 5, 
that some NHS general practitioners, at least, tended to share a view with other staff, 
that levels of income inequality were too high. Opinion on issues, such as the role of 
trade unions or income distribution, did not necessarily divide down professional fault 
lines. Nevertheless, there were important differences in values and viewpoints 
between NHS staff.
Thus, “...conventional wisdom has emphasized the dominant nature of professional 
rather than political or managerial influences on both the pattern and the provision of 
health care through the NHS.” (Wistow, 1992: 51, italics added). But, this present 
research is concerned with health promotion and public health work at a time when, 
due to political change, increased binding had been allocated to some (but not all) 
services in this area. The success of attempts to control the autonomy of the 
profession also had a growing impact throughout the late 1990s, for example, via 
restrictions on prescribing, as cited by Wistow (1992: 65). It can also be argued that
42 The present author also interprets Alford as warning against a too hasty an adoption of the normative 
values of Bums et al (1994: 278-9) and Keane (1988: 144-5), quoted approvingly by Parsons (1995: 
614). They champion the ‘energy and strategic protection* of the non-party realm of civil society. This 
is acceptable only where the role of party organisation is understood, a subject that is returned to in 
section 3 of this chapter.
43 For example, the ‘fruit in schools* scheme, the Sure Start initiative, provision of money advice 
within primary care, the increased role of NHS human resource services in working with local youth 
training initiatives, the healthy walks scheme, new arrangements for public involvement, the health 
inequalities conference, etc.
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yearly NHS budget cuts (or “efficiency savings” (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 85)), 
pre-1997, had increased public support for the medical profession. For these reasons 
attention here is focused more on broader political factors affecting policy.
To summarise this section on the state, - we have looked at theories of the state as a 
neutral arbiter and as a partisan or biased player, supporting its own policy interests or 
the interests of particular social groups or classes. The author argues that both general 
perspectives help to explain the work of local staff in operationalizing national policy 
to reduce health inequalities. This is firstly, because state employees may apply 
boundaries to their work, based on certain conceptions of the state’s requirements for 
neutrality. These boundaries are investigated further in chapters 4-6. Secondly, 
aspects of the work of the state may be controlled by a variety of self-serving forces. 
Numerous partisan pressures affecting the operation of the state are no doubt worthy 
of investigation within the health and health inequalities field. Here the author 
concentrates on arguing that party-political interpretations of changing economic 
circumstances,44 combined with other national political imperatives, have had an 
impact in structuring local responses to the public involvement element of health 
inequalities implementation. Given this, it is argued that local public involvement in 
upstream elements has been adversely affected (Pauly, 1997). The next section looks 
at these issues from the perspective of the labour movement.
3. Political parties and the policy process
Introduction
This section considers how the classes that have poorer health and are less well off 
might exercise power over the policies of the state. It is argued in chapter 2 that in 
order to best achieve the upstream recommendations of the Acheson report the less 
well off need to influence policy. Of particular relevance is how lower income groups 
influence income distribution. This, it is suggested, needs to take into account theories 
of collective action and the role of political organisation (for instance: Castles, 1982; 
Parry et al, 1992; Rothstein, 1992; Sharpe and Newton, 1984; Verba, Nie, Kim, 1978; 
Baldwin, 1990). Opinion is divided on the extent to which ‘labour movement’
44 Which in turn may have political antecedents.
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organisation can influence the reduction of income inequalities. It has been assumed 
from the available evidence that such a relationship can exist, although it may be 
stronger or weaker in different locations and at different times. It is also dependent on 
contingent factors such as the strength of organised opposition, or the parallel 
interests of middle-income groups (Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Anderson, 1990).
Intra-party power relations may also affect government policy towards income 
distribution and ‘citizen activity’. Party elites controlling aspects of government 
policy may be mindful of the effect policies will have on their support within the 
party. Mule, in Political Parties, Games and Redistribution, 2001, describes this 
process (see also, Panebianco (1988)). So, we should consider the possibility that 
internal Labour Party issues and culture might influence the character of local 
democracy, which in turn is relevant to the direction of local implementation in the 
public health field under investigation. As with ‘bureau-shaping’ public sector 
managers, who were found to not necessarily want a large workforce (Dunleavy, 
1991), the Labour elite may have ‘cut-off, in some ways, the membership (this point 
is referred to again under the heading ‘Reducing public involvement in Labour’).
Whilst the state or the party of government might possibly at times control democratic 
arrangements to secure its interests, research evidence also shows that some state 
interventions designed to produce social improvement in fact have the opposite 
effect.45 Some commentators, such as Klein (HEN conference 2002, and 
correspondence), believe that many of the social policy initiatives currently being 
undertaken to address health inequalities are ‘good’ and therefore, even if their ability 
to reduce health inequalities is unproven and questionable, they may still be usefully 
adopted.46 But this is not the case, at least in respect of one particular policy furrow. 
Here it is argued that some of the social policies resulting from social exclusion 
theory (Hills, Le Grand, Piachaud, 2002), adapted for use in tackling health 
inequalities, have potentially damaging effects. The encouragement of particular
45 Sally Macintyre (HEN conference, 2002) referred to Petrosino et al (2000) Well-meaning Programs 
Can Have Harmful Effects! This describes the introduction of teenagers to prisoners in order to put the 
young people off crime. However, the group taking part went on to commit more offences than the 
control group. Deacon (2000) also provides an example in the work of international NGOs -  being, he 
suggests, too focused on extreme poverty and therefore causing more problems for people in lower 
income groups.
46 Klein himself was focusing more on income distribution.
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forms of public involvement may be to the detriment of forms that would be more 
beneficial to lower income groups. Policy may be ‘doing bad by doing something’.47 
This is particularly true of ‘public involvement’ work. It may seem uncontroversial 
and appropriate to try to boost social capital (Piachaud, 2002: 18), but the state, 
controlled in part by the party of government, is not necessarily neutral in this 
process.
Public involvement policies could do the ‘wrong’ thing. For instance they might 
encourage or increase: anti-party sentiment (Poguntke and Scarrow, 1996), ‘partisan 
dealignment’ (Dalton, 2000: 23), political cynicism (Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992: 
179-189) and “generally inefficacious outlooks” (Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992: 173). 
Non-party methods of involvement are considered by some analysts to be more costly 
for lower income groups (for example, Scarrow, 2000: 84; Verba, Nie, Kim, 1978: 
307-8; Togeby, 1992, cited in Scarrow, 2000). This highlights the importance of 
accurately diagnosing the causes of ‘partisan dealignment’ and unpacking the concept 
of ‘political disengagement’ which is considered to be an indicator of ‘social 
exclusion’ (Hills, Le Grand, Piachaud, 2002).
Now will be considered, firstly, the particular features of the Labour Party that are 
relevant to the question of income and health inequalities and, secondly, the party as a 
form of public involvement.
The specific character of Labour
Of key importance to the research under discussion, it is argued, is the historic 
function and organisation of the British Labour Party. The two main British political 
parties are not just bodies that happen to be in favour of different policies. The 
Conservative and Labour parties traditionally have roots in the communities they 
represent, and are, in part, formed from these differing populations. In relation to 
income and health inequality policy, different parties’ supporters have different 
interests.48
As Verba et al (1978) state:
47 This being an inversion of Kirp, 1979.
48 A large literature exists on changes in working class identity, or embourgoisement theory, 
Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963) being one famous study.
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“There is ...an asymmetry between the processes by which upper-status and 
lower-status citizens become politically involved. It does not require any 
explicit group-based process of mobilization of upper-status citizens to take a 
disproportionate role in political life....lower-status groups, in contrast, need a 
group based process of political mobilization if they are to catch up with the 
upper-status groups in terms of political activity.” (Verba et at, 1978: 14, 
italics added).
Lower income groups may also have different interests in relation to public 
involvement. If the constituency of party membership tends to be less well off, then, 
in order to acquire comparable funds to those of parties with a wealthier cohort of 
members, the Labour Party needs to organise larger numbers of members and trade 
union affiliates, or will need to break in some way from this funding formula. Epstein 
says:
“Of necessity, a working class party has had to have a collective organization 
of working-class members to support its leadership, whether that leadership 
was middle class or working class. The organisational problem is entirely 
analogous to that of trade unions. Only in large numbers can there be strength. 
Dues cannot be high and so must come from the many rather than the few.” 
(Epstein, 1980: 130).
By reporting this the aim is to highlight the particular importance of organisation, 
democratic rules49 and collective action for groups that are less well off and have less 
access to resources and start with less power. Trade union influence on the Labour 
Party has been, and continues to be, it is suggested, significant in providing this 
‘group-based’ organisation.50
British Conservative government had presided over significant shifts in income 
distribution and growing income inequalities (for example, Mule, 2001:108). 51
49 See Minkin (1980, 1991) and Lipsit, (1958) who carefully analyse democratic institutions, or rules, 
used in labour movement decision-making, producing exemplary historical records of activity.
50 Although as Heclo notes, the role British trade unions played in forming welfare policy proposals in 
the 20th century was limited, especially in comparison to their role in Sweden (Heclo, 1974: 300-301).
51 The fact that there were tensions in the Labour Party and government concerning policy on income 
distribution throughout the time span of the research period, is backed up by much evidence. For
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Members of the respective parties generally opposed each other on the income 
inequalities issue. “There is a clear division of opinion regarding the redistribution of 
income and wealth towards ordinary people. Labour members support such a 
commitment while Conservative members oppose it.” (Seyd et al, 1996: 5).
In the Commons Health Committee hearing on public health (House of Commons, 
November 16th, 2000), Labour MPs were delighted to draw the conclusion, from 
evidence provided by Professor Sir Michael Marmot, that income inequalities had 
increased during the years of Conservative rule, and that health inequalities were 
linked with income inequalities. They guffawed theatrically on hearing this (personal 
observation of committee). Thus, Labour members and MPs can be associated with 
policy to reduce income and health inequalities.
Voter choice correlates with health inequalities. Standardised mortality ratios show 
positive correlations with Labour voting:
“For the years surrounding the three elections of 1983, 1987 and 1992 overall 
standardised mortality ratios showed substantial positive correlations...with 
Labour voting... Labour and Conservative voting explained more of the 
variance in mortality than did the Townsend score.”52 (Davey Smith, Dorling, 
1996: 1573).
According to Dorling, Davey Smith and Shaw (2001: 1336): “This reflects the socio­
economic characteristics of individuals who vote for these parties, with Labour being 
identified with the working class and the Conservatives with the middle class.”
Davey Smith and Dorling’s statistics show the very real differences in Labour and 
Conservative constituencies and highlight the need to pay attention to ‘Labour’ in all 
its guises, when considering health inequalities policy implementation. Labour voters 
had reason to expect that, post-1997, ‘things would only get better’ in terms of health
example, Levitas (1998: 142-5) documents ructions over the December 1997 abolition of lone-parent 
premiums for child benefit, income support and housing benefit And in May/June 2003 disputes 
between senior party figures over “new taxes to squeeze the ‘rich’” hit the headlines again (Daily Mail, 
24 June, 2003:33).
52 The Townsend score is a standard measure of social deprivation.
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inequalities, while Conservative voters might have been fearful of a damaging policy 
reversal with regard to income distribution. This mix of raised expectations and wary 
concern among different sections of the population had the potential to place 
unwelcome pressure on the new Labour government.
Labour and public involvement
Beer saw the party membership as having had some power to influence party policy, 
especially in the 1950s (Beer, 1982). Dictation of policy by the leadership was not 
absolute, as predicted by Michels’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’: ‘who says organisation 
says oligarchy’ (Michels, 1959). With some qualifications, Minkin also found various 
constituencies inside the party able to inform policy development and the trade unions 
act as an important factor in his analysis (Minkin, 1980: 316, Minkin, 1991: 622).53
McKenzie provides an alternative perspective. He considers that the power of the 
membership should be restricted and that they should be used simply to assist in 
electioneering (1964: 558).54 He sees this as beneficial in a parliamentary system, 
where MPs’ prime responsibility is to the electorate not the party membership. As will 
be seen, confusion and disagreements over which constituencies of the population 
should be given priority in influencing decisions still abound. As Day and Klein found 
some, but not all, Labour councillors saw themselves as accountable to the party 
(1987: 230). If in Lewisham, the citizens’ panel, the community council and the Hubs 
(council-run residents’ meetings) propose clear action points, with which the elected 
councillors and MPs disagree, the question arises: whose decision should or will 
prevail?
As might be anticipated from the previous discussion on the partisan state, a Marxist 
analysis suggested by the work of Coates, for example, views policy development in 
the Labour Party as conditioned by the operation of capitalism. Here the rank-and-file 
have little or no power in relation to that of the parliamentary party. But even in this 
analysis the leadership’s power over policy creation is not always absolute. The
53 For example, in pressure for policy on a statutory minimum wage (Minkin, 1991:429-431, 620).
The national minimum wage has had less impact on differentials than other, less publicised policies 
and it has been offset by continued growing inequality in original incomes in the market place 
(Piachaud and Sutherland, 2002:10; Shephard, 2003).
54 See also his study of working class Toiy voters (McKenzie and Silver, 1968).
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unions have some, largely dormant, powers. An upsurge in radicalism from 1970-74 
led to the election of less compliant union leaders who drove forward more 
redistributive policy (Coates, 1980: 57-85). This worried establishment opinion and, 
some have argued, stimulated the rise of Thatcherism (Panitch and Leys, 1997: 87).
While pressure groups may pressurise MPs and councillors, these representatives can 
-  as one Lewisham Labour councillor said - continue to do as they wish in the 
meetings where they vote. Ordinary party members did have more power to influence 
councillor actions than non-party members. However, deliberate Labour Party 
decisions, culminating in Partnership in Power (Labour Party, 1997), have been taken 
to curtail ordinary members’ contact with and influence on councillors and MPs. The 
consequences, for better or worse, are felt locally. On the one hand it can be said that 
Labour, particularly since the focus groups of the early 1980s and those of the 1990s 
led by Philip Gould (Gould, 1998: 326-333), has been very keen to measure public 
opinion. However, it has at the same time been reluctant to encourage policy debate 
within the party (Smith, 2000: 145-147, 153) and engage with trade unions. As the 
Mayor of Lewisham said in interview, the deselection of local MPs by Labour Party 
members over policy disagreements would now be more difficult than it was in 1997.
Within popular ‘social capital’ reasoning, which links increased community 
involvement with improved health (Gillies, 1997), there is no reason why Labour 
Party and trade union membership should be any less important than membership of 
other groups. Indeed, various discussions on social capital refer to trade unions, for 
example, Putnam (1993) and Peters (2001: 60).55 The fortunes of the role of the 
Labour Party can be compared and contrasted with the development of the role of 
‘faith groups’ in public health and health promotion work (Lewis and Randolph-Horn, 
2001). Yet, as Seyd et al (1996: 6) explain, there has been important involvement in 
the party by lower income groups:
“....working class members play a more active part in local Labour politics
than their middle-class counterparts. They are more frequent attendees at party
55 Putnam finds that trade union membership is twice as high in ‘civic’ areas of Italy as ‘non-civic’ 
areas. Although, his summaries neglect to mention this point, for example, he says: “Good government 
in Italy is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs, not prayer.” (Putnam, 1993: 115,176).
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meetings and they are more active in delivering party leaflets and canvassing 
voters; they also have a stronger sense of political efficacy, or a belief that 
individual political involvement results in political influence. Furthermore, 
they regard party activism as a good way to meet people and to receive a 
political education. This suggests that grassroots activism is not, and need not 
become solely a middle class preserve, if the Labour Party provides 
appropriate incentives for working class recruits. However, working class 
members also feel more strongly that the party leadership does not listen to 
ordinary party members ”
A lot has changed regarding the public’s involvement in the Labour Party since 1996. 
Some of the issues raised by the above statement will be returned to in chapter 6. Here 
the quote is simply used to draw attention to the fact that analysis of health inequality 
policy implementation, which incorporates public involvement policy, can usefully 
include questions about the role of the local Labour Party. The Labour Party itself as 
will be described in chapter 6, appears to have been less concerned with ‘providing 
appropriate incentives for recruits’ and is more interested in asking members how 
involvement in voluntary organisations might be encouraged (Labour Party, 2002: 8). 
Interviews with senior Labour Party representatives in Lewisham back up this 
observation.
Of key importance in explaining these developments is Rose’s suggestion that the 
first constraint on new governments comes from within the party of government and 
these internal pressures are traditionally more acute for the Labour Party given its 
historical formation (Rose, 1984: 147). However, the present author concurs with 
Rose in stating that: “To recognise the importance of parties is not to argue that 
parties are all-important in the government of Britain.” (Rose, 1984: 142-143). The 
thesis highlights other factors governing the success of policy implementation, not 
least the role of the local implementers. Nevertheless, it does aim to focus attention on 
an aspect of implementation that has been underreported.
Reducing public involvement in Labour
An analysis of reasons why the party leadership decided to curtail membership 
powers from 1995 onwards can usefully incorporate elements of elitist, pluralist,
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Marxist and rational choice theory, used in the previous discussion on the state. That 
these powers have been curbed means that suspicions are legitimately aroused when 
current government policy also states that local communities should be involved in 
policy aimed at reducing health inequalities. Listed below are reasons, from the 
perspective of the party’s leadership, as to why the internal regime of the party needed 
to change.
Firstly, elite theory reasoning may be applied. Having been out of office since the 
1970s, the party had to appeal to voters who did not share the views of the 
membership. Since the membership would object to fiscal policy that diverged little 
from the previous two Conservative governments’, their voice would need to be 
muffled. The elite echelons of the party structure needed both to control the strings of 
power and to amend membership powers in order to meet these ends (Gould, 1998). 
The argument has been made, by implication, that elite power is more beneficial.
The longer-term implications of this approach appear to be, not only less active 
involvement by the membership in the party, but also a lower turn-out of support at 
the polls in areas like Lewisham. The conundrum is that whilst Labour’s share of the 
votes went up in 1997, “at the same time [the party] was less able to bring citizens of 
low socio-economic status to the polls.” (Wattenberg, 2000: 76).
Secondly, from the pluralist perspective, it might be argued that members still do have 
access to powers, but that now a more representative plurality of voices is able to 
influence the structures of the party. As Scarrow et al suggest, steps have been taken 
to by-pass ‘sub-leadership groups’ within the party (Scarrow et al, 2000: 150). But the 
result, as Dalton and Wattenberg point, out is “....better described as moving towards 
consultative democracy rather than direct democracy.” (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000: 
268). The same consultative methods are being developed within the wider 
population, with party structures in Lewisham by-passed in favour of structures 
described in chapter 6, that is: Hubs, citizen panels, the community network and the 
Local Strategic Partnership.
Thirdly, a Marxist-variant line of reasoning may be taken, holding that the party has 
no choice and its policies are determined by the economic circumstances flowing
45
from the end of the post-war consensus and the liberalisation of the global economy. 
Labour is incapable of controlling the operation and the pressures of international 
capitalism, as limits to their influence are prescribed by the laws of capitalist 
accumulation. The fear of upsetting markets has long haunted Labour ministers, and 
this recent statement from Alan Milbum (former Secretary of State for Health) 
indicates the type of trade-offs made: “It’s perfectly reasonable that people [cabinet 
ministers] should be able to express a view, so long as you are responsible about it 
and you don’t undermine markets and confidence.” (White and Wintor, 2002: 2). 
Labour peer Roy Hattersley and others provide another perspective that also 
associates organisational change with economic developments. He considers that 
there is less interest in local government now because, as a result of privatisation, the 
local state has few powers and responsibilities.56
Fourthly, the party restructuring may be seen from the perspective of a rational choice 
or bureau-shaping approach. This might hold that leaders of an organisation do not 
necessarily want to extend the size of the domain under their control, as more 
employees provide more problems (Dunleavy, 1991). This can been seen in the 
attitude of the leadership to the membership, as witnessed in interviews with one 
Lewisham councillor and the Labour Mayor who questioned the need to encourage 
increased party membership. This echoes Epstein’s suggestion that it is more efficient 
to win an election with a low party membership than with a high one (Epstein, 1980: 
117-118).
Our interviews and observed discussions at the local level demonstrate that people 
draw on elements of these general theories -  elite, pluralist, Marxist and also rational 
choice, to perform their own analysis of the value of different forms of public 
involvement, and to assess dynamic trends. As the value of the Labour Party 
diminishes as a vehicle for public influence, more import may accrue to other 
methods of consultation and involvement. However, it is not clear that the developing 
institutions are more democratic in relation to upstream policy, if assessed against the 
definition of democracy provided earlier.
56 The links between private versus public ownership and public health issues are made in Hattersley’s 
article on Birmingham City Council. These relate to funding for public health infrastructure, 
democratic participation, worsening pay and conditions and housing provision (Hattersley, 2001).
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Our perception is that the Labour Party has become more elitist than hitherto. No 
attempts were being made in Lewisham to draw the population into party structures, 
despite an acknowledgement that activity levels had fallen dramatically since 1997. 
Scarrow holds that one option for increasing membership participation is to provide 
‘political rights’. “Parties need to provide reasons for supports to enrol, and political 
rights may become an increasingly important enticement as ongoing changes force 
parties to alter their mix of enrolment incentives.” (Scarrow et al, 2000:132). 
However, one councillor said, and other members concurred, that political rights had 
been withdrawn in the last five years.
Our fieldwork indicated that the view existed among some at the local level, endorsed 
by party officials, that the worse off were really being disempowered for their own 
good, as part of the Labour leadership’s better judgement concerning electoral 
calculations. Lower income groups are better off with Labour in power, even if the 
government won’t meet all their demands. These same groups may have less power 
than they used to, in internal party organisations, but what was the point of that, when 
the party as a whole had no power?
Mair (1997:11) salutes the effectiveness of modernised parties in adapting to external 
environments. But, there are a number of potential dangers for parties representing the 
worse off, in these developments. Firstly, as is reported in chapter 6, no ‘young blood* 
is now coming forward to fill party positions. Secondly, with voter mobility 
increasing, the party may well lose power again and then ordinary members would be 
even worse off, in terms of access to influence, than they were before. Thirdly, even 
if, as Epstein holds, the membership is liable to hold more extreme views than the 
electorate, this does not mean to say that their opinions will always be wrong, or that 
they themselves are incapable of receiving and acting on reports from opinion polls 
and focus groups. Fourthly, Campbell’s research on social capital for the Health 
Development Agency suggests that the location of small numbers of committed local 
activists within communities, perhaps in the form of party members, can provide 
benefits for non-party members and non-activists. She writes:
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“....we argue that this feature of social capital [local community activist 
networks] was the most effective in distinguishing between the communities 
of Farley [low health] and Sundon Park [high health]. However we ...specify 
that the role played by this form of social capital in people’s lives often took 
an indirect form. It was not necessarily the case that large numbers of people 
were personally involved in these networks....the presence of these often very 
small-scale successful activist networks and groupings in the community 
generated an amorphous sense of what we shall call ‘perceived citizen- 
power’...” (Campbell, 1999:134-5).
Thus, with fewer incentives for small numbers of people within the local population 
to become active Labour Party members, non-activists may also lose out. Finally, a 
more democratic party might allow wider internal analysis of opinion polls and focus 
group results, in order to safeguard against biased research questions and 
interpretations by elite leaders.57
‘Supply-side’ reasons for the loss of party members and activists, such as the 
distractions of TV entertainment, should not be discounted, although those listed by 
Dalton et al (2000) are not the most convincing. It should be noted that supply-side 
reasons for low party involvement might be applied equally to participation in 
community groups and ‘new social movements’ as to party involvement (McLaverty, 
2002: 189).
Despite the supply-side pressures and intra-party trends explained by pluralist, 
Marxist, rational choice and, in particular, elite theory, the importance of party 
democracy for lower income groups is still considered relevant in this research. We 
can usefully turn to an analogy to illustrate the reasons why an engaged party 
membership, with political powers to hold representatives to account, continues to be 
important, especially for lower-income groups via the Labour Party. We might 
compare the party membership to trade union negotiators and the party leadership to 
company employers. In this situation it is sometimes found that spaces do in fact exist 
for improvement in conditions, which, without a probing negotiation, were denied. On
57 Examples of the use of ‘leading’ research questions are provided by the 1998 Annual Survey of 
Supporters’ Opinions (Labour Party, 1998).
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the other hand, it could be that the company really is about to go bust, and excessive 
demands will lose the employees their jobs.58 The role of unions in society is 
contested, in the same way the national and local Labour Party leadership clearly 
appeared to have an ambiguous attitude to the membership. The dangers of not using 
the checks of membership opinion, both for the population base they represent and for 
the leadership’s benefit, are, it is argued, at least a possibility.
Trade unions
Having compared Labour’s membership to union negotiators, the role of trade unions 
is now investigated. As references to the work of Beer, Minkin and Coates pointed 
out, historically and to some extent currently, the trade unions have had a particular 
role in influencing Labour Party policy. At times this role has been aligned with the 
leadership and not with the membership.
Government policy clearly affects the ability of trade unions to organise, although 
other supply-side factors should, as with party organisation, also be taken into 
account. This complicates relations between the state and the political organisation of 
the less well off. The effect of political changes post-1980 on the ability of trade 
unions to influence earnings distribution is considered by Metcalf et al (2000): “The 
labour market has been deregulated as a consequence of the legislative onslaught 
against unions...”. Market competition and unemployment should also be taken into 
account. (Metcalf et al, 2000: 1). However, the authors find that:
“Although the move away from national bargaining to decentralised 
bargaining has caused pay dispersion to rise, workers in the organised sector 
have much lower pay dispersion than those in the unorganised sector....Unions 
narrow the wage differentials between women and men, blacks and whites, 
those with health problems and those without, and between manual and non- 
manual workers.... Unions remain a major egalitarian influence on the British 
labour market.” (Metcalf et al, 2000: 16-17).
58 A further danger in an excessively elitist attitude to the membership might also be that the same 
approach develops in relation to the opinions of the population as a whole.
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Atkinson (1983: 131-137), Gosling and Machin (1995) and Machin (2000) have also 
found that trade unions influence a reduction in income dispersion. Baldwin suggests 
that unions have played a historical role in influencing the development of welfare 
policies liable to affect income distribution. For instance, he cites Labour’s plans for 
superannuation developments in the 1950s as requiring union support: “Crucial for 
the success of Labour’s plans was the union reaction.” (Baldwin, 1990: 237). 
However, his research indicates that class alliances are equally important in 
supporting egalitarian welfare policy. For this reason we might also be suspicious of 
the local targeting of welfare policies and regeneration funds to the worst off, since in 
the longer term this practice may lead to a middle-class withdrawal of support. A 
similar view is taken by Esping-Anderson (1996) and Timmins (1998).
Given the links between Labour and the unions, reduced trade union membership may 
also mean a reduction in Labour Party income. So once again the legislative powers 
of the state can be seen to have affected the future powers of partisan political forces. 
Trade union powers can be dependent on local government management regimes 
adopting varying attitudes towards workforce organisation, for example, through 
acquiescence, patronage, or ‘clamping down’. The author would argue that it is still 
necessary to consider national and local government policy relating to trade union 
legislation and support for trade union organisation, as being of relevance to the 
implementation of health inequalities policy. This is because they can link local 
people with upstream policy formation. According to trade union respondents, local 
NHS and local government services are not investing resources in supporting union 
organisation, as they did in previous decades. NHS project work directed at reducing 
health inequalities in Lewisham and elsewhere has made no connections with trade 
union groups. ‘Building capacity’ among community groups takes precedence over 
‘building capacity’ among trade unions, which are known to affect Acheson’s 
upstream recommendations and Whitehead’s ‘wider determinants of health’. Thus, 
the state acts in a partisan way towards partisan forces associated with supporting 
lower income groups. Chapter 6 returns to this topic and describes the views of trade 
union officials.
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Conclusion
In this chapter some theoretical concepts that are useful in situating and ordering an 
analysis of complex local activity have been introduced. These local processes can 
now be analysed in relation to theories of the policy process and state interests. In 
discussing the concept of democracy particular emphasis has been place on rules that 
provide the less well off with non-arbitrary levers on state policy. The way in which 
democratic rules might work for the less well off in affecting upstream policy has 
been highlighted as an issue for investigation at the local level.
National policy to reduce health inequalities and local NHS implementation supports 
a particular form of increased public involvement. This form has a pluralist pedigree: 
at least rhetorically imbuing community groups and state-managed consultation with 
significant powers. However, it is suggested that, because of the increasingly elitist 
trajectory of the Labour Party, the new local systems that are being introduced may be 
competing with what is now a less supported system, whose ethos is that legitimated 
power rests with elected councillors and, in-tum, party members. The author concurs 
with Mair in saying that: “....Western democracies remain essentially party 
democracies, their governments remaining party governments.” (Mair, 1997: 13). 
However, the picture of democracy is in transition, and competing conceptions are 
potentially clashing with one another. The task here is to report on this ‘shifting of the 
balance of power’, and its theoretical potential to affect a long-term reduction in 
health inequalities. The democratic changes impact on all levels of analysis, but they 
particularly affect involvement in influencing the upstream ‘wider determinants of 
health’. The local framework for public involvement is increasingly managed through 
non-elected bodies. Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) continue this trajectory.59
The effects of these changes on the political power of lower income groups seem at 
first sight, negative. Chapter 6 investigates further whether The Labour Party is 
supporting a de-emphasis on democracy arranged via the party system. This chapter
59 LSPs are “central to the delivery o f’ neighbourhood ‘regeneration and renewal’. “They are non- 
statutory bodies, which aim to bring together at a local level a range of stakeholders -  from the public, 
private, voluntary and community sectors. Local partners working through the LSP will be expected to 
take many of the major decisions about priorities and funding for their local area.” Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Neighbourhood Renewal Unit website: v v n  w.nei<j|iUonrliooc?.»o v.uk■pnrtiici>.!iips.asp 
(2003) (Hamer and Smithies, 2002).
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has suggested that the alternative to representation via the party will not improve the 
voice of the worse off vis-a-vis the upstream recommendations of the Acheson report. 
Local consultation mechanisms, supported by the state, may not be an effective 
substitute. Local state workers are not in a good position to point this out, due, firstly, 
to a residue of support for rational-legal process and a desire, perhaps for laudable 
reasons, to uphold the principle of the neutral state. Secondly, employment interests 
inhibit local discretion in this area. Thirdly, there is a lack of understanding of the 
options, linked to the fact that staff themselves are part of the party dealignment 
phenomenon. Fourthly, there are important political divisions among NHS staff, 
including NHS public health staff
A balance sheet of democratic privileges accruing to the less well off is required in 
order to assess long-term factors in the causal chain leading to health inequalities 
reduction. This is because there is a relationship between particular forms of 
democracy and the powers of the less well off to control income distribution, coupled 
with the effect of income inequality on democracy. There may or may not have been 
an increase in access to effective influence over certain downstream issues at the local 
level, for instance over traffic calming schemes.60 But at the same time, the technical, 
cultural and theoretical ability of individuals to influence upstream issues through the 
democratic rules of the labour movement may also have diminished. The development 
of NHS and local government institutions since 1997 will, it is argued, influence these 
processes. These institutional changes are discussed in chapter 4. Staff values and 
their impact are considered in chapter 5. Chapter 6 concentrates on the particular 
issues of public involvement in relation to upstream and downstream factors in health 
inequalities reduction.
60 Provided by one NHS public involvement manager as an example of the issues that the borough’s 
community council might influence.
Chapter 2 PUBLIC HEALTH BACKGROUND: 
HISTORY AND POLICY
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it shows the link between the study’s
interests and public health history. In doing this, the impact of ‘political-social
61 •  62 organisations’ on health is considered to a greater extent than in other analyses.
Secondly, the chapter introduces recent debates within the health inequalities
literature in order to highlight issues for investigation at the local level.
Particularly important is the fact that the health of a population can be improved by 
measures that are not specifically ‘public health’ policies. Within this framework, and 
of significance, is the extent to which health inequalities are viewed as being linked to 
income inequalities. Given these links, consideration is needed as to how public 
health practice affects grassroots organisation, which might, in turn, influence income 
inequalities. In later chapters, it will be seen that there are differences of opinion, 
among staff on the ground, relating to these issues.
Saving Lives (DoH, 1999), the first Labour government White Paper on public health 
for twenty-two years, is reviewed in the light of a particular reading of public health 
history. The movement of public health interest into the fields of income inequalities 
and ‘social capital’ can be compared and contrasted with the discipline’s interest in 
drains and poverty one hundred and fifty years ago. Policy in these areas is, and was, 
politically contested. Public health practice is subject to political biases which result 
not only from the beliefs of different factions within the profession, but also from the 
desire of civil servants and state funded researchers to appear politically neutral.
The chapter divides into four sections. (1) A brief history of different approaches to 
public health is provided, falling into two parts (1.1. and 1.2). (2) Some recent debates 
concerning health inequalities are outlined. (3) Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) is then
61 ‘Political-social organisations’ means here, not only various loose formations of professional 
interests, but also political organisations with formalised rules for members, such as, for example, the 
Chartists.
62 One exception being Navarro and Shi (2002).
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looked at in more detail, historical and political interpretations of Saving Lives and the 
Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health (1998) led by Sir Donald Acheson 
(3.1 and 3.2) are considered respectively. (4) On the basis of this discussion, the 
author highlights developments and responses that are of interest to monitor at the 
local level, providing a further justification for the choice of research question.
1.1 Public health -  a historical overview
Past policies are referred to somewhat disparagingly in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999: 6). 
However, some facets of past approaches are still visible within current policy. To 
start with, the thesis examines the period from around the middle of the 19th century 
to the middle of the 20th, concentrating on the earlier years of this period. Later 20th 
century developments are discussed in the next section (1.2). One of the reasons for 
looking at this history is to highlight different approaches to public health. Therefore, 
the analysis does not necessarily give equal weight to different periods of time.
The context of public health in the 19th century is that of a rapid increase in the 
population of the urban poor, linked to industrialisation in agriculture and the growth 
of factory production (Hobsbawm, 1963: 122-124). The evidence shows that at the 
beginning of this process the general health of the population deteriorated, especially 
in the countryside, which is not to say that the original base was high. Then followed 
a remarkable improvement in health. To take just one example: deaths of babies under 
one year per 1,000 live births in England and Wales stood at 295 in 1841/45, while in 
1926/30 the equivalent figure was 136 (Greenwood, 1936).63
This history is looked at from a number of different perspectives and causal levels. 
The advantage of this is to show the complexity of the matrix of reasons for health 
improvement and the leeway for political ‘games’ or strategies (Gintis, 2000).
Table 2.1, below, indicates various ‘ideal type’ class perspectives and causal levels 
within: 1. the material reasons why health improved between say, 1841/1845 and 
1926/30, 2. the motivations behind a desire for improvements, affecting health
63 Mackenbach (1994: 330) notes previous improvements in European population health in the late 17th 
and mid-18th centuries.
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indirectly and directly, 3. aims and objectives for such improvement, which affected 
health indirectly and directly, 4. approaches to specific health improvement, and 5. 
organised agents of change. These points are discussed in order in the text below.
Three general points can be made about this approach to public health history. Firstly, 
it takes into account the fact that health may be improved as a by-product of other 
primary policy development and motivations. Even within a public health framework, 
it makes a distinction between immediate, or downstream, causes, and the upstream 
causes of those causes, these secondary causes often being of more interest to policy 
analysis. Casting up the causal chain (Graham, 2001b: 298; Hamlin, 1998: 56, 106-9), 
it recognises that the reasons why a population's health improves may be directly, 
indirectly, or not at all linked to measures designed to lead specifically to health 
improvement. In other words, some approaches to health improvement work better 
than others, whether direct or indirect. Secondly, it considers the various positions of 
different classes in relation to motivation, targets, approaches and organisation. 
Thirdly, it recognises that health improvement is achieved through a matrix of factors 
and that the effects of different causes may be difficult to distinguish. Various 
academic commentators have stressed different factors within this table, as indicated 
by the footnotes. This then leaves ample room for political opponents to champion 
divergent strategies.
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Table 2.1 Different causal levels in public health improvement — showing political and class components in determining change (1840s to 
early 20th century)
1. The reasons for achieved health improvement
1. Increases in economic 
surplus resulting from 
industrialisation and 
imperialism, coupled 
with -
2. redistribution of 
services and wealth to the 
working class.
Increased employment 
and wealth of the 
working class 
(Hobsbawm, 1963).
Improved education and 
working conditions 
(Greenwood, 1936; 
Blane, 1989).
Improved nutrition 
(McKeown, 1976, and 
others).
Improved housing, 
sanitation, water supply 
(Szreter, 1988) (a).
Working class 
organisation providing 
goods and services.
Improvements in 
scientific knowledge, 
statistics, medical 
practice and health care.
2. Motivations for developments associated with health improvement
1. Experiences of 
hardship -  hunger, cold, 
stench, dirt, illness and 
death.
2. because the superior 
conditions of other 
classes deemed increased 
prosperity feasible.
3. because political 
organisation enabled joint 
working and appeared to 
result in successful 
campaigns.
Desire to ensure an 
adequate supply of 
industrial labour and 
military recruits. 
(Chadwick and Alison 
disagreed with Malthus 
on issues relating to the 
supply of labour (Flinn, 
introduction to 
Chadwick, 1965:65). (b).
1. Concern to forestall 
greater insurrection
2. to address fears of 
crime
3. to address middle-class 
fears of fever and cholera 
in particular (‘plague is 
the oppressor’s reward’, 
see, Hamlin, 1998: 70).
4. concern over infection 
risks to medical 
practitioners entering 
working class areas 
(Simon, 1897:183).
Because of professional, 
religious, political 
commitments (c). 
Because suffering had 
been brought to the 
attention of a wider 
audience by, among 
others, Charles Dickens 
(Flinn, 1965: 38).
Because improvements 
would not cause too 
many difficulties for 
higher social classes 
given overall economic 
performance.
Because of the cost to the 
middle and upper classes 
of supporting families 
made destitute due to the 
illness and early death of 
wage earners (Simon, 
1897:184).
Technical advances. International comparison 
(Sweden is referred to by 
Chadwick, 1965:422- 
423). Laws passed by 
German Reichstag, 
referred to by Simon 
(1897: 487).
3. General aims and objectives, which lead directly or indirectly to health Improving actions
1. Enhanced political 
powers such as increased 
suffrage
2. working class 
organisation and changes 
in legislation to allow 
working class 
organisation
3. improved working and 
living conditions
4. justice in the context of 
extremes of wealth and 
poverty.
A reliable supply of 
labour and soldiers.
Improved education, 
health and working 
conditions.
Legislation to control 
conditions relating to 
housing, sanitation, water 
supply, education and 
working conditions. 
Improved housing, 
sanitation, water supply 
etc.
Aspects of aiming for a 
profitable business 
environment.
To address other 
motivations (above).
Decentralisation of power 
to local authorities 
(Simon, 1897: 379-380).
4. Specific approaches to health improvement
Via legislation and 
investment to improve 
sanitation (associated 
with Chadwick).
Improving working 
conditions (associated 
with Engels and others).
Organisation of health 
services.
Teaching individuals how 
to take care of their 
health.
Improving medical 
interventions.
Improving nutrition 
(associated with 
W. P. Alison).
Regulating local 
authorities and the 
medical profession 
(Simon, 1897:472).
5. Organised agents: advocating or blocking change
The medical profession 
(eg, Hamlin, 1998: 96).
Political parties and 
groups, e.g., the 
Chartists, the Communist 
League and the 
International and London 
Working Men’s 
Associations (d). The 
Health of Towns 
Association, (e)
The state bureaucracy (f). Trade unions. Business. Working class friendly 
societies,
mutual aid societies, 
co-operatives. 
Lobbying associations 
providing services. 
Middle and upper-class 
philanthropy, (g)
The church 
And others.
Notes:
(a) Szreter (2002) does not dispute McKeown’s (1976) view that nutrition was important in health improvement, but he adds that public health policies such as 
clean water played an important role.
(b) The public health implications of ‘too many unskilled workers’ in the 21st century are considered by Graham (2001: 308).
(c) In the present time Pereira (1993) and Oliver, Healey, Le Grand, (2002) have stressed the need to specify equity objectives. The latter authors arguing that not 
all health inequalities are sufficiently inequitable to warrant action and that political lobbying by academics has resulted in biased presentation of statistics.
(d) Described by Hobsbawm (1975:134-135).
(e) The Health of Towns Association is described by Lewis (1952:110-113, 166), The lobbying group was set up by Chadwick, Lord Ashley (Earl of 
Shaftesbury) and others to combat class forces hostile to sanitation improvements. Chadwick supplied data, but die association was ‘fronted’ by his supporters, as 
the civil servant wished to appear ‘neutral’.
(f) The state is discussed further in chapter 3. The tension between centralisation and decentralisation of public health policy issues is highlighted by Chadwick’s 
proposals. The state’s role was challenged by public health demands. “In the late (1850s and 1860s) alone, the heyday of economic and philosophic laissezfaire, 
the legislature intervened to regulate, among other specific health matters, the organisation and education of the medical and pharmaceutical professions, the sale 
of poisons, the adulteration of food, burials, vaccination, the health of prostitutes, the diet of merchant seamen, housing, overcrowding and sum clearance, 
industrial hygiene, bakehouses and alkali works.” (Lambert, 1963: 606).
(g) For example, the Association for Promoting Cleanliness among the Poor; the Metropolitan Association for improving Dwellings of the Industrious Classes; 
the Society for the Improvement of the condition of the Labouring Classes. These, and more, are listed by Simon (1897: 213).
Reasons why health improvement was achieved (row 1, table 2.1)
Firstly, it is important to look at the factors said to be responsible for the improvement 
in health of the British population in the period in question (1840s-early 20th century). 
The significance of different potential factors has been contested. Of particular 
interest has been the relative contribution of sanitation measures, championed in the 
19th century by Chadwick (1965), and of medical science, debated by Illich (1975), 
McKeown (1976), and Szreter (2002).64 However, there now seems to be some 
consensus that increases in working-class living standards were of fundamental 
importance to health improvements. Blane cites a two-thirds increase in individual 
living standards between 1870 and 1914.
“The increased real wages were spent in a variety of ways. A large proportion 
was individually spent on the purchase of commodities, particularly a more 
varied, less protein-deficient diet.... Some was collectively spent on, for 
example, the sanitary reforms. Some was spent at work on Friendly Society 
subscriptions which offered benefit during illness and unemployment, and 
finally some was ‘spent’ at work in the form of shorter hours and a less 
punishing work regime.” Blane (1989: 25).
Greenwood may be thought of as a ‘lost prophet’ of public health, writing in the 
1930s of causal factors that were to gain recognition in later decades. He considers the 
various contributions of reduced housing density, improved food supply, medical 
care, sanitation, water safety and factory legislation. He concludes, “the respective 
forces of the major mortalities are determined by the stamina vitae woven in 
childhood”. In other words, the principal factor causing improved mortality is 
improvement in the environment of children. But he also sees environmental factors 
coming into play after childhood as important. He does not consider any one 
environmental factor, from housing to nutrition, to stand out over and above another 
(Greenwood, 1936: 705-7).
64 In Medical Nemesis (1975), Illich accused medicine of producing iatrogenic illness and thus being a 
threat to health. McKeown also questions the role of medicine, while Szreter argues that medical 
science and sanitation advances combined with improved nutrition to drive advances in life 
expectancy. He reasserts the positive impact of purposive public health interventions (table 2.1, note 
a.).
58
Motivations fo r improvement (row 2, table 2.1)
One of the strengths of Greenwood’s analysis is his recognition that motivation for 
improvements in living and working conditions, and in particular, for improvements 
in the lot of children, played an important role in the introduction of legislation that 
was beneficial to health. ‘The factory legislation was inspired by horror of the 
cruelties endured by children”. He notes that trends in public feeling are vital to 
securing policy change. “To make life more liveable seems to me quite as worthy a 
motive for hygienic reform as to make it longer.” (Greenwood, 1936: 684-5, 703).
However, just because conditions were deplorable does not mean that they would be 
acted on (Hamlin, 1998:10). It is also important to bear in mind that the urban poor 
themselves were organising through trade unions, co-operative societies and broader 
political movements, to achieve improvements in conditions, both at work and more 
generally. Engels, in The Condition o f the Working Class in England (1969, first 
published in English 1887) takes a chapter to discuss labour movements in 1840s 
England, mainly among cotton factory workers and coal miners. Co-operative 
societies organised the provision of goods and services to the advantage of the 
working class. For example, milk was sold at reduced rates due to mass distribution 
through the co-operative (Gurney, 1996). The Co-operative Women’s Guild 
established in 1883 was “successful in organising for state benefits and better health 
facilities for working mothers." (Smithies and Webster, 1998: 8). Thus, collective 
agency provided long-term levers for health improvement.65
As Doyal and Pennell (1976: 145) note, Chartism66 was seen by the state as a threat to 
social order. According to Simon67 (1897) parliamentary records of February 1840 
show requests for a Select Committee to: “inquire into the causes of discontent among 
great bodies of the working class...to remove as far as possible any reasonable
65 Here theoretical underpinning appears to diverge from Blane, et al (1996: 7) who equate the 
relationship between behavioural and structural factors in health with the agency/structure debate in 
sociology. However, given that they previously link the behavioural approach with individual action, 
they do not seem to view ‘agency’ as collective or class agency, which is the view taken here.
66 The Chartists were a large and relatively short-lived political organisation lobbying for democratic 
change. The six points of Chartism were: universal suffrage, abolition of all property qualification, 
annual parliaments, equal constituencies, salaries for MPs and the secret ballot Their petition was 
drawn up by the London Workingmen’s Association in 1837 and was to serve as the programme of a 
new political Labour Party (Rothstein, 1983: 38-39).
67 Simon was the Medical Officer of the Privy Council, reporting 1859-72, “etc, etc, etc”. (Simon, 
1897: 280 and title page).
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grounds for complaint in order thereby to strengthen the attachment of the people to 
the institutions of the country.” The debate led eventually to an agreement to proceed 
to an inquiry into health. According to Simon, in the discussion, “many references 
were o f course made to the “Chartism” of the time.” (1897: 188, italics added). The 
upper and middle classes were, in part, motivated by a desire to control deeper 
demands for reform. Lewis finds that Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury and the civil 
servant Chadwick, author of the influential government report An Inquiry into the 
Sanitary Condition o f the Labouring Population o f Great Britain (Chadwick 1842), 
considered that:
"The sullen resentment of the neglected workers might organise itself behind 
the trade union leaders and the six points men [referring to the six demands of 
Chartism]...and thence, if a Chartist millennium were to be averted, the 
governing classes must free the governed from the sharp spur of their misery 
by improving the physical conditions of their lives.” (Lewis, 1952: 183).
Chadwick’s sanitation schemes and support for urban parks would, it was hoped, 
neutralise political unrest. He reports approvingly on the free opening of Manchester’s 
gardens and museum, specifically timed to coincide with, and thus pull support away 
from, a Chartist demonstration (Chadwick, 1965: 337).
Health improvement was part and parcel of the general living improvements that were 
sought by the organised working-class. The relationship between living circumstances 
conducive to good health and those that are sought their own sake, is discussed by 
Greenwood:
"It is certainly hygienically right to eat plenty of good food, to work and to 
play in moderation and to live in a large, well-ventilated and equipped house. 
It is also pleasant to do so. A great many, perhaps a majority, of hygienic 
improvements would certainly have been adopted for hedonistic reasons if 
people had been able to afford them." (Greenwood, 1936: 680)
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In the same way the Chartists and later political parties were not just concerned with 
health improvement, but with general living and working conditions, as well as 
political rights. Nevertheless, they did influence the drive for public health reform.
Opposition to the demands of the Chartists came not only from Chadwick, but also 
from those whom he himself opposed. Among those he criticised were the staunch 
defenders of laissez faire political economy, such as Malthus (Hamlin, 1998: 74).
Aims and objectives that lead, directly or indirectly, to health improvement (row 3, 
table 2.1)
Examples of improvements sought that might affect health are provided in table 2.1. 
Aims will depend on assessments of feasibility and political and economic 
desirability.68 It may be that primary motivations concerning the relief of personal 
suffering, as opposed to professional desires to see health improvement within a 
particular population, would lead to different primary objectives for improvement. It 
is also the case that, although motivated in part by a desire for health improvement, 
the objective or target for improvement may at times focus on political factors seen as 
blocking progress, for example, the lack of political representation for the urban poor. 
The point is that tactics may differ from strategy.
The campaign for improved health by the organised working class was targeted more 
widely than that of the medical profession. This is not to suggest that members of the 
two groups were never allies, the latter body having, in some respects, more 
credibility and therefore more influence. In order to achieve legislative changes of 
benefit to themselves, lower income groups needed to gain a stake in control over 
national policy. Thus, the political-democratic rules linking the local population with 
the national legislature were significant.
Simon saw progress in public health as linked to decentralisation of powers to local 
government. However, his analysis was extremely circumspect. He refused to be 
drawn into making generalisations about the benefits of decentralisation, and 
recognised that central control and recourse to legal authority is necessary in order to
68 The task of deciding exactly which programme to adopt is, of course, still undertaken today 
Macintyre et al (2001) describes a selection process.
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ensure that local areas operate in the best interests of public health (Simon, 1897: 379- 
380).
Approaches to specific health improvement (row 4, table 2.1)
Even where a more focused aim of direct health improvement is considered, a number 
of different approaches have been taken since the nineteenth century, when modem 
histories of public health begin. In England the public health movement of the mid­
nineteenth century focused on municipal reform: alleviating overcrowding, improving 
sanitary conditions, and keeping “filth” out of food and drink.69 The Public Health 
Act of 1848 and the Consolidating Act of 1875 made provision, for example, for the 
control of the water supply, sewage disposal and animal slaughter.
Blane outlines less successful health education tactics that concentrated on providing 
health advice in the context of poverty:
“While the record of health education during this period [1870-1914] was, 
with the exception of health visiting, not particularly distinguished, preventive 
reforms achieved perhaps their greatest successes. These reforms need to be 
seen in context, however, because they interacted with a rise in real wages..” 
(Blane, 1989: 23)
The focus o f the working class was on organising to advance political rights, 
provision of collective services, campaigns for better working conditions and 
individual struggles to purchase better food, clothing, housing and nursing/medical 
care. But improved nutrition and shorter working hours were low priorities for expert 
preventive medicine, whose aims stayed firmly within the boundaries of the political 
status quo. ‘Sanitation measures’ were the only reforms specifically aimed at public 
health improvement to be promulgated. Scientific and medical discoveries backed up 
the sanitary reforms, for example, the finding that cholera was a waterborne disease 
(Simon, 1897: 241; Donaldson and Donaldson, 1993: 110-112). In the area of sanitary 
reform expert opinion and lay interests coincided. However, air-borne infections were 
reduced more significantly than any other cause of death, and this was because of the
69 German, French and Scottish public health practice, as represented by Virchow, Villerme and Alison 
respectively, have a divergent history (Amick et al, 1995:4, Flinn, 1965:23; Krieger, 2000: 27).
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increased immunity that improvements in diet and working conditions brought 
(Blane, 1989: 27).
Organised agents fo r change (row 5, table 2.1)
As will be evident from the preceding text, particular social agents or organisations 
may be regarded as levers for acquiring changes that affect health. The Chartists, 
sections of the medical profession, parties representing laissez faire capitalism, 
different sections of the Christian church, trade unions, state officials and others, all 
attempted to influence policy and tried, in different ways, to discredit opponents and 
also to build alliances.
The public health issues being addressed and the way they were tackled, were 
intimately bound to political questions. At times the social backdrop was “incipient 
revolution” and the stakes were high (Hamlin, 1998: 3). Choices were being made as 
to which groups of people would have access to better health. Under these 
circumstances “The history of public health ... ceases to be a subdivision of state 
growth or medical science and becomes part of the history of the acquisition of 
political rights or ...the history of class struggle.” (Hamlin, 1998: 2). While public 
health leaders recognised the links between poverty and health improvement, they 
were, nevertheless, reluctant to recommend actions that impeded commercial 
conditions, encouraged ‘unthrift’ and laziness, and increased taxes (Simon, 1897: 440, 
445, 450, 457). Simon argues that the poor, who do not pay taxes, should not be 
granted the vote. Whereas for the Chartists and the nascent Labour Party, the 
conditions of the poor could be improved by their representation in national policy 
making.
Within this setting, the organisation of different agents lobbying for various policies 
becomes a factor in the ‘causal chain’ of health improvement. While Graham (2000a, 
2000b, 2001), Krieger (2000) and Hamlin (1998) go some way to recognising this, 
even they, it is suggested, are not really explicit enough in their analysis. Graham 
(2001: 307; 2000: 4) highlights, as part of the chain, the political choices facing 
national governments and the impact of free market approaches in the 20th century. 
However, she does not refer to political organisation in this chain.
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Krieger says that some 19th century figures ‘go one step further* than Alison (and way 
beyond Chadwick), in their analysis o f the causes of epidemics and early death. 
Virchow and Engels lay “blame at the feet of governments who collude with industry 
to keep wages down and working hours long, suppressing labour organising and 
squelching democracy.” (Krieger, 2000: 27). Krieger* s observation is significant. 
However, the conclusion Engels drew was that organised labour and Chartist demands 
for democracy would help the condition, including the health, of the English working 
class. He regarded these bodies, and not just the policies of the government, as causal 
agents (Wheen, 1999: 196). Krieger concludes that “The fundamental tension, then 
and now, is between theories that seek causes of social inequalities in health in innate 
versus imposed, or individual versus societal, characteristics.” (2000: 27). However, 
the present author suggests that public health academics’ interpretation of ‘societal 
characteristics’ or ‘socio-economic determinants’ has not given sufficient attention to 
the political characteristics of the socio-economic, so that even on the 
‘imposed/societal side’, there are fundamental tensions.
Hamlin (1998) does provide a public health history that recognises the political nature 
of public health questions (Hamlin, 1998: 15, 74). Nevertheless, his book is primarily 
a historical study of Chadwick, and therefore does not look in detail at the impact of 
the various social movements and parties active at the time.
The status of public health work in the 19th century may also have been assisted by its 
independence from the health system with its attendant powerful professional groups. 
It can be suggested that it was less in the shadow of curative medicine than it is now, 
and therefore had more ‘clout’.
In summary, various approaches to health improvement in this period have been set 
out: health education, medical and scientific intervention, improvements in living and 
working conditions, and increased wages to support a more balanced diet. The actual 
effects of these approaches differed, as did the motivations of key players, and their 
prime aims and objectives for improvement. The 19th century provides us with a 
spectacle of relationships between protagonists supporting divergent ideas. Crucial 
among these are the English laissez faire political economists, the ‘Chadwickian’
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drive for bureaucratic centralisation70 coupled with his desire to ‘scotch’ Chartist 
working-class organisation (Hamlin, 1998: 104, 74) and the countervailing working 
class lobby; plus interests concerned with unemployment, welfare dependency and a 
lack of good quality labour. This thesis considers that different political and social 
organisations should not be neglected in analysis of current public health 
developments.
The debate between Chalmers and Alison in 1840, witnessed by Chadwick,71 itself 
suggests that, in the 21st century, the interconnection of public health practice and 
political organisation, needs to be carefully assessed by researchers looking at policy 
implementation. In the 19th century, public health and state professionals, such as 
Chadwick, had a relationship with organised groups of the working-class whose 
demands were for reforms likely to benefit health. Yet for political, tactical and class 
reasons, these professionals were not always supportive of working class 
organisations, despite these organisations being active in the causal chain influencing 
health improvement. They also had their own arguments with other sections of the 
establishment as the debate between Chadwick and Malthus testifies. Whilst the late 
20th and early 21st centuries provide a very different political, social, economic and 
epidemiological environment, the author is still concerned to investigate whether 
similar processes may be occurring in different guises.
1.2 Further twentieth century developments
Gilbert (1970) demonstrates that the major British policy changes between 1914 and 
1939 were especially to do with unemployment, pensions, slum clearance, and the 
demise of the poor law and subsequent municipalisation of poor law hospitals. 
Professional groups positioned themselves as attempts were made to create a national 
health service. Criticism of national health insurance came from “experts in health 
matters who in other things were politically conservative. Generally [this criticism] 
centred on the narrowness of coverage and the inadequacy of care offered..” (Gilbert,
70 This is said to have dimmed in his later years.
71 “...Chalmers held that demoralization, destitution, and disease could be overcome not by impersonal 
institutions of state but by a morally united parish community, through a mix of exhortation, market 
incentives, pervasive moral oversight, and, at last resort, minimal and carefully targeted relief in 
kind....Chalmers seemed to represent a Christian political economy that merged the call to help the 
needy with a faith in the market” (Hamlin, 1998: 75). The links with modem communitarianism and 
some interpretations of social capital theory are easily made.
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1970: 259). The tradition of public health, as understood by 19th century reformers, 
was still in the hands of medical officers of health concerned with sanitation but not 
the impact of living conditions on health status.
A number of overlapping phases of public health activity have been identified from 
the 19th century onwards (Ashton and Seymore, 1988:15; Naidoo and Wills, 1994: 
72). Here is briefly considered some further 20th century developments in public 
health. These are, the role of medical advances, the individual behaviour change 
model, the ‘new public health’, community development, and the Conservative 
government’s Health o f the Nation (DoH, 1992) strategy.
Medical advances
In the 20th century unprecedented changes in technology affected all spheres of the 
economy, as well as medical and surgical developments. These changes were highly 
visible and touched millions of British lives throughout the period. “It seemed 
obvious to contemporaries, if not to the public health profession, that the decline in 
infectious disease mortality owed much to the progress of medical science.” (Blane et 
al, 1996: 1).
However, as has been seen, the relative contribution of health care and medical 
advances to health improvement has since been challenged. The subject is still 
controversial and assessments are dependent on baseline definitions and social 
assumptions. Medical and surgical practice tends to have more ‘immediate’ and 
verifiable results than public health measures. This may well impact on local views as 
to the benefits of preventive measures, while traditional accounting methods also tend 
to favour ‘short term’ technologies (Spackman, 2002; Oxera, 2002).
Individual behaviour change
Research moved on to identifying behaviours detrimental to health. For instance, “By 
1954 the link between smoking and lung cancer was clear.” (Blane et al, 1996: 4). 
Recession in the 1970s also provided an impetus for questioning spending on medical 
practice. A watershed document, produced by the 1974 Labour government was 
entitled Prevention and health: everybody’s business, a reassessment o f public and 
personal health (DHSS, 1976). This is characterised by Naidoo and Wills (1994: 67)
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as coming from the tradition that sees health problems as the result of individual 
lifestyle choices. However, although this is one of its themes, the document does in 
fact recognise the role of government in developing: “clean air legislation, steps to 
reduce road accidents, improvements in housing standards....[and ensuring] that 
undue commercial pressures are not placed upon the individual and society.” (DHSS, 
1976: 17).
The significance of the document is not just that it takes an individual behaviour 
change approach: “Most of us can improve our own health and that of the 
community.” (p. 95). It is also sceptical of clinical interventions. Taking whooping 
cough mortality as an example, it notes that the death rate fell by 80% between 1895 
and 1935, and that this was not due to vaccines, which did not appear until the 1930s 
(p. 91). The document also called for more research into health inequalities, the result 
of which was the Black report (DHSS, 1980). In a discussion on the causes of health 
differences between classes, and between countries, the following comments are 
made:
“Housing, nutrition, life-style, education and income may all play a part. It is 
said that the organisation of society in such countries as Sweden reduces the 
social class differences. This may well be so, but it is noteworthy that other 
nations with widely differing structures of society have caught up and passed 
us in the past few years” (DHSS, 1976: 57).
The potential pressure on governments to find evidence that fits wider political 
objectives is shown in this passage. As will be seen, the individual behaviour change 
model was suited to Conservative economic philosophy and similarly the post-1997 
Labour government has been characterised as constrained by its prevailing 
orthodoxies (for instance, Moran and Simpkin, 2000).
The success of health information campaigns was thrown into question by the results 
of the famous ‘Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial* (MRFIT) of the 1970s, 
conducted in the US. In that trial, behaviour change programmes were shown to have 
had less success than predicted (Wilkinson, 1996: 20). The individual behaviour 
change model became associated with ‘blaming the victim’ and this was seen as a
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deflection of responsibility away from the upstream causes of ill health (Ryan, 1971: 
163).
The ‘New Public Health9
By the 1980s a body of health promotion and public health opinion consolidated a 
move away both from clinical solutions to health improvement and from a ‘victim 
blaming’ behaviour change model. The new approach valued public involvement in 
promoting health and supported ‘healthy alliances’ between services to address public 
policy issues. More attention was also focused on the determinants of health 
inequalities, and on the context in which the prevention of disease takes place. It was 
argued that preventive work could not rely solely on the provision of information 
(Gray, 1979: 115, 146).
In 1986 a World Health Organisation conference produced The Ottawa Charter which 
outlines these areas as important for health promotion:
1. Building a healthy public policy
2. Creating supportive environments
3. Developing personal skills
4. Strengthening community action
5. Reorienting health services.
At Alma Ata in 1977 the WHO had also announced five principles of health 
promotion. The first of these advocates involving “the population as a whole in the 
context of their everyday life, rather than focusing on people at risk for specific 
diseases.” (Naidoo and Wills, 1994: 75).72 This principle links with Rose’s 
observation that:
“a preventive policy which focuses on high-risk individuals may offer 
substantial benefits for those individuals, but its potential impact on the total 
burden of disease in the population is often disappointing... .The visible part of 
the iceberg (prevalence), is a function of its total mass (the population 
average)...(Thus) most cases may arise among the many at lower risk rather 
than among the few who are at high risk..” (Rose, 1992: 73).
72 Chen and Berlinguer (2001: 41) say “...the model of state responsibility for universal access [Health 
For All] in primary health care promulgated at Alma Ata in 1978 has been virtually abandoned” 
However, in relation to the research period and locality described here, interviewees far from abandon 
the model
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The importance that this observation is awarded at the local level may affect the 
nature of public health practice. Its message is evident in health inequalities policy 
updates, such as the Cross-Cutting Review (DoH, 2002: 31,43).
Community development and the community health movement
‘Community development’, a term that originates in the 1960s, is an important 
element of health promotion. Its philosophy is that communities themselves should be 
supported to define and take action to meet their needs (Community Health Initiatives 
Resource Unit, 1987). In 1969 the Wilson government announced a programme to 
develop a series of Community Development Projects (CDPs), to be administered by 
the Home Office, as part of a wider Urban Programme. A history of their ups and 
downs is contained in Loney’s Community Against Government (1983). The book 
highlights different perspectives within community development, and notes the 
tensions that occurred when communities extended their demands beyond what the 
Home Office viewed as appropriate.
The Health Education Authority73 set up a community and professional development 
division in 1988. However, this only lasted a few years before being disbanded. 
Although many projects did not survive, initiatives such as Local Voices (NHSME, 
1992), continued to stress the need to involve the public in service planning, and 
indeed expanded this requirement further into mainstream health services in the 
1990s. Post-1997 policy puts even more weight on the use of community 
development for health improvement within area-based regeneration schemes and 
supports this approach in helping to build ‘social cohesion’ (DoH, 2002: 53). It is an 
area of work that, the author suspects, is influenced by the wider political strategy of 
the post-1997 Labour government, combined with the non-political remit of NHS 
staff.
73 The Health Education Authority (HEA) was a special government organisation contracted by the 
DoH to act as the umbrella body running health education campaigns and to support health 
professionals and health promotion departments. The organisation was reconfigured in 2000, becoming 
the Health Development Agency, and its focus shifted towards increased provision of research 
evidence.
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The NHS Plan (DoH, 2000) has resulted in a further increase in local NHS investment 
in patient involvement work.74 But in addressing health inequalities, local government 
and NHS departments’ work on public involvement comes together. Firstly, within 
Saving Lives there is a belief that local people must be involved in developing the 
policies that most affect them (DoH, 1999: 126). Secondly, new local government 
legislation also supports a particular form of citizen involvement (District Audit, 
2002: 9-10). Public involvement is particularly emphasised in New Deal for 
Communities and other post-1997 regeneration schemes, in which the local authority 
plays a key co-ordinating role (DETRA, 2000). These regeneration programmes 
require health ‘pathways’ and health service input and they are seen as important for 
health inequality reduction. Public health and health promotion staff are heavily 
involved in supporting this work. Therefore, NHS employees are also working within 
a local authority framework concerning public involvement.
The Health of the Nation
In 1991 the Conservative government consulted on proposals for a health strategy for 
England -  The Health o f the Nation (HOTN) (DoH, 1992). Central to the 
government’s programme was to be the setting of specific targets for improvements in 
health. Joseph Califano, who had been American Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW) in the late 70s, influenced this approach. In 1979 he issued a set of 
goals for reducing mortality within different age groups by the year 1990 (Califano, 
1986: 223).
Initially, the HOTN strategy did not include any programme for addressing health 
inequalities. However it did “recognise that as health is determined by a whole range 
of influences -  from genetic inheritance, through personal behaviour, family and 
social circumstances to the physical and social environment -  so opportunities and 
responsibilities for action to improve health are widely spread from individuals to 
government as a whole” (p. 5). And in 1995 a Health of the Nation supplement called 
Variations in Health: what can the department o f health and the NHS do? was 
produced (DoH, 1995). This documented local interventions, advocated strategic or
74 In 2002 there were at least 3 whole time equivalent NHS staff employed in patient involvement 
work in Lewisham and many more staff hours devoted to the work.
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‘healthy alliances' to address the variations in health, and provided an excellent 
source of statistical information for local health authorities. Research funding was 
made available to evaluate projects aimed at achieving the HOTN targets by 
improving the health of the less well off.
As referred to in chapter 1, an assessment of the strategy was produced (LSHTM, 
1998) in order to inform the development of Saving Lives (DoH, 1999). Several 
factors emerged as influencing the implementation of HOTN, which are provided in 
table form in appendix 7.1 of this thesis. It was concluded that: “A health strategy 
needs to acknowledge the importance of the socio-economic determinants of the 
health of the local population if it is to be credible with those responsible for 
implementation locally.” (LSHTM, 1998 b: 147). For this reason, the present research 
looks at a snapshot of local views to assess if this credibility has been achieved.
The assessment does not, however, specifically investigate whether credibility comes 
from local players' beliefs about the compatibility of national economic policy with 
health improvement, and how a loss of credibility might affect the policy’s 
effectiveness. This has provided a strong justification for pursuing the research 
questions posed here, that is, for considering how local responses are influenced by 
wider political policy. The 1998 assessment does not appear to have sought the views 
of respondents on the relationship between national economic policy and local health 
policy. So it may be that problems were not so much to do with HOTN in itself, but 
rather with other relevant government policy that demoralised potential local 
champions of HOTN.
The HOTN strategy does seem to have had more potential for results than actual 
success, and it is more similar to Saving Lives than the latter document acknowledges. 
The speciality of public health medicine failed to grasp the opportunity presented by 
the HOTN (LSHTM, 1998: 28). However, it is recognised that a number of flaws in 
the strategy meant that it lacked weight on the ground (p. 147). Although, perhaps the 
key flaw was that policy in other areas of government was seen to be in conflict with 
public health objectives.
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2. Inequalities in health
Now follows a selective review of the health inequalities literature and an attempt to 
show how a reading of the key works has influenced the issues that have been 
investigated at the local level. There is a vast number and ever-expanding supply of 
research texts in this field (Muntaner and Lynch, 1999: 59). Here, the present author 
simply provides an outline of what appear to be the most relevant publications and 
theories. The section starts by looking at the main explanations of inequalities in 
health. The theory that income inequalities, rather than absolute levels of poverty, 
lead to health inequalities is then outlined, along with accounts that emphasise the 
life-course, location, race and social capital.75 The section then proceeds to a 
discussion highlighting points of most relevance to this study.
The current extent of health inequalities is set out in The Widening Gap: health 
inequalities and policy in Britain (Shaw at al, 1999), which is referenced in the Chief 
Medical Officer’s annual report (DoH, 2001: 5).76 Health inequalities were found to 
be increasing at the time of Labour’s return to office (Abbasi, 1997). Since then there 
has been some indication of a fall in at least one determinant of health inequality, that 
is, smoking among low-income groups (DoH, 2002: i).
The Black report into inequalities in health described four types of explanation for 
health inequalities (Townsend et al, 1992). These were: artefact, selection, cultural or 
behavioural, and materialist. Definitions are provided in appendix 2.1. The first three 
explanations have been variously dismissed, although they are still thought to account 
for some observed statistical variations in health status between social groups (Blane, 
1985; Macintyre, 1997). The ‘materialist’ explanation is described as one that 
emphasises “hazards inherent in society, to which some people have no choice but to 
be exposed, given the present distribution of income and opportunity.” (Davey Smith 
et al, 1990: 373). The Black report stated a preference for this type of explanation.
75 The health of women within die inequalities literature is discussed by, among others, Bartley et al
(2000) and, within a global context, in Evans (2001).
76 The government has documented numerous examples of significant inequalities in health. For 
instance: “In the 45 to 64 age group, 25% of professional women and 17% of professional men report a 
limiting long-standing illness, compared to 45% of unskilled women and 48% of unskilled men” (DoH, 
1999.b: 2).
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Le Grand (1986) sets out some problems associated with the Black report under three 
headings: health indicators, groups (the ‘who’ issue) and inequality measures. The 
health indicators used were limited since they concentrated on mortality rates, due to 
difficulties in collecting morbidity data. On groups, differences between social 
classes, as defined by occupational group, are emphasised. According to Le Grand 
this supports a subtle hypothesis that:
“ ...occupation is the major determinant of ill-health, and that inequalities 
between other groupings are simply reflections of the more basic occupational 
inequalities. But [Le Grand says] neither of these propositions are likely to 
command universal agreement....inequalities between income groups, the 
sexes, races or regions may be just as important for policy purposes are those 
between occupational groups.” (Le Grand, 1986: 3)
These other non-occupational groups were dealt with more extensively in the 
Acheson report (Acheson, 1998). The ‘who’ topics of race and area are briefly 
considered under those headings, below. Criticism over inequality measures was 
made on a number of grounds (Le Grand, 1986: 4), for example, a charge of 
inadequately accounting for changes in the relative size of population groups over 
time (see also, Dlsley (1980, 1986), Klein (1982), Hart (1986), Oliver et al (2002)). 
Macintyre (1997) suggests that the Black report’s explanations were not “hard” 
enough to warrant intensely polarised debates. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the key point is that hard or soft materialist explanations are widely supported 
and significant commentators would agree with Le Grand in saying that: “..the best 
way to reduce inequalities in health significantly is to reduce inequalities in income..” 
(Le Grand, 1982: 51). Even if this statement is incorrect, the findings reported here 
suggest that responses at the local level are affect by its credibility, and at the same 
time, local actions might affect long-term leavers controlling inequalities in income.
Le Grand also considers inequalities in health care as opposed to health outcomes (the 
‘what’ issues, see below) (Le Grand, 1982: 4). Disputes continue on the extent to
77 The materialist link has been made strongly, and has also been vigorously contested, in the academic 
literature (For instance: Wolfson et al, 1999; Dorling et al 2001: 1336; Wilkinson and Marmot, 2002: 
9; Gravelle, 1998). But for our purposes the important issue is that some link was made in Saving 
Lives.
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which different income groups use NHS services more or less, relative to need (Le 
Grand, 1982: 29-30). Developing the work of Sen (1992), Powell and Exworthy 
(2003: 54) describe the ‘what’ question as focusing “on the good to be ‘distributed: 
health care or health itself...”. Having presented an account of seven definitions of 
equity in health care systems, ranging from, ‘equal expenditure per capita’, to, ‘equal 
health, focusing on health rather than health care’ they place equality policies in a 
matrix of five ‘what’ dimensions and five ‘who’ dimensions. The what’s are: 
spending, provision, access, use, outcomes, and the ‘who’s’ are: class, race, gender, 
client, geography (Powell and Exworthy, 2003: 55). This is important since it alerts us 
to issues in the subject of health inequalities that are underreported in this thesis due 
to its particular research focus and space and time constraints; for example, to take the 
middle of the matrix, issues of access to services by gender.
Wilkinson has developed a thesis, set out in Unhealthy Societies (1996), which puts a 
further twist on the Black report’s materialist perspective. He argues that following 
‘epidemiological transition’:78 “the scale of income differences in a society is one of 
the most powerful determinants of health standards in different countries.” 
(Wilkinson, 1998: 8). Here it is not just absolute poverty that affects health, but 
relative poverty. The extent to which this theory has been taken on board by Saving 
Lives is discussed in the next section; however it should be noted that the policy 
implications of the theory, if it is correct and received in a supportive political 
climate, are potentially significant.79
The proposition is, however, challenged, for instance, by Judge (1995: 1282), who 
does not dispute the importance of poverty per se, but mainly the impact of income 
inequalities. He says that data fails to support the hypothesis that an egalitarian 
distribution of income is related to higher levels of health. He finds that it is “much 
more likely that they [differences in life expectancy] are the product of many 
influences, which probably interact over long periods of time.” For another critique
78 The concept of ‘epidemiological transition' (Wilkinson, 19%: 43, Illsley and Baker, 1997) states that 
as countries become more prosperous, further increases in Gross National Product per capita (GNPpc) 
bring little health improvement And the main causes of death shift from infectious to degenerative 
diseases. The concept has been criticised by Mackenbach (1994) for being too vague and ill defined
79 The Whitehall studies (Marmot and Shipley, 1996; Marmot et al, 1997), which show graduated 
poorer health linked to consecutively lower job grades, are used to support his claim.
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see West (1997). It might also be argued that whilst infant mortality rates and income 
differentials are lower in Sweden than Britain, for example, “in terms of both average 
levels of adult self-reported health and social inequalities in health, the two countries 
show surprisingly similar patterns.” (Diderichsen et al, 2001: 254). Finally, data can 
be read as indicating that health inequalities started widening before income 
inequalities. This is if tables showing health inequalities over time (DoH, 1999: 44; 
DoH, 2003: 13) are compared with income inequalities over time (Shephard, 2003: 4).
Navarro (2002), Muntaner et al (1999) Moran and Simpkin (2000: 93) and Krieger, 
(2000: 29-30) critique the psychosocial framework that Wilkinson uses to explain the 
links between health and income inequalities that he has observed. This:
“directs attention to endogenous biological responses to human interactions. 
Its focus is on responses to “stress” and on stressed people in need of 
psychosocial resources. Comparatively less attention, theoretically and 
empirically, is accorded to who and what generates psychosocial insults and 
buffers, and also to how their distribution -  along with that of ...pathogenic 
physical, chemical or biological agents -  is shaped by social, political, and 
economic policies.” (Krieger, 2000: 30).
Perhaps more clarification is needed on Wilkinson’s findings before they can be 
confidently accepted (Plant, 2000). Statistical analysis, beyond the scope of this 
thesis, would be required to make a firm judgement. The debate is complicated further 
by the fact that, for some, including practitioners at the local level, increasing the 
incomes of the less well off is best done through income redistribution, whether or not 
Wilkinson’s theory is correct. Research demonstrates widening income differentials 
can have knock-on effects for the less well off, affecting absolute standards of living, 
for example, via housing availability (Livingstone, 2002). This, it is argued here, 
provides a justification for focusing on the effect of income inequalities on health 
using a connection that does not need to rely specifically on Wilkinson’s psychosocial 
theory. Whilst redistribution via tax to the least well off is possible in a context of 
widening income inequalities (Brewer et al, 2004), this redistribution could be greater
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in the context of diminishing income inequalities.80 The Acheson report (1998) argues 
for policies that improve the living standards of the less well off and further reduce 
income inequalities. Therefore, the connection made between health and income 
inequality is within the paradigm of the Acheson report and the implications of the 
link are worthy of the research provided here, even if judgement is withheld on 
Wilkinson’s particular thesis.
The life-course approach
Here, less controversially, the impact of socio-economic position on health is 
analysed from the perspective of its effect at different stages in the human life cycle 
(Davey Smith, Gunnell and Ben-Shlomo, 2001; Kuh and Ben-Shlomo, 1997). 
Different diseases are found to be more or less sensitive to insults at different stages 
of human development. Of particular importance are exposures in the period of foetal 
development (Barker, 1991) and these exposures are likely to vary according to wider 
social patterns of economic distribution (Davey Smith et al, 2001: 92). There are, of 
course, numerous implications and ways of interpreting this research in relation to 
policy development. Its impact can be seen in the Acheson report’s recommendations, 
where particular attention is paid to women of childbearing age (1998: 67).
Neighbourhood and area effects
Graham’s Understanding Inequalities in Health (2000a) collects a number of articles 
on the theme of the influence of home and place, and suggests that: “Investing in 
[geographical] areas is a central plank of the UK’s new public health policy.” 
(Graham, 2000a: 127). This is partly because different geographical areas have been 
associated with differential health impacts beyond what might be predicted by the 
class position of individuals living in a neighbourhood (Macintyre et al, 2000: 130;
80 Of course, taxing the rich ‘until the pips squeak’ is politically contested. Economic arguments are 
used against policies of further redistribution to the less well off. Chancellor Lawson’s view, in 1988, 
was that higher tax rates would produce lower revenues (Johnson, 1994: 173). Indeed, from the mid- 
1970s “the expectation was that as the economy recovered, ‘trickle down’ effects would benefit the 
least well-off.” (Mule, 2001:2). Milton Friedman and the Chicago School influenced these views, he 
says: “...with respect to changes over time, the economic progress achieved in the capitalist societies 
has been accompanied by drastic diminution in inequality”. Government-led redistribution from the 
rich to the poor, via taxation, was not advisable (Friedman, 1982:169-70). However, some writers are 
more circumspect: “The point at which redistributive policies do start eating into the efficiency of the 
economy or start themselves to cause inequalities is not clear cut” (Johnson, 1994: 180). And others 
directly oppose the Thatcherite perspective, for example: “The facts do not support those who argue 
that considerations of efficiency rule out egalitarian policies. In fact macroeconomic evidence tends to 
point in precisely the opposite direction...” (Corry and Glyn, 1994:205).
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Lupton and Power, 2002: 134).81 Macintyre recognises that social rented 
neighbourhoods can also have social characteristics that support health. These 
features relate to the concepts of social capital or cohesion, referred to below.82
Ethnicity and race
Nazroo (1999) says that the effect of race and membership of minority ethnic groups, 
as opposed to class effects on producing health inequalities, may have been over 
reported by some previous research. The Cross-Cutting Review states: “Many people 
from Black and minority ethnic communities also experience other social conditions 
which impact on health status and risk-taking behaviour, including poverty, poor 
housing and racism.” (DoH, 2003: 38). Key facts from the Health Survey fo r England, 
1999 (Bajekal and Erens, 2001), the most extensive survey on the health of black and 
minority ethnic groups ever carried out in England, are included in the Cross-Cutting 
Review (pp.37-38).83 The extent to which work to address health inequalities should 
target black and minority ethnic groups in Lewisham, as opposed to all ethnic groups 
in social classes V to HIM, has been an issue in various local discussions over the past 
five years. The nature of these conversations is reported in chapters 4 and 5.
Social capital and social exclusion
One important perspective on the health inequalities literature concerns debates about 
the various concepts of social capital84/exclusion/isolation/solidarity/cohesion. These 
ideas are generally associated with Bourdieu (1997), Coleman (1994) and Putman 
(1993). Piachaud (2002: 6-11) discusses various definitions of social capital and 
quotes, among others, Putnam’s view: “By ‘social capital’ we mean features of social 
life -  networks, norms, and trust -  that enable participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives.” (Putnam, 1996:56). Burchardt et al (2002:1- 
3) note that the term ‘social exclusion’ is contested. The British ‘Economic and Social 
Research Council’ who fund research on the subject, say that they want social
81 As Glennerster et al (1999: 7) say: “The most powerful attack on the whole idea of area-based 
strategies came from Peter Townsend. It began in his Barnett Shine Memorial Lecture and was 
developed in Chapter 15 o f  Poverty in the United Kingdom... [Townsend, 1979]”
82 Home Office advice on how to build and maintain cohesive communities is provided for local 
authorities and their partners in order to combat civil unrest (Home Office, Guidance on Community 
Cohesion, 2002).
83 See also: McKenzie (2003).
84 Defined in the thesis’s introduction.
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exclusion studies to help in “understanding the processes by which individuals and 
their communities become polarised, socially differentiated and unequal” (ESRC, 
1997; Burchardt et al, 2002: 3).
Barry (2002) highlights some of the difficulties with defining exactly when groups are 
excluded. Addressing this issue, Putnam distinguishes between ‘bonding’ and 
‘bridging’ capital. Bonding may increase exclusion by the formation of closed tight- 
knit groups while bridging may reduce exclusion. Here again, there is ample room for 
normative interpretation affecting policy recommendations. Self-organisation of 
population groups may lead to more bonding, whereas state-led policy to address 
social exclusion may attempt to encourage bridging. The example of the Mafia is 
often given to illustrate negative social capital (Sen, 1999: 267-8; Fine, 2001: 92), but 
political organisation on estates with poor health records - and the attitudes of public 
sector staff towards this - is of more relevance to this study. It may be that some 
institutional features of statutory bodies are biased against supporting particular forms 
of political self-organisatioa Whether these organisations are classed as providing 
social capita] supportive of health is likely to be a contentious subject on many 
grounds.
Phillimore notes:
“....levels of health provide a sensitive guide to the conditions in which
people’s lives are led Not everything that distinguishes one social milieu
from another...will show up in the health record....Nevertheless, levels of 
mortality summarize the cumulative impact of multiple influences upon 
people’s lives, in a way that has no parallel among routine socio-economic 
indicators.” (Phillimore, 1993: 175).
Poor health has not only come to be used as a marker for social exclusion (Social 
Exclusion Unit, 1998, para 1.24), but, it is also through working with regeneration 
projects at the local level (New Deal for Communities, SRB and the Neighbourhood 
Renewal fund (DETR, 2000, 1999; SEU, 1998)) that public health practice aims to 
improve health among the worst off.
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The relationship between social capital and health is also reinforced by Wilkinson’s 
thesis, referred to above, on the effects of income inequality. Thus, government might 
attempt to strengthen social capital to improve health, within a policy framework of 
higher or lower economic redistribution.85 Inculcating a ‘duty to participate’ might 
either save money or save having to follow the ‘higher risk’ political strategies of 
income redistribution (Petersen and Lupton, 1996:146-173).
Strategies and Tactics in Health Inequalities Reduction -  Discussion 
The shelving of the Black report following publication again highlights the political 
nature of work to reduce health inequalities (Black, 2000). As Bechhofer asserts: 
“social inequality is immensely important in matters of health, .. it would require 
considerable redistribution to make much impact, and this is a very hot political 
potato.” (Bechofer, 1989:14).
Carr-Hill (1987) and Shaw (et al) (1999) are among many distinguished academics 
who have been obviously frustrated by lack of government action, given the body of 
evidence amassed that indicates income transfer is required to resolve the problem. 
Carr-Hill summarises his survey article with the statement that “the time is long 
overdue for a redistribution of resources to eradicate poverty.” (p. 509). And Shaw 
says, “It is clear that the most effective way of reducing inequalities in health in 
Britain is to reduce poverty. The poor have too little money and the solution to ending 
their poverty is to provide them with more money.” (p. 191). As the history of public 
health showed, collective agency can provide long-term levers for health 
improvement tied to macro-economic policy. The tactics required to follow this 
strategy do not appear to have been comprehensively investigated within the ‘health 
inequalities’ literature. Social capital is increasingly used as a concept to both explain 
health inequalities and to offer policy solutions. However, within academic 
discussions concerning the evolution of social democracy, issues such as the role of 
trade unions (Korpi, 1983) and the role of the formation of state institutions 
(Rothstein, 1992) are key to the future egalitarian nature of different societies, a point 
referred to in chapter 1.
85 As Moran and Simplon (2000: 90) point out, governments of the centre right and left have attempted 
to address social exclusion.
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Sweden is often held up as an example of good health (Chadwick, 1842, 1965: 422- 
423; DoH, 1976; Navarro and Shi, 2002). It is a country whose wealth distribution, 
Carr-Hill and Shaw presumably feel, should be matched in Britain. However, if such a 
change is sought, consideration should be given to preparing the ground for such 
movement. Campaigning for intermediary measures might prove more successful than 
simple demands for redistribution. In a study on the development of Swedish labour 
market policy, which examines the way trade union interests were built into the policy 
process, Rothstein suggests that “In some, albeit probably rare, historical cases, 
people actually create the very institutional circumstances under which their own as 
well as others’ future behaviour will take place” (1992: 52). As Rothstein describes so 
elegantly, redistribution in Sweden did not come out of the blue, it involved a series 
of tactical political struggles and manoeuvres, based on experience and theory.
Lowi (1972) has put forward a framework for categorising policy which distinguishes 
between those which redistribute, distribute, regulate, and design/redesign institutions. 
In the light of this typology Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) may perhaps be seen as 
regulatory, but it is clearly not redistributive in and of itself. In order to achieve its 
goals however, redistribution is considered necessary (Carr-Hill, 1987). Lowi 
suggests that redistributive policy may require, and/or result in, more general political 
mobilisation than other types of policy; it is affected by the pattern of local and 
national political mobilisation (Lowi, 1972). This thesis upholds the view that, as 
suggested by public health history, in order to address the question of redistribution 
for health gain, the political links between the local and the national should be closely 
examined. The ability of the less well off to access national policy-making processes 
remains as important an issue now, for all agents, as it was 150 years ago. We should 
be aware of all the various cultural, political and economic strategies that are, or could 
be, employed by those supporting or opposing redistribution.
Shaw (1999: 198) makes no distinction between the tactical merits of redistribution 
via tax, reduced differentials, or NHS services. Middle-class NHS users may or may 
not be accessing services more than poorer users (Tudor Hart, 1971; O’Donnell and 
Propper, 1989 (cited in Wilkinson, 1996: 67); Rein, 1969). But there is little evidence 
to suggest the middle class are ‘over-using’ the NHS. According to Esping-Anderson, 
withdrawing provision welfare from this section of the community is likely to lead to
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alienation, a withdrawal in support for state-funded services, and calls for further tax 
cuts (1999).
At the local level different opinions on approaches to health inequalities reduction can 
be detected. Bold calls for wealth redistribution to reduce health inequalities 
contained in a report by Shaw et al (1999) led to the publication of an interesting short 
article in the Health Service Journal (Miller, 2000: 16). Harry Bums, director of 
public health at the Greater Glasgow health board, is quoted as saying that the 
findings of Shaw’s report are ‘naive’. He says: “We are focusing on policies that will 
improve life for children from birth, antenatally and even pre-conception, improving 
the ability of parents to bring up their kids as citizens with aspirations. Social 
inclusion policies are the best way to turn the areas like Shettleston around.” This 
might be labelled as a social capital approach, informed by life-course research. 
Following Levitas’s categories, set out in The Inclusive Society? Social exclusion and 
New Labour (1998), this could possibly be named a ‘MUD’ approach. ‘MUD’ (Moral 
Underclass Discourse) emphasises the needs of the ‘underclass’. In contrast, the focus 
of Phil Hanlon, professor of public health at Glasgow University, and Daminan 
Killeen, director of the Poverty Alliance in Glasgow, is on jobs and economic 
development. This is an approach that adopts the ‘socio-economic model of health’ 
perspective. Turning to Levitas again, this might be called a ‘SID’ view. In ‘SID’ 
(Social Intergrationist Discourse) emphasis is on participation in paid work, but is not 
focused on unpaid work and poverty among non-workers. The authors’ perspective 
(Shaw et al, 1999) can safely be called ‘RED’ (Redistributionist Discourse), that is 
defined as one where poverty is the central issue. The analytical lead for Shaw et al’s 
view was provided by the Black report (1980). However, they do not fully explore, at 
least in the report under discussion, the processes that produce inequality; a fact that 
is, in general, one of the main critiques of this thesis. Finally, the chair of Greater 
Glasgow’s health board and of the Healthy Cities Partnership, David Hamblen, is 
concerned by the negative press coverage Glasgow received on publication of Shaw’s 
report. Perhaps this might be called a ‘marketing’ perspective.
Although it must be pointed out that the quotes from these Glasgow stakeholders are 
short and possibly misrepresentative of the individuals’ views, the article shows some 
of the different opinions that might be found at a local level in inner-London. The
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local perspectives show different strategic and operational concerns, and may indicate 
different definitions of policy success and failure. It is unclear whether, beneath this, 
rests divergent opinion on the point at which health inequality becomes inequitable 
(Oliver et al, 2002). Normative responses to the level of health inequalities were 
observed in local fieldwork, as are beliefs about the levers of collective action, such as 
trade union organisation.
3.1 The Public Health White Paper ‘Saving Lives’
The public health White Paper Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) was the stimulus for this 
research. It is a policy document open to diverse interpretations whose 
implementation at the local level therefore suggests the need for investigation. The 
present author expected that the response to the policy would be in the arena of both 
beliefs and of action, and would depend on various factors, such as concurrent work 
pressures. A brief summary of the public health rationale upheld in the document 
follows. After which the document is analysed from historical and political 
perspectives.
Firstly, ‘health’ in Saving Lives is seen as being determined by more than just health 
care. Issues such as housing, access to healthy food, and income all affect the 
prevalence of illnesses such as cardiovascular disease and stroke. Using this multi­
factorial determinants argument, a health improvement strategy means engaging all 
government departments responsible for issues ranging from transport to agriculture. 
Within this perspective, central government is viewed as responsible for those social 
and economic policies relating to the broad determinants of health. In particular, 
government policy on unemployment and low wages is seen as a crucial determinant 
of health status. But individuals are also regarded as having a responsibility to look 
after their health by, for example, taking regular exercise and not smoking.
Secondly, Saving Lives holds that there are currently significant inequalities in health 
status, with those on low wages or unemployed experiencing higher death rates at 
younger ages and longer periods of sickness. Differentials in health status are again 
found by ethnic group and by gender. Populations located in different geographical 
regions of the country also experience varying rates of diseases. Government would
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like to see greater improvement in health among those with the highest levels of 
morbidity and mortality; in other words, a reduction in health inequalities is sought. 86
Thirdly, trends in British health over the last 150 years indicate a gradual 
improvement in life expectancy. This pattern, as described in Saving Lives, has been 
generally shared by all sectors of society, although the gap between the health of 
social class I and V remains, and in some populations, in relation to some causes of 
death, the situation has declined.
Fourthly, the government aims to see specific improvements in the numbers of people 
dying from the following causes: cancer, coronary heart disease and stroke, accidents 
and suicide/undetermined injury. Targets are set in Saving Lives for these reductions 
to be met by 2010.
Finally, reference is made to a need to involve the public in the planning of 
interventions to improve health. Local communities and partnerships between 
different local agencies and sectors all have a role to play, for instance see (DoH, 
1999:147).
Thus, in summary, for Saving Lives, social, environmental and economic factors are 
important determinants of health. It is this broader agenda that is the focus of the 
research, and partnership working between agencies, such as health service and local 
authority bodies, constitutes the fieldwork environment. The thesis is concerned with 
three inter-linking issues found in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999). These are: (i.) the link 
between poverty and health and its implications; (ii.) decisions about centralisation- 
decentralisation, and in particular the role of individuals and communities vis-a-vis 
the role of government; and, (iii.) state-led public involvement and its ramifications. 
Referring back to previous points made in this chapter, it can be said that local staff 
opinion concerning government economic policy on income distribution may affect
86 It should be noted that health inequalities may be defined in relation to medical care provided 
through health services. Access to health services, their utilisation and resulting health outcomes are all 
measures used to assess inequalities (Rein, 1969). Examples o f inequalities in service access and use 
are described by Acheson (1998:111-119). Outcome may also be measured by mortality or morbidity. 
But, as Carr-Hill (1984) explains, although morbidity data is extremely important in devising effective 
policy, the quality of morbidity data is less reliable than mortality data.
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policy implementation. Local political organisation, in turn potentially influenced by 
local state employees, can also affect the determinants of health, as set out in Saving 
Lives.
Early speculation in this thesis suggests that with detailed fieldwork, the above simple 
summary will be shown to hide more complexity and implementation difficulties than 
is at first apparent. This is because a White Paper or policy document is a generalised 
view of the entire policy field. Only detailed, local research can test the assumptions 
and the fit between government objectives and the local conditions. The outcomes 
will depend heavily on the feasibility of implementing generalised policy.
Saving Lives: historical and political interpretations
Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) came out in two parts, the main body of the text and a 
supplement, which was a reply to the Acheson report (1998). Firstly, the main 
document is discussed. The features considered are: the extent to which public health 
theory associated with previous governments’ policy has been retained or amended to 
suit the new government’s ideology. This discussion looks at the question of a balance 
between secondary and primary prevention, as well as particular issues in the ‘health 
inequalities’ literature and the role of local targets and associated ‘centralisation 
versus decentralisation’ implications. Finally, the links made between downstream 
public involvement and upstream policies are reviewed. As Edelman (1977) notes, in 
a discussion on American ‘acceptance of inequality’, government policy should be 
considered both from the perspective of its rhetoric and the extent to which words will 
translate into actions. The present author attempts to use this perspective in 
interpretation of the document.
The approach to public health in Saving Lives reflects many of the themes of ‘New 
Labour’. Six are listed here. These are, firstly, a “third way” that rejects both the “old 
nanny-state approach” and the view that government has no responsibilities beyond 
those that can be controlled by individuals (DoH, 1999: 6-7; see also, Paton, 1999: 74; 
Giddens, 1998; Klein and Rafferty, 1999). Secondly, ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
(DoH, 1999: 9), is a relationship associated with ‘conditional citizenship’ and 
‘communitarianism’ (for example, see Dwyer, 1998; Moran and Simpkin, 2000). 
Thirdly, ‘partnerships’ (DoH, 1999: 8, 123), implying an emphasis on joint working
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across agency boundaries (see Rouse and Smith, 2002: 47-48). Fourthly, criticism of 
the so-called ‘nanny state’ (DoH, 1999, foreword: v, 7). This is a phrase popularised 
by the Conservative press to mock government social intervention and now adopted 
by Labour. However, it is used in Saving Lives to distance the document from the 
‘victim blaming' model, discussed previously.87 Fifthly, the series title Our Healthier 
Nation echoes the ‘one nation’ thesis (Gould, 1998: 250-253) and might be seen to 
advocate a bridging of the gap between rich and poor. Alternatively, ‘one nation’ 
language fits well with a view that class divides are a thing of the past and could 
consequently downplay options for social democratic style redistribution.88 The 
rhetoric of ‘our one healthier nation’ is unlikely to become a reality without a truer 
meeting of the two nations of rich and poor (Gould, 1998: 252). Finally, ‘social 
exclusion’ (DoH, 1999: 3) is also referred to, a topic mentioned previously and to 
which will be returned to in subsequent chapters.
Saving Lives does not fully abandon the individual behaviour change model seen in 
the earlier Labour government’s Prevention and Health: everybody's business 
(DHSS, 1976). However, unlike the Conservative’s Health o f the Nation programme, 
it does make use of subsequent research that has shown a clearer causal link between 
ill health and poverty. Thus, government action to increase the minimum wage is 
explicitly seen in Saving Lives as contributing to public health goals. But it might be 
argued that, in practice, the politics of the Labour government that launched 
Prevention and Health was far more supportive of economic equality. Evidence for 
this can be found in speeches by Gordon Brown compared with Labour economic 
policy speeches of the 1970s. The actual manifestos of the two governments are even 
further apart. The rhetoric of Saving Lives may be clearer than the 1976 policy as to 
the economic determinants of health inequality, and the Treasury, for instance, is now 
recognised as a key partner in health policy. However, the practice of government 
across all departments could be less supportive of health inequality reduction because 
of maintenance of income inequality levels above those of 25 years ago (Townsend, 
2000: 66).
87 Labour’s policy is not as extreme as the analysis provided by The Daily Telegraph might lead one to 
believe: ‘Health advice ‘nannies’ killed off by ministers’ (12.1.00:1).
88 National governments may have the capacity to pursue different redistribution policies, as Graham
(2001) suggests in her comparison of Finland and Britain.
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The health improvement targets provided in Saving Lives may be predicted to skew 
local work towards secondary prevention, since they relate to mortality. As we have 
seen in a discussion on Rose’s work (1992), people presenting with clinical symptoms 
will only be a proportion of the people with sub-clinical problems present within the 
population. In order to reduce the number of deaths, it would be possible to 
concentrate initiatives only on those presenting with clinical problems. That is, to 
concentrate on secondary prevention work, and not to focus so much attention on 
work to reduce the causes of disease, i.e. primary prevention work. Secondary 
prevention initiatives gained considerable weight in the document’s translation from a 
Green to White Paper. For example, the Healthy Citizens’ programme is comprised of 
three initiatives: a 24 hour health advice-line called ‘NHS Direct’; expansion o f ‘first 
aid’ training, including increased sites for defibrillators; and an Expert Patients’ 
programme, designed to enable those with chronic illness to increase their own role in 
managing conditions.
It is unclear why Saving Lives uses the language of ‘responsibilities’ in relation to 
individuals taking action to look after their health, except in order to sound consistent 
with ‘New Labour’ language. The vast bulk of literature on the subject would show 
this to be inappropriate (see for example, Benzeval, et al., 1995), and even the 
document itself recognises that healthy lifestyles are influenced by social situation.
Discussed in the thesis’s introduction was one of the subtlest features of the document 
- that is, the lack of a link between upstream policy and local people. In respect of 
trade unions, all references in Our Healthier Nation (DoH, 1998) were deliberately 
deleted on transition from Green to White paper. Employees’ sense of control within 
the workplace, is referred to, but only outside the context of control via trade unions. 
Therefore, the thesis reviews local views on the links between public health policy 
and trade union membership.89 90
89 Business, as represented by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), has been largely 
unsupportive of wealth redistribution. The Institute of Directors has produced documents arguing for 
tax reduction and more specifically, the abolition of inheritance tax (IOD 1997a, 1997b).
90 By deciding to maintain most Conservative trade union laws, New Labour may have given more 
power, than any previous Labour administration, to a business class which has proactively argued 
against a reduction in inequalities (Panitch and Leys, 1997: 254). The redress, via the ‘Fairness at 
Work’ policy (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998), has been comparatively minimal 
(Diderichsen, 2001: 245).
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As Klein has noted, there are a number of tensions in the organisation of the NHS 
(Klein, 1982). However, the specific tension for NHS management between a 
requirement to reduce health inequalities and the responsibility of dealing with union 
claims for improved terms and conditions in a cost-efficient manner is not specifically 
referred to in his article. This tension also exists in state-led health partnerships with 
private businesses, where the same companies may also be involved in lobbying 
central and local government on, for example, a lower minimum wage, fewer 
restrictions on working hours, fewer tax increases relating to road-use and land-use 
for building and parking.
Research has indicated health benefits from participation in decision-making (Rutten, 
et al 2000). However, the operation of Labour as a mass democratic party, 
traditionally representing and providing some limited access to involvement of the 
less well off, has not been raised, to the author’s knowledge, within any academic 
discussions on health inequality. The author therefore seeks to investigate this issue 
further when looking at the implementation of public health policy in the 21st century, 
in the case study area.
The aim to reduce health inequalities is central to Saving Lives. The action plan to 
tackle poor health, as the first lines of the executive summary state, is to: “Improve 
the health of everyone. And improve the health of the worst off in particular.” 
However, Wilkinson's thesis, referred to earlier, is that it is not just absolute levels of 
poverty that affect health, but it is also the psychosocial consequences of income 
inequalities. To what extent is this accepted by Saving Lives? This is not clear, 
although section 6.11 would appear to concur with Wilkinson's view. This reads as 
follows:
“In countries with greater income inequality, health inequality is greater too. 
And there is evidence that social stress, reflected in the extent to which an 
individual has low control over his or her job, increases the risk of coronary 
heart disease and of premature death. Similarly the degree of social cohesion, 
the strength of social networks in a community and the nature of people’s
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work may all affect their risk of dying from coronary heart disease.” (DoH, 
1999: 77)
The White Paper also instructs that: “Campaigns to improve health must concentrate 
on the least healthy.” (preface). However, Acheson recommends concentrating action 
on the less well off, as opposed to the least well off. Thus, in general, while a firm 
government commitment to aim to reduce inequalities in health can be seen, this is 
coupled with ambiguity. There is ample room for diverse interpretation on the details 
of how to achieve the policy aim at the local level. There is also room for post-policy 
reinterpretation by government.
3.2 The Acheson Report (1998) and Reducing Health 
Inequalities: an action report (DoH, 1999b)
As referred to earlier, a response to the Acheson report (1998) was produced 
alongside Saving Lives (DoH, 1999). This was called Reducing Health Inequalities: 
an action report (DoH, 1999b). The Acheson report itself had been commissioned by 
the new Labour government just two months after the 1997 election (Exworthy et al, 
2002: 82). It gives a series of recommendations, over 40 in total, as to how health 
inequalities should be tackled. The report was welcomed in public health departments 
at the local level and also by the government in its initial response (DoH, 1999b). The 
recommendations can be divided into those requiring national responses and those 
that can be acted on locally. While the report was not organised in this way, Acheson 
came to mark his copy of the report with ‘L’ for local and ‘N* for national, so that he 
could emphasis to local players what they should focus on. Examples of local issues 
were - the further development of the role and capacity of health visitors 
(recommendation 23.1) and nicotine replacement therapy on prescription 
(recommendation 26.4). Examples of national issues were - the uprating of benefits 
and pensions (recommendation 3.2) and more generally: “policies which will further 
reduce income inequalities..” (recommendation 3).
Exworthy observes that while the Acheson report was “generally well received”, 
some pointed to “the lack of prioritisation, the weak evidence base for some 
recommendations and the lack of cost-benefit data supporting their analysis [e.g.
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Illsley, 1999; Williams, 1999; Klein, 2000; Davey Smith, 2001; Macintyre et al, 2001; 
Oliver et al, 2001] .” (Exworthy et al, 2002: 82). The Cross-Cutting Review also refers 
to these critiques of the Acheson report. Marmot and Law were commissioned to 
review evidence that had been published since the original inquiry (DoH, 2002: 25). 
The evidence base was not systematically weaker or stronger according to whether the 
recommendations were directed at local or national work, although the political risks 
were perhaps unevenly spread, e.g., the addition of one drug to the prescribing list 
holds less potential for long term political ramifications than a significant uprating of 
benefits and pensions. Later chapters in this thesis report on how ‘Acheson’ was used 
locally. It was found that there were no disputes over the evidence provided to justify 
the report’s recommendations. The recommendations were unquestioningly accepted. 
The problems encountered were around prioritisation and the lack of clarity over what 
was ‘the local role’. (See the reference to Day and Klein (1987) below.)
This thesis takes the view that, while Acheson (1998) says what needs to be done at 
the national level, the factors affecting the likelihood that these recommendations are 
acted on and influenced, should be theorised and considered as part of a 
comprehensive policy analysis. For instance, while Acheson may recommend a 
redistributive increase in pensions, numerous academics in political theory and social 
policy have demonstrated how different factors affect the likelihood of this outcome. 
For example, redistribution may be affected by constellations of power relations, such 
as the extent of middle-class risk taking (Baldwin, 1990) or the organisation of 
political parties (Castles, 1982) and trade unions (Rothstein, 1992; Unison Focus, 
1997). It is an assumption of this thesis that some of the activities of the local and 
national state can affect political and social forces that, in turn, influence the 
likelihood of Acheson’s national recommendations being extensively implemented.
The terms of reference of the Acheson report are set out in the DoH’s response (DoH, 
1999b: 3) and each recommendation of the report is dealt with. For instance: “We 
recommend policies which will further reduce income inequalities, and improve the 
living standards of households in receipt of social security benefits. (Independent 
Inquiry into Inequalities in Health (1998), recommendation 3). The government’s 
response to this recommendation includes a somewhat vague commitment to increase 
the opportunities for all members of society to participate fully in the economic and
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social life of the community in which they live. If the objective had been to return 
inequalities in health back to their 1970-72 level (which it was not) then it might have 
been reasonable to compare pay differentials, tax and benefit policies, and 
unemployment levels with that period in order to assess the chances of achieving the 
aim. However, no such intention was made clear, at least at the time of the 
document’s publication. A stated intention to redistribute income became slightly 
clearer towards the start of the second Labour term (Blair, Hackney school speech 
18.9.02; Jones, 2002). Sir Donald Acheson was disappointed with the government’s 
action report (DoH, 1999b). However, he was more satisfied with subsequent 
redistributive budgetary measures, and took these as a possible indication that the 
recommendations of his inquiry had been noted (Acheson interview, 30.3.00).
This thesis reports in its findings that the DoH’s failure to respond adequately to the 
Acheson report had an important local impact. The lack of any translation of the 
report into a template for local action resulted in severe delays and increased 
difficulties in the effective co-ordination of local work. It was not until half way 
through 2003 that this omission in support from ‘the centre’ was rectified, with the 
publication of Tackling Health Inequalities: a programme fo r action (DoH, 2003). 
This failure may have been guided by general beliefs about the benefits of 
decentralisation. It may also be the case that senior DoH staff were unsure what they 
should recommend as the most important things the NHS should do locally. In the 
words of one senior official who observed early construction of the policy: “their 
hearts were in it, but their minds were uncertain.” (civil servant, informal interview, 
2003).
In 2003 it was found that the Acheson report was still in use locally and relevant to 
local public health planning. Saving Lives was not by this date such a read document. 
It had been superseded as a practical guide because of its failure to provide national 
targets, which meant that its details quickly became outdated. Having said that, the 
principles and tensions that characterise it are still as relevant in 2003 as when it was 
published.
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4. Saving Lives within the local setting
Here, looked at briefly, are developments that might be expected at the local level, 
and questions to be asked, following analysis of Saving Lives and associated 
literature. This takes into account the thesis’s aim of looking at local implementation 
with a particular lens, sensitive to national and local political dimensions and within 
this, the political tensions of income inequalities and central versus local control.
1. Firstly, one might expect more of a stress on health improvement within the 
local NHS and in partnerships between the NHS and local government. For 
instance: “The roles of the NHS and of local authorities are crucial. They must 
become organisations for health improvement, as well as for health care and 
service provision.” (DoH, 1999: 8).
2. Increased funds should be available to develop the public health function 
(DoH, 1999: 140).
3. Local targets for improving health and reducing health inequalities should 
have been set out in the local Health Improvement Programme from 1999. 
Although health inequalities targets had to be developed at a local level, by 
contrast, national targets were set for health improvement, but not for health 
inequalities. This was despite a strong lobby for national health inequalities 
targets in response to the Green Paper (DoH, 1998). In the White Paper’s 
preface it was stated: “We reject the previous Governments’ scatter gun 
targets. Instead we are setting tougher but attainable targets in priority areas.” 
(DoH, 1999: preface). So, it will be interesting to see how these local targets 
were established. In particular, we will look at how inequalities targets 
developed locally.91
4. The balance between secondary and primary prevention initiatives may be 
contentious since the national targets for health improvements may favour 
secondary prevention practice.
91 In The NHS Plan the government reversed its decision not to provide national health inequalities 
targets (DoH, 2000).
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5. Given the initial belief held by some policy makers, that decentralisation in 
public health would aid implementation,92 benefits from this approach should 
be seen in local strategy development and implementation.
6. Given the central aims of Saving Lives, one would also expect to see 
campaigns to improve health concentrating on the least healthy (preface). 
However, as was noted in the discussion on health inequalities, and as clarified 
in the Acheson report (1998) and the Cross-Cutting Review (2002) the less 
well off, not just the least well off, should be targeted. Therefore, local debate 
and confusion might be expected; this will be about the extent to which health 
improvement work should be targeted.
7. Research should be alert to the possibility that local players may have mixed 
views on their role in influencing income inequalities and other upstream 
determinants of health. Day and Klein show the difficulty of assigning 
responsibility for outputs or outcomes to any single service. Where a ‘holistic’ 
view of accountability is adopted and responsibility for factors over which 
local agencies have little control -  such as the social and economic 
environment -  “....all-embracing accountability might all to easily become 
meaningless..” (Day and Klein, 1987: 246).
8. Given Saving Lives 's imperative to involve local people in policies that affect 
their health, a number of questions need to be asked about local democratic 
structures. For instance: does political practice, such as the use of citizens’ 
panels and attitudes to trade union representation, conflict with a desire to 
reduce inequalities in health and therefore wealth?
The above points, raised as issues in the author’s reading of Saving Lives, have been 
used to structure the research. The first findings chapter, chapter 4, concentrates on 
the institutional changes delineated in points 1-6 above, as well as developments 
heralded by parallel Department of Health initiatives, particularly the creation of 
primary care trusts. The second findings chapter, chapter 5, assesses staff opinion
92 As demonstrated by the requirement to provide local targets and by the lack of guidance on the local 
implementation of Acheson (1998).
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regarding these institutional changes and staff views on the question of income 
inequality referred to in point 7, above. The final findings chapter - 6, deals with point 
8 and focuses on public involvement in issues affecting income inequalities. This is 
because Saving Lives makes a link between health and income inequalities.
Conclusion
It is apparent from reading Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) and the Acheson report (1998) 
that both consider a separation in responsibilities between ‘the local’ and ‘the 
national’ appropriate. This is legitimate, in that local staff have a particular role to 
play, as do national agencies. But little consideration is given to how grassroots forces 
might influence national policy or might combine to create national political 
movements. This is a state of affairs, which is, albeit unintentionally, portrayed in 
Dahlgren and Whitehead’s famous diagram of ‘the main determinants of health’, 
reproduced in the Acheson report (p.6). In this diagram, individuals form the centre 
core with rings expanding outwards towards determining socio-economic factors. 
Thus, the people appear more as subjects determined ‘economistically’ by wider 
forces, rather than as agents capable of impacting on socio-economic factors.93 Yet as 
the reading of public health history showed, political movements, based on grassroots 
involvement, but linked to a national political voice, can affect these determinants of 
health. While Chadwick is associated with leading public health improvement in the 
19th century, he himself) according to various accounts, was influenced by the Chartist 
‘threat’. The thesis is concerned, in part, with the character of political movements 
that might influence the wider determinants of health. More specifically, the research 
looks at the way in which staff views and unfolding institutional arrangements at the 
local level might affect the power of these movements. Thus, it is an intention of the 
thesis to seek to redress the fact that little consideration has hitherto been given, in the 
public health literature, as to how grassroots forces might influence national policy.
93 “Economism [was] a concept developed by Lenin in several articles of 1899...which criticized some 
groups in the Russian social democratic movement for separating political from economic struggles 
and concentrating their efforts on the latter...” (Bottomore, 1985: 143). Of course ‘socio-economic 
determinants’ are not the same as ‘economic determinants’ and it is, therefore, unfair to overly criticise 
the diagram. But interpretations of the model have often not given due emphasis to political aspects of 
the social element (for instance, Benzeval, Judge and Whitehead, 1995: 23). The thesis is interested to 
see if this academic tendency is repeated locally.
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Public involvement is a key feature of post-1997 public health policy, but it is 
confined to a role in local developments. The danger of local consumer-orientated 
methods of public involvement undermining party politics is a subject that is growing 
rapidly in the academic literature. For instance, as Wilson, Leach and Wingfield say, 
it is possible to argue that these methods “distract from political participation because 
they enable individuals to interact with public bodies as customers rather than 
citizens, thus avoiding the messy complexities of politics” (Leach and Wingfield, 
1999; Wilson, 2001). Various divergent opinions are developing as to why local 
involvement is to be supported, for example, Rowe and Shepherd (2002) categorise 
conceptualisations based on consumerism, citizenship and new public management. 
There is also an increasing tendency to regard local participation as primarily useful 
as a cost-effective investment in regeneration projects and other local government 
services. Some commentators value the health enhancing features of increased social 
capital, which are to be encouraged through community participation (Gillies, 1997). 
Others see local participation as a necessary step in enhancing democracy, defined as 
increasing self-government and the power and authority of the people (Arblaster, 
1994: 9).
The development of the ‘new public health’ was described in this chapter as, in part, a 
reaction to earlier models such as the ‘medical model’, the ‘individual behaviour 
change’ model, the so called ‘nanny state’ model and ‘victim blaming’. Saving Lives 
has clearly attempted to learn from these developments, but determining a programme 
of effective local work to reduce health inequalities has, as we will see, not been an 
easy process. Exactly what should be done locally that does not encroach onto the 
terrain of ‘individual behaviour change’ has been hard for agencies to determine, 
even when they do not, in principal, support the model. Recurring tensions over 
centralised control of the National Health Service, coupled with moves towards local 
autonomy,94 has not helped to resolve these difficulties. Public health policy has been 
caught up in these polarised battles between the centre and the localities, whereas a 
model of mutual support would have, it is argued, been more productive. The 
problems of delegation from the centre are exemplified in the failed attempt to get 
local health authorities to set their own targets to reduce health inequalities, at least
94 As addressed by, among other policy documents, Shifting the Balance o f Power (DoH, 2001).
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before national targets had been set. Here the mantra of ‘local autonomy is good’ 
clearly did not live up to expectations. Sir John Simon’s caveats as to the advantages 
of decentralisation appear no less valid after a century of public health practice.
That policy towards health inequalities changed with the election of a Labour 
government in 1997 highlights the political nature of the subject. The shift is 
underlined by the Chief Medical Officer: “The government-commissioned Acheson 
Report, showed the importance of social, economic and environmental determinants 
of health and served as the basis of the White Paper Saving Lives: Our Healthier 
Nation. The document commits the government to addressing the fundamental 
determinants of poor health.” (DoH, 2001: 5).
The extent to which the state ‘problematises’ the fact that some groups within the 
population live, on average, a number of years longer than others, is based on values 
and beliefs held within a political context. The assertion that those tending to be 
worse off, also tend to have worse health and also tend to be Labour voters, means 
that these three inter-linking factors create a tension when the agency tasked with 
policy implementation is the ‘political neutral’ NHS. Yet links between health and 
income inequalities mean that the NHS is forced to enter, in some way, into the 
political fray. As we will see it does this in a particular manner that highlights the 
difficult position that it has been led into. The review of the literature indicates that 
local initiatives to reduce health inequalities may encounter pressures to expand 
horizons of activity, in order to take into account the links between health and wealth. 
Counter pressures, for instance to keep NHS activity politically neutral, are also likely 
to operate. This might lead to either frustration or to less ambitious work at the local 
level.
The imperative to ‘involve people in the policies that affect them’ is associated with 
the ‘new public health’, the Ottawa Charted5 and now Saving Lives. The difficulty in 
helping people to be involved in policy development, whilst at the same time not 
referring to political organisation for fear of being politically partisan, is a problem 
that the local NHS grapples with and which the thesis seeks to investigate further.
95 The Ottawa Charter is referred to in section 1.2 of this chapter, under the heading 'The ‘new ’ public 
health \
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Chapter 3 The Research Plan and Process
Introduction
This chapter outlines the research design used to investigate the inquiry’s hypothesis. 
The hypothesis, described in the introduction, is that broad political considerations, 
issues and tensions in the Labour Party and government, concerning aspects of the 
‘wider determinants of health’, played a role in affecting the pattern and speed of 
local implementation of the policy to reduce health inequalities. The hypothesis was 
set in context by making comparisons with the factors that were found to affect the 
implementation of previous public health policy (LSHTM, 1997).
The chapter, firstly, looks briefly at the relationship between the methods chosen and 
the epistemological and theoretical background to the study. Then discussed are the 
pros and cons of a case study approach within the field of policy implementation 
studies. The particular case study area is described along with research access issues. 
Following this, the research design and methods are outlined. The methods discussed 
are: in-depth interviews, participant observation and documentary and data analysis.
Whilst the approach adopted relies primarily on qualitative data collection, the author 
would concur with the social science literature that questions both a neat fit between 
quantitative methods and empiricism, and that which rules out an empiricist use of 
qualitative data (Bryman, 1984; King, Keohane, Verba, 1994). Data, be they 
qualitative or quantitative, may be used in different ways. They may be allowed to 
speak for themselves and tell us ‘facts’, an approach associated with a positivist or 
empiricist orientation. Or they may be placed within a theoretical framework and 
interpreted by means of some rules of logic, in order to provide varying degrees of 
foreknowledge (Eckstein, 1975). Alternatively, there is a relativist or post-modern 
approach that claims, to a greater or lesser extent, that all ‘facts’ and descriptions are 
open to interpretation and there is no one correct view of what has happened, is 
happening, and will happen. Here the author treads a path, as May (1997: 15, 136) 
and others advise, bridging the extremes of positivism and post-modernism. One 
advantage of looking at research from divergent epistemological perspectives is that it 
may sensitise us to questions surrounding the validity of the research methods
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selected. A positivist perspective would be concerned to question thus: ‘Can we trust 
a single case study? Can we trust these open-ended interviews?’ And a more post­
modern perspective might ask: ‘Can we trust these policy recommendations, based as 
they are, on ‘ruleful’ assumptions?’.
As advised by, among others, Clyde Mitchell (1983), Eckstein (1975), Hall, Land, 
Parker and Webb (1975) and Pollitt et al (1990), the case study approach needs to 
start with a preliminary theoretical framework. This has been developed in the 
preceding chapters. Pollitt et al (1990: 179) suggest that initially, and in practice, this 
process can mean a rather general movement towards establishing relevant concepts. 
A somewhat similar and iterative process occurred in developing and undertaking this 
research. Acheson’s (1998) terms - ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ - and Saving Lives 's 
split in responsibilities between local people and national government, coupled with 
missives to involve local people in factors affecting their health, suggested a paradox 
that theories of democracy and power might help to unpack. At the same time these 
and related theories suggested the need to investigate local institutions, values and 
democratic models that might have been sidelined without the theoretical signposting.
A Case Study Approach
Whilst a single case study, focusing in depth on opinions and events in one 
geographical area over a five-year period, is a legitimate and appropriate method for 
considering the thesis’s research question, it is not the only approach that might have 
been adopted. It was taken with the knowledge that it might complement other 
research. It was not designed to be the only contribution to the field, as others have, 
for instance, done surveys (Benzeval, forthcoming). One of the interviewees in this 
case study, by coincidence, had replied to her questionnaire of 2000, administered by 
Queen Mary’s College, University of London. Multiple case studies have also been 
conducted over shorter time-spans (Exworthy and Powell, 2000). The pulling together 
of a series of complementary and comparable case studies into a meta-analysis can 
successfully move us towards the Popperian criteria of results being replicable and 
generalisable (Popper, 2002).
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Attention to contextual material is recommended, this enhances comparability, and 
legitimate claims can be made of being able to move beyond ‘situational relativism’ 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 22). The features of the case study area are described in a 
separate section below. A number of features in the study area are taken into account, 
for example, that it is an inner-city area that attracted HAZ funding. It may be 
suggested that, for various reasons, NHS professionals working in Labour voting 
areas are more likely to espouse egalitarian values than their equivalents in 
Conservative voting areas. Further research would be needed to test this view; and it 
does not mean that the results are not generali sable to geographical areas more 
relevant to the policy under investigation.
‘Realism’ in social science (see for example, Keat and Urry (1975) and Sayer (1984)) 
attempts to overcome the problems of both positivism and relativism. In lay terms, it 
does not accept that immediate observable empirical data is the only reliable source of 
evidence and the only way to reveal causal processes, but at the same time it wants to 
be able to produce a hierarchy of truth which is grounded in reality. To do this it 
emphasises ‘theory’ and ‘context’. The author endorses the view that a rigorous 
account of theory and context can help in elucidating realities that are less than 
immediately observable but which, nevertheless, make sense as fact. The 
methodological problems posed by positivism and relativism may not entirely 
disappear as they might also be applied to the contextual and ‘beneath the surface’ 
factors themselves. But the increased role of context and theory in research 
methodology, as exemplified by Pawson and Tilley (1997) and Chen and Rossi 
(1989) (see also, Magee, 1985: 22), is applicable to case studies and helpful in 
enhancing their value.
“The realistic explanation of programs involves an understanding of their 
mechanisms, contexts and outcomes, and so requires asking questions about 
the reasoning and resources of those involved in the initiative, the social and 
cultural conditions necessary to sustain change, and the extent to which one 
behavioural regularity is exchanged for another.” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 
154)
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An attempted has been made to follow the research values inherent in this statement, 
in particular by asking questions about reasoning, and, social and cultural conditions. 
The theoretical base has not simply been applied to assessing the inputs and outputs of 
a programme but has attempted to set up and test an explanation of processes and in 
doing so the study’s design was altered, for instance by the inclusion of local 
councillors among the interviewees (Chen and Rossi, 1989).
Case study methodology developed from ethnography and social anthropology, used 
to analyse human behaviour in context. According to Yin “...you would use the case 
study method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual conditions -  
believing that they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study.” (Yin, 
1989: 13). And it would be used when “ the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.” The way in which the research question has been 
posed makes good use of this facet of the case study method.
The questions asked need not dictate the method adopted (Bryman, 1994). Having 
said this, decisions to concentrate on particular aspects of the data available were 
taken with the knowledge that these were areas that surveys, for instance, might find 
more difficult to determine accurately. Whichever method is chosen must be explicit, 
as it can affect the data. Here an unusual opportunity was presented to work in this 
way (Yin, 1989: 40) and this also contributed to reasoning that the method was 
appropriate.
The case study approach should, according to Yin, employ a variety of different 
methods for empirical data collection (Yin, 1989: 8, 92). “Any finding or conclusion 
in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on 
several different sources of information...” (Yin, 1989: 92). The present researcher 
used participant-observation, in-depth interviews, documentary analysis, and 
participant-testing or action research (described below). This represents a form of 
triangulation. Triangulation of analytical models is exemplified by Allison’s 1971 
study of the Cuban missile crisis, in which he uses three different models drawn from 
political science in order to interpret the same events. This is also an approach that the 
author has attempted to draw on in theoretical discussions in chapters 1 and 2, 
although the data are not systematically analysed from three perspectives.
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Decisions on which case study area to pick need not focus on what is likely to be the 
most representative of cases. Hakim (1987: 63) describes ways in which typical, 
deviant or critical cases may be of use. Here, the particular case may be regarded as 
typical of areas significant to the policy implementation under investigation.
The case study may also vary according to whether it is exploratory, descriptive or 
explanatory (Yin, 1989: 4). According to Hakim: “ ..special effort is required to 
achieve the intellectual rigour of an explanatory study, and case studies can all too 
easily slip back into being descriptive and exploratory in the main.” (1987: 72). In this 
study the author has provided an exploratory account of developments and attempted 
to explain particular aspects of the implementation process. If recommendations for 
future actions, based on assumed values, are to be made, then some forecasting based 
on predictions of regularity is required (Eckstein, 1975: 88). A purely exploratory or 
descriptive account on its own is less helpful in this task, while provision of some 
rationale for the observed phenomena will mean that prediction becomes more 
feasible.
In Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy a series of case studies showing 
policy innovation, development and reform are described. The conclusions drawn 
from these studies include “certain propositions about what determines the priority 
that an issue attains.” (Hall, Land, Parker and Webb, 1975: 476). The propositions 
include: legitimacy, feasibility, support, association, trend expectation, origin, 
information, and ideology. These provide a wide framework within which to consider 
the determinants of health inequalities policy in inner-London.96 An assessment of 
factors at play while the policy was being developed may point to drivers and blocks 
likely to continue into implementation. This is particularly so as policy often develops 
further once implementation starts, as was very much the case with the policy 
investigated.
96 In one of the case studies the events and circumstances preceding the Clean Air Act, passed by the 
British parliament in 1956, are outlined. The conclusions of the case study investigation are related to 
Hall et al’s overall framework. For example, the issue of clean air was in an ‘acutely competitive 
position’ (p. 381), not least because available technical solutions and information pointed to the need 
for reformed housing design, but post-war housing demands were for simple and rapid expansion. An 
ideological brake on further legislative controls was also being promoted by the then Conservative 
government The act eventually got through because it was legitimate, feasible and had strong support
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The policy considered here appears to have been founded on the strengths of 
legitimacy, key support, trend expectation, origin and ideology. This is because it was 
associated with a twenty-year build-up of academic interest, research practice, central 
and local political ideology and administrative experience. However, problems still 
remained which primarily related to information and feasibility, but also drew out 
specific issues within the category of ‘support’. The questions and observations 
regarding local implementation developments sought to assess support and, related to 
this, opinions and ideologies regarding feasibility.
An important research study in the USA (1971) builds on the above criteria. Crenson's 
analysis involves two detailed case studies and investigates opinions related to the 
“issue-ness” of air pollution. The subjects were 'leaders' -  from mayors to local labor 
council presidents - in 51 American cities (Crenson, 1971: 32). Crenson discusses the 
extent to which data from these interviews can be taken as evidence. But for our 
purposes, the interest is that he was assessing not only what their opinions and 
influence helped to make happen, but also what this cocktail prevented from taking 
place. Certain people and institutions, and certain combinations of people, policy and 
institutions, it was held, had the power to enforce inaction (p. 33). Similarly, Bachrach 
and Baratz (1962) strongly suggest that the ‘issues’ kept off a public agenda are as 
important as those placed on the agenda for discussion.
Stephen Lukes, in Power: A Radical View (1974), refers to Crenson's study as 
containing "certain elements of the three-dimensional view of power" (p. 60), which 
Lukes's book describes. Lukes is concerned with possible bias in the way political 
agendas are controlled, and with methods deployed to suppress latent conflict. This is 
a potentially treacherous line of enquiry, criticised by Polsby (1963), since it involves 
assessment of things that did not happen. However, Crenson's study uses a 
comparative approach, which has been widely accepted as useful (Hill, 1997a: 40). 
This is because it allows factors present in some geographical areas, where policy 
implementation moved faster than expected, to be noted against those processes and 
institutions that were different in the sluggish implementation areas. Crenson’s 
research thus empirically supports Lukes’s theory. The research design does not 
explicitly seek to further validate Lukes’s theory. As outlined in chapter 1, the author
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used Lukes’s theory for planning the research, in that it provided for the possibility 
that certain ‘activity’ and processes may be unfolding, which can easily be 
overlooked.97
Case study area and key service components
The case study concentrated on aspects of policy implementation in the London 
Borough of Lewisham. This was part of Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham Health 
Authority (LSLHA) until 1st April 2002. On this date the health authority was 
officially disbanded and the six primary care groups of Lambeth, Southwark and 
Lewisham (LSL) became three primary care trusts whose boundaries were 
coterminous with those of the local authorities. The health promotion department 
continued to work across the three boroughs of LSL after April 1st 2002, a situation 
that, as will be seen in chapter 4, caused some local friction.
In 2001 the second ‘Lewisham health profile’ was produced by a partnership of 
council and NHS public health and health promotion staff. This was an update of a 
1996 document containing population and health statistics. It also provided more 
information relating to the ‘wider determinants of health’ than its predecessor and 
gave some information on ‘partnerships for health improvement and regeneration’. 
The initial meetings to plan the 2001 document were more ambitious in their aims to 
link health with its wider determinants. Nevertheless, there is a perceptible change in 
character between the two reports. Given the previous discussion on Labour’s public 
health policy in the 1970s its full title is of interest: The Health o f Lewisham -  
everybody’s business (THL).
Lewisham’s population in 2001 was approximately 242,000 (THL, 2001: 6). The 
index of multiple deprivation score (IMD)98 shows that sixteen, out of twenty-six 
wards in the borough lie in the most deprived 20 per cent of wards in England. 
Lewisham is the eleventh most deprived borough in the country (THL, 2001:9). The 
age profile is comparatively young (THL, 2001:6). “It is estimated that 69,500 of
97 One example, picked up in the interviews, being, ‘non-activity’ in recruiting Labour Party members.
98 “The Index of Multiple Deprivation [IMD] score, developed by the Department of Environment and 
Transport [DETR], is a composite of seven components called domains [child poverty, access, 
education, employment, income, housing and health]. The higher the domain score the more deprived 
the area.” (THL, 2001:6).
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Lewisham’s total population (28.7%) are of black and other minority ethnic origin, for 
England and Wales the figure is around six per cent.” (THL, 2001:6). New census 
data were released in 2003, which showed a similar picture (Wallace, 2003).
Those services and partnerships associated most closely with work to reduce health 
inequalities were: the Healthier Lewisham Partnership, the LSLHA, the health 
promotion department, the local authority, the NHS community health trust and the 
other NHS trusts, the voluntary sector and, from 2002, the primary care trust. As will 
be seen below, all these parties in the ‘governance network’ (Rhodes, 1988) have 
been included in the data collection processes.
Research Access
Having commenced employment within the LSL health promotion department in 
March 1997 the present author was well placed to conduct the study from the 
perspectives of participant observation, local documentaiy analysis, in-depth 
interviews, informal questioning and follow-up questioning.
Permission was not explicitly sought to conduct participant observation for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the research strategy did not require any information of an 
individual or professionally sensitive nature that would reveal the identities of 
associated actors to be included in the writing up of the report. Secondly, given the 
partnership nature and changing membership of many of the meetings that were the 
subject of participant observation, a genuine attempt to gain agreement of all those 
involved would have been too disruptive to the business in hand.
These guidelines would clearly not apply in other participant observation scenarios. It 
was believed that the research findings could easily be reported so as not to cause any 
personal damage or offence. Moreover, this would not require self-censorship that 
would interfere with the accurate presentation of findings. In other research situations 
the best method of obtaining data may also be classed as unethical and therefore ruled 
out. However, in this case no real problems of this nature were envisaged. In 1999 the 
author enquired as to whether NHS ethics committee approval for the research was
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required, she was informed by the local NHS research manager that it was not (see 
appendix 3.1).
Furthermore, whilst not a justification for more covert participant observation, the 
intention was only to report on those processes that would legitimately be considered 
to be within the public domain. It was fairly open and common knowledge that the 
research was being conducted and it was not a secretive operation. It is also the case 
that to break from ethical considerations would be damaging to future employment 
opportunities within the local NHS. This is not to say that the substantive content of 
the thesis is altered by considerations of future employment, but simply that 
presentation of the main findings is not restricted by the need for confidentiality. The 
possibility of conscious or unconscious researcher bias must be considered and may 
have inadvertently operated in some form within the thesis production. Again, the 
formal processes of methodological openness are one attempt to mitigate against the 
pressures of unconscious bias. An awareness of and deliberate attempt to overcome 
potential factors, such as professional association, has been a focus of attention. But it 
is also the case that some pressures that might result in bias were not present. For 
instance, state or business commissioned studies may be pressurised to play down 
policy recommendations known to be at odds with government or company thinking 
(an example is given by Crenson, 1971).
The research design
The research questions specific to this implementation study were, in part, influenced 
by the research opportunity offered. This is a situation that might be regarded as 
luxurious by research workers contracted to provide reports for institutions such as the 
health service, charitable bodies and trade unions.
The plan was to trace the progress of government strategy when it arrived ‘on local 
desks’ and was placed in staff briefs and on the agendas of local organisations. This 
would provide a unique perspective on the factors influencing progress at the local 
level. Participant observation would provide a crosscheck on interview reports. 
Government policy to reduce health inequalities reached the case study area in 
different forms, but broadly speaking it was as White Papers, NHS directives and
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local government directives. ‘The implemented and their work* was a complex and 
constantly changing target for research. To detail all the aspects of work on the 
subject and its evaluation was beyond the scope of the study. The decision was made 
therefore, to concentrate on specific aspects of implementation, including the 
development of local targets and strategy, actors’ beliefs, and relations with non-NHS 
forces shaping public participation.
The time period ‘in the field’ was extensive (March 1997 to July 2003) and therefore 
a number of phases of implementation could be discerned. The research design was 
able to respond to these new groups and structures. As will become evident in later 
chapters, the plans for target setting and strategy development constantly evolved and 
observation moved with this situation.
The research methods
Further details on the key methods employed will now be provided.
In-depth interviews
Thirty-seven, in-depth semi-structured interviews (May, 1997: 111-113) were 
conducted with a range of key staff responsible, in various ways, for the process of 
policy implementation. Interviewees were chosen in order to gain as wide a 
perspective and range of opinions on the process as possible. Interviewing continued 
until the researcher was satisfied that no more broad perspectives, representative of 
local work cultures, would be acquired. Those interviewed included: public health 
department staff, local authority staff, voluntary sector staff, local councillors, trade 
union officials, and non-public health NHS staff. In each department more than one 
interview was conducted in order to widen the range of opinions identified.
The interviewer shared a general remit for work on the topics discussed at the 
interviews with many of the key interviewees. This poses potential hazards since it 
may be suspected that under such circumstances interviewees could tailor their 
answers to fit what they felt were the views of the interviewer. Care was taken to try 
to avoid this problem. Firstly, the work site was separate from the locality of the 
research subjects. The health promotion unit where the researcher was based was in
105
Southwark and the field study area was Lewisham. Therefore, the author’s 
connections with the staff* interviewed in Lewisham were mainly limited to formal 
meetings and the majority of interviewees were people who the author had not met 
previously, at least outside of formal settings. Secondly, the interviews were 
conducted relatively early on in the researcher’s attachment to Lewisham. Thirdly, the 
staff member that the author worked with most closely was not interviewed. The 
impression was gained that interviewees did not know what the researcher thought 
about the topics in question, as many of them asked at the end of the process what the 
author’s views were.
All those interviewed were informed by letter about the nature of the research. It was 
decided that assurances of confidentiality would generally assist the confidence of 
interviewees in providing more ‘honest’ responses." Therefore, this was put in 
writing to all interviewees, aside from the 2 mentioned. Some then volunteered, 
without this being requested, that the interview need not be treated as confidential (see 
appendix 3.1).
Details of the interviewees are listed in figure 3.1. In order to maintain anonymity, job 
titles have been merged in the reporting of the data in chapters 4-6. Thus, while 3 
chief executives (2 NHS and 1 CHC) and 2 chairs (1 PCG and 1 health authority) 
were interviewed, all of these have been reported as ‘chief executive (NHS)’.
In line with elite interview techniques, the interviews progressed flexibly (Dexter, 
1970). A series of topics comprising of five broad issues guided the interview process. 
These were: 1. introductory issues: personal context, changes in importance of the 
issue, success or otherwise so far. 2. target setting locally. 3. national and local 
balance of responsibilities and effects of actions. 4. public involvement. 5. 
redistribution. Twelve questions were developed in order to prompt discussion on the 
topics (Appendix 3.2). Discussion was allowed to digress and to focus on areas of 
importance to the interviewee. Given the specialist roles of interviewees the same 
questions were not posed in the same order in all interviews and some questions were 
dropped. For instance, some questions on NHS target setting would have been
99 The mayor of Lewisham’s letter stated that he would be identified in the thesis. The letter sent to Sir 
Donald Acheson prior to the interview did not say that the interview would be confidential.
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inappropriate for use with local authority and voluntary sector staff. And some 
specific questions were asked of councillors.
The topic areas might have been raised in a more unstructured manner with no 
recourse to specific predetermined questions. However, in this instance it was 
considered that a semi-structured process, containing elements of both open interview 
techniques and more formal procedures, was appropriate. The reasons for this 
approach were, firstly, opportunities to assess interviewees’ general concerns were 
more available in a less formal arena. Secondly, the research question pointed to a 
need to raise issues that were not necessarily part of the normal content of local 
discussions on the subject. Therefore, it was considered that specific interrogation to 
obtain views would be needed. Unless particular questions had been asked about the 
Labour Party and the trade unions, for instance, it was anticipated that these areas 
would not have been raised. The impression was that interviewees did welcome the 
‘permission’ granted, by the asking of specific questions, to talk on subjects related to 
the area they were working in, but outside the normal content of professional 
dialogue.
Interviews lasted on average 60 minutes, with some lasting 90 minutes. All interviews 
were transcribed within three weeks of the interview date. Transcripts were sent to 
some interviewees for clarification, to check errors, and for elaboration. Informal 
follow-up of points raised was possible with other respondents. One interviewee was 
used as a key informant and was interviewed last. The informant’s views on others’ 
general anonymised responses were discussed for cross-checking and validation.
Opportunities were taken in conferences, seminars and meetings to ask questions of 
the Minister for Public Health, local members of parliament, councillors, senior NHS 
and Department of Health staff, trade union officers and general practitioners not 
formally interviewed.
Observation and questioning of staff from groups not specifically represented within 
the interviewing programme was also undertaken. In particular health visitors, district 
nurses, school nurses, an environmental health officer and a trading standards officer 
were questioned.
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Table 3.1 Categories o f Interviewee
Title provided in thesis 
text against quotes
General titles included 
in this category10*
Sector Number of 
interviewees
Health promotion 
worker
Health promotion 
manager
Health promotion 
specialist
NHS health promotion 2
Senior manager (NHS)/ 
Senior practitioner
Public health specialists 
HAZ senior workers 
Staff employed in public 
participation roles 
Members of the 
Healthier Lewisham 
Partnership Board
NHS health authority 7
Director of public 
health/consultant in 
public health
Consultant in public 
health
Director of public health
NHS 2
General practitioner General practitioner Primary care 1
Chief executive Chief executive 
Chair
NHS/CHC 5
Community 
development 
worker/voluntary sector 
worker
Community 
development worker
Voluntary sector, joint 
local authority/NHS 
post
7
Local authority officer Middle
management/senior 
management — 
partnerships
Local authority (London 
borough of Lewisham)
3
Councillor: ‘New’ 
Labour, ‘Old’ Labour,101 
Socialist Party
Councillors Local authority 4
Steve Bullock Lewisham Mayor Local authority I
Trade union official Trade union official Trade union 2
Civil servant/senior 
manager (NHS)
London Region (NHS) 
and DoH officials
Civil service 2
Sir Donald Acheson Former chief medical 
officer. Chair -  
Independent Inquiry into 
inequalities in Health
Academic. Former civil 
servant.
1
Tessa Jowell (telephone 
interview agreed but not 
arranged)
Former Minister for 
Public Health
Government Minister (1)
Total 37
In order to look at the local implementation process there is a need to uncover: “Who 
the dramatis personae were, [their social relationships,] what they did and how they 
reacted to the events in which they were involved.” (Clyde Mitchell, 1983: 204). 
Some contacts for in-depth interview emerged in the course of participant 
observation.
100 Where unique titles exist, broader descriptions are provided.
101 The aim was to interview councillors from the right and left of the party. A contact with knowledge 
of the local party identified the interviewees.
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Twenty of the 37 interviewees were women. This reflects the position of women in 
NHS public health and community health management positions in the borough. Five 
interviewees were of African or African-Caribbean origin and three were from other 
minority ethnic groups. As with the gender balance, no specific attempts were made 
to interview staff from minority ethnic groups. Work roles, followed by availability, 
were the deciding factors.
The social class background of the interviewees is assessed here only on the basis of 
unsolicited comments made at interview or in post-interview chatting while sharing 
car or train journeys. On this basis, eleven interviewees came from backgrounds 
where one or more of the following factors existed: father in manual occupation, lived 
in council house, brought up on low income. A further eleven came from backgrounds 
where father was teacher or businessman, went to private school or was “middle- 
class”. The class background of the remaining interviewees was not ascertained. 
Whilst the choice of interviewees was not organised to acquire an average profile of 
workers from the employment sectors concerned on the basis of gender, race and 
class, in the event the distribution was fairly representative of the local staff profile.
Some questions asked at interview depended on the special experiences of the 
interviewee. Thus, there was little to be gained in focusing on the topic guide section 
referring to the details of target setting in discussions with community development 
workers or local councillors. Other areas concerning income inequalities and trade 
union involvement were asked of all respondents. In the course of discussion the 
particular concerns of interviewees were allowed to develop. Prompting also took 
place where it was felt that less than full answers had been given.
Participant observation
The researcher was employed as Business Manager at the health promotion 
department for the case study area in March 1997. The role initially involved working 
as part of the department’s senior management team on areas such as budget 
management, marketing, building refurbishment. However, given the post holder’s 
previous experience and reorganisation within the department, the role developed to 
take on a broader health promotion management remit. Part of the new role of the post 
was to be a ‘borough link’. This was an innovation for the department, made in
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response to the gradual move towards trust status of the six primary care groups 
within the three boroughs: thus in 1999 three of the five senior managers became 
‘borough links’. The post of Senior Manager, health policy and business, which the 
Business Manager’s role had developed into, became the Lewisham link. This meant 
the post would be responsible for working with the Healthier Lewisham partnership, 
of which the health promotion department was a part, and acting as a conduit for 
information flowing between the department and the borough. Since the Healthier 
Lewisham partnership was widely recognised as the most likely body to take the lead 
responsibility for raising the profile of health inequalities work in Lewisham, this 
presented an ideal opportunity to follow through new national policy implementation 
in a local setting.
Participant observation took a number of forms. Firstly, some observation was 
'simple1, that is "passive unobtrusive observation"; for instance, in the recording of 
early Primary Care Group board meeting discussions (Robson, 1993: 159). Secondly, 
some observation was of a more participatory nature. The 'Lewisham link' work 
involved sitting on a planning group for the organisation of a health inequalities 
conference and on a post-conference sub-board. Here the researcher was able both to 
observe and interact with colleagues and to experience first-hand the issues facing 
local staff when they come to attempt to follow through government policy. Thirdly, 
the researcher was able, in the course of work, to ask a range of staff informally for 
their opinions and to discuss aspects of health inequalities work.102 Fourthly, opinions 
expressed in informal settings, in corridors, making tea and coffee, travelling to 
meetings and in social settings provided occasional confirmation of previous 
observation and a context to the work. Finally, opportunities to attend academic 
seminars and London public health network conferences on the topic of health 
inequalities were occasionally provided to the staff of the health promotion unit. The 
researcher attended some of these in a work capacity and at others colleagues took 
notes or made tapes. Invitations to attend various other ‘one-ofF events were also sent 
to the health promotion department and taken up by the researcher. For example, she 
attended a session of the House of Commons health committee enquiry into public 
health, a briefing on the health remit of the new GLA and a Public Health Association
102 For instance, staff came to the health promotion department for courses and one-day training events.
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meeting with the Minister for Public Health, Yvette Cooper. This activity gave the 
researcher an invaluable ‘feel’ for the context, culture and salience of the issues being 
researched.
Striving towards objectivity in order to provide an accurate account of what took 
place may pose problems for the participant observer. Getting to like or dislike 
colleagues, having worries about employment opportunities, not wanting to let people 
down, and generally being ‘too deep into the trees to see the wood’, could all be 
problems within this research method. However, there are a number of advantages, 
the following two being key. Firstly, it makes the balance of concerns and issues for 
local staff easier to assess, even when compared with the picture gained from in-depth 
interviews. Aspects of local implementation that may simply not appear on interview 
topic guides or in questionnaires may also present themselves. Secondly, researchers 
not using participatory methods are still at risk of being influenced by prevailing 
opinion within work settings in a way that detracts from being open to understanding 
the nuances of the local setting.
The local forums within which decisions on health inequality reduction and strategies 
to achieve these target reductions were made, were as follows:
North Lewisham PCG board meetings 
South Lewisham PCG board meetings 
Lewisham PCT board meetings
The Healthier Lewisham partnership board steering group 
The Healthier Lewisham partnership board health inequalities sub-group 
The health authority's HimP sub-group on health inequalities (covers 
Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham)
The Lewisham HimP group 
Health authority board meetings 
The Lewisham PCGs public health workstream 
One-off, ad hoc meetings.
Although observation was semi-structured, the intention was to pay particular 
attention to the areas listed as follows. In practice, this list can be organised under the 
topics of the interview guide.
I l l
a. Targets.
Every discussion referring to health inequalities targets was of particular interest as 
the requirement for local areas to set their own targets immediately posed difficulties 
for local implemented.
b. Evidence o f beliefs on the links between income and health inequalities, and o f the 
relative importance o f national work compared to local work.
This was a key theme of the interviews, and observations provided a cross-reference, 
validating and enriching the interview data.
c. Links with local elected politicians and taking issues to elected politicians (MPs 
and councillors).
Any mention of local politicians was noted. References normally related to getting 
politicians to conferences and having photographs taken with them. In the course of 6 
years the number of unprompted individual references to local politicians observed in 
public health, health promotion, primary care and interagency settings was less than 
10.
d  Strengthening participation in the political process.
The reason for observation of points c and d  is because of concern to note support for 
public involvement in influencing the upstream and downstream causes of health 
inequalities.
e. Linking with national public health organisations.
This point is derived from the previous analysis of public health history, where 
professional lobbies were correlated with changes in public health practice. The 
reasoning associated with points c and d  is also pertinent.
f  Training fo r staff on health inequalities issues.
This was taken as a general measure of commitment to, and understanding of, the 
need for changes in practice in order to address the policy issues. Given the aim of 
improving public health capacity, outlined in Saving Lives, developments in public 
health training were anticipated. These were not evident until 2003; when funding
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was made available for health impact assessment, project management and change 
management training.
g. Similar issues to those described by Loney in relation to the CDPs (Loney, 1983). 
That is, statutory concerns over the ‘politicisation’ of community development work, 
as well as frustrations among community development workers about their remit.
h. Inter-borough disputes on funding distribution and concerns and pressures 
resultingfrom funding issues.
Given institutional changes and a new work remit, it was considered likely that issues 
regarding finance would arise. The extent to which financial concerns blocked 
progress was monitored.
Staff workload pressures.
Again as in point h, this issue would be likely to mean delayed or distorted 
implementation.
j. Reduction o f action on inequalities to 'allocation o f care' issues. For example, GP 
protocols on treatment o f chest pain.
Given the change in emphasis noted in chapter 2, in the move from Green to White 
public health paper, that is, an increased focus on secondary prevention, this item was 
considered worthy of observation. Hall et al (1975) refer to the importance of 
competition between different policy priorities. The competition between primary 
prevention and secondary prevention, bordering onto acute care, is a central 
conundrum of modem public health practice.
k. NHS staff involvement in issues affecting the wider determinants o f health.
Work involvement was noted, and this was most informative in providing information 
on what projects were being invested in, from a time and financial perspective. For 
example, knowledge of funding for work on warm homes and energy efficiency, and 
staffing allocated to this area, was ascertained from agency work plans and events, 
rather than from observation at the level of individual conversations.
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/. Evidence o f staff views on the relationship between wealth inequalities and trade 
union organisation.
See point m below.
m. Evidence o f staff views on the role o f local and national Labour policy affecting 
inequalities.
Points / and m were issues that were part of the interview topic guide. Any ‘natural’ 
occurrence during the participant observation was to be noted. With regard to / none 
occurred within the 6 year period. As far as m goes few comments specifically on 
Labour policy affecting inequalities or redistribution were observed. In some 
meetings discussions on poverty took place and these have been reported in the text. 
But these issues were not discussed much when staff across the organisation were 
socialising. As the interviews indicate, this does not mean that the same people did 
not have opinions on the subject.
n. Evidence o f participants and forums being controlled in order to minimise dissent. 
This concern arose from a reading of Crenson (1971) and Lukes (1974). Some 
examples of this activity is provided in chapters 4-6.
o. Evidence o f grappling with the difficulties o f the subject.
As has been noted in discussion on Hall at al (1975) ‘feasibility’ was seen as a 
potential block at the local level; thus the concern to monitor this point.
p. Conflict in prioritising between inequalities in health caused by either inequalities 
in income or disadvantages associated with minority ethnic group membership.
A recommendation to address health inequalities associated with minority ethnic 
status was included in the Acheson report (1998). This area did not necessarily 
generate conflict. However, given the general confusion as to where to begin work to 
reduce health inequalities, this added dimension was likely to create more questions 
as to the correct priorities. The extent to which income inequalities are the cause of 
inequalities in ethnic minority health status is analysed by Nazroo (1999). The 
researcher was interested to observe whether debate within the academic field was 
mirrored at the local level.
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q. Other issues arising, which were not anticipated but were considered to be relevant 
to the research topic, were noted and included in the analysis.
This was a particularly important point. Subjects of relevance that had not been 
preconceived in planning the topics of interest to observe were noted when they arose.
Pre-interviews and post-interviews observation concentrated on firstly, building-up 
corroborative evidence to show that the interview topics were credible and of 
sufficient research interest. Secondly, it added additional sources and reconfirmed 
opinions expressed in interview. No new discrete staff opinions were encountered 
post-interviews, but the weight and richness of the data was enhanced. The 
implementation environment and reaction to new policy elements continued to unfold, 
intensifying certain findings and causing others to become less significant from a 
staff, if not a research, perspective.
Documentary evidence
All the relevant local documents were easily accessible to the researcher. Minutes of 
certain meetings such as the health authority board were circulated to the health 
promotion managers as a matter of course and national policy was also made 
available to staff.
Local policy documents, minutes, monitoring submissions, the local health 
improvement programme and the Lewisham community plan are among the 
documents studied. This documentation was a source of factual information and gave 
a perspective on priorities within the borough. Policy documents in general had a 
tendency to show a side to the work that was ‘confident’, ‘professional’ and ‘in 
control’. The researcher also witnessed some of the debates, disputes, uncertainties, 
confusions and frustrations that lay behind many of these local public documents.
Minutes of meetings were used as factual records and reminders of attendance. 
Although, participant observation of meetings often revealed more of a picture of the 
feelings of the agents involved and their doubts about how to proceed, that went 
beyond the formal minutes. Local documentary evidence was reviewed for its key 
features and linkages with other sources of data. However, no formal content analysis 
was conducted at this stage.
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Some comparison has been made throughout the research with developments in the 
London boroughs of Lambeth and Southwark. This has been achieved by a review of 
key documents, for instance HimP development. However, informal inquiries and 
updates from within local public health and health promotion sector, where many 
colleagues worked in the two boroughs was the main source of information. Whilst 
the characters involved were different in each area, a broadly similar pace of progress 
was noted; although it might be argued that in 1997 Lewisham started with and 
maintained a lead, in relation to the sophistication and effective functioning of its 
health partnership structures.
A close review of the national documentation such as the Green and White public 
health papers (1998, 1999 respectively) was undertaken using an informal content 
analysis approach (Berelson, 1952). Firstly, the documents were read to gain an 
overview and a perspective on how they related to the research question. With this 
general knowledge of the documents’ contents, a broad list of headings was drawn up, 
including such features as conceptions of health promotion, that is the ‘medical 
model’ and the ‘new public health model’; fit with New Labour strategy; local role - 
national role; and, role of income inequalities. These headings related to themes noted 
in the general reading, and issues known to be of relevance following a reading of 
public health history outlined in chapter 2. The headings assisted in the identification 
of examples of text that matched the categories’ subjects. Picking out quotes from the 
text which related to the subjects chosen helped in developing a thorough knowledge 
of the policy and in formulating the interview questions and observation points.
Analysis of tbe data
The interview data was analysed at a number of levels. Firstly, as referred to above, 
within the interviews themselves, additional probing on points considered to be of 
particular interest meant that data were being actively sifted, prioritised and in some 
senses informally analysed even at that stage. Secondly, the themes and headings 
through which the data were coded were, in part, generated both by a later reading of 
the transcripts, and by the researcher’s mental sifting of what respondents had said, 
which, throughout the process of interviewing, transcribing and initial analysis
116
remained in active memory. The fact that the environment within which many of the 
interviewees operated was known o£ in a professional sense, to the researcher prior to 
interview possibly meant that what they said was more vivid and easier to remember 
than where interviewing takes place on the basis of, for example, a random sample of 
survey respondents.
A gradual process of theme development, coding and theme refinement took place in 
reading the transcripts. The themes to emerge as practical headings were broad and 
seemed to divide most easily into three: 1. Administrative issues, practical barriers, 
‘rowing’ tensions.103 2. Values, philosophy, principles, ideas, ‘steering’ tensions. 3. 
Speed of change, assessing change, achievements, impacts, implementation and 
evaluation tensions. This is probably because the interviewees tended to divide 
responses into what affected their individual jobs, what their own beliefs were about 
the issues raised, and how they saw general developments in the work at the local 
level. To some extent this tripartite division has been mirrored in the writing-up of the 
findings. However, the headings picked out in Saving Lives, those chosen for 
observation and the interview topics, also shape the themes picked out from within the 
three-way division of the interview data.
The number of sub-headings under these themes became very long, at thirty, twenty- 
two and fourteen respectively. After coding five transcripts using all the sub-headings 
it was considered that the process was becoming unnecessarily complex. The 
remaining transcripts were coded only according to the main themes and exemplary 
sub-code issues were highlighted.
In writing about the interview data, in chapters 4 to 6, some reference has been made 
to quantitative values. Information on the relative numbers of staff in different sectors 
describing particular views is given. Whilst the interview sample is not statistically 
significant, the respondents were considered to represent the range of local staff 
influencing the implementation process. Therefore, the balance of views within the 
interview group is of interest in the analysis. However, at the same time, even if one
103 The distinction between ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’ is made by Osborne and Gaebler (1992). Rowing 
being generally associated with the work of local agencies performing duties that they are instructed to 
undertake by government departments with strategic objectives who steer the work. Here, their 
metaphor has been adapted to use solely at the local level and ‘speed of change’ has been added.
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interviewee held a view that no other respondent shared, this view might hold sway 
and be of more influence because of the power and alliances of the respondent. This is 
why the context to the interview data is important in deriving implications.
Grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Glaser and Strauss, 1968) was not 
employed in a comprehensive manner for the start of the study. The data gained was 
analysed using previously considered theoretical guides and concerns. However, the 
recommendations of grounded theory were taken into account in that, theoretical 
interests were “open to modification and challenge by the interview data analysed.” 
(May, 1997: 125). In analysing the data, techniques recommended to enhance rigour 
were adopted, for example, looking for opposites or extremes and making 
comparisons. The objective was to become sensitive to properties that would 
otherwise be overlooked (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
Methodological debates have questioned the extent to which interview texts can be 
trusted to provide a ‘true’ representation of actions, events and beliefs (May, 1997: 
128). Here the position is taken that some scepticism is required and that factors 
supporting bias need to be considered in order to assess the level of mis-reporting. 
However, the author can also envisage situations where statements of beliefs and 
understanding of events will, firstly, be a truthful reflection of the respondents’ 
current views and secondly, lead to future action based on these responses and beliefs. 
Therefore, the process, while open to question, is worthwhile. The factors potentially 
biasing responses in the interviews were considered to be: 1. The pressure to appear to 
understand and conform to professional policy, evidence, culture and rhetoric, based 
on both employment concerns and social concerns. 2. The need to have an opinion 
and therefore to respond with a varying of a depth of belief. 3. NHS acute sector 
concerns influencing thinking within discussion on public health. 4. The topical news 
of the day. 5. Linking to point 1, the need to justify work conducted post hoc, and the 
need to justify employment at the local level. 6. Other unknowns.
An explicit attempt was made to set interviewees at ease and to create a neutral 
atmosphere. The impression gained was that respondents said what they believed to 
be true and were not intimidated by any consideration of the interviewer’s views. 
However, this does not overcome the power of cultural pressure to conform to wider
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professional and social norms. The interview data gives a view of directions of 
thought and a range of possibilities for action and change. They also provide a 
benchmark by which to assess other findings. They are not a ‘signed and sworn 
statement’ that cannot be changed by environmental developments.
Conclusion
An ideal opportunity to observe the implementation of policy from aspiration to 
implementation was provided to the researcher by way of firstly, a new work role 
allowing participant observation in one London borough, and secondly, a change of 
government and consequent public health policy changes.
A theoretical framework was sketched out in order to direct the data collection 
towards an explanation of specific issues. A case study approach was adopted, firstly, 
in order to take opportunistic advantage of the opening provided by the researcher’s 
position. Secondly, the case study method was thought to allow the broad context of 
implementation to be considered. The ultimate aim was to ascertain factors 
influencing the direction of implementation that might be missed by ‘less 
contextualised’ research.
In order to attempt to increase the reliability of the data and rigour, a process of 
methodological triangulation was adopted. Data from semi-structured interviews was 
considered against data obtained from participant observation on the same issues 
(Yin, 1994: 93). Within the interview and participant observation setting a conscious 
attempt was made to search for alternative perspectives, accounts and views that 
differed between each other. At every stage in the data collection and analysis process 
the researcher consciously attempted to look objectively at the information presented. 
Deliberately valuing a desire to find different views and values in the local setting 
helped this, along with analysis techniques referred to in this chapter (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990).
Analysis of national documents both informed the development of the research focus 
and, as subsequent national policy was released, it was considered from the 
perspective of the key emerging research issues. The opportunity to remain for a
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period of over five years in the same work environment provided temporal context to 
what, in particular periods, appeared to be factors of greater or lesser significance. For 
example, the Health Action Zone initiative seemed to be of greater significance in 
1998 than in 2002. In contrast, the ‘issue-ness’ of health inequalities was sustained 
throughout the period, although it fluctuated at particular points.
Whilst all these factors helped to increase the rigour of the research, the account 
should still be seen as ‘striving towards’ reliability. An attempt has been made, in 
chapters 1 to 3, both to provide clear theory, emphasising the case study’s context, 
and a full account of the research methods. The net has been tightened but holes 
remain, as they do in all research (Popper, 2002: 38).
With hindsight, aspects of the research process may have been altered and improved. 
Firstly, an even narrower set of research issues would have resulted in a more focused 
thesis. The author could for instance have structured the research more around the 
findings of The Health o f the Nation: a policy assessed (LSHTM, 1997). Secondly, if 
the author had had prior experience of using NVivo or a similar software package for 
examining qualitative data, analysis of the interview data would possibly have used 
this tool. NVivo’s use may ease and speed-up future qualitative analysis, but it is not 
thought that its use here would have increased the rigour of the process. Generally, the 
focus of the research was in part driven by the good opportunities available for data 
collection. Freedom from both the restrictions of collaborative programmes and the 
need to meet funders’ requirements allowed for a particular type of creative autonomy 
in respect of the research subject.
The purpose of this qualitative research has been to produce an account that is reliable 
enough to build explanations and provide an exploratory and descriptive account. 
However, the possibilities of researcher bias, local interviewee distortions and the 
potential salience of deprioritised theory and observation means that these are 
explanations that should be seen as part of a broader academic programme and used 
as ‘checks and balances’ against other research generated by a variety of methods.
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Chapter 4 
FINDINGS -  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Introduction
The incoming government of 1997 initiated reorganisation of local NHS services. In 
so doing it demonstrated an apparent belief that particular structures and institutions 
exacerbated NHS difficulties, and that restructuring would relieve those difficulties. 
Government policy recognised in institutional arrangements the ability to shape and 
control staff action, which, in turn, affects service delivery. The then health minister, 
Alan Milbum, is quoted as saying in July 2001: “Unless you get the structures right, 
you won’t get delivery” (Eaton, 2001: 10).
The new institutions and structures dominating NHS public health work environments 
in Lewisham from 1997 were: two primary care groups (North and South Lewisham 
PCGs officially operated between April 1999-April 2002), one primary care trust 
(formed in April 2002), the health action zone, reforms in local government and 
health partnerships, and requirements to set and meet targets. Observations showed 
that these structural changes influenced the implementation of policy to reduce health 
inequalities. Over the five-year period, from 1997, work was slowed down by 
constant reorganisation. But by the sixth year the reshaping of institutions linked to 
public health departments resulted in, on balance, a position of increased strength for 
the discipline of public health within the local NHS. This chapter describes these 
developments.
Academics, politicians, journalists and members of the public from across the 
political spectrum are keen to understand the relationship between increased NHS 
funding and increased delivery. For many, money appears, in colloquial terms, to 
have been thrown at the service and to have disappeared into a ‘black hole’. When 
funding has been increased, an inability to demonstrate improvements within a 
relatively short time frame (for example, two years) is met with the speculation that 
money is being wasted on increased management. Some argue that the NHS is
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unreformable and should be privatised. Explaining time lags in delivering change is 
thus crucial to the future organisation of the service and indeed, to the future of the 
welfare state in Britain. The chapter gives an insight into how policy implementation 
became delayed in the NHS, and provides a warning to those who make too speedy, 
and often negative, assessments of longer-term progress in meeting objectives.
New organisational structures might legitimately be seen as a key to understanding 
the implementation of the policy under investigation. However, notwithstanding their 
importance, the hypothesis is that the new NHS institutional environment should be 
seen within a broader political and values-based context that has also affected policy 
implementation. In order to decipher the boundaries between, and the comparative 
influence of, these different levers of change, it is necessary to firstly plot what is 
possibly the most straightforward component -  the new institutional setting. To aid 
analysis of the implementation of government policy, itself apparently influenced by a 
structural and institutional perspective, this chapter describes the particularities of the 
new local ‘institutional arrangements for the provision of public services’ (Hood, 
1987: 504; Rhodes, 1995: 52). However, the limitations of remaining within a 
descriptive institutional paradigm that underplays subjects’ behaviour and values 
should be highlighted (Dunleavy, 1982; Le Grand, 1997). The belief that particular 
reforms and the ‘modernisation’ of structures will improve delivery is based on 
assumptions and analysis of agents’ opinions and reactions (Hay, 1995). Government 
reform of NHS institutions also takes into account wider political imperatives and 
opportunity costs.
The chapter concentrates on observed institutional changes post-1997. In doing so it 
also juxtaposes these developments with the tensions of centralisation versus 
decentralisation and, to a lesser extent, with the ‘problem’ of income distribution. 
New Labour’s NHS restructuring was not primarily brought in to meet any pledges on 
public health improvement. As will be described, upheavals in the name of improved 
patient care were not always helpful to public health policy implementation. Before 
‘values’ are placed centre-stage in the next chapter, consideration should be given to 
the extent to which institutional and administrative factors helped or hampered the 
progress of local work to reduce health inequalities. While supporting an approach 
that interrelates policy and implementation (Barrett and Fudge, 1981), itself
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developed in response to a greater appreciation of the significance of agents’ values, it 
is still necessary to assess the pressure of institutional structures on agents. Accepting 
that values will have influenced the historical formation of structures need not, of 
course, lessen the immediate power of institutions to impinge on and distort 
negotiation, planning and action.
The definition of institution used here starts with the “...general agreement that, at 
their core, [political] institutions are “the rules of the game” (Rothstein, 1996:145, 
brackets added). Thus, institutions will include, for example, the requirement to set 
and work to public health targets, the organisation of partnership bodies, the 
development of primary care trusts, new duties placed on local government, the 
requirement to publish health improvement and modernisation programmes and the 
reorganisation of NHS pay scales.
The chapter will consider how recent institutional changes have affected the extent to 
which local agents with a specific interest in public health can control the health 
improvement work-plan and raise the profile of action to improve health. It will look 
at the extent to which public health agenda setting is free from a medical dominance 
that drives health improvement measures towards secondary and tertiary prevention 
work. Also considered is whether the temporary nature and instability of prevention 
programme budgets has been addressed by post-1997 changes. All these features - 
control over agenda setting, freedom from medical dominance and budgetary stability 
- are elements to be considered in an assessment of the power of the public health 
interest in the new NHS. Have recent institutional changes strengthened or weakened 
this interest? What are the longer-term effects of recent institutional changes likely to 
be? These questions will be addressed in the course of this chapter.
The chapter takes the following form. Firstly, it describes recent change and stasis in 
the structures of NHS and other agencies with a role in public health policy 
implementation in Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham (LSL). In doing this, the key 
institutions that impact on public health will be taken in turn. These are: the primary 
care groups (1999-2002) and trust (April 2002 onwards), the Healthier Lewisham 
partnership, the Health Action Zone and other initiatives, and the local authority. 
Specific work to address health inequalities within these institutions is discussed.
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The work then reports on plans and targets, covering, The NHS Plan (DoH, 2000), the 
development of LSL’s Health Improvement Programme (HimP) (LSLHA, 2001), the 
Lewisham Health Improvement and Modernisation Programme (2002) and the related 
target setting process. According to Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) the HimP was to be 
central to achieving the key aims of that White Paper (DoH, 1999: 125), that is, 
improving the health of everybody, and the worst off in particular (DoH, 1999: viii). 
The HimP was required to set out “locally-determined priorities and targets with 
particular emphasis on addressing areas of major health inequality”. It was also to be 
a “vehicle for setting strategies for the shaping of local health services.” (DoH, 
1999:125). Local staff perspectives concerning HimP development will be 
considered.
Generally, the chapter will be looking at the extent and nature of local change 
resulting from the health inequalities policy first outlined in Saving Lives, and the 
impact of parallel organisational changes on capacity to address health inequalities. 
The likely sustainability of developments, their trajectory and main dependencies will 
also be considered.
Institutional Change
The Development of Primary Care Trusts
Whilst the House of Commons Select Committee hearing on public health (2001) 
concentrated on the problems and challenges within the discipline of public health, 
the extent to which work within the field has been distracted by reorganisation aimed 
at improved patient care should not be overlooked.
Prior to 1998, the establishment of NHS Trusts, via the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act of 1990,104 had been the last major reconfiguration of NHS 
services. Ripples from this old policy were still influencing local service 
reconfiguration as PCGs (Primary Care Groups) were being introduced from 1998. 
For example, in that year two NHS trusts providing community services merged to
104 The Act gave effect to the Conservative Government’s White Paper Working for Patients (1989). 
See Klein (1995: 198).
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create the Community Health South London NHS Trust covering Lambeth, 
Southwark and Lewisham. This was because the optimum size for a community trust 
had not been agreed in the initial stages of trust creation, in the early 1990s.
The formation of NHS trusts broke up district health authorities, with direct patient 
services and related administration being provided by acute, community and specialist 
trusts, and the remaining health authority staff purchasing or ‘commissioning’ 
services from the trusts and undertaking certain public health functions. Health 
promotion departments were sometimes retained by health authorities and sometimes 
moved into community trusts. In the case of Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham the 
health promotion departments attached to the three respective health authorities were 
merged and retained by the merged health authority. At a later date this merged 
department was moved into one of the community trusts and renamed ‘Health First’; 
the two community trusts then merged. Thus, between 1986 and 2002 a member of 
staff continuously employed within the local health promotion department, would 
have been paid consecutively by five different employers. This situation has been 
typical for tens of thousands of NHS staff. However, the impact of reorganisation on 
service delivery has varied. The 1998 transfer of ‘Health First’ staff from one 
community trust to a larger merged trust, for instance, had virtually no effect on 
health promotion service delivery. Previous mergers had disrupted LSL health 
promotion staff, led to job losses and a refocusing of services. Consequently, as 
consensus among these staff indicates, there was a short-term loss of service but 
longer-term service improvement.
Two reasons, different sides of the same coin, were given by the Conservative 
government for the creation of NHS trusts in the early 1990s. Firstly, a separation of 
the ‘purchaser’ from the ‘provider’ role would ‘free providers to concentrate on 
delivery’ (Bartlett and Harrison, 1993: 90). Secondly, planners would be distanced 
from providers who might influence decisions on service investment to their own 
advantage (Dixon, 1998: 5-7). A third, and related justification, was linked to an 
understanding of the properties of markets in economic theoiy. Providers would need 
to compete for contracts and survival, using price and quality as levers (Enthoven, 
1985: 38-42).
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However, alternative explanations as to why government had created trusts were on 
offer. The view that the ‘floating-off of NHS trusts was a precursor to their 
privatisation was widespread (Unison, 1994). A belief that the division of the service 
into smaller local employer organisations was designed to weaken trade union power, 
by splitting union branches, appears not to have been widely held, outside select 
union circles (trade union official in interview). Labour, the main opposition party up 
to 1997, made a number of pre-election commitments: to scrap the internal market, to 
retain the purchaser-provider split and, in response to those urging a re-integration of 
trusts with health authorities, an end to constant service reconfiguration and upheaval 
(The Labour Party, 1996: 1,3).
Once in power the Labour government proceeded however, to institute a further series 
of profound changes in NHS service configuration. The lynchpin of this reshuffle was 
the creation of primary care trusts (PCTs). At first sight it might have looked as if 
PCT development would have little impact on public health strategy implementation. 
After all, public health departments were safely established in health authorities and, 
it was suggested, PCTs were only designed to mitigate the two-tier service created by 
GP fimd-holding (Mulligan, 1998:75). However, the public health role of PCTs was 
wider than that previously logged in primary care. They were to be responsible for the 
health of the whole population in their geographical patch, not just for patients 
attending local surgeries and health centres {The New NHS, modem  - dependable, 
DoH, 1997).105
The reasons for PCT development were again seen by non-government sources in a 
way at odds with official explanations. Some local non-medical NHS staff saw 
movements that would eventually undermine the autonomy of the family doctor, as 
they would be required to join primaiy care trusts (Le Grand, Mays, Dixon, 1998: 
138). They regarded the changes as being generally positive. One primary care 
manager said that: “The GPs do what they want. It takes so long to do anything about 
bad practice. You’ve got to be really tough with them.” She praised the work of one
105 pc t  development reintroduces a situation where purchasers and providers o f community and health 
promotion services are employed by the same organisation, thus breaking one of a number of pre-1997 
Labour policy commitments. This allows for future budgetary choices of a more immediate ‘zero-sum’ 
nature within the new PCT environment
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manager in rigorously pursuing complaints against doctors. There was also a view 
among some that family practitioners would not do anything, particularly relating to 
health promotion or training, without arguing for extra cash. She joked: “They expect 
to be paid bonuses to come to their own disciplinary hearings.” (non-interview 
discussion). However, the work of some local GPs was highly regarded.106 107
Interviews with non-medical staff involved in PCG development indicate satisfaction 
with the role PCGs were seen to have played in facilitating increased communications 
between GP practices. “[In Lewisham] we’ve not had the fighting that’s gone on in 
other areas I think. There were GPs that didn’t talk to each other from one year to the 
next, but they’ve seen us building bridges for them, making links so they can work 
together now.” (chief executive). Within Lewisham a number of prominent GPs were 
members of PCG boards and in interview professional loyalty did not appear as 
intense as may have been predicted from the literature.
The dropping of pre-1997 policy commitments by Labour is an indication of the 
rapidly changing policy environment.108 Staff were sometimes uncertain of the status 
of old policy. By 2003 some public health staff were surprised to learn that Saving 
Lives was still public health policy. As a civil servant in interview said: “Old policies 
are not officially dumped. They are simply replaced by new policies, so that it is 
difficult to tell if policy still stands or not.”. As has been noted by Barrett and Fudge 
(1981), one change in policy often leads to unforeseen consequences and the need for 
further policy shifts. Therefore, the power to improve services through institutional 
change may be diminished.
Seven examples of the impact of local PCT development on the strength of the public 
health interest in the NHS will now be described. 1. Firstly, the development of PCTs 
from PCGs, over the same time period as work to address health inequalities was
106 Non-medical staff on a number of occasions indicated that they felt GPs who were prepared to work 
in the inner-city were sometimes among the most dedicated.
107 These doctors, from the inception of the NHS, were said to be able to hold the government to 
ransom and GPs negotiated terms in 1948 which gave them ‘self employed independent contractor’ 
status (Klein, 1995: 12; Carrier and Kendall, 1998: 74). With the move to PCTs non-medical 
managerial authority was extended within the primary care setting via the control exercised by PCT 
boards.
108 For example, the loss of a clear purchaser-provider split between public health and health 
improvement services.
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expected to commence, had a disruptive effect on the later work in LSL. There was 
general agreement among senior NHS staff in Lewisham that PCG and PCT 
formation distracted attention from planning work to reduce health inequalities. One 
senior practitioner commented: “I don’t think we will do anything useful until the 
PCT stuff is sorted out, because we are completely, almost completely, diverted by 
the PCT process..”.
Public health staff time was taken up with PCT development in a variety of ways.
1. A number of secondment arrangements were put in place to initiate PCT 
organisational development and these had disruptive knock-on effects on staffing, 
recruitment and retention, further down the organisational line.
Public health staff time was also required in a more ad hoc manner. For instance, staff 
attended PCG board meetings in order to familiarise themselves with the new 
developments; they worked on PCG strategies and plans; they assisted in the training 
of new PCG staff and they were involved in their own internal department meetings to 
consider repositioning in order to adapt to the changed environment.
2. The second impact of PCT development on public health is that responsibility for 
the health of the population of Lewisham was split between the health authority and 
the emerging PCTs over the period 1997-2001. The eventual home of accountability 
for public health was not clear at the outset, and was only slowly clarified via local 
disputes, formal circular (clarifications of: Shifting the Balance o f Power, DoH, 2001) 
and government statements. As late as July 2001, the public health responsibilities of 
PCTs were still developing. Yvette Cooper, minister for public health, addressing a 
King’s Fund conference attended by LSLHA staff at this time, signalled that PCT 
boards would incorporate a director of public health. This was how public health staff 
in Lewisham first heard the news.
An uneasy division in responsibilities emerged between the director of public health 
at the health authority and the two PCGs led by their chief executives, the most open 
dispute being over the creation of an LSL-wide ‘health improvement board’. This was 
seen as a useful development by leading figures within the health authority, but was 
bitterly opposed by chief executives and others within the PCGs from across LSL.
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The details of public health responsibility had not been worked out in the original 
policy that introduced PCGs/PCTs (The New NHS -  modem, dependable, 1997; 
Shifting the Balance o f Power, 2001), leading to unnecessary uncertainty and, over a 
five-year period, the lack of a robust structure for public health planning. Eventually 
the home of the public health directorate was firmly established in the primary care 
trust. However, the relationship between the health promotion and public health 
departments was still uncertain at mid-2003.
3. The above two points account for a temporary slowdown of strategic planning to 
reduce health inequalities. The third impact of PCTs on this work is generally more 
positive and relates to the increased role in public health work of non-medical and 
non-specialist practitioners and staff. The institutional developments associated with 
PCGs and PCTs brought together, in new ways, groups of staff who share a public 
health role. In June 2001, late in the process of PCT development, a ‘Public Health 
Away-day’ was organised by the ‘partnerships manager’ of South Lewisham PCG. 
This event brought together approximately 25 staff members from a range of 
organisations. The voluntary sector was represented, alongside staff working in 
community health services, health promotion, primary care management and the 
health authority’s public health department. The morning started with a discussion on 
the meaning of public health for the different organisations represented. The feedback 
from participants indicated that progress had been made, firstly, in articulating and 
staking-out a broad coalition of staff in support of a number of core public health 
principles. And secondly, in recognition among those present that public health is not 
just the domain of the public health department. A ‘public health workstream’ for the 
PCT was launched, which subsequently met five times and drew up draft ‘principles 
for public health in Lewisham’. Again, input came from a range of organisations. 
However, medical public health consultants did not contribute significantly to this 
public health development work of the Lewisham PCGs, the reason being that 
consultant numbers at this time were spread thinly across the three boroughs of 
Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham and some informal assessment indicated that 
Lambeth, at least, required more support.
Moves to increase the status of non-medical public health staff had been in train since 
1993. However, this trajectory was been sped up by the formation of PCTs. With
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three times more PCTs in 2002 than there were health authorities in 1997, it was 
likely that public health at PCT level might not be led by a medical consultant in 
public health. This is a policy that was signalled in Saving Lives (1999: 136). The 
long-term implications for the power of public health within the NHS and the local 
authority area will be, in part, dependent on the ability of this non-medical and 
medical public health coalition to find senior support within the new PCT.
4. The increased public health role of primary care staff also creates a challenge to 
primary preventive work. GPs will acquire more influence over public health, a move 
that predisposes an emphasis on secondary prevention via prescribing.
5. The PCGs started to provide new opportunities for discussion concerning public 
health within a local geographical area, with regular items pertinent to public health 
on the board agendas of both North and South Lewisham PCGs and the new whole- 
borough PCT. These discussions, one for instance concerning poverty and its effect 
on health and possible local action, have, in effect, brought discussion on public 
health issues to a wider number of local staff from primary care, the local authority 
and the voluntary sector. A public involvement group, led by the PCG, was also 
initiated. It ran for two years and then its work was transferred to PCT control. 
Attendance was high, at around 20, with staff and some service users coming from a 
wide range of organisations. Closer working relationships between GPs and other 
practice staff within the new management framework have also been referred to in 
interviews with local staff.
6. Co-terminous boundaries between the new PCT and the local authority in 
Lewisham began to act as a lever to assist public health work, the reasons being, for 
example, that NHS staff with a public health brief were no longer required to acquaint 
themselves with all the relevant departments of three London boroughs. Public health 
staff specialising in particular topics may however, not be in sufficient demand in so 
small a geographical area; requiring collaborative funding arrangements and networks 
that are administratively time-consuming.109
109 It should be noted that “the local health economy” for public health is not the same as it is for acute 
health and statutory social care services.
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7. Finally, a deciding factor will be the continued availability of resources for primary 
and secondary care and the extent to which public health finances are ‘ring-fenced’. 
One senior practitioner in the PCG suggested that money should be switched from the 
acute sector into prevention. However, as the director of public health pointed out, 
acute services within LSL were unable to meet NHS executive targets for 2002/3. The 
movement of resources away from the acute sector is therefore unlikely to be 
acceptable to any major stakeholders. The focus on reducing waiting times was 
considered, in some staff discussions outside of the interviews, to be driven by ‘the 
media’. The profile of problems in the acute sector being exaggerated at the expense 
of longer-term health improvement strategies. To a lesser extent, acute sector 
consultants and the medical profession lobby were also seen to highlight secondary 
care issues to the detriment of primary prevention. However, cynicism with regard to 
the medical profession was generally focused on what was regarded as an over 
obsession with pay and conditions.
Overall, the power of a PCT to act as an institutional lever in facilitating the improved 
status of public health work, and thus its ability to champion measures to reduce 
health inequalities, is not clear-cut. On balance in 2003, the trajectory looked positive. 
However, from the local perspective, the outlook for public health swung so rapidly 
between 2001 and 2003, that caution in predictions is advisable.
Before the organisation of the HimP is discussed in more detail, the author outlines 
developments within three other major potential contributors to health improvement 
and health inequalities reduction: the Healthier Lewisham Partnership, the Health 
Action Zone and changes associated with the London Borough of Lewisham.
The Healthier Lewisham Partnership (HLP)
The HLP was a significant local force in planning and delivering health improvement 
work throughout the research period. Its basic structure saw little substantive change
Other more minor impacts of PCT development were also evident, and again demonstrate the 
unintended effects of policy change (Pressman and Wildavasky, 1973; Barrett and Fudge, 1981). For 
example, protracted uncertainty over former ‘joint finance’ monies for health improvement, being 
resolved only by March 2003.
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over eight years.110 The partnership was made up of representatives from key local 
agencies seen as having a role to play in joint working for health improvement. The 
services and directorates involved from Lewisham council have been: adult education, 
social care and health, housing, equalities, environmental services. The voluntary 
sector was represented by Voluntary Action Lewisham, Lewisham Community 
Partnership and two other small voluntary groups. Other agencies represented 
include: the police, the NHS mental health trust, the primary care trust (formerly the 
primary care groups and before that the community health trust), the public health 
department, the health promotion department and others. The partnership has had a 
number of sub-groups including, for example, a coronary heart disease sub-group, and 
a sub-group charged with delivering an updated Lewisham health profile (The Health 
of Lewisham, 2001), and most importantly for this study, a health inequalities sub­
group which met in three distinct phases, set out below.
In 1999 it was agreed that the then chair of Healthier Lewisham would suggest to the 
Joint Executive Team of the council that Healthier Lewisham be requested to hold a 
conference on health inequalities. This was in order to respond to the Acheson report 
and look at how Lewisham should address health inequalities: “The chairs at the time 
suggested that perhaps we hold a conference to open the debate out ....and -  what felt 
like wading through treacle - to get some sort of clarity for Lewisham.” (senior 
manager, NHS).
In order to plan for this conference a small ‘inequalities sub-group’ was set up. This 
consisted of: an equalities officer from the council, who was later made redundant due 
to council reorganisation; a worker from Lewisham Council for Race Equality who 
was also made redundant after three meetings due to grant reductions to her 
organisation; the co-ordinator of Healthier Lewisham who was funded jointly by the 
council and the health authority; and the present author, from the health promotion 
department, who joined the group after the first two meetings. A health inequalities 
lead from the health authority’s public health department came to one pre-conference
110 The fact that the HLP was set up before 1997 supports those interviewees who did not believe that 
the policy objective to reduce health inequalities, described in Our Healthier Nation, had significantly 
changed local practice.
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meeting. Prior to the conference three other council officers from different 
departments also attended.
The discussions of the group revolved around deciding the aims and objectives of the 
conference, who should be invited to speak, who should be invited to attend, what the 
conference should be called, what workshops should take place and what outcomes 
were sought. As such, it provided a useful insight into the difficulties faced by local 
staff planning work to address health inequalities. The main problems encountered 
were, firstly, the high turnover of staff at the level involved in the conference 
planning, as indicated above. Secondly, there was uncertainty as to the extent to 
which the conference should focus on poverty or on race. One group member in 
particular, felt that race was the key issue to be addressed. Thus, in addition to 
distractions caused by the organisational upheavals of PCT formation and health 
authority disbanding, there also existed profound uncertainties as to how to work most 
effectively to reduce health inequalities. Aside from the Acheson report, which was 
interpreted as prioritising income redistribution, no national guidance on local 
effective strategies had been produced. Therefore, the focus of the conference became 
vaguer and expanded into the area of income inequality, which local agencies were 
not well equipped to tackle. Disputes over the remit of the conference were resolved 
by group members leaving (for unconnected reasons) and by the fact that the 
conference was organised to incorporate workshops on a range of subjects including 
race and poverty.
However, despite uncertainty as to how to prioritise work to address heath 
inequalities, personal tensions in the group were minimal as all the participants 
appeared interested in the subject and happy to work together. The impression was 
that work to address health inequalities was more rewarding than other aspects of all 
the group participants’ workloads.111
111 This factor in health inequalities work has been noted in other settings and is referred to later in this 
chapter.
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The conference took place in November 2000,112 and as a direct consequence a 
renewed ‘health inequalities sub-group’ of Healthier Lewisham was established with a 
membership from a wider number of organisations. This group met nine times after 
the conference before being disbanded for reasons outlined below. The membership 
of the group was not static, and some members had a higher regular attendance level 
than others. The following were members: a researcher from the community trust, a 
worker from a drugs project, two members of the local pensioners forum (the only 
group members not attending in a work capacity), a PCG manager, the co-ordinator of 
Healthier Lewisham, the project officer from Healthier Lewisham, a manager from 
the community trust, a HAZ funded community development officer, a council 
information officer, a council equalities officer, a health visitor (one attendance only), 
and the present author. Thus, the membership was not from director level, but was 
composed more of ‘middle managers’ and policy officers. It was drawn from 
interested conference attendees who had filled in a form in the conference pack. 
Attempts to involve other staff were largely unsuccessful.
No one staff member attended all the meetings, some giving apologies on the grounds 
of other work commitments, indicating that the group was seen to be of less 
immediate value than other forums. It was nevertheless the only group in Lewisham 
that was specifically looking at health inequalities. It was suggested at the first 
meeting that the chairing and note taking would rotate, thus sharing ‘ownership’ and 
the workload. This decision increased the lack of continuity and meant that no one 
person took responsibility for leading the work. The group disbanded in the run up to 
the formation of PCTs. The main reason for the break up was that a high proportion of 
staff either changed jobs or faced an uncertain future and attendance fell to two in the 
last two meetings of the group.113
112 Observations from the event are used intermittently throughout the thesis.
113 Another feature of the group was the continued attendance of two African-Caribbean older 
pensioners. They had been the only voluntary agency representatives to indicate an interest in the group 
following an invitation that was circulated at the health inequalities conference. Within the group they 
were relatively quiet. A concern was expressed that if members of voluntary groups were to attend, 
then these two older women were not representative of the wide range of local bodies. Some group 
members commented on the issue outside of the meeting, but this did not lead to any action.
As a direct result of the women’s attendance the pensioners’ forum was allocated a small financial 
contribution towards an event that contained a health promotion-related element. Of importance to the 
thesis is the fact that the women operated politically in a way that attempted to address both upstream 
and downsteam factors affecting pensioners’ incomes. Within the research period, not only did they
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The main work of the group was to decide which of the conference recommendations 
to focus on and what work to commission from a relatively small budget (£13,000) to 
cover these decisions. As with the pre-conference inequalities sub-group, the 
discussions are an excellent source of data in understanding the tensions attendant in 
local work to address health inequalities. The conference had produced lists of 
recommendations from five workshops, many of which were very general and 
required large investments, for example, one suggestion was to increase nursery 
places and another to improve housing, both being financially and administratively 
outside the power of the group to influence.
The group started by looking at the conference’s workshop reports and 
recommendations. One group member had an interest in the issue of monitoring of 
service use by minority ethnic groups so it was decided that work in the borough on 
the subject should be researched and, if necessary, support provided by the group to 
assist any work already underway. The second area considered was the funding of a 
‘fruit in schools’ scheme. This was agreed because it was known that work was 
already underway to provide fruit to children in certain schools and it was thought that 
money to extend the scheme would be well spent. Finally, a small allocation of funds 
was granted to the pensioners’ forum to support a one-off health event. The 
impression was of opportunistic work based on some background knowledge of 
effectiveness but dictated more by the fact that initiatives were already taking place 
that could be ‘piggy-backed’ to create additional benefits. One or two group members 
had other ideas that they raised but which were not pursued. For example, one felt that 
after a gap of one year, another conference on health inequalities should be organised. 
Another suggested increased investment in benefits advice in primary care practices, 
and a third argued for more investment to support community development workers.
There was a general sense of not knowing what was best to do. As one public health 
consultant later said: “ ..there is a very very wide range of what is acceptable to do, 
there is a very big agenda. I suppose decisions have to be made on pragmatic grounds
attended the pensioners’ lobby of the annual Labour Party conference - the demonstration called on 
government to increase in the state pension - but they also suggested more support for local trading 
standards inspectors to crack down on traders who ‘ripped off older people.
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about something that is important enough, and that will help you progress things a 
bit..”. This wide range of possibilities combined with three significant factors that 
hindered progress. Firstly, a belief among almost all the group members that income 
inequalities were the real issue and that what they were involved in was “small fry”. 
Different group members put this view forward on a number of occasions, but it was 
impossible to address, and therefore appeared to cause some disillusionment and 
demotivation. Secondly, no steer was provided by any national guidance, despite the 
increasingly prevalent idea in other sections of the NHS that ‘the centre’ was too 
domineering. Thirdly, given that a number of things were acceptable to do, lack of 
leadership in the group meant that staff with particular projects in mind were not 
provided with good reasons as to why their ideas should not be carried out.
The disruptive influence of PCT development and constantly changing initiatives is 
exemplified by the July 2001 meeting of the group. The initial two thirds of the 
meeting was taken up with updates concerning relevant institutional developments. 
For example, a large allocation of ‘National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal’ 
money needed to be spent before April 2002.114 This money was to be administered in 
future by the, as yet unformed, Local Strategic Partnership (described previously). 
Bids for 2001/2002 were therefore being handled through established joint finance 
channels. A report on progress was made to the inequalities group.
Following this agenda item it was agreed that a proposal to bid for HAZ monies to be 
used to employ a lead senior officer for the group, which had been suggested at the 
previous meeting, was to be dropped. This was due to the ‘current climate in which 
too much is going on’. The HAZ priorities for 2002 were not known and it was 
assumed that a bid for the post would have to be made against these priorities. The 
priorities were not known because PCT development meant that the LSL HAZ was 
‘refocusing’ towards the borough level. On top of this, the public health department 
had just been informed that they would, after all, be moved into PCTs by April 2002 
and that the health authority would merge to form a new strategic health authority. It 
was for these reasons that it was put to the group that there were too many changes 
underway, making recruitment unmanageable.
114 £700,000 was initially allocated to be spent in 18 months.
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It was held by members of the group, and by Healthier Lewisham members more 
widely, that departments and agencies such as housing, health and the voluntary 
sector should co-operate in order to deliver effective work to reduce health 
inequalities. We will now go on to look briefly at one initiative that was designed to 
support this co-operation - the Health Action Zone.
The Health Action Zone (HAZ) and “initiative-itis”115
The LSL HAZ was given the go-ahead by the DoH in 1999. Over £3,000,000 per year 
was allocated over a seven-year period, with the aim of improving health through 
joint agency working, assisted by a relaxation of rules governing inter-agency 
partnerships. The main LSL HAZ theme was children, and its work programme was 
aimed at the least advantaged in order to reduce health inequalities. Special 
administrative structures were set up for running the HAZ. It had its own director and 
six other central support staff, some of whom were, as with PCT development, 
seconded from other NHS departments.
One interviewee suggested that HAZ funding arrived before adequate plans to receive 
the money had been put in place. HAZ used its funds to support a large number of 
small projects aimed at prevention of ill-health and health improvement. HAZ- 
commissioned research has criticised arrangements for bidding for these funds, 
suggesting that they failed to adequately involve smaller voluntary agencies providing 
services to black and minority ethnic groups (Bitel and Hill, 2001).116 117 Under­
115 Lord Hunt coined die term ‘target-itis’. (Hunt, 2003:18)
116 The report concluded that the LSL HAZ commissioning process was institutionally racist (defined 
below). This was “based on the fact that there is little evidence to show that specific consideration was 
given to minority ethnic issues, even though a significant minority of the population in LSL is from 
these communities.” (Bitel and Hill, 2001: ix). Three of the main failings were as follows: 1. The 
commissioning process was found to favour larger established voluntary and community groups and, as 
Black and minority community based organisations tended to be small, there was an in-build bias 
against them being allocated funds (p.24, 34). 2. “.... ethnic monitoring was not a specific requirement 
of the HAZ.” (p.ix). 3. There was no explicit community involvement strategy, and “community 
consultation failed to materialise into community involvement”, (p. 21). Generally: “The desire to be 
seen to be equitable and fair was thought to run contrary to deliberate action to target excluded 
communities and organisations that could reach them.”, (p.23). The report also suggests that another 
key problem with HAZ commissioning was the conflict between a ‘top-down’ approach whereby the 
HAZ responded to the health improvement priorities of central government and a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
to addressing local needs as identified by the local communities (pp: 21-22). However, no examples of 
this clash are provided. The HAZ responded with a new ‘developmental commissioning’ structure to 
address these criticisms.
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spending and late spending became a major problem as staff struggled to cope with 
additional workloads. Perhaps more fundamentally, the fact that baseline public health 
and health promotion budgets were decreasing, at a time when new money was being 
allocated to temporary HAZ projects able to ‘demonstrate innovation’, perpetuated 
the transient nature of many public health work programmes.118
Evaluation of the HAZ as a whole is fraught with difficulty, for example, because 
some individual HAZ-funded projects were felt by local staff to have been highly 
successful and others less so. However, whether these projects would not have taken 
place without the HAZ structures, as opposed to the HAZ finance, is open to dispute. 
From the second year of the HAZ, criticism from local staff regarding the initiative 
began to increase. One public health interviewee asked (in relation to the HAZ) “ do I 
sound cynical?” However, a number of local NHS staff believed that LSL’s HAZ was 
considered to have achieved more in comparison with Health Action Zones in other 
parts of the country. This was repeated to the researcher on one occasion with some 
amusement.
The HAZ suffered, on a larger scale, from a similar problem to that faced by the 
inequalities sub-group: namely, it did not know what the most effective programme of 
action was. HAZ staff also believed that reducing income inequalities was of 
paramount importance and this gave some of them a sense that they were “just using 
sticking plasters.” It was acknowledged by senior staff that the HAZ spread itself too 
widely, encompassing too broad a set of targets (HAZ, 2001). However, as with the 
inequalities sub-group, much of the investment made by the HAZ was, nevertheless, 
justified on the pragmatic grounds advocated by the consultant in public health quoted 
previously. That is, that the problems of the boroughs were so great that initiatives
117 The Macpherson inquiry (1999) collates a number of definitions of institutional racism. For instance 
institutional racism can influence [police] service delivery "not solely through the deliberate actions of 
a small number of bigoted individuals, but through a more systematic tendency that could 
unconsciously influence [policy] performance generally” (brackets added) (6.5, Dr Robin Oakley). The 
inquiry found “Racism, institutional or otherwise, is not the prerogative of the Police Service. It is clear 
that other [statutory] agencies ... also suffer from the disease.” (6.54).
1,8 The health promotion department lost two WTE posts between 1997 and 1999, due to reductions in 
the baseline allocation.
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addressing any number of themes from accidents to fear of crime are likely to be of 
some benefit.119
Other initiatives were funded in a similar way to the HAZ. Regeneration funds were 
received for particular geographical areas on a three to five year basis. Healthy Living 
Centre funds are allocated on a five-year basis. Sure Start funds were based on a 
seven year timescale, with a taper in funds from year three.120
In respect of housing regeneration initiatives, the Socialist Party councillor and the 
chair of the chamber of commerce both commented that the need for huge initiatives 
to develop housing and estate facilities was the result of previous under-investment. 
The Socialist Party councillor expressed a view that, in the event of recession, these 
initiatives would be easier to dismantle than changes to the council’s core budgets, 
which had not increased.
In numerous meetings, jokes were made about the number of new initiatives and the 
accompanying terminology, reporting mechanisms and planning groups. This humour 
was particularly evident in joint meetings between local authority and NHS staff when 
the new initiatives from each organisation had to be quickly summarised. The 
realisation that both sets of statutory services were working to strategies that firstly, 
spawned acronyms and that secondly, seemed to frequently change their names, 
emboldened staff to mock what was going on. For example, the community plan 
became the community strategy, and the health improvement programme became the 
health improvement and modernisation programme, while at the same time as the 
modernisation audit was required, the borough plan, as well as the community plan, 
was on the agenda. Which strategy documents were to be overarching was sometimes 
never agreed before the revised strategy template came out. The spirit of staff humour
119 Examples of HAZ investments included: breakfast clubs scheme, primary care based money advice, 
a warm homes project, borough-based community development co-ordinators, early intervention 
schemes for children with language/literacy delay, emergency contraception projects funded with 
pharmacists’ training, youth employment solutions project, supported employment projects, and many
more (HAZ, 2001).
120 Staff shortages and recruitment difficulties were noted in respect of some public health project 
work. This was assumed to have resulted from the increased number of public health initiatives, 
particularly those linked to regeneration and Sure Start. For instance, it was reported in interview that 
one community development post could not be filled until the fourth interview round, adding to 
delivery and under-spend difficulties.
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provided mutual support in keeping up with the pace of change and allowed 
employees not to feel belittled if they did not know about the latest policy. For 
example, one email sent by a senior manager of the PCT ran: “For those of you who 
are remotely interested the new jargon term for the combined PCIP and S AFF is the 
Franchise Plan. We had the ADP for a short while but that seems to have gone by the 
board. Hey ho! Ffrnm....”121
The HAZ was set up with the intention of forming new links between staff in order to 
plan multi-agency initiatives. However, for Lewisham the multi-agency planning 
structure for public health work, namely Healthier Lewisham, was already well 
established. The HAZ benefited Lewisham by supplying funding for a number of 
posts and projects. While the funding was welcomed, there was no benefit in it 
arriving as special HAZ money from a special HAZ team at the health authority. At 
the beginning of the HAZ initiative the slogan -  ‘aiming to do things differently’ had 
a certain inspirational effect, and it encouraged suggestions for new work that might 
otherwise have gone unsaid. However, the HAZ meetings that staff attended were 
over and above their regular workloads, and those who were not involved in the 
process from the outset became excluded. Two local staff argued that the 
development of PCTs gave an opportunity to move public health back into the local 
authorities, and that responsibility for leading the HAZ would have been a good place 
to start. However, as will be seen in the next section, a number of changes were also 
taking place in the local authority at the time.
Local Authority Changes
Lewisham council had a reputation among some interviewees for being a flagship for 
New Labour ‘modernisation’. It was among the first councils in the country to move 
to a cabinet system (DETR, 1998). Labour councillors not given a cabinet role were 
allocated ‘back-bench scrutiny’ duties. They were also, according to one ‘New 
Labour’ councillor, able to spend more time engaging with their local communities 
and seeking their views.
121 PCIP = Primary care investment plan. ADP = Area development plan. SAFF= Service and financial 
framework.
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Changes from the committee to cabinet system were also accompanied by changes in 
the internal structures of the local Labour Party. ‘Old’ Labour councillors noted the 
passing of a system where party members could effectively influence party and 
therefore council policy via a process of voting on resolutions passed from the wards 
to the general committee of the party. A new ‘Hub system’ was set up in 1999, 
whereby local residents are invited to non-party political meetings attended by council 
officers and ‘back-bench’ councillors. This system was designed to encourage 
residents to voice their opinions on local services. Interviews with both ‘old and new’ 
Labour councillors indicate that the ‘Hub’ system seems to be, in effect, a 
replacement for policy formation through channels controlled by the Labour Party 
membership. The democratic implications of this transformation and its consequences 
for the representation of those likely to experience poorer health will be discussed in 
chapter 6.122
In the course of this research the author heard no positive or negative comments, or 
analysis of any kind, from NHS staff, with regard to the new cabinet structure. This 
demonstrates the detachment of NHS community development workers from formal 
local democratic structures and a culture that does not regard partisan democratic 
structures as relevant to health improvement.123
The involvement of council directorates in public health issues, for instance via 
Healthier Lewisham, was mixed. The Directorate of Social Care and Health had 
perhaps the most involvement in Healthier Lewisham. Regeneration initiatives such 
as the New Cross - New Deal for Communities and various single regeneration 
budget allocations were led over five years by a combination of Lewisham Challenge 
Partnership (LCP) and the council’s regeneration department. LCP was a ‘quango’ 
made up of representatives from local business, NHS trusts, the voluntary sector and 
the council. It received and managed the allocation of regeneration resources; the 
Local Strategic Partnership replaced it in 2002. More attention came to be paid to the
122 Low turnout in council elections is also an issue, which will be touched on later.
123 Pejorative asides, with no confirmed factual backing, were made in meetings of local NHS staff, 
they referred to general ‘corruption’ in the council relating to the business transactions of former 
councillors.
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impact of schemes on the health of residents.124 A number of local community 
development workers also believed that more effective account is now taken of the 
views and desires of residents affected by the schemes. However, one manager did 
comment that he felt “regeneration workers are always critical of previous 
regeneration work”. The general consensus was that it had become more widely 
recognised that a lot of time needed to be devoted to resident involvement in schemes.
Thus, the local authority’s role in influencing change in the status and practice of 
public health has been both direct and indirect. Firstly, closer links have been 
developed between NHS public health and health promotion staff and council 
regeneration officers within particular SRB and New Deal schemes. This strengthened 
the broader view of public health, that is, one that takes into account ‘the wider 
determinants of health’. Secondly, changing democratic institutions within the council 
may potentially have a significant impact on the representation of sections of the 
population likely to experience poorer health. This issue is discussed in more depth in 
chapter 6. Now the chapter looks briefly at the impact of three NHS initiatives on 
local health inequalities work: The NHS Plan (2000), the HimPs and the requirement 
to set local health inequalities and public health targets.
Plans and targets
The National Plan
In 2000, before the full implementation of most of the post-1997 health policies, a 
new plan for the NHS was brought out by the Department of Health, The NHS Plan. 
PCTs had not yet been introduced, evaluation of the HAZ had not been completed, 
implementation of local authority changes had not ended - the mayoral election in 
Lewisham for instance, not having taken place - and the Local Strategic Partnership 
had not come on-stream. The movement of responsibility for the HimPs to the 
borough PCTs was not established; and little implementation or evaluation of any 
work resulting from the health inequalities section of the LSL HimP, had taken place.
124 Department of Health hinds to conduct a major health impact assessment (HIA) in one scheme was 
backed up by staff HIA training initiatives and the employment by the health authority of a HIA officer 
to assist with regeneration work
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The NHS Plan was precipitated by a ‘beds crisis’ in the winter of 1998, which in turn 
was exacerbated by a flu epidemic. This resulted in the Prime Minister’s increased 
concern and interest in NHS delivery. The plan is set out in sixteen chapters, many of 
which relate to clinical aspects of the service. At the time of its release in Lewisham, 
the plan was seen by some as a threat to the increasing importance of health 
improvement work, and was cast as a return to the predominance of the medical 
model. As one chief executive commented in 2000:
“...The NHS Plan has taken over...the HimPs seem to have gone out the 
window...if we’re not careful all they [the government] will be doing is to 
focus on The NHS Plan and it will ..take away power [to do] anything else 
really. So I think it is about how we keep putting inequalities on the top of the 
agenda really.”
Following publication of the plan there was considerable confusion concerning the 
position of 1997-2000 public health policy. Although it was not explicitly dropped, it 
was anticipated or guessed by staff at the local level, that the ‘older’ post-1997 public 
health policy was not now of such priority. In retrospect this guess proved to be 
unfounded.
The plan contained updated policy relating to health inequalities. It announced the 
imminent arrival of national health inequalities targets and it focused attention onto 
inequalities in child health. The national targets were later announced in a ministerial 
speech, but by mid-2002 they had still not been discussed widely within the local 
NHS. This was perhaps because of the way they were disseminated, or because of 
other more pressing demands, such as the allocation of National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal funds. It was only towards the end of 2002 that attention 
refocused onto health inequalities. Thus, it can be said that at least two years were 
‘lost’ between the Lewisham health inequalities conference of 2000 and the 
reestablishment of work to reduce health inequalities in Lewisham.
The health inequalities chapter of The NHS Plan was never discussed as such in the 
Healthier Lewisham partnership board, or in the second phase of the inequalities sub­
group. Although it was mentioned in the local health promotion department in one
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discussion on The NHS Plan, it was not referred to in any public health forums in the 
same way that the Acheson report was, for instance. There was not a high level of 
local conversance with the contents of the chapter. The South East London Strategic 
Health Authority (SELSHA) issued health inequalities monitoring requirements in 
late 2002, for inclusion in the Local Delivery Plan (LDP).125 These targets, in part, 
responded to The NHS Plan and it was in this synthesised form that local staff dealt 
with the plan.
The Health Improvement and Modernisation Programme (HimP)
Here this work discusses the development of two HimPs: the LSL HimP and the first 
Lewisham borough HimP.126 The original development of the LSL HimP, published 
in 2000, illustrates the tendency for public health work to be subsumed into the 
demands of patient care, be it in the acute or community sector. In 1997 lead 
consultants in the public health department, the health authority board and significant 
players in organisations external to the health authority, understood that the HimP 
would in future be an important new tool for detailing plans to improve health across 
LSL. It was anticipated that it would strengthen the status of public health within the 
local NHS. It was also assumed by senior health authority figures that the HimP 
would be the key to co-ordinating and planning work to reduce health inequalities. 
Four years later, in 2001, these hopes remained unfulfilled. In that time the LSL HimP 
had been transformed as a concept, the key players involved in its development had 
changed dramatically, and there was confusion over its future significance and fate. 
As one public health consultant commented:
“...the SAFF [service and financial framework] bit stays firmly rooted in the 
stuff which is about money and numbers and activity...So you have got two 
documents, one [the HimP] with the kind of ‘good intentions’ bit, and the 
other is the bit about the money. So it is not surprising that the HimP bit is in 
trouble..”
125 ‘Local Delivery Plans (LDPs) set out how the Priorities and Planning Framework 2003-2006 
translates into targets for the NHS (and social services). This builds on the changes introduced in 
Shifting the Balance of Power (2001), setting out a new system for planning and performance 
management.’ ( \ v \ v v / . d o l i . g o v . i i k / i d { ) 2 0 0 3 - 2 ( » ) 6 / June 10,2003).
126 The borough HimP was initiated when there were 2 borough PCGs covering the North and the 
South of Lewisham. It was completed after the PCT formation.
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As another public health consultant said:
“...there is still uncertainty about what the HimP is for, does it really
matter particularly now that there are going to be community plans and
regeneration strategies...There is a question mark about what the HimP is for, 
other than a sort of formal...writing down of things a documentation process 
..one that is geared to particular regional requirements...what the HimP is 
supposed to be has changed.”
An example of this change is that less work on CHD prevention would revolve around 
the HimP planning process once the CHD National Service Framework (CHD NSF) 
had been produced.
The HimP’s name did not give a clear indication of the balance between the ‘health 
care improvement’ and the ‘health improvement’ elements of the plan. Descriptions 
of what the HimPs would cover suggested substantial ‘health improvement’ sections 
(National Priorities Guidance 1998/ NHS HimP Guidance). However, as time passed 
‘health care’ issues came to the fore. The number of staff with a primary interest in 
‘health care’ development on the LSL HimP groups outweighed staff whose primary 
concern was health improvement.127 In addition, due to health authority 
reorganisation, responsibility for the HimP and health inequalities planning passed 
from the Director of Public Health to the Director of Corporate Affairs. The health 
authority’s senior, ‘non-public health’ staff came to describe the HimP in a way that 
encompassed ‘health care’ issues to greater extent.
The relationship between the HimP and the local authority’s community plan had 
already caused confusion. Discussion in the Healthier Lewisham group demonstrated 
that staff were unsure of the relationship between the two documents. And as has been 
seen, the arrival of The NHS Plan in 2000 led senior NHS staff to believe that the 
HimP was no longer going to be of any interest to the DoH and the NHS Executive. In 
late 2000, messages from the London NHS Executive to London directors of public 
health were understood by these staff to indicate the scrapping of the HimP. These
127 For example, on the CHD group health promotion staff often numbered one, compared to five acute 
clinical
145
local developments were accompanied by NHS guidance on the priority to be 
accorded to health inequalities work that, two senior health authority employees felt, 
changed on an annual basis. One of them commented that: “the ‘national planning and 
priorities guidance’ has been putting health inequalities in a different order of priority 
over the last three years, so it is not clear how important the issue should be seen as 
by the health authority. And sometimes it’s put as a general theme and other times as 
specific issues, e.g. teenage pregnancy, so we need more clarity.”
As has already been set out, the establishment of the PCGs also caused uncertainty 
and delay in HimP development. In late 1999 PCG, health authority and other senior 
staff from local agencies (e.g. social services and the voluntary sector), met at 
Millwall football stadium to discuss the health improvement planning mechanisms. 
Disagreement was evident, as some PCG chief executives said they wanted the HimP 
devolved to the boroughs and some health authority staff argued the need for an LSL- 
wide health improvement board. In the end such a board was never set up. In the same 
vein, the health authority’s (HA) public health department initiated an internal 
planning group to organise a conference on health inequalities in 2001. However, this 
conference never took place as by the end of the year the disestablishment of the HAs 
had been announced.
In 1998 it had appeared ‘on paper’ that the development of HimPs would increase the 
importance of public health agenda setting within NHS planning structures. This was 
the expectation of public health staff on publication of the proposals. Did the rhetoric 
of a ‘health improvement plan’ help to increase the importance of plans to improve 
public health and reduce health inequalities within the health authority area up to 
2001? The health authority’s annual investment plan had always contained a health 
improvement element and rationale. The new health authority HimP was arranged 
around this theme to a greater extent. But, aside from Health Action Zone money, no 
additional financial resources were available for health improvement initiatives. The 
restructuring of the health authority, taking the HimP lead away from the Director of 
Public Health, along with the gradually increasing role of the PCGs in relation to 
health improvement planning, meant that the HimP at the health authority level in 
LSL never really ‘lived’ as a document. On the basis of interviews it can be said that
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the LSL HimP was not even known about in wider public health-related settings in the 
boroughs, let alone ‘owned’.
Specifically in relation to the health inequalities section of the HimP, a number of 
developments took place. Firstly, an attempt was made in 1999 to form an LSL wide 
group, administered by the health authority, and made up of external stakeholders, to 
write the inequalities section of the HimP. This group only met twice and was then 
dissolved, for a combination of reasons. The group argued about the priorities for 
health inequalities work. One attendee described the first meeting as “a bear garden”. 
Some of the attendees wanted the work to focus solely on inequalities between ethnic 
groups, whereas others prioritised access to services and yet others thought the focus 
should be on inequalities between those on lower incomes and the rest of the 
population. The discussion was a more complex and less amicable version of similar 
discussions that took place in the planning meetings for the Lewisham health 
inequalities conference, referred to in the Healthier Lewisham section above.128 This 
reinforces the finding that local workers had great difficulty in making sense of how 
to take forward the policy in the most effective way. The options for adopting 
different priorities and work plans were huge and it was difficult for local staff to 
know at what point to begin. As one consultant in public health said: “..people always 
worry that they will pick the wrong health inequality, or they will have done 
something that is actually trivial when there are big issues like poverty, and race and 
whatever.....”
However, HimP development at borough level then commenced. In this borough 
setting the HimP was almost exclusively public health and ‘health and social care’ 
(local authority) related. It was not expected to contain details of acute clinical service
128 The problems of the aborted health inequalities group for the LSL HimP also highlight the 
difficulties in choosing HimP group and health inequality planning group members. As has been noted 
previously, work on health inequalities was "popular’ among public health-related staff. Senior staff 
control of the group’s membership and the fact that the group was closed down alter two meetings 
demonstrates the way in which staff values may affect institutional formation at a local level where 
discretion exists.
129 The importance of borough HimPs was uncertain at first, as it was not know what other local 
strategic plans would cover and which plans would be more, or less, encompassing or strategic. 
Originally it was thought that the PCGs were expected to write their own HimPs. However, they were 
also expected to write annual plans. In the event the public health element of the annual plans became 
the HimP, and was well submerged in clinical service development issues; where prevention was 
mentioned, it was of a secondary preventive nature.
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developments and focused more on public health development. The extent to which 
PCTs would want to use the HimP as the main vehicle for all their plans was unclear 
in 2001. Senior staff thought that if the HimP was separate from the PCT annual plan 
then it would be easier for it to be jointly ‘owned’ by the local authority, voluntary 
agencies, and other relevant parties. On the other hand, the danger of producing 
separate public health and patient care plans was thought to be that the former might 
get sidelined. Yet the danger of merging the two documents was that the public health 
element could be subsumed into clinical affairs.130 On balance, it appeared that public 
health would accrue more leverage if the HimP remained independent of the PCT’s 
annual plans and was simply referred to in them. In this way public health would not 
become too subsumed by acute concerns and would be better placed to work with 
non-NHS organisations that are as significant to health improvement as the NHS 
itself.
Following the announcement of the disbanding of health authorities and the march 
towards PCT formation on April 1st 2002, the local Lewisham borough HimP began 
to take shape. Indeed it can be said that the HimP enjoyed a renaissance, a remarkable 
rebirth. Staff at the borough level within the PCG were enthusiastic to get on with the 
job of writing the HimP and good relations were enjoyed with employees in the 
borough’s health and social care department. One local authority officer was given the 
task of co-ordinating the HimP, and the borough also provided administrative support. 
An experienced PCG manager chaired the group and a public health consultant 
provided statistical information. On publication of the Lewisham HimP in 2002 a 
conference was organised to disseminate its messages and to involve local partnership 
groups131 in planning work to address the HimP priorities. The conference format 
included one session of workshops, requiring Health Partnership sub-boards to list 
their priorities for addressing inequalities in health. The general tone of the responses
130 It is also possible to define public health in such broad tains that most clinical and patient care 
issues can be placed into a public health improvement plaa As almost any aspect of NHS work can be 
said to be public health, if the discipline moves to a higher status then clinicians can redefine what they 
are doing to call it ‘health improvement’. The issue for public health is - where can measures make 
most impact on tire ground? This problem needs to be analysed across service spending areas. But 
public health capacity and expertise at the borough level was too weak to perform this role without 
additional central support
131 There were seven partnership groups in Lewisham at the time, all feeding into the ‘health 
partnership board’. The groups were, for example, the older people’s group, the children’s group and 
the Healthier Lewisham group (as previously discussed). They were staffed by NHS, other statutory 
and voluntary sector personnel.
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was more concerned with issues relating to fair access to NHS and social care services 
than the comments from participants at the Lewisham health inequalities conference 
of 2000. This probably simply reflected the type of participants present at each event. 
The HimP conference, in contrast to the health inequalities conference, drew in a 
slightly more senior group of public and voluntary sector staff who had more 
experience of various local authority and NHS planning structures. Thus, it can be 
said that the borough HimP placed health inequalities higher up the statutory sector’s 
agenda, at least with regard to the seniority of staff engaged in considering how to 
address the subject. However, by 2003 minor frustrations began to emerge on the part 
of some involved in the Lewisham HimP development. Certain local authority staff 
had come to see the HimP as ‘out-of-date’, even though it had not been published 
more than six months previously.
A new health inequalities sub-group of Healthier Lewisham was formed in 2003. This 
began the third phase of health inequalities work conducted via a sub-group of 
Healthier Lewisham. The newly appointed Director of Public Health chaired it. Thus, 
again it can said that the status of work to reduce health inequalities rose at the end of 
2002, following the firm establishment of PCTs and the consequent ability of staff to 
concentrate on their core objectives.
Target and priority setting for health inequalities reduction
We have looked at the overall framework of the health improvement programme, and 
prior to that, at its local institutional setting. The chapter now considers how local 
targets were set. For instance, how was a priority to reduce the incidence of low birth 
weight babies picked for North Lewisham PCG? In response to critiques of the 1992 
Health o f the Nation public health strategy (LSHTM, 1998), in which targets for 
health improvement were seen to have been ‘set from on high’, local target setting 
was favoured in Saving Lives - Our Healthier Nation,132 This suggested that certain 
health improvement priorities had been set by national government and others should 
be picked locally. However, no national targets were set for reducing health 
inequalities, and local health authorities were expected to set their own local targets
132 A comparison can be drawn between the problems of NHS target delivery, following The NHS Plan 
(DoH, 2000) and those difficulties experienced in the Soviet Union (Dobb, 1970). Devine (1988) and 
Nove (1983), among others, seek to address these issues by emphasizing increased local feedback, 
mechanisms.
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(iSaving Lives, DoH, 1999: 125). This is an interesting illustration of centralisation 
versus decentralisation issues in the NHS.133 Local target setting came across a 
number of barriers that will be described.
In the course of this local NHS work the words ‘target’ and ‘priority’ came to be used 
interchangeably. The ideal was that precise targets with specific measures to show 
improvement would be picked. The reality was that no such targets were chosen and 
instead general priorities were selected, for example, ‘CHD is a priority area’. As one 
senior health authority manager said of the requirement to produce local targets:
“Priorities were set by the PCGs within the framework of national targets. At 
the time the PCGs were starting up and we had to give them control of some 
things and not other things. They picked their own targets and we did not 
intervene. We would have done if they had picked something silly, but within 
LSL, because there is so much need, there are so many things that could be 
done that would be useful, it is unlikely that they would pick something totally 
useless...though it is difficult to assess what effect particular work on 
particular issues will have. They really picked priorities not targets, that is, 
they were not the product of specific systematic analysis, but broad knowledge 
of local and national needs/priorities.”
The requirement to set local health improvement and health inequalities targets could 
have been a strong lever with which to raise the importance of public health and to 
free it from the dominance of clinical medicine. It might have encouraged a more 
solid and permanent basis for public health work because of the need for sustained
133 The extent to which NHS staff want local autonomy and freedom to implement their own policies is 
itself a subject of political concern to governments. Ministers may not be responding to widespread 
calls for greater local freedoms, but instead may want to provide those freedoms and therefore only 
hear and repeat those local voices that say the right thing (Carlyle, 2001; Thomas, 1983; Self, 1977: 44, 
51). Academics and commentators may also be influenced by the ‘spin’ of governments on the 
question of the drive for ‘local freedoms’, the benefits of which have been highlighted by successive 
administrations in the run up to service reorganization (Jones, 1999; Mayo and Lea, 2002). NHS 
respondents to interviews for the thesis may themselves be influenced by the ‘prevailing wisdom’ that 
greater local policy control is good. Managers might feel they show themselves to be less competent, 
intelligent and creative if they support local delivery conducted within the framework of clear national 
guidelines that have been provided for them. They may want, as it were, to have to add eggs to the 
instant cake mix. The reverse side of this research dilemma is that it cannot be assumed that if staff 
don’t ask for and recommend policy, it therefore means that they don’t want it, or would not be happy 
to implement it
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long-term programmes to deliver change. However, in part because of the institutional 
factors cited in the previous two sections of this chapter, and for a variety of other 
reasons which will be discussed, target setting was not as effective as it might have 
been. Nevertheless, although the requirement to set local targets may not have been 
justified on the basis of the reasons given in Saving Lives - that is, that local 
circumstances are variable - it did ensure that the profile of public health was raised 
slightly within the PCG setting. While the particular choice of local targets set was, 
according to the respondent reported above, of marginal significance, the process of 
setting priorities was supportive of the public health ‘cause’, since it forced a certain 
amount of time in PCG meetings to be diverted to public health planning.
Between 1999 and 2002 the distinction between general health improvement target 
setting and target setting to reduce health inequalities was often lacking. This 
mirrored confusion at ministerial level. Government justification for originally not 
setting a national health inequalities target was two-fold. Firstly, it was stated that if 
the Saving Lives targets were met, for instance around CHD, then because CHD had 
such a unequal incidence, reducing CHD rates by large amounts would reduce health 
inequality. Therefore, a national health inequalities target was not required. The 
problem with this argument, apart from the fact that those groups first benefiting from 
reduced CHD rates might be those generally least likely to acquire the disease,134 is 
that it can be equally applied locally. Yet local inequalities targets were required. The 
second reason given by the DoH for not setting a national health inequalities target 
was that it was better for the targets to be set locally because local epidemiology 
differed between areas. For instance, former mining communities might have high 
levels of lung disease not experienced in London. In reality, setting local targets 
proved to be so unsuccessful that this reason was not sufficient justification for not 
having a national target. Not providing a national target was unpopular with local 
staff, as reflected in 1997 local returns to the Green Paper.
A public health consultant felt that: “...there is more performance management than I 
have ever experienced in the health services in terms of the number of things we are 
supposed to be measuring or progressing.. .1 suppose I think I am getting quite cynical
134 The ‘inverse care law’ was discussed in chapter 2.
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about that kind of target setting really..” (2001). On local targets she said: “..you don’t 
have much capacity or enthusiasm for making up other ones because you have all got 
plenty already.”
In the first Lewisham PCG annual plan o f2000, the following priority areas were set. 
North Lewisham PCG picked - CHD, sexual health and health inequalities. Within the 
health inequalities section, low birth weight babies were picked. South Lewisham 
PCG picked diabetes, sexual health and stroke. The LSL-wide priorities for all the 
PCGs to cover, alongside their individual priorities, were: children, cancers and health 
inequalities. The national priorities within Saving Lives were also to be LSL-wide and 
PCG priorities. These were: CHD, cancers, accidents and mental health.
A number of points emerge from interviewee responses on the target or priority 
setting process. Only a small number of ‘inner circle’ staff knew how the 
targets/priorities were set. Many ‘peripheral’ staff did not even know what the local 
priorities were, although interestingly, they were all far more aware of the national 
targets. Those who had been involved in some capacity with the process emphasised 
its speedy nature and pragmatic approach. Descriptions of the process ranged from: 
“It was really holding a finger to the wind.”, to, “We did a brief scoping exercise to 
look at our main local problems and picked them on that basis, with the knowledge in 
the heads of the people who were present at the time.”
The health authority’s public health department had a role in supporting the PCGs to 
find targets. One staff member viewed the first year of target setting as “encouraging 
the PCGs to get used to the process”. Unless the PCGs picked targets that were “daft” 
the health authority would not interfere. The PCGs themselves had mixed views on 
the effectiveness of support in target setting provided by the health authority. Some 
PCG staff regarded it as sufficient, whereas others felt that the public health 
department was too small to offer effective support. A number of respondents felt 
they did not have sufficient epidemiological data to make decisions. While no 
interviewees criticised the targets set or suggested others, in other non-interview 
settings such criticisms were encountered. Some public health department staff were 
critical of the ‘low birth weight baby’ target, saying that it was too specific. They 
expressed annoyance that they had not been consulted on the target chosen. This
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dissatisfaction demonstrates a further institutional failing, in that staff working across 
NHS agencies at a borough level did not meet to discuss setting the targets.
Health impact assessment (HIA) methodology135 was pared down into a ‘rapid health 
impact assessment’ (RHIA) option to assist with priority setting, and this was used in 
LSLHA to arrive at priorities for investment in health. In the spring of 2001 an 
internal health authority event was organised at which public health staff ranked a 
number of potential developments from one to three according to their likely 
beneficial health impact. This method of arriving at priorities may perhaps have been 
slightly less arbitrary than the method used to pick PCG priorities. The latter were set 
by a similar number of staff from the Lewisham area. They chose local needs they 
considered to be of priority, and combined this information with areas of work that 
they felt could be most effectively addressed. However, an attempt was made to 
circulate, check and discuss the draft PCG priorities with a wider audience. Both 
processes were rapid and did not appear to employ high proportions of time in 
specifically tailored pre-analysis and data collection.136
Considerable resources have been devoted, since the early to mid-1990s, to research 
and dissemination of evidence on the effectiveness of public health initiatives. This 
investment did not appear to increase between 1997 and 2001, at least at the local 
level, where ‘evidence facilitator’ and ‘needs assessment’ posts had existed pre-1997. 
However, the establishment of regional health observatories, the HDA (Health 
Development Agency) and NICE (National Centre for Clinical Excellence) 
demonstrates a strengthening of the infrastructure from 2002 and an extension of a
135 This methodological development in public health planning and priority setting was given added 
impetus by the Acheson report (1998) which encouraged the practice of ‘health (inequalities) impact 
assessment’ (HIA).
136 Priority setting via a process which starts from a ‘zero state’ and then attempts to devise strategy 
based on knowledge and evidence has been researched since before the 1960s (John, 1998). This 
‘rational’ or ‘idealist’ method was famously criticised by, among others, Lindblom (1959). The process 
required too much knowledge, which was unattainable and impractical. Instead an ‘incremental’ 
approach was suggested whereby certain elements of a policy were taken as given and not up for 
consideration. A ‘middle way’ was put forward as an alternative (Etzioni, 1967; Walker, 1984).
There is no clear-cut boundary between the ‘zero state’ and the ‘incremental’ method. An approach 
may take more or fewer, external or contingent, factors into consideration. This leaves decisions as to 
what balance to employ open to normative pressures. The flip-side of critiques of the rational approach 
is that the incremental approach is ‘undemocratic’. It takes areas of potential change, such as the 
distribution of income and wealth as given, and tends to exclude these issues from the agenda (Hill, 
1997a: 99-109,104).
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form of ‘rational’ practice.137 No clear links between these public health ‘evidence 
services’ and specific instances of PCG priority setting were witnessed in the course 
of the research. This does not mean to say that those setting priorities were 
uninfluenced by previous dissemination of information. As one account of the PCG 
priority-setting process indicated, participants “used the knowledge in their heads”. 
Development of the PCT HimP made more effective use of standard data sources and 
the public health evidence base. However, even here the timescales of the process 
dictated a limited use of high quality data, and a number of staff complained that the
|  <90
relevant datasets were either not available or were inaccurate.
Further problems in developing work programmes
A number of other public health service problems were encountered in setting health 
inequality work priorities. These problems concern the distribution of resources, 
accountability and central-local relations. They encroach into the terrain of the next 
chapter, but five inter-linking issues will be discussed initially here.
Firstly, the issue of whether the borough of Lewisham is working towards reducing 
health inequalities within its patch or between the borough and the rest of the country 
has caused some local controversy. (See, Bull and Hamer, 2002: 26, who discuss 
‘national versus local targets’). In 1999 members of one LSL community health 
council interpreted the requirement to reduce health inequalities as operating strictly 
within the local base. They therefore concluded that significant resources should be 
moved from some wards in LSL to other more deprived wards. Barry Quirk, the Chief 
Executive of Lewisham Council, also gave some support to this intra-borough 
redistribution argument at the Lewisham health inequalities conference in 2000. He 
drew different conclusions though, suggesting that, as Lewisham had one of the 
lowest levels of ‘internal’ income inequality for any London borough, health 
inequalities were unlikely to be a major problem for the area. Boroughs such as 
Greenwich had far more of a problem. The issue arose again in a post HimP- 
conference Lewisham health inequalities group discussion in 2003. Some group 
members did not want the aims of the work programme to include: ‘to contribute to a
137 Macintyre et al provide a useful discussion on evidence-based practice (Maeintyre, 2001).
138 For this reason, a mistake was made in according low priority to accident prevention in the 2002/5 
Lewisham HimP.
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reduction in national inequalities in health'. They felt that the work should be seen to 
only focus on Lewisham issues.
Secondly, the targeting of new resources to the most deprived wards of the borough is 
a less sensitive version of the ward redistribution argument. Here, for instance in the 
2001 distribution of ‘National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal' monies, 
allocation of resources was understood by some senior council officials as needing to 
be limited to only those wards with the worst indices of deprivation. In a Healthier 
Lewisham meeting, one local consultant in public health made a case for not 
allocating the funds simply on this basis, because other wards have high levels of 
particular elements of the index but a lower overall score. For example, a ward might 
have a high level of lone parent households, but due to the presence of one wealthy 
neighbourhood, a higher overall level of deprivation.
Further debates around the current targeting of regeneration funds to very small estate 
areas also occurred within the local policy community, although no change in 
procedure resulted. It was recognised that the targeting approach may cause tensions 
in communities as people from just outside a target area can resent what is seen to be 
an unfair distribution of resources. In the early years of work to reduce health 
inequalities, the opinions of Sir Donald Acheson who recommended targeting the less 
well off, rather than the least well-off, were better known among senior public health 
staff than officers of the local authority. In the council, officers were more concerned 
that ward-based targeting was too broad, and they were investing resources in 
developing more refined sub-ward data and in services and support at a sub-ward 
level.
Thirdly, the setting of local targets in the context of PCT development may have 
encouraged the ‘bonding’ of a more identifiable public health voice for Lewisham. 
However, national bodies’ support for local health inequalities target setting seems to 
have been pitched at the wrong level. Senior staff in both the PCG and the health 
authority complained of spending large amounts of time in compiling an increasing 
number of written returns and reports. The use of targets and reporting processes 
generally became the bete noire of many managers and senior practitioners
155
throughout the statutory services, particularly before increases in funding allocations 
were felt at the primary care level in 2002/3 and 2003/4.
One chief executive said: “We keep getting asked to do all this paper stuff. I think I 
could spend my whole day and my team could, so could [all the other local NHS 
trusts], filling in forms saying how they are doing, you know some of this stuff is 
daily, and that means that people’s attention gets diverted.”
On the Modernisation Audit and borough plan o f2001, they said:
“...if we are not careful we might have another year ahead of us of just doing 
these paper exercises of audits and reams and reams of paper, with no one 
having the chance to say: we talked two years ago about low birth weight 
babies, about poverty and the links with ill health, diabetes and CHD -  what 
are we actually doing?”
The frustration was compounded by a lack of new resources and the need to invest 
over eight million pounds into the care of mentally disordered offenders and other 
deficits within mental health services.
However, at the same time, there was a lack of clear and well-disseminated direction 
documents on how to set local health inequality targets coming from the Department 
of Health, the Health Development Agency or the London regional NHS office. The 
Acheson report was the most definitive assistance available and it is, as has been seen 
in chapter 2, problematic as a clear guide to local action. An attempt to address the 
problem has been provided by the London Health Observatory in its Health Equity 
Audit Made Simple (2003). However, this document only addresses one aspect of a 
strategy to reduce health inequalities in local boroughs.139 Thus, the fashionable view 
in 2003, that ‘the centre’ in the NHS is too dominating and local areas need more
139 The debates reported by Bobbie Jacobson in 2003, concerning the use o f the word ‘equity’ in the 
report, as opposed to ‘health inequalities’, indicate, in the author’s opinion, a certain lack of empathy 
with the problems of local implementers. Whilst in academic circles an argument can be made for 
using the former term, ‘on the ground’ the shift in terminology caused confusion. Staff with a 
peripheral role to play in public health work were still getting to know the Acheson report, and even 
some public health and health promotion staff became worried that there had been another shift in 
policy, as health inequalities appeared to be out, and equity in.
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freedom, is confounded by an example, provided here, from work to reduce 
inequalities in health.
Fourthly, difficulty in monitoring improvements in targets relating to very small 
incidence was noted in a broad discussion on the HimP in a 1999 meeting of Healthier 
Lewisham. If the incidence of suicide in Lewisham is below 1 every 2 years then, it 
was suggested, it is difficult to show the effect of work to reduce suicide in the 
borough.
Fifthly, HAZ and health authority staff considered that performance management by 
the London regional office of the NHS Executive up to the end o f2002, indicated the 
low status that was really afforded to the issue of health inequalities. The subject was 
never raised in meetings between the chief executive of the health authority and the 
regional director. On the other hand the subject of waiting lists was raised frequently 
and, to a more limited extent, that of joint working between social services and the 
NHS. These discussions were felt by senior health authority officials to be extremely 
important in setting the direction of health authority work. Lack of data to help with 
health inequality target setting was thought be of secondary importance, since if the 
discussions were to prioritise health inequalities, then “we would make sure the data 
was there to help the work”.
2000/1 was a low point for staff in the importance accorded to health inequalities 
work. One consultant said:
“I think that there has not been a strong message centrally that inequalities 
matter, so compared to all the messages you know -  modernisation, waiting 
lists, national service frameworks... It is clear that there are very strong 
messages given around other things, so that at a local level... despite Acheson 
and various other reports, there is a message that says ‘these don’t matter very 
much’ .. you won’t get ticked-off for not doing very much on this. ... There is 
not much, if any, management mechanism about making sure that [we’re] 
doing something different [about health inequalities] from what [we’re] doing 
already, so quite a lot of it is about re-badging things, and not really about 
change.”
157
However, by late 2002 the lack of performance management for health inequalities 
work was being redressed by requirements to monitor and report on work to the 
Strategic Health Authority. According to interviews conduced in 2001, this 
development bodes well for the status and success of local work to reduce health 
inequalities.
Finally, the CHD National Service Framework (2000) indicates the potential for 
increased policy implementation success, given a changed relationship between the 
central NHS and the local level. Here, far more detailed instructions were given to 
local areas as to what they were expected to have achieved. A public health consultant 
said: “There is the perception that the CHD one is the best from the services point of 
view, because it is so precise.” Funding was attached to the document’s 
implementation. Although this was considered to be insufficient: “We don’t have the 
money to even get half way to delivering on the cardiac NSF, particularly on statins” 
(chief executive, 2001). Joint work between agencies to achieve the document’s 
targets led to an increased sense of shared responsibility for the issue. This is not to 
say that a rolling-out of such a method would have identical success in every policy 
area, or indeed that it would in the area of health inequalities reduction. However, the 
approach does appear to have suited local structures while a lack of such appropriate 
support from the national level has hindered effective local work to reduce health 
inequalities.
Conclusion
Labour’s concern to promote public health and to see “good health [as about] more 
than the NHS”, is clear from its pre-election commitments of 1996. In the executive 
summary of Renewing the NHS -  Labour’s agenda fo r a healthier Britain, public 
health is discussed a page before GP services. Of the five priorities listed, the first is 
to: “attack health inequalities” (Labour, 1996: 3). As explained in this chapter, a 
number of structural and incentive barriers made achieving this political commitment 
a sluggish project, these are listed below.
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Firstly, although Labour had no great appetite for NHS reorganisation, all levels of 
the party appeared to agree that the Tories had taken clinical service arrangements in 
“entirely the wrong direction.” (Labour, 1996: 3). Therefore, reform was required and 
the main area for proposed change was to be primary care. The thesis has explained 
how the establishment of PCGs and PCTs delayed work to implement policy to 
reduce health inequalities. Coupled with these hold-ups, the unforeseen consequence 
of PCT formation was that the health authority, which was to have been responsible 
for the health improvement programme, was disbanded. The health authority did write 
a HimP, but by the time it was published staff in Lewisham were not interested in 
what it had to say, and many did not even see it. The development of Lewisham PCT 
resulted in five years of protracted uncertainty. This particularly affected public health 
leadership, as responsibilities moved slowly and at times painfully, from the health 
authority to the PCT, via the PCGs.
Secondly, the central departments of the NHS provided almost no useful technical 
support for local staff in planning work to reduce inequalities in health up to 2003. 
The Acheson report was all there was to go on, and that had been written with the 
DoH in mind.140 Staff saw income inequalities as key to improving health inequalities 
and they were uncertain as to the most effective work that they could do at the local 
level. This led to some arguments, disillusionment and delays in the work of the local 
planning groups which had been set up to prioritise work to reduce health inequalities. 
Academic theory was warning the new government about the dangers of centralist 
control in the NHS (Le Grand et al, 1998: 141, 143). But health authorities and PCGs 
were not equipped to set their own targets for health inequality reduction and 
consequently this requirement was ignored. In any case, the most senior health 
authority staff interviewed felt that no sanctions would be taken by those responsible 
for performance monitoring against poor results in health inequalities work. While 
many local staff were at times bitter, cynical and bemused by numerous new 
strategies, audits, plans and requirements, it is important to sort the wheat from the 
chaff of these complaints and to try to understand exactly what their difficulties were.
140 In August 2001 the Department of Health produced: Tackling Health Inequalities: consultation on a 
plan for delivery. This document provided a list of questions for local players and a year later, in June 
2002, fed the results bade However, since it would appear that local players wanted more support in 
strategic planning to tackle health inequalities, to rely on their own recommendations was not the most 
appropriate action for the years 2001 and 2002.
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Also, it should be noted that different groups of staff might experience different sets 
of problems and incentives. While some felt overburdened with paper work, none, at 
any level, seriously criticised certain national initiatives, policies and targets. For 
example, the national fruit in schools scheme, the Sure Start initiative, the National 
Service Framework for coronary heart disease, the policy to reduce inequalities in 
health and the national targets that were provided in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) were 
all generally supported. Staff were therefore not always critical of central control, in 
fact, they under performed when such support was not provided. However, they were 
hostile towards a confusing array of changing requirements. They did not want to be 
put into situations where their work would be wasted and they would not get credit, 
because it was out-of-date by the time it was finished.
One conclusion of this investigation may at first sight appear to be unfashionable. 
That is, that more direction and support from ‘the centre* would have helped. 
However, a more sophisticated recommendation is intended. The local area appears to 
need both more support and less ‘interference*. More help is required in providing 
recommendations on strategic planning and priority setting to reduce health 
inequalities and less time, according to senior interviewees, should be spent on 
reporting what has been done.
Thirdly, clinical services were seen to be capable of blocking progress within public 
health. This was primarily because of acute sector demands on resources. The care of 
mentally disordered offenders and the prescription of statins were two examples of 
expensive services. It was generally accepted that treatments had to be provided, but 
there was also a view that advocates of health improvement strategies needed to make 
an effort to be heard, otherwise their work would be marginalised further. Initially 
The NHS Plan was widely interpreted as signalling a stronger emphasis on patient 
care, to the detriment of work to reduce health inequalities. The drive to reduce 
waiting times was seen as something the government needed to do in order to win 
elections, whereas there was a concern that health improvement work was not seen as 
a vote winner.
The investment of additional resources, albeit in short-term projects, such as the HAZ, 
brought quantitative increases in funds aimed at reducing health inequalities. The
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money provided by the HAZ was welcomed by public health staff and was seen as a 
signal that preventive work was, post-1997, more highly valued. However, the future 
of this binding was often uncertain from one year to the next, which meant that HAZ 
staff were employed on temporary contracts and the whole programme appeared 
unsustainable. The fact that a new management structure was created for the 
allocation of HAZ funds led to the compartmentalisation of this programme of health 
improvement work and a duplication of planning arrangements.
While all these barriers led to significant delays in policy implementation, by 2002 
and 2003 most public health staff were beginning to recognise progress in the 
consolidation of NHS and local authority institutions that would support work to 
reduce health inequalities. This took various forms. Firstly, the PCT’s public health 
department gradually filled its vacancies throughout the period. Secondly, the new 
Director of Public Health agreed to chair the reformed health inequalities strategy 
group, which met again in the spring of 2003. Thirdly, national technical support was 
more forthcoming, for instance, in the form of the work of the London Health 
Observatory. Fourthly, the new ‘co-terminosity’ between PCT and local authority was 
taken by public health staff as an impetus to work more closely with non-social 
services council departments.141 Fifthly, funds for health improvement, in the form of, 
for example, national neighbourhood renewal monies, continued to enter the borough 
and also HAZ funds were devolved to PCT control. Finally and importantly, the 
details of national targets to reduce health inequalities outlined in The NHS Plan were 
released and the new strategic health authority began to performance manage targets 
to reduce health inequalities.
On balance, statutory public health and associated health improvement work at the 
local level appears to have been institutionally strengthened by the move to primary 
care trusts. The increase in support from ‘the centre’, available firstly in the form of 
policy such as the CHD National Service Framework and latterly, in more specific 
briefings and targets relating to health inequalities is also considered to be a positive 
development. This finding contradicts much current thinking. A mutually agreed and 
understood balance between local and higher NHS roles and responsibilities is needed
141 This was evident in a programme of local public health networking events where it was agreed that 
one session should focus on environmental health.
161
in order to further increase the value of the local target setting and monitoring 
process.
The character and success of policy implementation is not only dependent on 
institutional levers. In his critique of The NHS Plan Enthoven notes that he cannot 
entirely predict the outcome of the policy because the people staffing the NHS are an 
important factor making for success (Enthoven, 2000:8). The Conservative 
government’s Health o f the Nation policy was unpopular with local staff, not only for 
a number of technical and managerial reasons, but also because it was seen as 
ineffective in the context of wider Conservative government social and economic 
policy. Thus the thesis blends reports of institutional factors, agents’ opinions and 
wider government motivations to create an analysis of health inequalities policy 
implementation. The next chapter concentrates on the values, beliefs and opinions of 
local actors.
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Chapter 5 FINDINGS - VALUES 
Introduction
Much of the literature on policy implementation considers the effect of local opinion 
on the fate of national directives (Lipsky, 1980; Hall et al, 1975; Kingdon, 1984). The 
beliefs and values of local staff have the potential to champion or frustrate 
implementation. Scope often exists for local players to decide on the details of what 
work takes place, to prioritise or de-prioritise work in such a way as to encourage or 
stall progress in particular areas and to influence the structure of local institutions. 
Local staff may feel that national government policy conflicts with their views, or 
does not go far enough in supporting them. Scope for local interpretation of policy 
means that implementation is influenced by staff perceptions. Disputes between staff 
may also arise within the local area, potentially distorting interpretation further.
Government recognises the power of collective staff views to affect policy 
implementation, as is shown, for example by the following passage:
“At the heart of modernised public services there needs to be a common sense of 
purpose. Within public health there is a clear consensus about the focus on:
• the protection of the public’s health
• health promotion and disease prevention programmes, and
• reductions in health inequalities.” (Secretary of State for Health, 2001)
Academic criticism of Conservative public health policy in the 1980s and early 1990s
informed the incoming Labour government of 1997 (Moore, 1988; Benzeval and 
Judge, 1990; RSHG, 1991). The TUC and individual unions also attempted to 
influence policy in this area (TUC, 1982; NUPE, n.d.). In looking at local values it 
should be noted that, when forming policy in opposition, the Labour Party was said to 
have listened to the views of NHS representatives and was keen to be seen as the 
party to be trusted with the NHS and the public’s health (Labour, 1996). However, the 
thesis is not dealing with this stage in the life of the policy.
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This chapter looks at the views of staff working in key areas for implementation of 
policy to reduce health inequalities. Staff from the public health department of the 
health authority, the Health Action Zone, the local authority, regeneration services 
and community workers were interviewed, as were local councillors and trade union 
officials.
The rationale for the choice of interviewee was described in the methods chapter. 
They can be grouped in a number of ways, and table 3.1 in chapter 3 should be 
referred to for this purpose.
The views and beliefs considered here refer to:
1. health inequalities
2. income inequalities
3. NHS neutrality
4. trade unions.
An assessment will be made of three factors relating to the above headings. Firstly, 
the general characteristics of local views and discrepancies in thinking between 
different local staff groups. Secondly, the extent to which local staff are ‘in tune’ with 
central government, the Acheson report (1998) and academic thinking. Thirdly, the 
extent to which policy implementation has been supported or hindered by staff beliefs 
on the issues raised. Reporting on these points is interwoven in the text under the four 
subject headings listed.
Sabatier (1986: 290) describes three levels of belief among coalitions of actors: deep 
core, near core and secondary aspects.142 Sabatier’s assumption is that near-core and 
secondary beliefs will not contradict deep core beliefs but may be more amenable to 
change. This is not at first sight convincing, since it might be imagined that secondary 
aspects could influence core beliefs, especially in cultures that allow for open 
discussion of core beliefs. Whilst the beliefs considered here may not fit with 
Sabatier’s definition of ‘deep core’ they still relate to issues that, as at least one of the
142 The defining characteristics of these are: deep (normative) core -  fundamental normative and 
ontological axioms; near (policy) core -  fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies 
for achieving normative axioms of deep core; secondary aspects -  instrumental decisions and 
information searches necessary to implement core policy positions. (Sabatier, 1986:290).
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subjects pointed out, will affect career progression within the institutions involved and 
will also influence the success of policy to reduce health inequalities. They may be of 
deep significance to those involved. Thus, it might be said that Sabatier’s categories 
are helpful in highlighting layers of belief. But they should not be interpreted rigidly, 
especially as players may hold contradictory beliefs, not having had opportunity to or 
‘space’ to reflect thoroughly on them.
The thesis is also mindful of the possibility that interested parties may wish to control 
staff beliefs and/or the publication of their opinions. Government, opposition, private 
health care industries and trade unions may all accrue benefits from the broadcasting 
or suppression of dominant and minority NHS staff opinion. As the quote from 
government on the first page of this chapter indicates, for example, credibility may be 
enhanced in some scenarios where staff are seen to be ‘in tune’ with government 
policy.
Views on health inequalities -  solutions, blocks and causes
This section o f the chapter looks at local beliefs about the mechanisms by which 
health inequalities can be reduced. Different approaches to reducing health 
inequalities were noted by a senior manager who covered health promotion work in 
the early days of the new policy’s implementation in 1997-8:
“The first major problem was in people interpreting what was meant by 
‘health inequality’ in completely different ways. Particularly at the health 
authority, who at the time when I was there, were still thinking of health 
inequalities in terms of whether black and minority ethnic populations 
accessed143 particular services. And so actually getting them using a broader 
social model of health and looking at impacting on determinants of health was 
not ..currency really. So it felt that the difficulties were about a lack of 
common understanding about what that area of work meant and inexperience 
in all of us in terms of what that actually meant you did. And I think...things 
have moved on ...people have started to develop in the last two years...”
143 Here ‘access’ to services is taken to mean a combination of Donabedian’s ‘structure and process’, 
and it results in differences in outcome (Donabedian, 1966).
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Differential access to services by black and minority ethnic groups is one element in 
Acheson’s analysis of health inequality causation within a model that emphasises the 
social determinants of health. So this respondent could be interpreted as noting a 
difference in the weight accorded to different aspects of the Acheson report. Disputes 
between staff, for example, on the importance of focusing on access to services, 
meant that multi-agency planning was frustrated and lines of accountability were 
challenged in the early days of policy implementation.144
Such clear-cut fault-lines in thinking between whole agencies were however, not 
widely reported, or apparent from observation. But, it did emerge that different 
respondents gave differing weightings to particular aspects of work to reduce health 
inequalities. Six areas of contention concerning the impact of different factors can be 
listed, and the relative importance accorded to these issues in contributing to a 
reduction in health inequalities will be considered. The areas are: 1. Local post-1997 
initiatives specifically designed to reduce health inequalities. 2. The role of NHS 
services. 3. The role o f ‘social capital’. 4. The effect of resource restrictions. 5. The 
extent to which health inequalities were linked to income inequalities. 6. Links 
between race and health inequalities. These are looked at in turn.
1. Local post-1997 health Inequalities initiatives
Staff cited a range of local work areas, initiated or expanded since 1997, that they 
considered were good examples of effective work to reduce health inequalities. Free 
fruit in schools and breakfast clubs were the most frequent examples given. It is 
significant that free fruit in schools is the clearest recommendation for local action in 
the Acheson (1998) report, thus underlining the influence of the report.
Generally, the expansion of regeneration work in geographical areas such as New 
Cross was seen as important among staff from all sectors. Effective lobbying to 
increase social security benefit flexibilities was cited by some staff who knew that this
144 As reported in the previous chapter, a difference of opinion on the importance of access issues was 
noted between staff discussion at the Lewisham health inequalities conference (2000) and the 
Lewisham HimP conference (2002). In the latter conference access was of more concern. This could be 
attributable to the different mix of staff groups and grades present, generally there were more senior 
staff from professions such as nursing at the second event
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had been undertaken by the employment group of the HAZ. Staff working closely on 
programmes to reduce teenage pregnancy and support parenting also saw these as 
offering improvements. The Sure Start programmes in Lewisham were gearing up 
during the interview period and these were also regarded as good models for progress.
Interviewees made some recommendations for expansion of this work:
• Accidents and safety work
• Benefits advice
• Increases in numbers of community development workers
• Credit unions and LETs schemes.
The need to increase work to address sexually transmitted infections and mental 
health promotion was also raised in a number of forums (for instance in the Lewisham 
public health workstream).
A number of staff, particularly from public health, were satisfied that the general 
work area of the HAZ picked by LSL in 1997 had been ‘children and young people’. 
The Acheson report clearly supports this choice. There was also some disquiet as to 
the fact that the DoH had subsequently attempted to expand the remit to include adults 
and all NSF areas.
Staff were generally supportive of the aim of reducing health inequalities via local 
initiatives. In this respect they appeared to differ from strong academic advocates of 
upstream145 change to reduce health inequalities who seem to be sceptical about the 
merits of much downstream work (for instance, Shaw et al, 1999). However, staff 
were unsure of their role in upstream work. If (as most did) they supported the theory 
of the wider determinants of health and the need for upstream work to address health 
inequalities, they had difficulty in working out the correct role for downstream 
workers within this context. Staff wanted to know if support for the need for upstream 
work meant that downstream workers like themselves, should be involved in upstream 
type issues, or in influencing upstream work. As will be apparent from the discussion
145 The terms ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ used in the Acheson report (1998) were common currency 
among public health and health promotion staff. But staff with a public health remit, working outside 
these departments, were not so conversant with the terms.
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below, they arrived at different answers. For example, some emphasised a need to 
educate local people in using their money well and others stressed that nationally, 
state pensions should be increased.
Recommendations to increase work on benefits advice and community development 
indicated a model of change which is not within the ‘victim blaming* mould, but 
again is congruent with the ‘wider determinants of health* model, as described by 
Acheson. The area of benefits advice demonstrated the most clear-cut gulf between 
NHS and local authority thinking. Benefits advice within primary care settings in 
Lewisham was being reorganised and expanded with the aim of increasing up take. 
“Putting money in people’s pockets” was seen as key among senior primary care staff. 
However, this was not the council’s position, where benefits advice services had been 
closed down in the early 1990s. One councillor said:
“We have moved away a long time now from the old fashioned anti-poverty 
strategies that most councils used to have, what did the anti-poverty strategies 
of councils use to consist of? It was really about benefit take-up campaigns. 
Whereas now national government is moving from the dependent welfare state 
to getting people into the labour market. So we have a different range of 
policies and initiatives to move away from the welfare dependency concept, it 
is not about take-up campaigns and maximising benefits, even though people 
should know their rights and entitlements.”
NHS staff did also recognise a need for work to improve local employment prospects, 
education and aspirations, and to reduce school refusal and exclusion. Senior staff in 
public health and primary care were concerned that the NHS should “facilitate the 
employment of local people.” This concept had been addressed in a HAZ employment 
workstream project. However, one PCT staff member reported that in a planning 
forum involving GPs and other practice staff: “they looked at me like I was mad when 
I suggested that we should encourage local employment.” This was because the 
proposal was considered to be beyond the remit of NHS staff. The high priority 
accorded to un/employment issues by senior NHS staff was not translated into highly 
visible initiatives or even known about ‘on the ground’; although this situation was 
changing towards the end of the research period. For example, a ‘Recruitment and
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Retention Officer’ was appointed in the local community health trust at the end of 
2001 .
Generally, effective work to reduce health inequalities was regarded as “extremely 
complicated and multi-factorial”, “like wading through treacle” and “something we 
are struggling with”. Hence the annoyance in some quarters when the HAZ remit was 
expanded (as referred to above). The need to focus on a smaller number of areas, and 
‘not spread ourselves too thinly’ was expressed by three senior members of the health 
authority/HAZ team. As one said: “I think that there is just so many different things 
that we could do and the motivation of people is to try and do it all and it is actually 
quite hard to say, we are not going to do it all”. Some things would need to be left out 
“which have just as much of an impact on health inequalities.” Reducing health 
inequalities and improving health was also regarded as a slow process. There was 
concern that government would want ‘quick wins’ and therefore not prioritise the area 
of work.
2. The role of NHS patient services in reducing health inequalities
A wide range of non-medical staff connected with public health and health promotion 
were critical of what they called ‘the medical model’. This was understood to be a 
view that gave priority to the role of medical services in health improvement and 
underplayed the importance of the ‘wider determinants’ of health, as referred to in the 
previous quote. As one senior HAZ worker suggested:
“...[Addressing] health inequalities is just so large because it is about housing, 
and it is about diet and it is about schools and educational attainment, and it is 
about parenting skills and life chances and expectations ..Although I think 
health [that is the NHS], or a large chunk of health, has come a long way about 
understanding that health is not just about health sendees...I think translating 
that theory into practice and joining all those different services -  we have still 
got an awful long way to go..”
Locating ‘medical model’ thinking in the responses of interviewees was not fruitful. 
Those connected with GPs informed the researcher that GPs now had a clear, or 
clearer, ‘understanding of the links between health and poverty’. For instance: “If you
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talk to GPs about how inequalities affect their patients they are completely au fa it 
with it and are very clear about it...so I think that has changed...whether there is any 
more real change I’m not sure..” (senior practitioner). Another respondent said: “I 
think amongst a number of GPs there is certainly a stronger recognition of the links 
between poverty and health..” (senior manager).
Most of the respondents regarded the NHS as playing a role in reducing health 
inequalities only in conjunction with other agencies. Public health staff, in particular, 
saw the NHS as having slightly less of a role in this, compared to other agencies. 
They tended to think that regeneration work was of particular significance. Some staff 
questioned the extent to which the NHS could really do any effective work to reduce 
health inequalities and suggested that wider economic reorganisation was required if 
more was to be done than simply “manage poverty”.
One area where the NHS was seen as playing a role was in ensuring equal access to 
services for asylum seekers. Access to interpreting services was cited as an important 
component of this. Respondents further from the public health ‘core’, that is 
community development workers and councillors, were more likely to regard NHS 
services as being of particular importance to health inequalities work. Poor patient 
accommodation, services and care within the local the NHS were cited by a number 
of respondents as detrimental to the aim of reducing health inequalities.
“ We are trying to develop better conditions for [mental health] service users 
...the conditions in hospital are not conducive to people getting better...there’s 
a big stench ..when you go into the mental health unit, staffing levels are quite 
low...the hospital has not even got any facilities for people suffering from 
mental illness apart from beds, and a few little lounge areas ...” (community 
worker).
One regeneration officer thought that GPs in some local areas, where people tended to 
be on lower incomes, were “hopeless”.
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3. Social Capital
Various staff working in health promotion and community development looked on 
any research which showed that ‘involvement’ of local people in community activities 
helped people’s health as a good thing and as providing justification for their work. 
However, staff were not very familiar with detailed evidence to support their case.
“...just participating in arts, life-long learning, there are all sorts of things going on in 
this area that people [do] .. and I think those sorts of things.... really can go quite a 
long way to improving health in the long term..” (community worker). This subject is 
returned to in chapter 6.
4. The effect of resource restriction
Those who believed that restriction in resources was a very significant element in 
determining the extent to which effective work could take place tended to be senior 
NHS staff from both the PCGs and public health. As one said:
“...we need to look at the prevalence of CHD, stroke, renal disease, and 
diabetes for our ethnic minority population, and we have, but we really need to 
rejig services., and ..we have not had the growth money to do that....We don’t 
have the money to get half way...to delivering on the cardiac NSF, particularly 
on statins...” (chief executive).
Debt on managing mentally disordered offenders (MDO) of around £5.6 million was 
cited by these staff as a key problem for local NHS services, as was investment in 
primary care. The debts of the acute trusts were also referred to. Finance, for these 
staff, was a lever, “...history tells us that we don’t change the way we do things unless 
someone has beaten us over the head with money...” (chief executive).
One community development worker felt that investment in preventive measures and 
a reduction in health inequalities would save money in the longer term. This view was 
shared by two senior NHS managers. However, they felt that getting sufficient 
investment ‘up-front’ in order to save money in the long run had been and continued 
to be extremely difficult, especially given the MDO spend referred to above.
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5. Links between health and income inequalities
All the respondents regarded local work to reduce health inequalities as important 
and, as mentioned previously, did not believe that the only really effective work that 
could be done was at the national economic level, via for example tax and benefit 
changes. However, all but three respondents (one from the voluntary sector and two 
from the health authority) saw a close link between income inequalities and health 
inequalities. Generally staff working closely with public health, both in the statutory 
and voluntary sector, tended to see national economic policy as being of relatively 
more importance than their colleagues.
One public health consultant summed up the relationship between local and national 
work as follows: “It is a bit like saying the best thing you can do to reduce road 
accidents is to stop drink-driving or stop speeding, that is true, but it still doesn’t 
mean that you should not pull a child out of the road ..there is still local action that 
will need to happen ..” A typical view of the link between income and health 
inequalities is given by one director of public health: “I am quite sure that the gradient 
in incomes is matched by the gradient in health..! think the policies of the Treasury 
have more impact on health than the policies of the Department of Health.”146
There was a view in some quarters that aiming to reduce health inequalities was less 
politically sensitive, and therefore easier, than talk of reducing income inequalities. 
The chief executive of Lewisham Council in his address to the borough’s inequalities 
conference of 2000 quoted a King’s Fund fellow, Anna Coote, as having expressed 
this view to him. There was also a belief held by some staff that they and their 
colleagues should work with the opportunities available and that central government 
was not supportive enough to be trusted to deal with the issue:
“ .. It is not enough to say ‘oh it is a big national issue we shouldn’t touch it’, 
because if we say that in the inner-city then everybody will say it and nothing 
will happen. ... it may be if you go for one single thing then the best thing 
should be national and should be around income, but it is better to do 
something than nothing there is no decent primary care service in this
146 Debates on the subject were presented in chapter 2.
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area...it is hard to see how you will get there just from economic policy....so I 
think that it is quite a disabling message, to actually sit back and wait for 
somebody else to sort it out...” (chief executive).
Two respondents who had weaker connections with public health, and in one case had 
not heard of the Acheson report (1998), did not see a connection between health and 
income inequalities. One health authority employee said:
“I think that there is probably a lot that can be done locally around educating 
people in how they use their income...I don’t think that increasing income is 
going to be the answer in addressing inequalities in health because people will 
spend more money on mobile phones, ..computers...dozens of things, rather 
than actually knowing how to prepare quality food or bothering to travel to 
buy good quality food because it is a low priority for them, and unless you can
change that ..no amount of income will actually improve health I think it
[income inequality] is a contributing factor or one of many contributing 
factors and it is no good tackling that alone.”
One community development worker held a similar view:
“unemployed blokes between [the ages of] 30 and 50 spend three times as 
long in front of a television...the issue is not that they have a low income, but 
that they take insufficient exercise and the reason why they take insufficient 
exercise is because they are not motivated to ..I am always fascinated by the 
fact that if you walk around council estates you will see loads more satellite 
dishes on council flats than you do walking down residential areas, better class 
areas ...I don’t think there is a straight line relationship between income and 
health.”
Views such as these were almost never heard in public health and health promotion 
staff circles, but away from this group they were a distinct, if minority, opinion. While 
these minority opinions may seem to be at odds with those of the director of public 
health quoted above, the two are connected by a belief in the importance of education, 
coupled with employment and motivation. Staff who linked health and income
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inequalities more closely tended to be those who also thought the NHS had a more 
secondary role to play in addressing health inequalities, and also tended to be those 
who wanted to see a reduction in income inequalities. But these correlations in beliefs 
were not absolute and a range of depth of expression was observed.
Drug and alcohol problems were cited as an area of public health concern by some 
interviewees, but perhaps less so than might have been anticipated. Due to the local 
arrangement of services, whereby drug and alcohol prevention work was the 
responsibility of specific council-led services and not of the NHS health promotion 
unit, the topic was perhaps lower down on the local NHS’ agenda. The view that 
hopelessness and boredom led to substance misuse, which in turn fuelled crime, was 
put forward by one staff member outside of the interview setting. This could be 
interpreted as supporting a perspective that does not see income inequalities as the 
main cause of local problems.
6. Links between race and health inequalities
A correlation between certain ethnic groups and ill health was widely acknowledged 
within the local policy implementation community. From before 1997, Healthier 
Lewisham had one board member who represented a voluntary organisation 
particularly addressing high blood pressure among African-Caribbeans. The 
inequalities sub-group, after their conference, started to work to the recommendations 
of the conference workshop that had looked at issues of health inequalities and race 
(plus recommendations from one other of the eight workshops). However, the extent 
to which inequalities in health between different ethnic groups should be the focus of 
work to reduce health inequalities attracted a range of opinion. As chapter 4 
described, the LSL health inequalities group set up to look at the issue for the HimP 
had two members who believed that race was the only issue to be addressed when 
looking at health inequalities. Other members of the group felt they were seen as 
racist for challenging this view. Similarly, within Lewisham one member of the 
health inequalities conference planning group had the view that race was a more 
significant determinant of health inequalities than income. Within the latter group, 
debates and confusion did not cause acrimony, but did, as has been described in the 
previous chapter, cause delays.
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Those black staff interviewed (5) tended to draw attention to general inequalities 
between different groups particularly those between men and women and those with 
disabilities, as well as health inequalities between ethnic groups. None of them 
considered that health inequalities work should exclusively address the gap in health 
between ethnic groups, although all but one felt it was a significant issue.
The lack of clarity at the local level on the extent to which health inequalities work 
should address health issues among Affican-Caribbean and Asian populations perhaps 
highlights a difficulty that local staff have in easily interpreting the Acheson report 
(1998) on this. Although the report details gaps in health between different economic 
groups and between different ethnic groups, it does not compare the influence of both 
factors. Local staff were not clear as to whether the mortality o£ for example, low 
income white males is likely to be higher or lower than, for example, high income 
males of Asian origin.147
The interplay between ethnicity and social cohesion also appeared to be a source of 
confusion for interviewees. One community development worker saying: “you can’t 
link people up in one group because people have all sorts of different value bases now 
and belief systems.” Another council officer felt that it would be more difficult for 
Britain to move towards lower income inequalities than for example Sweden, because 
of the greater diversity of the British population. “We’ve got to juggle to take into 
account a lot of ‘difference’, that means considering a lot of different agendas and 
looking in much more detail at smaller communities because we have got an awfiil lot 
of diverse communities...” 148
One regeneration officer also believed that refugees and asylum seekers from Africa 
and Eastern Europe would not relate to a “socialist philosophy, a Labour sort of view 
of the world,..OK they have got nobody else to vote for, so they will probably vote 
Labour, they can’t possibly vote Tory,., so they are inevitably going to, if they vote at 
all, vote Labour.” He did not elaborate on why non-Westem Europeans should be less 
likely to relate to left-of-centre ideology.
147 The evidence was briefly discussed in chapter 2.
148 This, debatable, view is reflected in academic literature. For instance: March and Olsen, 1996, in, 
Hill, 1997b: 146.
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In summarising this section on beliefs concerning the effectiveness of different 
strategies to reduce health inequalities it can be said that there was a high degree of 
compatibility between the views of local staff and the analysis provided by the 
Acheson report (1998). That is, staff generally accepted a model of the determinants 
of health that was socio-economic. However, there was no consensus on the balance 
between different factors in this model.
Income Inequalities
Given the almost uniform belief among the policy community charged with reducing 
health inequalities that there is a close link between health and income inequalities, it 
is pertinent to look at their beliefs concerning income inequalities. Participants were 
asked to try to stand aside from their work role and say what they really thought about 
income inequalities in Britain today and whether they thought they could or should be 
reduced.
The overwhelming majority of those interviewed apparently held a strong belief that 
income inequalities were too great. One community development worker expressed 
the following opinion, similar to a number of others: “They can be reduced more than 
they are, not to the level I would like them reduced to, I don’t think...I think the 
income inequalities in this country are obscene,... I do think you could make a major 
difference to people’s health by reducing them.”
A small number of participants hesitated to say that inequalities should be reduced. 
They were reluctant to distinguish reduction from elimination. One community 
development worker said the following:
“ I think it is a misnomer to talk about income inequality in the first place,... I 
think the real issue is about a minimum standard of living that you would 
reasonably expect people to have access to...otherwise you are getting onto 
really dodgy ground, you are moving into the realms of the Israeli kibbutz or a 
commune approach where the skills you have bear no relationship with what 
your income i s ...”
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Other participants wanted moves towards reduced income inequalities to be coupled 
with additional support through services, increased work to reduce racial 
discrimination and help in encouraging participation. Thus one community 
development worker said: “ ...it is preferable to move towards less difference, 
definitely. Income is just one part of it, initiatives that would support single parents’ 
groups ...would greatly aid some of the inequality ..and a lot of working class 
communities and minority ethnic communities work shift patterns, unsocial hours, 
that is all part of health inequalities, and then links with transport...” . Another senior 
health promotion officer said: “increased benefits through higher taxation would be 
something I would go for and community development projects to support people in 
making the most of what they have and in taking part..” Another interviewee, a 
council official, felt that people on a low income were more likely to have a fear of 
authority and not to like to ‘bother the doctor’ for instance and that this should be 
addressed.
For staff involved in employment training schemes, while there was a view that 
“basically poor people are less healthy”, there was a marginally stronger sense of 
employment being the best link to improved income: “getting people into work, 
having work gives the income, and therefore work and health become closely 
related.” There was also a view that qualifications were only part of the route to work: 
“particularly with young black men ..it is not necessarily the qualifications it is ‘job
ready’ Getting people into the world of work, checking out their own attitudes to
work, getting them out of bed, being a team player, being well presented..” A number 
of senior health service figures also emphasised the close links between income, 
employment, education and motivation.
Two trade union officials were interviewed for the research. One, an adviser to the 
Mayor of London and a Unison officer, was asked if it would be possible for the TUC 
to have a policy on income inequalities. He said that to some degree the TUC does 
have a policy, and that Unison does so to a greater degree:
“...the Tory budgets, which massively reduced the higher rates of tax, and
Lawson’s budget in particular, saw huge give-aways to people who were
already rich, and allowed people to literally get an extra ..gardener...! think
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you will find that in the TUC budget submissions that it makes every year to 
the Chancellor and in its general economic policy, certainly in ours 
[Unison’s], we have produced lots of documents on this, we would argue for 
much heavier rates of tax on the higher paid, certainly a higher rate of tax for 
those earning over £100,000 if not below, and also a wealth tax, and generally 
speaking far greater redistribution...”
‘Pay differentials’ was an area where one ‘New’ Labour councillor felt the 
government should improve:
“... something has to be done, it is one thing that the Labour government has 
failed to do in the last three years is to narrow pay differentials, in fact what it 
has done, it has seen a bigger difference...and it continues to increase... I think 
that people should be paid no more or less than their real value, that is easy to 
say!., [laughter]. So a senior director of a company who gets an increase which 
puts their salary up to 4 million pounds a year.... I still have great difficulty in 
accepting that that person really needs all that money...”
But the same councillor went on to say that:
“What people get paid is important to them, but it may not actually be the 
most important thing, because if you have got a good home and you have got a
good family, and good health, you can do what you like there is only so
much that other people can do for an individual, it does not matter what the 
trade union does, the government does, friends do, it doesn’t matter where you 
live, it does not matter what the family does for you, it matters what you think 
inside, if you have a positive expectation of achieving anything at all then the 
chances are that you will do it....and the reason that there are these inequalities 
in geographical areas is that if somebody is told time and time again that you 
live in an area with massive deprivation and your expectation is really low of 
ever getting out of that, you never will.”
A member of the HAZ team was also concerned about the effect on people from poor 
areas of being constantly told they are from bad, deprived, sink estates.
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Some others echoed the councillor’s sentiments that people on high incomes don’t 
‘need’ what they have. One chief executive said: “I would be prepared to pay more 
tax if it would mean there were a level of redistribution, because half the time we 
don’t need stuff that we have, I don’t think it is necessary to drive around in £49,000 
cars.” Whereas one or two others, while clear in stating that they wanted income 
inequalities to be reduced, stressed that they felt that the rich would not disappear. 
They made comments such as: “there is always going to be the very rich, but that is 
OK I don’t think we are ever going to get rid of that.” (senior NHS manager). Thus 
debates on income inequalities associated with Tawney (1964) and others, discussed 
in chapter 1 were very much alive on the ground in local staff opinions stimulated by 
the interview discussions.
Moving from the desirable to the possible, there were mixed views on whether 
income inequalities could be reduced. Generally those in more senior positions both 
within the council and the NHS tended to be more optimistic about the possibilities 
for change. ‘Locus of control’ theory would seek to explain such a dichotomy in 
terms of more senior staff being likely to have a stronger internal locus of control or 
sense of power (Strickland, 1978; Lefcourt, 1982).
Four NHS employees with close links to public health argued that it was important, 
based on the evidence of the Acheson report (1998), not to focus redistribution on the 
worst off but to redistribute to the less well off as well. Not withstanding a range of 
caveats the views from this constituency are summed up by a senior practitioner: “I 
think they should be reduced further, definitely, I think there is still far too big a gap 
between the haves and the have nots.”
There was a body of opinion, particularly within the voluntary sector, that argued that 
unless the ‘economic system’, or ‘capitalism’ was changed, nothing would really 
improve. This polarisation of solutions has also been witnessed in academic public 
health-related conferences. It can be related to a context in which New Labour has 
moved away from social democratic thinking towards a more market-orientated 
approach. This perhaps leaves some sections of opposition to this trajectory more
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willing to consider that nothing can change without fundamental changes to ‘the 
market system’.
Various reasons for pessimism in the ability of British society to move towards 
greater income equality were given. Firstly, as referred to in the previous paragraph, a 
number of staff (5) thought that the market economy restricted the extent to which 
inequalities could be significantly reduced; that is, reduced enough to affect health 
inequalities. For instance one community development worker said:
“I was wildly interested in Cuba, short of installing a communist system with 
similar wages for everyone and a job for everyone, I am not sure how you 
would achieve that. But the health equality thing (in Cuba) is quite incredible 
because in a country that is falling apart there is lots of extremely well 
educated, very healthy people running around, it is an interesting model. The 
US is a dreadful place to look at, the differences there are even worse than 
they are here..”.
This interviewee was unaware of the HoC Select Committee’s interest in Cuba.149
Another community development worker felt that:
“I would like more equality across the board, but with our market economy 
that is not going to be possible...the Thatcher years brought us to where we are 
now ...and Reaganomic theory...their ‘trickle-down’ theories. America is 
capitalism gone mad, I lived there so I know, our capitalism is a lot more 
moderate but we are getting there, our model will always be America unless 
we change our mind-set. When our politicians want to learn something about 
working with young people or criminal justice or what ever, we go to 
America, new innovations they come from Harvard, Yale, Princeton 
whatever...”
149 They chose to visit the island “since it achieves excellent health outcomes despite the fact that its 
resources are very limited.” (House of Commons Select Committee on Health, report on public health, 
2001, introduction: 12).
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One HAZ worker, whilst thinking that reducing income inequalities was “desirable”, 
considered that there was not sufficient “political will”; and that “there are quite 
strong political drivers for maintaining or actually increasing inequalities,....in terms 
of numbers they [the very rich] are an insignificant group although they have a 
disproportionately high profile and probably disproportionate access to the media that 
gives them that profile and enables them to voice their opinions loudly.” The HAZ 
officer considered that the first-past-the-post electoral system meant the ‘middle 
block’ in electoral terms became the most important, so that even when there was 
work going on to reduce inequalities it was not worth it for the government to sing 
about them.150 An ‘Old’ Labour councillor also thought that the Labour Party was 
now more concerned with ‘women of Worcester’ than with lower income groups.
A small number of interviewees referred to the effect of new and expensive medical 
technology on health inequalities. One NHS employee in particular considered that 
very advanced genetic techniques and replacement body parts would only be available 
to the very rich and that, as a result, the gap in health inequalities would increase. 
Pressure from the very rich not to reduce income inequalities would also be sustained 
because of the medical benefits accruing to them. This interviewee also felt that 
although reducing income inequalities was desirable, it might lead to an increase in ill 
health among the better off.
A final note of pessimism regarding the chances of reducing income inequalities 
resulted from a trend observed over the years by one chief executive who had 
experience of working with local councillors. “You don’t get them [councillors] 
thumping the table and saying this is around the re-distribution of wealth issue, that 
debate does not take place any more and I am sure it did ten or fifteen years ago.” 
This interviewee’s view was that staff in prominent positions won’t “step out of 
line....you won’t get an NHS chief executive rolling up his shirt sleeves and saying 
...we need to look at the issue of income ...not unless there was a framework within 
which it was politically safe to do so.. We don’t seem to talk any more about the 
inequality issues because it sort of plays into that whole issue ..about redistribution of
150 The journalist Polly Toynbee (2002) shared this view.
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wealth.” As a result, she felt the issue was not within popular consciousness, and was 
less likely to be addressed.
However, there was another body of opinion that was more optimistic about the 
ability to, and chances of, progress to reduced income inequalities. One ‘Old’ Labour 
councillor considered that the government’s pledge to reduce child poverty would be 
effective in reducing income inequalities. And a ‘New’ Labour councillor also gave a 
range of policy tools that could be adopted in order to reduce income inequalities: “we 
need a whole raft of national policies to address income inequalities ...through 
taxation or whatever...” A chief executive cited increased child benefit, tax reform and 
support with access to mortgages as three initiatives that could be introduced.
One senior NHS manager listed the government’s policies of support for education 
and employment initiatives and the national minimum wage as positive progress 
towards reduced income inequalities. She said that she had recently heard a 
presentation from a member of the Child Poverty Action Group who was optimistic 
about the effects of the government’s policy to reduce and eradicate child poverty.
The policy most often quoted among interviewees as having a direct effect on income 
inequalities was the introduction of the national minimum wage. Council officers and 
members, along with NHS staff, cited its importance and a number of interviewees 
wanted to see it increase further. A number saw the unions as having been responsible 
for its introduction. The Unison official interviewed said: “One of our priorities has 
been increasing the national minimum wage, we have commissioned an awful lot of 
research over the years and part of our argument has been to do with issues like ill 
health.” One interviewee with considerable knowledge of local small businesses 
thought that even they would not be too concerned with an increase in the national 
minimum wage. What SMEs did not want was a large number of small hikes. For 
administrative and planning purposes they would much prefer to have larger increases 
less often; the bureaucracy of managing the increase was their major concern.
There was also uncertainty among all groups of staff as to what could be achieved and 
why income inequalities in this country were generally higher than Sweden and lower 
than the US. Many interviewees said that although they wanted to see a reduction in
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income inequalities they ‘didn’t know enough about it’. In relation to Sweden’s lower 
levels of income inequality one public health consultant said:
“I don’t know how it [Sweden] does it. I mean on the one hand, yes I 
absolutely do think that we ought to reduce income disparity; I do think that it 
is ridiculous that some people can earn absolutely vast quantities. On the other 
hand in order to keep our economy functioning I keep hearing the argument 
about how we are not paying our fat cats as much as everywhere else and they 
will drain away, so I honestly don’t know.”
NHS pay differentials
Interviewees were also asked what they thought of pay differentials in the NHS. The 
reason for asking this question was that, in an article in the Health Service Journal, a 
Kings Fund director had said that, before starting work to address health inequalities, 
NHS managers should firstly address the issue of NHS pay differentials (Appleby, 
2000). Generally staff, however, were not very clear in expressing an opinion that 
indicated they thought that the salaries of the lowest paid staff (e.g., cleaners or 
porters) should go up in relation to those of the highest paid (e.g., directors, chief 
executives and doctors).
Senior NHS managers saw strong connections between employment issues and health 
inequalities. Although, at the time the interviews were being conducted there seemed 
to be little awareness between senior managers that others in their position shared 
similar views. Subsequent to the interviews the chief executive of the community 
health trust left to join the new ‘NHS workforce confederation’ and a number of 
other, unconnected, recruitment initiatives gained more exposure.151
Different concerns within the discussion attracted different interviewees’ attention. 
One community development worker felt that NHS managers were paid too much, 
especially in relation to the voluntary sector: “I think that there are an awful lot of 
people in health who don’t need to be paid what they are paid, I think the money 
could be better spent.” Another interviewee said that, in the course of consultation on
151 These were led by the community health trust’s human resources department and the HAZ.
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the formation of PCTs, comments had also been made on disparity in pay between the 
voluntary sector and the NHS, which was said not to support ‘partnership working’. 
The same interviewee also said that pay should not be so low as to need 
supplementing through benefits as happens in the NHS. They found this situation 
“staggering.... lunacy...you’ve got an organisation [the NHS] that in its broadest sense 
ought to be increasing people’s life changes.... and they [its employees] are actually 
on benefits.”
Other voluntary sector interviewees simply felt that nurses were ‘drastically 
underpaid’ but did not have any other particular views on NHS pay differentials. One, 
in particular, felt that all staff providing direct patient care should be paid more than 
support staff. This person also thought that nurses were poorly paid because the 
tradition of charitable health provision that had existed prior to the formation of the 
NHS still pervaded employment rationales (the same view related to the education 
sector). This ethos meant that wages of, for example, head teachers would only 
increase on the basis of a ‘desperate’ need to recruit staff and not because there was a 
real value placed on public sector work. Another voluntary sector employee thought 
that pay differentials in the NHS should be looked at because those jobs that were 
occupied predominately by women saw worse pay. “...it almost feels like there is in­
built discrimination that is just there historically.”
A number of staff were influenced in their views by a consideration of the London 
housing market. They considered that almost all but the highest earning staff could 
not afford to buy housing and were therefore not sufficiently well paid. One 
interviewee who clearly expressed a belief that NHS ancillary workers, nurses and 
ambulance staff, should be paid more, thus closing the pay differential with doctors, 
was the Socialist Party councillor. While one ‘New’ Labour councillor also thought 
that pay differentials across all sectors and not just in the NHS were too high, another 
thought that for NHS services that had been out-sourced, such as cleaning, catering 
and car-parking, “the market should set the rate”. Contractors should be asked in the 
tendering process if they pay the national minimum wage.
One senior NHS manager thought that it was crucial to consider the issue of pay in 
order to recruit and retain staff. Since the local NHS was the largest employer in
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Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham, NHS employment terms and conditions had a 
“huge role” to play in local people’s lives. But the interviewee was unclear what pay 
scales were being used across the different local NHS employers. Therefore, they felt 
that an audit of local NHS pay was needed: “I don’t really quite know the truth of 
what has gone on”. This manager also thought that there was an urgent need to recruit 
young black men into mental health nursing services. This was because: “87% of the 
mental health patients on the key mental health wards are black men between [the 
ages of] 18 and 24, why are we not recruiting young black men to come and do this 
job? Why are we not having recruitment campaigns that say to those people who may 
never considered a career in the NHS (not just in nursing)- ‘this is for you’?”
One senior NHS manager did not know that NHS related pay differentials had grown 
and felt that chief executives needed to be paid the wages they received because their 
jobs were at least as complex as private sector executive roles where salaries were 
much higher. However, this manager also considered that NHS pay differentials 
should not increase and that we should “certainly, if anything, be trying to reduce 
them.” Another senior NHS manager agreed with the ‘New’ Labour councillor quoted 
previously. They felt that “the market rules” and that higher salaries had to be paid to 
get people into the jobs that needed to be done. Whereas one senior NHS manager 
from within the health promotion/public health service thought that the NHS:
“really needs to consider some of its employment practices. I think cleaning 
and portering staff being contracted out, that is not congruent with the aim of 
promoting health, if you are paying people on a subsistence salary.... [It is] not 
just pay differentials, the NHS has to look at issues such as racism, 
homophobia, sexism and treat them seriously because at the moment the NHS 
is largely managed by a ...tire of white middle-class managers....the NHS has 
also got a recruitment problems in nursing, therapy and medical staff in central 
London where people cannot afford to live anymore.”
One doctor thought that not only should administrative and clerical staff be paid more 
within the NHS but that services would improve as a result. “I think it is probably true 
if you are really going to get things to happen....why have you got a 50% chance of 
going to the diabetic clinic and not getting your records back? Well, people don’t
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actually pay records staff much, they don’t put much premium on them, so they get 
the service that they pay for.” Though they went on to say that the situation was 
difficult since in theory to increase nursing and occupational therapy staff salaries you 
could be “lopping money off doctors”, yet the government was, at the moment, 
putting additional demands on doctors and expecting their good will. The assumption 
was that the total wage bill for the NHS should be taken into account in NHS pay 
discussions. This style of thinking was evident in discussions on the relations between 
the acute sector and public health, where some staff suggested that the only way for 
public health to gain more funding was for acute services to be cut. The interviewee 
thought that pay differentials between doctors and nurses where being reduced 
slightly but “not by very much”. However, she posed the question as to “work in a 
multi-disciplinary team where one person is paid a huge amount more than the others 
and a couple of people are paid a huge amount less it is not exactly on, is it?”
Another senior manager in the health authority felt that it was very important to 
address the issues:
“How can we be part of addressing health inequalities which we know has a 
basis in income inequalities and at the same time be an employer that does not 
deal with those amongst a whole tranche of the population locally that is 
employed by the NHS?.... Is enough being done by the NHS? No....I think that 
people are not clearly focused on the connection [between pay differentials 
and health inequalities] and are not focused on doing something about it. It is 
in two different boxes, here is employment policies in the NHS and pay and 
issues of recruitment and retention and here are health inequalities and I think 
the two are interlinked.”
In conclusion to this section, it can be said that individuals within the local policy 
community held an almost uniform belief that income inequalities should be reduced. 
In the course of participant observation these views were never referred to outside of 
specific meetings about health inequalities, although, neither was there open 
contradiction of them. Generally staff in interviews swiftly linked health and income 
inequality, but they were uncertain of the chances of income inequality being reduced. 
This combination of beliefs fed a sense of personal ineffectiveness in some staff,
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while one or two of the more senior staff explicitly challenged, as ‘disabling’, the 
view that nothing could be changed. A wide range of views was held on the need to 
reduce pay differentials within the NHS. Generally, senior NHS staff were supportive. 
However, there was a small but significant body of opinion that felt the market should 
determine the wages of the lowest paid. This was within the framework of a national 
minimum wage, but meant that the current pay differentials were considered to be 
correct.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, health inequalities work was ‘popular’ and one 
of the reasons for this was that it was congruent with political beliefs about the 
desirability of reducing income inequalities. One public health staff member even 
explicitly suggested stressing the links between income and health inequalities in 
order to encourage more voluntary sector staff to come to meetings planning work in 
this area.
NHS Neutrality
The thesis has already established the importance for local staff of income inequalities 
in determining health inequalities. Some staff also saw the question of income 
inequalities as an area of political sensitivity. Therefore, what NHS staff can and 
cannot say on the political issue of income inequalities becomes relevant. Staff were 
asked to consider if they felt that the NHS was supposed to be politically neutral. The 
findings suggest that there was no very consistent view on the extent to which, in 
practice, it was, or was not, politically neutral and whether neutrality was desirable, or 
not.
Some staff regarded the NHS as too politically driven and therefore not geared to 
addressing real needs. An example given to back this up was the introduction of walk- 
in clinics in major railway stations. It was argued that this development had been 
engineered to earn support from a particular constituency of voters; while appealing to 
commuters, it was not catering to those most in need.
A number of staff, however, thought the NHS should speak out on politically 
sensitive issues, such as the links between income inequality and health inequality.
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One NHS employee said: “I think it is unfortunate that the NHS is so politically 
neutral. My background prior to this job was in a very campaigning organisation, 
when I came in to start here I thought ‘this is peculiar the things that people accept as 
given’.” And a local authority employee thought that “given there is evidence of the 
impact of income distribution on health then there is actually some imperative for 
public health advocates, most of whom reside in the NHS....to be leading on some of 
those issues, so I don’t think that it is a no-go area. Public health departments are best 
placed to have that kind of role because they are there to advocate on behalf of the 
public. They don’t all see themselves in that role.” Another respondent, close to the 
NHS, saw this role for public heath - to speak out and to say the ‘unpalatable home 
truths’ about the NHS - as the job of the director of public health, who she felt had, at 
times in the past, fulfilled it.
A substantial number of NHS staff did not see their role in health inequalities work as 
held back by any requirement for the NHS to be politically neutral. This appeared to 
be mainly because they did not seem to feel any restrictions on what they said or did. 
However, in at least one case it was because the respondent agreed with government 
policy. “It does not seem to arise as an issue ...it did arise I suppose with a previous 
government over issues, locally people were not particularly, at first, very keen on -  
GP fund holding.”
Only one interviewee saw any serious problems in the NHS becoming embroiled in 
political issues:
“Voluntary sector agencies have a role as lobbying groups on particular 
topics... I would be a bit wary of the state mediating local people’s 
views...acting as the voice of local people on what might be political decisions 
that go against the local health authority’s interests...I am dead iffy about local 
statutory agencies becoming lobbying bodies really...I see it as important for 
the NHS not to be seen as leading a particular lobby group, because I see the 
NHS’s role as consulting on issues of service delivery ..to try and address 
local peoples’ needs in the way services are developed. The role of public 
health is to highlight the impact of policies on health and to ..draw government 
attention to particular policy areas and to kind of speculate on what kind of
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impact it would have. But I think there’s a step beyond that which is leading 
lobby groups to campaign for particular changes which is questionable in 
terms of the NHS’s role and I think damaging to local democratic processes if 
the state steps in and starts doing that kind of stuff.” (NHS senior manager).
In a Healthier Lewisham discussion on priorities for the coming year, an amicable 
disagreement was witnessed between two senior officers about the extent to which the 
group should be ‘strident’ in its stance towards addressing inequalities. Although the 
resolution of the particular disagreement was weighted in favour of a more vociferous 
approach, no post-argument change in approach was detected. Another senior NHS 
manager however thought, that “you won’t get anyone in a sufficiently prominent 
place stepping out of line, in terms of what the central message is...yes it is politically 
neutral and I think ...if you step outside that political neutrality you probably won’t be 
stepping back.” Thus, NHS staff were unlikely to take a lead in calling for a reduction 
in income inequalities. Lewisham councillors were also felt by this manager to be 
unlikely to “step out of line” being of a particular “political ilk ....and closely 
following the centralist line, [that] guided them at elections not to use terms like 
wealth redistribution...something that you’re only supposed to discuss behind closed 
doors.” Therefore, the manager felt that “you need the academics championing...the 
sort of Peter Townsends, social commentators, to actually set the tone.”
The next section looks in more detail at attitudes towards the NHS working with the 
GLA or the TUC to promote trade union membership. But here it can just be said that 
the majority of staff interviewed saw no problems in such action with regard to the 
political neutrality of the NHS.
Summarising this section, it was found that staff were not generally aware of a block 
on their work in the form of any requirement to steer clear of political issues. They 
tended to think that they had sufficient freedom to operate as effectively as they 
could. A few staff did, however, feel restricted and others considered that more senior 
staff policed themselves, in order to assist their careers.
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Trade Unions
Another politically sensitive area, which impinges on health and income inequalities 
issues, is that of support for trade unions. As referred to in chapter 2, research 
suggests that a trade union presence in the workplace reduces accidents rates. In the 
context of a demand for evidence-based practice within public health and health 
promotion -  especially given a lack of research supporting other areas of NHS work - 
this evidence is significant. Whilst more contested, there is also evidence to suggest 
that wage differentials will be smaller in unionised workplaces and that, in general, an 
increased union presence in the workforce brings down pay differentials. Therefore, 
given the fact that most staff thought that significant links exist between health and 
income inequalities, it was considered appropriate to question local policy
implementers on aspects of their beliefs in relation to trade unions.
Aside from reducing income differentials, trade union and labour movement 
involvement may increase social solidarity among lower income groups. This 
provision of a route to a collective voice could increase self-respect and diminish 
powerlessness. Increased respect within society for people in social classes HV-V 
might accrue from reduced income differentials, but representation and a stronger 
collective power should also be taken into account in an analysis drawing on social 
capital theory (as defined in the thesis’s introduction).
Interviewees were asked in particular what they would think of a TUC or GLA
campaign to increase trade union membership being sponsored by the NHS. All but 
one interviewee was generally supportive, and the responses demonstrate an 
extraordinary picture of support for the promotion of trade unions. The majority said 
that they would support such a campaign. However, a number felt that it couldn’t 
happen. These responses are now looked at in more detail along with some of the 
accompanying comments.
The standard response is illustrated by this quote from a senior NHS manager: “I 
think that would be a good thing.” When prompted to consider the implications from 
the point of view of the NHS being involved in a political organisation, this particular 
respondent said that he thought the TUC was politically neutral. When reminded of
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the links between the TUC and the Labour Party he went on to say that he still did not 
think it would be a problem - “particularly if it was looked at locally...I also think that 
we should be working with the local trades councils and local employers...at a 
national level there may be problems.”
Others were even more cavalier about the possibilities. One chief executive said:
“I think that there is absolutely no danger at all and the NHS and the local 
authority and whoever should be open enough to say ‘yes we would want to 
support that*. But the NHS [and] local council need to get their house in order 
[over] flexible working hours, pay differentials and look after staff in the 
workplace, especially their health and safety and particularly their stress 
management..”
Another senior officer said: “Working with the GLA on it I think would be a useful 
way forward in terms of taking a broader view because what goes on in Lewisham I 
can’t think is that infinitely different from what goes on in other boroughs around 
health inequalities and income.”
Juxtaposing the Chief Medical Officer’s message, at the start of Saving Lives, with the 
benefits of trade union membership, one senior NHS manager said: “I mean they have 
top 10 handy hints about how to eat vegetables, I don’t see why they can’t have 
similar hints about “join a union”, or “join a child care co-op” or what ever.”
However, a more cautionary note was sounded by another senior NHS manager: “the 
NHS is working with a tight budget and it is not always working with a benevolent 
attitude towards its workforce, the NHS closes down some services and undertakes 
forms of reorganisation putting things out to private contract ...[where] people [are] 
paid ..very basic salaries, so trade unions may want to keep a clear space between 
themselves and the employer.” This respondent felt concerned that the arrangement 
would be encouraging people to give money (in the form of union dues) to 
organisations that give money to the current government. So care should be taken in 
this politicisation of the NHS.
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A HAZ worker thought that as long as partnership agreements between the 
organisations made it clear that they were not completely aligned, then there was 
“absolutely no reason why it should threaten the neutrality of the NHS. However, as 
unions don’t reach all communities: “they can never be the single route, but that 
doesn’t mean that they should be excluded.”
A senior member of the health authority thought that there were mixed advantages in 
increased trade union power. In order to restrict strike action and yet gain the 
advantages of reduced pay differentials and improved working conditions, a 
‘concordat’ should be negotiated between government and the unions. Another NHS 
officer thought that although NHS managers might agree to the idea in theory, in 
practice “it is having the courage and the bravery to actually say ‘this is what we are 
doing’...” One senior NHS manager was somewhat hesitant: “I can’t imagine it and 
yet if you think about it, if you are talking about involvement in health inequalities it 
is through trade unions that we might encourage people to have more of a voice, not 
only on their own conditions but in terms of health policy. That could be quite a good 
thing, but I can’t imagine it.” When prompted as to why this was unimaginable, the 
respondent thought that it was because trade unions were not good at seeing the wider 
role they could play and that it would involve breaking role boundaries, but “I guess it 
could happen.”
A community development worker felt that it was potentially problematic:
“I would like to see them do it, but whether they could do it and get away with 
it without a lot of media and right-wing flack, I really don’t know...I suppose 
if they highlighted health and safety they could get it past the media...if 
Labour got in for a second term they could do it...whether they would do that 
or not obviously that is a different issue, but I think it would be a good idea...”
Another community development worker was more positive and saw no problems, 
saying that: “I think it would be quite nice actually if your doctor handed you a leaflet 
about joining a trade union -  yes, great I like that idea...I think it could contribute to 
giving them a friendly face, I think doctors should encourage people to do lots of 
different things..”
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Interestingly, after the bulk of these interviews had taken place, the GLA, did produce 
a leaflet, in conjunction with the TUC, aimed at encouraging London workers to join 
trade unions. In September 2002 Ken Livingstone and John Monks, then leaders of 
the GLA and TUC respectively, handed out the leaflets at Blackfnars station in order 
to target city workers and gain publicity (SERTUC, 2002).152 It would appear that 
staff in LSL responsible for working to reduce health inequalities would have 
supported this move. One interviewee thought:
“Trade unions have got a bad ‘wap’ obviously over the last twenty years or so, 
but I still think they are valuable...I think people need some sort of security in 
terms of their jobs and sometimes the union is the only place they can turn to, 
but they are not always helpful, sometimes they go with the party line rather 
than working with the actual client...the union can stab you in the back...but I 
am for it.”
Another said: “That’s fine...I don’t have a problem with that....there is a mythology 
that trade unions equals trouble...trade unions have a body of experience and of 
knowledge and personally I have no issue about people sharing their knowledge and 
experience to do something together..” (community workers). This second 
interviewee went on to say: “...it may appear to (conflict with the NHS being neutral) 
but if you took that point of view then you would not have the NHS talking to any 
organised group...you can’t live in a world of total suspicion.”
One voluntary sector worker was concerned with working conditions in her sector, 
and said: “I think trade union membership and common political consciousness not 
just pay, but pay and conditions...because there is so little unionisation in the 
voluntary sector people do put up with poor conditions.” The Socialist Party 
councillor interviewed supported the move and said: “.. in all industries and 
organisations I think it is vital that workers play a role...To increase trade union 
membership and awareness is a positive thing.” An ‘Old’ Labour councillor said: “I 
think it’s a good thing and I hope it happens.” A ‘New’ Labour councillor was also
152 Among other points the leaflet makes is that: “Black workers who are in unions on average earn 32 
percent more than black workers who are not members of a union.” (SERTUC, 2002).
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supportive saying “In my life I’ve battered my career prospects because of my trade 
union activities...I don’t think, with the best will in the world, employers are the best 
people to lead on health and safety it has to be done in partnership.” This councillor 
also supported trade unions working ‘in partnership’ to play a part in reducing pay 
differentials. However, having just experienced criticism from Unison for service 
restructuring, the councillor felt blamed and ‘an anathema’ to some union members.
Another ‘New’ Labour councillor was also supportive:
“Yes, I don’t see why not, it is about recognising that unions are partners,
moving away from the ‘them and us’ adversarial scenario some people will
argue that the NHS should not, that as an employer it is nothing to do with 
them, it is up to the TUC if they want to increase their membership, that the 
NHS should not be involved....I think that the trade union movement has been 
historically at the forefront of reducing income inequalities. It is not the 
employers that have been in the forefront, it is not in the employers interests to 
reduce income inequalities, ...I think they (unions) still have a role, not just 
about income inequalities but in terms and conditions, the whole issues about 
equal pay for women.”
But the councillor went on to say:
“I think we need to make a business case, I think employer organisations like 
the CBI should. I am sure that there is a business case to be made about 
addressing income inequalities...if employers can make a business case for 
employing disabled people....multi-nationals have always argued that there is a 
business case for employing people with disabilities, more women and black 
people...there is a business case for addressing income inequalities ...it is about 
skilling people, paying people the right money for doing the right jobs, about 
staff retention..”
A local authority officer, who had previously been a private sector manager, felt that 
larger businesses would not object and that small businesses would not be affected, as 
they were often family-run.
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“I found [in the private sector, owners] seemed to like the fact that there was a 
trade union that they could work along side. ...I really feel ... that the trade 
unions must have reduced accidents at work because in every small 
[workplace] ..there would always be someone around who had been on a trade 
union health and safety course [to say this can cause injury].”
The interviewee also thought that some of the main high street retailers had better 
relations with their trade unions than others. Another manager working in 
regeneration said: “I would go along with that. There might be criticism, yes, but 
there will always be criticism.”
One senior trade union officer interviewed said that he would think the union would 
support the move. However, he referred to three constraints. Firstly, the unions had 
had a lot of battles with NHS management and while they (NHS management) were 
not anti-union, because of compulsory competitive tendering and now the private 
finance initiative (PFI), relations were difficult. Secondly, union members had limited 
time since “facility time has often been cut and often only allows for purely internal 
industrial relations issues. I think it is a good idea but there are those constraints, but I 
think in theory we would all be in favour of that...” The official felt that the unions, 
and Unison particularly, had been at the forefront of establishing a statutory national 
minimum wage:
“It is inadequate and increasing it is a central target of our union ...Unison has 
done research pointing out the connections between poverty and ill health. 
Fuel poverty is another issue that we have been pursuing, the whole issue of a 
living wage, the minimum wage, prevailing rates of pay, ...so on the general 
issue of low wages and poverty we are doing an awful lot...”
Finally, he considered that there was a problem in that local trades councils and trade 
union resource centres now received less statutory support:
“The trades councils are not particularly encouraged, they are often made up 
of retired activists, so I think you lack the kind of basis on which to run
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campaigns ..[and] organisations to which you can give money for these sorts
of campaigns Trade union resource centres or support units were funded by
local authorities in the past [in South London] and others were funded by the 
GLC [Greater London Council, disbanded 1985]....But through the 80’s and 
90’s ...these local units or centres tended to have their money withdrawn, 
overall union membership has declined, trades councils have declined. So,..we 
are less equipped now than they were in the early 80’s or late 70’s to take 
advantage of money that might be available to run local recruitment 
campaigns. But that does not mean to say that things won’t change ...I think 
the climate is shifting back again to a certain degree. Trade unions are 
certainly popular according to the opinion polls, in fact they have always been. 
But there is a prevailing culture, part of New Labour’s anti-collectivism anti- 
labour market regulation which probably means that NHS officials and others 
would think it would be the last place to put money, not the first. But if we 
think we can make that argument I think it would be good, perhaps we don’t 
do it sufficiently as a union movement, but it is, as I say, hard. The mechanics 
of it are difficult, because it is hard to see where that core of organisation 
exists on the ground...you have not got the resource centres that did exist and 
were publicly funded...”
The low profile of the trades councils was confirmed by one regeneration officer who 
had never heard of a Lewisham Trades Council. The union official also referred to 
government legislation that, “with all its flaws, nonetheless provides a statutory basis 
for recognition”. This had increased membership and collective bargaining. If income 
inequalities are seen to be closely linked with health inequalities and trade unions are 
seen as effective in supporting a reduction in income inequalities, then it can be 
argued that the extent to which government legislation hinders or allows trade union 
involvement is an upstream public health issue.
Despite the strong support for trade unions among all the groups of staff interviewed, 
including all the staff with greater responsibilities for regeneration work, no action to 
support these views was observed locally. An example of this is the development of 
the Lewisham Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) from 2001. To the researcher’s 
knowledge no local staff member anywhere in any forum suggested that trade unions
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be invited to be represented on the LSP. The Unison official interviewed said that he 
was hoping that unions would be involved in LSPs, since local businesses were to be 
represented. Perhaps the view of one interviewee outlined above - that staff will not 
step out of line, without jeopardising their jobs - is relevant to this observation. But 
this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation. That these views appear to be held, but 
their expression was not observed in the course of participant observation, means that 
the culture of the employment environment is not supportive to their being raised. 
‘Bureau-shaping’ and rational choice theory have been used to elucidate what 
motivates staff at the local level.153 Neither of these theories explain sufficiently the 
observed phenomenon. In the author’s opinion, if central government were more 
openly supportive of these proposals then they would find fertile ground in Lewisham 
and LSL in general. However, without this lead, local staff have few arenas in which 
to jointly develop ideas and strategies. They use ‘off-the-shelf patterns and 
instructions to guide their work and do not have the time or capacity to co-ordinate 
inter-staff debate that would allow for the construction of local consensus on policy 
that deviated from national policy.
Conclusion
All the key workers in Lewisham involved in leading work to reduce health 
inequalities had a view of public health and the causes of health inequality that can be 
said to fall broadly within the model used in the Acheson (1998) and Black (1980) 
reports into inequalities in health. That is, they regarded work at both a national and 
local level as valid, and they took a view of the causes and solutions to health 
inequalities that gives priority to socio-economic determinants. They tended to share a 
common view about the extent to which health was the individual’s responsibility, in 
contrast to that of society more generally. This balance came down on the 
‘collectivist’ rather than the ‘individualist’ side, with some exceptions.
‘Health inequalities’ was regarded as an important issue, one that it was valid to spend 
time addressing. In this respect their views are commensurate both with government 
thinking and with Acheson’s. This shared vision has helped to sustain local support 
for the work even in times of great institutional change. If, as has been argued, central
153 As discussed in chapter 1.
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governments will sometimes make adjustments over time-spans in the order of ten 
years in order to improve policy, then this shared vision at a local level will be helpful 
in sustaining commitment.
However, within what can broadly be described as the ‘socio-economic determinants 
of health* framework there was a diversity of opinion. There was support for actions 
going beyond those recommended by the Acheson report and contained in 
government policy. The divergence away from government thinking was both in 
relation to ends and means. The split from Acheson was solely related to means. 
Local policy implemented connected health inequality with income inequality and 
supported further moves, beyond those espoused by central government at the time, to 
decrease income inequality. They also supported the strengthening of structures and 
institutions that were seen to affect income inequality. This is where they diverge 
from Acheson, in that his report does not refer to these political institutions, such as 
trade unions, political parties, and the European Union, but only to the policy that 
they produce.
Whilst the local policy community held beliefs that contradicted government policy 
and went beyond the scope of the Acheson report, they tended not to articulate these 
beliefs in public. There was no discrepancy between opinions voiced by individuals in 
interview and opinion shared in the normal course of work; it was simply that these 
opinions were not normally discussed or acted on within the work arena. Here support 
may be found for Laumann and Knoke’s view that in ‘policy communities’ there will 
be consensus, which limits the range of arguments that are permissible, legitimate and 
likely to be accepted as valid forms of controversy.
“Major structural changes in both substantive and procedural matters [rules of 
the game] are generally off the agenda. The dominant belief systems in 
capitalist democracies tend to deflect challenges to a set of core values, 
including private ownership of capital, privatisation of the surplus, and 
managerial prerogatives in the workplace.” (Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 384-
5).
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The thesis challenges the extent to which ‘street level bureaucrats’ are understood to 
be free to influence and develop policy outside of a framework set by central 
government. Staff had views which did not ‘have anywhere to go’ or, little to co­
ordinate them. This did not lead to a strong sense of frustration, as policy was 
generally progressing in the direction of their beliefs; however, it is relevant to the 
discussion in chapter 1, on agenda setting and dimensions of power (Lukes, 1974). 
Items such as the links between trade union organisation and health inequality, or the 
widening gap in inequality of earnings, were not brought onto the agenda because of 
co-ordination of the policy agenda by central government. This happened in a way 
that was quiet and non-confrontational.
In this case study local players seem to have been highly influenced in their practice 
and their confidence to articulate beliefs, by a shared knowledge of the Acheson 
report (1998): a prestigious and ‘independent’ inquiry into inequalities in health, 
which also gained official government acceptance. The further away from knowledge 
of the report one travelled within the local policy community, the more opinions 
diverged. Knowledge of the Acheson report appears to have affected the articulation 
of beliefs. Similarly, the evidence suggests that staff were effectively controlled by 
government policy, in that, if policy had resonated even more with their beliefs it is 
likely that they would have implemented it. However, their disagreements with 
government policy were not normally visible outside of the interview setting.
Staff employed by the NHS did not have a shared vision of rules governing the 
political role of the institutions they worked for. Where effective practice to reduce 
health inequalities would take the NHS into politically sensitive areas, there was 
uncertainty as to whose interests to follow. Where no national or other respected 
leadership existed, to say what was right or wrong for local staff to do, they appeared 
to ignore evidence that suggested they should argue for particular kinds of work. This 
was demonstrated in submissions to the consultation document on reducing health 
inequalities released by the DoH in the autumn of 2001. Although the document 
explicitly asked for local views on national policy, submissions from the LSL area 
contained no mention of support for further reductions in income inequality. This was 
despite the overwhelming support for such moves across the policy community 
revealed in this research.
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The values of staff at the local level, at the time this research was conducted, cannot 
be said to have blocked government policy to reduce health inequalities. Generally, 
the view among staff was that government policy was blocking progress and not 
extending far enough to meet the needs of local populations.
In analysing policy implementation, Barrett and Fudge suggest that assessing the 
degree to which policy has changed practice should be considered:
“The degree to which policy represents change can be seen both as a function 
of the polarisation of ideologies, attitudes and value systems participating 
within the existing social order [if policy doesn’t amount to much then it 
won’t challenge values] and as a determinant of the degree and type of 
negotiation likely to be necessary if it is to be implemented [if much 
negotiation is needed then the policy change is significant].” (Barrett and 
Fudge, 1981: 273, comments in brackets added).
This research found that in the local implementation of policy to reduce health 
inequalities, the beliefs and values of local players have not been a determining factor 
in driving changes in practice over the period in question. At the same time staff 
opinion has worked with the grain of government policy. The change in beliefs has 
taken place at central government level. The resulting financing of local work has, 
within the local area, had the most significant impact on the degree to which policy 
has changed practice. Government policy moved further into line with local values. 
However, locally held beliefs would not have blocked more radical policy changes. 
There was more room and appetite for change in policy aimed at reducing health 
inequalities at the local level than central government permitted or believed possible. 
The next chapter moves on to look at the local institutions through which interviewees 
thought income inequalities were influenced.
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Chapter 6 
FINDINGS -  PARTICIPATORY FRAMEWORK 
Introduction
The thesis has moved from looking at how the evolving institutions of statutory 
agencies affected health inequalities work (chapter 4), to the individual views of the 
agents inhabiting those structures (chapter 5). This chapter now turns to look at the 
institutions through which those working in local agencies consider public 
involvement should and does take place.154 It considers developments in ‘public 
involvement’ institutions, particularly from the perspective of agents’ access to 
influencing income inequalities.
Statutory agencies have increasingly stressed the importance of ‘user and public 
involvement’.155 In the case of Lewisham Council, this has resulted in the creation of 
new institutions for receiving the views of Lewisham residents, namely the ‘Hubs’ 
and the citizens’ panel. The local NHS is also spending increased resources on public 
and user involvement (PUI).
The thesis considers how residents might influence income inequalities for the 
following reasons: (1) As described in the previous chapter, staff working in local 
services believe that there is an intimate connection between health inequalities and 
income inequalities and generally they would like to see both reduced. (2) Over the 
last ten years, since the publication of Local Voices (NHSME, 1992) and again with 
the publication of The NHS Plan (DoH, 2000) there has been increased investment in 
local statutory patient and public involvement work which, among other things, aims 
to involve residents in issues affecting their health. (3) Increased support, from both 
national government and local players, for a recognition of all the ‘wider determinants
154 A chronology of institutional changes and related policy documents is produced in Appendix 4.1.
155 A definition of ‘involvement’ in this context is provided by Lee and Mills (1982: 129). They divide 
the term into four sub-terms: (1) collaboration, (2) participation, (3) consultation and (4) negotiation. 
The first implies equal involvement rights, the second, that representatives of interest groups actively 
take part in the decision-making process. Thirdly, consultation is the seeking of advice, etc, but with no 
duty to take it  Finally, negotiation takes place where one body cannot get what it wants without 
seeking an accommodation with another party.
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of health’, means that a greater understanding of the relationships between the 
different elements of public participation is required. Increasingly, NHS employees 
are getting involved in projects that include public involvement, such as regeneration 
work, yet there is a lack of clarity and consensus as to what forms of participation are 
to be upheld as best practice. (4) Public health strategists such as Whitehead have also 
recommended public involvement as a necessary prerequisite for reducing health 
inequalities (Whitehead, 1992a). There is also a body of academic literature, and a 
belief among some public health practitioners, that increasing ‘social capital’ has a 
positive effect on health. This supposition ties in to views and practice concerning 
public involvement for health improvement. (5) Some academic and political opinion 
that holds that, in campaigning via their own organisations - be these political parties 
or trade unions -  the worse off can affect income inequalities to their advantage. 
These views were reported on in chapter 1.
It is this work’s contention that statutory services have difficulty in forming and 
delivering consistent and rational policy in the area of income inequality because of 
problems in delineating between party political concerns and areas of importance to 
public health. The strong correlation between poorer health and Labour voting, 
reported by Davey Smith and Dorling (1996), highlights the possibility of connections 
between party political programmes and benefits accruing to groups whose health is 
better or worse than average. At the same time, the Labour Party itself has been 
experiencing radical changes in its methods of involvement and in the extent to which 
local party members are involved and have power. The internal democracy and 
membership involvement practices of the Labour Party is certainly not an area that 
NHS public health staff are expected to be informed of, or make comment on. For 
instance, there has, unsurprisingly never been, to the author’s knowledge, any 
reference to the organisation of the Labour Party in responses to DoH consultation 
papers on policy to reduce health inequalities. Yet, as the chapter demonstrates, the 
two areas are linked.
This chapter will look, from a public health perspective, at the institutions that local 
people might use to influence policy. This is done by looking topics under six points: 
(1) looks at general conceptions as to how local people influence national policy; (2) 
reports views on what was happening locally in relation to public involvement; (3)
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takes a look at issues regarding a ‘traditional’ representative form, namely, use of 
MPs and councillors; (4) considers a new vehicle for public participation in 
Lewisham: the citizens’ panel. And investigates whether there is a consensus among 
local staff on whether the citizens’ panel could be used to consider issues of income 
inequality; (5) then asks respondents to consider the way in which an ‘ideal type’ 
resident might influence income inequalities. And it assesses the extent to which PUI 
institutions are arranged to exclude access to influence over income inequalities. 
Using the concept of three-dimensional power, it considers whether agendas within 
these institutions have been set a priori. Following this, participation in more 
autonomous forms of association is considered, and questions are posed as to whether 
this participation can be seen as a route to influencing income inequalities. Also 
considered from this perspective are developments in local involvement in the Labour 
Party; (6) finally, councillors’ views on involvement are investigated further.
Throughout the chapter, differences of opinion between local actors are demonstrated. 
By, for instance, comparing ‘Hubs’ with Labour Party branch meetings, the objective 
is to show that, while there is no clear local consensus on the best way for local 
people to influence the wider determinants of health, there is also increasing statutory, 
including NHS, involvement in this contested arena.
It should be noted that some of the ‘wider determinants of health’, for example 
housing, can be controlled to some extent locally, while others may fall under more 
national control, for example, income inequality. The boundaries between local and 
national issues are not clear-cut.
1. Methods by which local people influence policy
Chapter 1 looked at definitions of democracy and the means by which people are seen 
to influence policy. A summary of findings on the differing views of local players 
about this issue is set out here.
Democratic models
Representative, participative and direct democracy were concepts referred to by local 
players with a role in reducing health inequalities. The current model of democracy in
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Lewisham appears to be both in transition and contested. The system is changing 
because of a number o f immediate developments that, in turn, have various causes. 
Immediate changes in Lewisham’s system of representation and democracy include: 
the formation of a community council (described below); the formation o f ‘Hubs’; the 
formation of a ‘citizens’ panel’; the formation of a community network (also 
described below); a decrease in participation by Labour Party members and a decrease 
in their powers; a rearrangement of the responsibilities of councillors and a planned 
decrease in their numbers; the increased investment by statutory services in public and 
patient involvement workers, either based in the statutory or voluntary sector.
The community council is funded through the SRB (single regeneration budget). It 
aims to set up an elected council of residents who can represent the community, but 
who are not party-based. It covers an area that includes some parts of five wards in 
North Lewisham. NHS employees have roles in the project, advising on health issues. 
Those, state-funded, voluntary sector workers involved in setting up the ‘community 
council’ were especially driven by particular views on the merits of different 
democratic systems. They supported participative democratic models, encouraging the 
direct involvement of all residents.
The community network was set up in 2002 as a coalition of community and 
voluntary groups. Throughout 2002/3 it held comparatively large bimonthly evening 
meetings (attendance circa 200) to which various speakers, including the council’s 
chief executive, the mayor and Lewisham hospital’s chief executive were invited. The 
meetings also elected representatives to sit on the Local Strategic Partnership.
Held (1987: 262) describes proponents of participative democracy as recognising the 
need for “direct participation and control over immediate locales” to be 
“complemented by party and interest-group competition in governmental affairs..” 
This is in order to input into national politics. However, as will be seen, there was 
mixed local support for any party political involvement, coupled with a low general 
level of knowledge and understanding of the party structures.
For a number of interviewees, representative democracy was not functioning 
adequately. This was either because it needed improving and strengthening, or
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because the concept itself was suspect, a more direct, participative democracy being 
required. A number of specific criticisms came from community development 
workers who had connections to the formation of the ‘community council*. In 
particular, it was considered that the ability of local councillors to take up issues on 
behalf of local residents was very limited. At least two reasons were given for this. 
Firstly, council ward boundaries and the borough as a whole were considered to be 
the wrong units for discussion of local needs. The latter being too big, and the former 
not reflecting ‘real’ community boundaries. Thus ‘communities of interest’, such as 
the Somali community, were seen to cover areas spanning parts of three or four 
wards. However, there was no individual neighbourhood where lots of Somali people 
lived. Boundary-based political structures were therefore seen to be unable to 
represent such ‘communities of interest*.
Secondly, it was perceived that the councillors themselves were not selected from a 
wide enough base of people and were also in post for too long. The reason for their 
narrow base was that they were being selected from within Labour Party branch 
meetings that had few attendees and yet once selected as the local Labour candidate 
they were very likely to be elected.
Local involvement-national involvement
Statutory encouragement of local involvement in local issues, but neglect of local 
involvement in national issues, or issues relating to nationally determined ‘wider 
determinants of health’, was seen by one public health director to demonstrate 
inconsistency in policy. A number of public health staff appeared to have considered 
the issue prior to interview and drew similar conclusions. One senior HAZ worker 
said:
“ there is a difficulty, in that yes OK the local authorities have that form of
public involvement [‘Hubs’ or Area Forums], but there is no direct link at the 
moment taking that up...everybody in Lewisham, for example, is saying that 
this estate is really desperate, ... and got to have new windows for 
example....now that is something that sits at borough level....so in theory, 
depending on finances obviously, that is something the borough could actually 
tackle. But, for example, if it was around the level of housing benefit, that is
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not something that is decided at borough level, that would actually need to go 
straight on. There is not, in my reading of the guidance [Modernising Local 
Government, DETR, 2000], there is not that relationship between ....the 
ground-swell of opinion ...on the ground, which relates to national policy, and 
the government having any accountability to change national policy in line 
with what is coming through there.”
Others considered that local councillors and MPs could influence national policy on 
behalf of local people. One local councillor considered that: “I am in a position where 
I have more chance of influencing national policy than many people...”. Another 
councillor said - “I do think that local people do look to their elected representatives 
to do that [influencing policy]...they do look at an elected representative, councillors 
or MPs, to influence national policy. You know I don’t think there are other 
structures, unless it is like consumer pressure or as specific issues, or you know a 
protest.”
At a local health-related conference, one MP for Lewisham, Joan Ruddock, advised 
that those wishing to influence national policy should take specific steps, including 
making contact with her, or other appropriate MPs. She said that: “politics in this 
country is organised on a party basis, therefore you need to go through the party 
process.” However, as will be described, this is not the message that comes from other 
quarters, it is also an issue that is in a state of rapid change.
A small number of interviewees thought that local people were not interested in being 
involved in any issues that were wider than immediate local concerns, such as street 
lighting, fear of crime, or finding employment. Those who thought this tended to be 
people working in areas related to employment initiatives within regeneration 
strategies. Linked with this idea, that local people were only interested in their own 
immediate circumstances and immediate local issues, was a view that a lot more work 
needed to be done to involve local people in influencing local decisions, therefore, to 
move on to national issues would be premature. Definitions of the terms ‘local issues’ 
and ‘wider national issues’ were, however, to a certain extent set by local 
administrators. Benefit levels for instance are a local issue, in the sense that they 
affect local people, but not in the sense that local authorities control them.
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Stages of participation
A ‘stages of participation’ perspective, as exemplified by the ‘ladder of participation’ 
(Amstein, 1971), meant that involvement was seen as something that had to develop 
gradually, with residents needing to be involved in local issues, before reaching the 
point of being interested in such ‘wider’ concerns.
So for example, one community development worker, involved in employment issues, 
said, in a discussion concerning the extent to which residents on the estate where he 
worked would be able to raise wider issues relating to the determinants of health:
“Gosh, I’m not sure that they are at that stage,...that people are ready to 
engage in that kind of dialogue, and it may take time for them to get to that 
point. I mean they worry about things like -  why hasn’t the lift been repaired 
for fourteen months... about the fact that in some blocks they are potentially 
going to be moved out of their homes, where some of them have lived for 
years....to get them on to thinking about how they might influence those sorts 
of policies, I think that is a bit early.”
However, one community development worker was critical of ‘the ladder of 
participation’, saying that:
“I don’t like it personally...I am always trying to get away from the idea of 
levels, because I don’t think it works like that, because otherwise you 
encourage everybody to see themselves on a particular rung of the ladder, and 
that it is very evolutionary, they have to ‘become’, ..they have to get to some 
point at the end. Whereas actually, the whole point of our kind of approach ..is 
that we are so ambitious we believe that we can reach everyone over time and 
eventually. We will try every different thing that we can think of to try and 
appeal to different people. But people are very different and they don’t all 
want the same approach. We talk about ‘multiple ways in’ -  you can turn up at 
an event, you can write a letter, you can phone up, you can have different 
types of involvement. ..[It] may end up being your life’s work, but I would not
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say that the ‘life’s work’ people, like myself, are at the top of that ladder, you 
know we are all involved in different ways.”
Nevertheless, in other areas of the local ‘public health community’ the ‘ladder’ was 
widely supported and used as a descriptive and educational tool, for example, in 
training run by the health promotion department.
Rational Choice
One respondent took a particularly ‘rational choice’ perspective on the motivation of 
estate residents and his views can also be related to a specific reading of the ‘ladder of 
participation’ theory.
A classical ‘rational choice theory’ (RCT) perspective might consider the individual 
motivations of residents (Ward, 1995), for instance, their motivation to - participate in 
campaigns to increase the level o f pensions, or the national minimum wage, or child 
benefit, or to change the formula for parks’ funding. Crudely, for example, RCT 
would not see the motivation of a pensioner to be involved in a minimum wage 
campaign as being so strong as the same pensioner’s interest in a campaign to 
increase pensions. Motivations are seen to relate strongly to immediate individual 
interests and the perspective does not tend to credit individuals with a wider strategic 
approach.156 Thus, for example, one community development worker said:
“I think you will not be talking to a poor person for very long before they want 
to earn some money...if you are going to encouraged people to participate in 
the affairs of things, they will be doing it for a rational reason, that that is, they 
want a job. In other words a lot of people want a job administrating the [SRB] 
programme, if not, they want to get on a training programme and you can’t 
really, I don’t think, expect people to just participate philosophically. They 
have to be there for a reason, for themselves.” (community development 
worker).
156 Fine (2001) traces the links between methodological individualism, rational choice and social 
capital.
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Social Capital157
A number of staff from all sectors linked the public involvement agenda with the aim 
of ‘building social capital*. The HAZ for instance was seen, in part, by one 
interviewee as trying to “help people influence decision making and support them so 
that they feel that they can (and) have a right to, have some influence..”
Differences of opinion between local players
There were some clear divisions of opinion between local employees charged with 
implementing policy to reduce health inequalities. Divisions existed between, for 
example, councillors elected from certain estates and community development 
workers based on the estates. These concern the way in which local residents should 
be and are, involved in influencing issues relating to the wider determinants of health 
and, in particular, income inequalities. They concern the value of participative and 
representative democracy.
2. Public involvement - views on what was happening
Held points out that discussions on democracy often contain both descriptive and 
normative elements (Held, 1987: 7). This section looks at some local opinions on the 
current state of public involvement. Later on some local prescriptions for its 
development are reported.
Changes in the nature and level of involvement
Despite moves by statutory agencies to invest more in public participation, there was 
a sense from one or two interviewees, from each of the represented sectors, that public 
involvement had actually decreased over the previous ten years. The Socialist Party 
councillor, for instance, said that tenants used to have more effective control of 
policy:
“In the housing committee, there used to be reps from the tenants movement 
across Lewisham, a rep sat on the housing committee and could have an input 
into that, which could have an input to the council. For instance, tenants could
157 Social capital is also discussed later in this chapter.
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put forward that they felt that one of the issues respecting to them was low 
incomes and that could feed through ...to council policy ..”
One community development worker felt that ‘the working class’ in particular, had 
been ‘disenfranchised’ over the last twenty years. “I think that because of the damage 
that’s been done over the years to working class communities, in terms of people 
feeding back centrally ...you can’t do it through the political process that exists, 
because people don’t bother with those any more half the time..”
A regeneration officer considered that -
“Local democracy, in my view, has become much weaker...At the present time 
there is a strong Labour central government, they don’t see the objective of 
having a strong local government, they see it as something that is going to 
answer them back... the weaker it [local government] is I think, that affects the 
quality of the candidates you have got coming forward. A few years ago, ten 
or twenty years ago, you probably had much more dynamic material.”
Other interviewees had not considered public involvement in issues affecting the 
wider determinants of health, be they local or national. Of these, almost all said that 
the questions relating to this issue were “very interesting” and they welcomed the 
questioning. One said: “To be honest I have not really thought...my gut feeling would 
be yes, I am sure there can be some local work that does start to look at the national, I 
am not quite sure how you would organise it to be honest.” (NHS senior manager)
Support for the ‘public involvement agenda9
Some interviewees said they were cynical about the whole ‘public involvement 
agenda’. Their concerns were various. Firstly, there was a small body of opinion that 
considered that at least “if we are giving people control we have to make sure they 
want it”. This was coupled with a feeling that people often did not want more control. 
Secondly, there was a concern that people needed the skills or support to get involved, 
and that this was not generally prioritised (Senior NHS manager). Thirdly, it was felt 
that real choices had to be on offer:
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“There is absolutely no point in asking the community to identify a problem 
and then (have them) choose decisions that we can’t do anything about., and 
sometimes in the NHS we have to work to such timetables that there aren’t 
many choices., and so I think the trick is to identify areas where there really 
are difficulties and allow the community to participate and also areas where 
there is enough time to actually do it.. A lot of NHS consultation with patients 
is a bit of a sham and the community is not going to be interested .. the choices 
are broadly made by someone and then the community is agreeing with it.. So 
I have quite strong feelings about it -  a lot of it is a waste of time.” (public 
health consultant).
However, chapter 5 showed that interviewees did not agree on the question of whether 
income inequalities could be reduced, linked to this there were divergent opinions on 
what local people can ‘do something about’ and what they can’t alter. Not to involve 
people in decisions about income inequalities, because you don’t think their opinions 
can possibly have any effect, is to take a political decision. Such decisions, or ‘non­
decisions’ (Crenson, 1971), are clearly being taken by NHS staff.
One interviewee said that she felt that public involvement work had only really 
developed in Lewisham in the past three years. However, she considered that the 
provisions for development in the field outlined in chapter ten of The NHS Plan 
(DoH, 2000) were poor.
“I actually think that chapter ten will result in a wave of committees and 
structures that will further distance decision making from the ordinary person 
on the street. I think that it is a bureaucrat’s heaven. ....I am not sure that the 
agenda will be anything other than those quite mechanistic things -  how long 
people wait in the A&E department the quality of the food -  obviously there 
are inequalities in that. But if the new agenda should be inequalities, I am not 
massively optimistic that that is what the new agenda will be.” (senior 
manager).
Others felt that gaining participation was too difficult, especially if “your standard 
meeting format” was used. And that “more assertive contact [using] out-reach [with]
211
door-to-door discussions was needed” (voluntary sector worker). Another perspective 
was that national policy was driving local work more and more and that therefore 
there was less scope for local variation in policy implementation - “with a whole 
range of initiatives ...coming up from the social exclusion unit ..and a whole raft of 
initiatives..” (councillor).
Finally, one senior manager thought that we already know what people think about 
many of the things they are asked about. So the process of public involvement causes 
unnecessary time delays and the resources used should be considered carefully, as 
they could often be more effectively employed. This manager considered that a lot 
more understanding was required generally and in relation to inequalities, on the place 
of public involvement in local policymaking -  it depends on the purpose. His 
sentiments were echoed by a number of councillors in relation to the findings of the 
‘Hubs’ (to be discussed below). Although they approved of the Hubs, they still 
thought Hubs weren’t telling them anything they didn’t already know.
3. Old style representation - taking issues to locally elected 
councillors and MPS
Generally the most senior staff interviewed liaised with the MPs of the borough and 
the ‘deputy mayors’ on the health partnership board. Some of the less senior staff had 
ad hoc contact with various councillors. Some staff, with a remit to work on health 
inequalities, had contact with MPs. But it was not felt by them to be appropriate to 
raise issues on the links between health and income inequalities. As one NHS chief 
executive said: “ ...my feeling with the MPs is they are busy, they only really want to 
know if you have got sexy stuff to tell them which will help them sound good, or if 
they want to beat you over the head because you are messing up.”
However, the same interviewee felt that partnership arrangements with the council 
now meant that better relationships were developing with senior councillors via 
meetings of the Health Partnership Board. Another chief executive was impressed 
with the commitment of a local MP in spending time visiting tenants and small 
community groups. The MP had advised her that: “...if you want to find out what 
people are saying then that is where you need to go..”
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MPs tended to be contacted by the local NHS when there were particular things staff 
wanted the members to do. For instance, the public health department was deeply 
concerned in early 2001 when the inequalities adjustment for the allocation of 
national funds was announced, since it left LSL worse off than had been anticipated, 
given levels of deprivation in the three boroughs. Therefore, the MPs were contacted 
by letter and met with face-to-face.
A senior member of the health authority said that they had not ever discussed the links 
between income inequality and health inequality with MPs since -
“...we would need to be very clear what we were asking for...we tend not to 
talk to them so much about the income side of it, but we talk to them about our 
income, our resources. And we brief them about our overall working ..with the 
local authorities. But we have not specifically gone to them around issues 
about income, regeneration, income inequalities. I can’t imagine that we 
would, because we would want them to focus on the things we need them to 
do specifically for us.”
Some other senior NHS staff did not have any links with elected councillors and did 
not know links existed: “...the PCGs, as far as I am aware ..have actually not had 
links with the councillors, we have links with the local authorities, but in terms of 
influencing and shaping and having the ear, no we have not actually made a particular 
effort to link with councillors.”
Others were unsure of the relationship: “I must admit that that has always been 
something that I have ..wondered about...what contact should we have with them 
(councillors).” But this senior NHS manager went on to say that she also thought 
councillors were “driven by power, rather than the drive to really do something about 
their area..”
As mentioned above, some community development workers were hostile to the 
political process through which councillors acquired their seats. They felt the 
councillors were not up to the job, not representative of local people and therefore not
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worth working with. “They are chosen in the wrong way and therefore they are the 
wrong people. If we want community leaders, we have to chose community leaders 
not politicians...So the obvious thing is to cut the party system out of the very local 
structure....”.158 According to the workers involved, the introduction of the 
community council meant intensive neighbourhood development. That is, going into 
twenty-one identified neighbourhoods and having discussions, debates and workshops 
about the areas themselves, about what is wrong with them, what is good about them 
and also asking questions such as: who do you trust to champion your 
neighbourhood? “..What we are doing is saying -  you don’t need to woriy about 
politics, what you need to worry about is your neighbourhood. So it is quite 
iconoclastic, it is really saying people don’t care about politics. OK, but they do care 
about where they live, they really do..”
Another community development worker said “..I don’t think councillors are people 
who represent me or my views, so I don’t vote for them and I probably never will...” 
This worker again espoused the concept of ‘participatory democracy’ over 
‘representative democracy’. However, in discussing a particular councillor, the same 
worker said that they had been very supportive of developments to make health 
services more accessible in the local area.
However, another community development worker took a different view of the power 
of voluntary organisation over political involvement:
“...a lot of people go into the voluntary-community sector ...thinking that you 
can change [things]. By going in and providing services...it might improve 
practice ...on a micro level, but why they think that is going to make a 
difference is beyond me, but some people do think like that....I think it is 
because people don’t feel part of the political process and don’t really grasp 
what it is all about or how to go about things ...”
Councillors were involved in the management committees and evaluation panels of 
various voluntary organisations such as Voluntary Action Lewisham and also the
158 This view is also reflected in published work by community development workers based in other 
areas of England (for instance: Atkinson, 2000).
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Community Health Council (CHC). They were also developing a role on council 
health scrutiny committees, which would take over some of the remit of the CHC.
If organisations or partnerships, such as the New Deal for Communities area 
(covering New Cross Gate), were undertaking local public involvement work and 
wanted to contact the local Labour Party, which was rare, they did this via the 
councillors. No contact was ever attempted with Labour Party members, and also, to 
our knowledge, no attempts were made to contact trade union members.
One community development worker discussed the need for ‘political will’ to drive 
health and income inequalities work. However, he felt that power had been removed 
from the local councillors he had links with. “I think that the chief executives at the 
health authority, the PCGs and community and borough managers have a lot more 
juice, a lot more power, a lot more influence, than they [elected councillors] do.” A 
vicious circle was thus set up, in that the councillors were thought to have little 
power, they were therefore not used and supported and in-tum their status diminished.
The councillors themselves had ambivalent attitudes towards influencing income 
inequalities policy. In relation to increasing the national minimum wage (NMW), for 
instance, one councillor, who said he was friends with one of the MPs, said that if he 
lobbied the MP to say that the NMW should increase, the MP would just say: “OK 
you can think that, but I am not going to do anything about it..” There was really no 
point in even trying to affect the policy of local MPs towards income inequalities. On 
the other hand, another ‘New’ Labour councillor thought:
“It is very important for MPs to go through their case work and the evidence 
and take up those issues [of income inequality]. They are the ones who can 
influence policy...Not many people use their MPs and councillors for those 
purposes, they come when they are in trouble, they see you as a last resort. I 
still don’t think we use local politicians and our MPs in a pro-active way, as 
we should.”
This councillor’s position did not square with the views of those involved in setting 
up the local community council. She felt that:
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“For me personally, I like people to join political parties, obviously personally 
I would like people to join the Labour Party, but you know, I think people 
don’t recognise the value of being a party member. I think it is very important. 
But recognising that a lot of people don’t want to become members, I think 
they should use politicians in a more effective way, not just at crises points..”
The Socialist Party councillor interviewed approved, in principle, of people using 
their local MPs and council -
“If there were some genuine opportunities for people to feed back to their 
elected representatives who could then take issues forward. After all, the 
council represents a whole area and the MPs represent it. But I have to say that 
the whole current consultation process, and fashioning the direction in which it 
[involvement in the Labour council] is going, is one that in real terms excludes 
people from having a real say.”
He felt that MPs in marginal constituencies were more likely to be responsive and that 
even then it would be down to the amount of influence the particular MP had in their 
party.
4. New style involvement - the Citizens’ Panel
The citizens’ panel is a Lewisham borough council scheme that seeks the views of 
1,000 Lewisham residents, chosen at random. It is similar to other schemes now used 
in a large number of councils in the UK. The panel has been used to gain opinions on 
numerous local issues, from library developments to the services that should be 
provided by healthy living centres.
Interviewees were asked if they thought that the citizens’ panel could be invited to 
comment on what they thought of income inequalities. The results are summarised in
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Figure 6.1 This shows the answer to the question: ‘Could and should the Lewisham 
Citizens’ panel be asked to comment on income inequalities?’. Each arrow runs from the 
organisation of the respondent to their answer. There is one arrow per interviewee who 
responded.
Could and 
should
Voluntary Sector
Could but 
should not
Local Authority
Could not
Councillors
Other
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figure 6.1. These findings show a lack of clarity at the local level as to the role of the 
citizens’ panel. They expose the perceived importance of controlling the use of the 
panel, both in relation to what is put to it and to the way in which findings are then 
used. It is clear that consultation on an issue like income inequalities, which has a big 
impact locally but which is also a national political issue, has not been thought 
through locally.
Of those NHS staff recommending that the citizens’ panel should take up this issue, 
one chief executive suggested that the question be addressed by a new local NHS-led 
forum set up to co-ordinate public and user participation. But generally she felt that 
the issue of income inequalities, although being a national issue, also “has a direct 
impact on our people in Lewisham.” And therefore was of relevance to the citizens’ 
panel.
Another senior member of the public health department thought, along with a number 
of other respondents, that the panel should only be asked to come up with 
“recommendations that you can do something about”, or “what would make a 
difference to people’s economic position locally.” So her proviso on using the panel 
for this issue was that questions should have a local focus and that discussion should 
be about what Lewisham could do to reduce income inequalities. Another NHS 
manager thought that the council should consult the panel about income inequalities 
among its own employees.
Other respondents also felt that the panel should only be used for things that people 
locally had the power to do something about. But they, therefore, concluded that the 
panel should not be used to discuss the issue of income inequalities. Of them, one 
NHS director in particular said: “People can contact their MP and councillors, but 
fundamentally it takes real national government commitment to say -  ‘we are going to 
have a redistributive policy’. I don’t want to say to people not to have local 
mechanisms, but in terms of influencing the national agenda, I am sceptical about 
what impact it might have.” She cited an anti-globalisation demonstration that had 
taken place the day before as evidence that people do care about wider national issues, 
but said “what happened to them? -  they were penned in.” In other words, they had no
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impact. So she concluded: “I think the best that local people can do is influence local 
agendas.”
A public health consultant felt cynical for another reason. Firstly, she thought that 
panels of this nature tended to be biased against those who are “at the bottom of the 
heap -  the substance misusers, mentally disordered offenders...”. And that anything 
they were asked would produce a “middle of the road” view. Secondly, she said that -
“In a democracy everyone will say yes to everything, until it affects their 
pockets. So they say - yes we will do this - and then you say - you will be 
paying more per pound in tax - and they say ‘no’. So I bet you, everyone 
would say yes, and if it affected them they would say no.. Is that just too 
cynical?”.
One senior manager had used a citizens’ panel to acquire recommendations on 
priorities for healthy living centres. However, she thought that people would “tinker 
with the research to meet their own needs” and that therefore, the panel could, but 
should not be used to ask about income inequality. Some senior NHS staff had not 
heard of the panel and could not comment.
Of the voluntary sector staff interviewed most thought that it should be used for 
discussing income inequalities. However, there was again some cynicism about the 
panel, particularly since it had reportedly won an award and its members had all been 
given free computers. “They should be kept busy and asked all sorts of things, given 
that they keep winning prizes.” Of those voluntary sector staff who did not think the 
panel should be asked, the feeling was not strong, but the reason given was simply 
that it was felt no one would take any notice of what local people thought. This 
cynicism was also reflected in the view of the Socialist Party councillor, who thought 
that: “The only consultation in my opinion that takes place in a lot of boroughs and 
particularly in Lewisham, is to consult, in effect, on decisions that have already been 
made, to give them some legitimacy.”
Another comment, repeated a number of times, was that the panel members would 
have to be well supported in order to understand the questions. It was also felt by
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some respondents that the presentation of information by council officers was likely 
to ‘push people down the road the council wants’. A councillor however, thought that 
“if you were looking for a particular answer you would have to be careful how the 
question was framed and consider how people can look objectively at an issue without 
seeing it from the perspective of their own personal gain.” He cited the case of Bristol 
Council which had held a poll on cutting council tax or funding schools and had, in 
his opinion, got into trouble when people had said they wanted the former. And a 
‘New’ Labour councillor said, “what people often say they want is not what is 
necessarily good for them, in as much as the whole holistic view of the thing is 
concerned”.
Another ‘New’ Labour councillor thought that the purpose of the panel was not just to 
get answers, but also to ‘engage citizens’. A health authority employee also cited the 
role of the panel, in allowing people a ‘foot in’ to public engagement. She had seen a 
number of members of the public first becoming involved because of an invitation 
and then, eventually moving into more substantive public positions, such as non­
executive NHS Trust member.
Local authority strategy to involve residents also involves schemes such as the Hubs, 
which will be discussed below.
5. Local organisation to reduce income inequality
A consultation document on transport prepared by the Social Exclusion Unit in 2001 
asked ‘Do people in local communities know who to go to if they want to influence 
transport services?’. In a similar vein, interviewees were asked -  ‘if a local person 
said they wanted to see a reduction in income inequalities, what local organisation 
would you suggest the person contacting?’ This question attempts to see control of 
income inequalities from a local person’s perspective, in a similar way to ‘patient 
pathways’ work, which tracks services users between departments. We seek to look at 
options considered to be available locally for input into this policy.
Generally respondents said they found the question ‘very interesting’. They either 
offered suggestions for organisations for people to join, or to go to in order to find out
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Figure 6.2 This shows the answer to the question: ‘if a member of the public in Lewisham wanted to see a reduction in income inequalities, which organisation should they join or where should they go?’ The 
arrows represent the answers of those asked. An arrow starts from the respondent’s organisation and travels to the organisation(s) they recommended. One respondent may come up with more than one answer. 
Some, for example, the Socialist Party councillor, recommended their own organisation so the arrow is shown going back into their own circle.
more information. However, the imaginary person was often referred to organisations 
which themselves had referred elsewhere (see figure 6.2).
The Labour Party
If they did not mention sending people to the local Labour Party, as indeed the 
majority did not, interviewees were then asked -  ‘What about the local Labour Party 
in Lewisham?’. To which a number gave answers along the lines of this senior public 
health manager: “No, it is interesting that it did not cross my mind”. Others were not 
aware at all of the local Labour Party. Some considered that it would not be 
appropriate. One saying, for instance, that because the party was in government, 
anyone in the Labour Party wanting to change policy on income distribution “would 
be frowned on”. And another senior NHS manager saying that - “..I suppose I have a 
fundamental problem of advising someone to go to the Labour Party at the moment. I 
don’t see any evidence that it [inequalities reduction] is really at its heart and is what 
they passionately feel.” Even people who mentioned that they were themselves 
members of the Labour Party and cited policy that they felt was effective in reducing 
health and income inequalities, did not recommend others going to the Labour Party 
as an organisation to be involved with in order to reduce inequalities.
There seemed to be little conception as to where Labour Party policy might come 
from, although generally it was assumed that it did not come from the membership. 
Both council and health authority officers with responsibilities for involving the 
public had never had any contact with the local Labour Party membership and knew 
nothing about its structure, organisation or membership.
Social capital and non-party methods
There was fairly widespread support for statutory services to ‘engage with building 
social capital’. One NHS manager characterised the best way to ‘build social capital’ 
as offering support to the type of “community based organisations, staffed by 
volunteers, meeting on a Wednesday night..” Another manager explained social 
capital light-heartedly as “people being nice to each other”. There was a belief among 
a number of interviewees that people would be enfranchised by being involved in 
these local voluntary organisations, “in terms of individuals developing a feeling that 
they are able to participate.” The same respondent said of local political parties: “ I
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have no personal contacts with any political parties, I don’t know anything about how 
they work.” (NHS manager).
At the same time, a number of community development workers (CDWs) did not 
know anywhere to suggest that people should go. One, for instance, saying: “I don’t 
know whether such groups exist, and I don’t know where local people come together 
to talk about such things in any shape or form, all I can say is if someone came here 
and asked such a question I would have to say - ‘I don’t know I will try and find out 
for you’.”
One CDW specifically said they would recommend - “don’t go into politics, go to the 
community-voluntary sector”. However, another CDW did recommend the Labour 
Party, saying - “I know it sounds ridiculous, but I would say go along to your local 
Labour Party branch”. She said that it was wrong to think the issue could be addressed 
simply via the community-voluntary sector, adding that cynicism towards politics 
serves a function “because it is more familiar and comfortable. I am not saying that 
the political process isn’t a nightmare to negotiate and that it is not full of things that 
the rest of society is full of like sexism, racism you know.” However, she also felt that 
locally, people were going to associate the political process with the council and that 
“people will be aware of the shady dealings and the shenanigans around the council.”
Another senior NHS manager mentioned the reputation Lewisham Council had for 
being ‘corrupt’. She had heard this discussed on a number of occasions in the past two 
years. The association between Labour Party membership, the council and local 
politics was echoed by one CDW who said, when asked about the Labour Party as an 
organisation to go to: “No they wouldn’t spring to my mind, and that is probably 
because of my own prejudice about local government, which is a kind of closed-shop 
- cliquey little groups of people..” One health authority employee said that the health 
authority and its partners should “put their own house in order first”. In other words 
inequalities in terms and conditions in the health services should be addressed first.
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Trade unions
The largest single number of responses recommended going to ‘a trade union’. One 
senior health authority manager added that, in the past she would have recommended 
a trades council, but that they no longer operated.
Three out of the five councillors interviewed said that they would recommend joining 
their own party, thus contradicting those CDWs who recommended not ‘going to 
politics’. The Socialist Party councillor said that his party supported, among other 
things, a move to increase the national minimum wage and index linking of pensions 
and thus would be where people should go to effect change. One Labour councillor 
had an extremely non-proselytising attitude, saying that although they were a member 
and personally supported joining the Labour Party, “for other people I would 
recommend the Low Pay Unit.” Giving the impression that encouraging people to join 
the Labour Party was either, not quite an acceptable thing for a councillor to be doing, 
or, a forlorn hope. One councillor simply recommended joining a trade union.
To summarise to this section it can be said that statutory and voluntary sector workers 
responsible for reducing health inequalities in Lewisham do not have a clear vision as 
to how people affected by poor health, possibly due to their economic circumstances, 
might influence the economic context in which they find themselves. It can be argued 
that income inequalities are not controlled by statutory and voluntary sector staff, 
whereas services are, and that therefore this finding should be anticipated. However, 
in the observations documented in the previous chapter we saw that the same group of 
staff generally considered income inequalities to be an important factor in 
determining the level of health inequalities. The context of increased investment by 
statutory services in various initiatives to involve the public should also be noted. 
Statutory services are encouraging participation in community groups in order, among 
other things, to promote social capital. But party political bodies do not enjoy this 
signposting.
6. Councillors’ views on involvement
Considered below, in more detail, are the opinions of local councillors on issues 
pertinent to the public involvement and health agenda.
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The importance of councillors in relation to the public health agenda
Firstly, this section looks at the types of issues councillors have brought to them at 
their surgeries and raised with them via other ‘one-to-one’ routes. These issues vary 
from ward to ward, depending on the population profile. However, they are all 
subjects that may be classed within ‘the wider determinants of health’. For instance, 
housing was cited by three of the councillors interviewed as the main problem that 
people came to them with: “The main problems they come to me with is poor 
housing, over-crowding and issues relating to that” Although for one of the 
councillors, based in a ward with a higher level of private housing, education was the 
single largest cause for contact by his constituents. Other issues raised included roads 
and traffic safety concerns, race and immigration issues,159 parking, street-cleaning, 
and planning. Of the more direct health problems one councillor said: “The odd case 
that I get on the health front is to do with tenants who have got mental health 
problems. Because they have been re-housed into the community and there has been a 
lack of interagency working in supporting that tenant with the mental health 
problem.” The councillors believed there were links between housing and health. 
They had also been encouraged to take this view by NHS staff. For instance," ...the 
GPs tell me - if I had prescribed good housing the health of all my patients would 
improve, or my patient case load would decrease by a quarter, if not a half.” The 
extent to which the points system, which positions applicants on the housing list, is 
affected by medical concerns was however challenged: “...a GP letter does not really 
give you more points to be honest.”
Aside from being seen by many constituents as having power over issues that cover 
the wider determinants of health, councillors collectively also have some power to 
influence income distribution in Lewisham directly. As one said “..we use 
everybody’s council tax to address., the areas where we have the biggest priorities.” 
This councillor also added, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that when people paying 
council tax from higher property bands say, -  “ ‘I pay a lot of money, I want some of 
that money back [in services]’ -  you have to remind them that the whole purpose of
159 One said: “In my case as well, because I am a [ethnic minority] councillor, I get people calling from 
other wards in Lewisham and also from outside Lewisham.”
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the system we work in is not ‘to those that have should be given’, but ‘to those that 
have shall be taken away!”’
Councillors have other powers to influence the health agenda. As has been seen, many 
sit on the boards of voluntary groups that have a role to play in health issues and some 
are non-executive members of local NHS trusts. With proposed changes to the role of 
the community health council, councillors will acquire new powers to initiate 
enquiries into health services. MPs are seen by both councillors and staff as having 
more power to affect national health and income inequalities.
Later on in this chapter, overlap between the various systems of representation is 
discussed. Before that, a digression is required to look at the councillors’ remit and 
structural position.
Modernising local government
Changes heralded by the White Paper Modernising Local Government (DETR, 1998) 
involved granting increased powers to some councillors and decreasing the power of 
others. In Lewisham a cabinet, consisting of the mayor and six deputy mayors, was 
formed in 1999. The borough was one of the first councils to move to this system. In 
2001 a local referendum took place, the results of which supported holding elections 
to agree the mayor. The non-cabinet councillors now have a role in developing closer 
links with constituents and acting as ‘scrutineers’ of council policy. A number of 
statutory and non-statutory sector staff mentioned that they thought these non-cabinet 
councillors now had less power. One regeneration manager said, for instance: - “..if 
you are a back-bench board member then you probably sometimes wonder what on 
earth you are doing it for, especially since...very few people came out to vote for 
you...”
Labour Party democracy and the role of the party and its candidates
In Lewisham the changes in council structure that got underway from 1997 ran in 
parallel to changes in the internal institutions of the Labour Party. One of the most 
significant changes in the latter appears to be the ruling out of resolutions from branch 
(or ward level) meetings, to the party central committee, in order to inform the local 
policy of the party. “There has been no new party policy since 1997, only that created
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by the ruling group. I suppose they use the focus groups more now than anything 
else.” The reason given for this change by one ‘New’ Labour councillor was that -  “I 
don’t want to go to a meeting where somebody moves a motion, and somebody 
seconds it, and somebody opposes it, and you know who was there, only six people, 
and it becomes a party mandate at a local level. That is ridiculous, that is not 
democratic.” Looking at these arguments a vicious circle can be seen. Members don’t 
want to attend meetings because they have less power in the form of debating motions 
and passing resolutions, yet because branch meetings are so small, they are not 
thought to be suitable places to pass such resolutions.160
Generally, it can be said that councillors have found themselves encouraged to be less 
accountable to Labour Party members and to spend more time listening to the views 
of the electorate and residents, whatever their political affiliations or lack of them. 
For the Socialist Party councillor this meant that: “I think [as a Labour Party member 
in Lewisham] going to the bus stop you’ve got more power than going to a Labour 
Party meeting!”
The councillors see themselves as being accountable to a number of different groups. 
-  “I am accountable to the ward I represent because I have to give a councillors 
report. I am accountable to the political party that elected me and therefore I have to 
go along with the policy of that party.... So I am accountable to the ward, the party and 
I am accountable to the people who elected me.”. But the ‘New’ Labour councillors 
appeared to have a stronger sense of representing non-Labour members and voters. 
One said for instance: “...it is not about proceeding to all your long held beliefs about 
...socialism, because that has not won for us in nineteen years, it is about finding out 
what other people want, delivering on that, and then trying to find ways of getting 
closer than that, back to the roots.” In other words, the art of political compromise 
was imperative to the holding of office.
The selection of candidates, particularly MPs, within the Labour Party is seen to be of 
crucial significance to the party’s leading group. This suggests that council members 
have certain powers to support, or disrupt, national and local policy. The party was
160 Quorum rules should apply to minimise these difficulties.
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seen to manipulate the selection of candidates to produce ones holding the same views 
as the leadership. The most notable cases being those of Ken Livingstone, Rhodri 
Morgan and Denis Canavan. While these ‘big names’ have been prominently 
reported, they are only a small fraction of those candidates who have undergone 
‘controlled selection’. That is, selection that does not follow normal party procedures. 
The Socialist Party councillor, with an obvious hostility to the party in power, referred 
to a Lewisham example: “I know previously., local wards were able to play a major 
role in the selection of their councillors and I know that is becoming less and less the 
case...When someone stood against me the Labour candidate was imposed on 
them...he was not selected by the local ward, he was imposed by the local machinery 
of the party.” The ‘Old’ Labour councillor interviewed said: “Things are far less 
transparent than they used to be. You used to be able to remove people.”
Labour Party membership
Given the increase in statutory attention given to public involvement work, it is 
important to note that Labour Party membership and attendance at ward meetings fell 
considerably between 1997 and 2003. This is the case in Lewisham, London-wide and 
nationally. All of the councillors interviewed agreed that there was far less 
participation by members in ward meetings in Lewisham and that membership was 
probably down. The Socialist Party councillor said there were “...less...people 
prepared to go out to campaign for the [Labour] party.” Two Labour councillors 
corroborated this.
No attempts had been made to increase Labour Party membership, especially among 
lower income groups. As an ‘Old’ Labour councillor reported, fund-raising dinners 
were organised at £60.00 per head. “So people who are on low incomes, even if they 
are lifelong members, there is no way they are going to spend £60 per head. That 
happened in West and East Lewisham. In Deptford there was one that was £25 per 
head.” Public meetings organised by the Labour Party to attract new members were 
considered to be “not something we would do.” by one ‘New’ Labour councillor. The 
reason given was -  “because people read papers and see the television, people think 
that they know what is going on, so public meetings are no good, unless you have one 
of half a dozen people (Tony Blair, John Prescott, Paul Boateng, Jack Straw). 
However, another thought it was important: “I think occasionally we should hold
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public meetings on a specific issue, whether it’s an area based issue, or a wider issue.” 
No local party leaflets in non-English texts had been distributed. No local 
membership drives had been initiated, let alone any that targeted lower income 
groups.
The ‘New’ Labour councillors were less concerned about decreases in membership 
levels and attendance at ward meetings. They also gave different reasons for 
diminishing attendance. One saying:
“I personally don’t think that New Labour is a factor in that decrease in 
activism. I think it is the old unwieldy, boring structures and what goes on in 
those structures that actually killed hard activism in the party. Who wants to 
go to a ward meeting now on a wet night and talk about motions and 
resolutions with three other people? That is why we have got to think of new 
ways of meeting, that is why we introduced local forums and themed debate 
and presentations from outside speakers and politicians.”
The councillor thought that the character of the membership had not changed, in that 
it was still a mix of “working class, middle class, white collar workers, that’s the 
membership of Lewisham Labour Party.”
However, one ‘New’ Labour councillor also commented that the age profile of 
members had gone up by ten years since 1990 and that retired members were not 
being replaced by young people. The enthusiasm of previous generations of Labour 
Party members in Lewisham is demonstrated by, for instance: - “When I started, 
elections for branch officers, even polling district officers, who were responsible for 
the ‘redipacks’ and the canvas sheets in an election, were contested. Well now you 
don’t get enough people to do anything at all.” Another councillor said that since 
1998 no members would canvass in elections, and the only people going out were the 
candidates themselves. However, this councillor asked the rhetorical question - “Is it 
important that people attend ward meetings and that the membership is increased?”, to 
which they replied “I’d suggest that both those things are not important any longer...! 
think in 2001 there are other ways of doing things.”
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Trade unions
As described in chapter 5, there was widespread support for trade unions among the 
professional population under investigation. However, as also reported in that chapter, 
the strength of endorsement for unions indicated in private interviews did not find 
matching advocacy in public, or result in any practical consequences.
Trade union officials argued that union membership and the activities of trade unions 
in lobbying the Labour government had lead to a reduction in income inequalities. 
They supported further reductions, for example via an increase in the national 
minimum wage. However, local statutory support for union activity had been reduced 
over a period of twenty years.
The Socialist Party councillor considered that the TUC gave contradictory signals in 
respect of its thinking on income inequalities policy: supporting a national minimum 
wage and criticising fat cats, yet at the same time not wanting to commit to a target on 
income inequality reduction. The cause of this anomaly he put down to the influence 
of New Labour on the TUC. A number of community development workers were both 
supportive of trade union aims and at the same time critical of their methods and 
organisation.
The lack of joint working between trade unions and statutory workers assigned to 
public involvement work possibly suggests political reasons for a lack of integration. 
Examples of this lack of involvement were: trade unions not having been invited onto 
LSPs (Local Strategic Partnerships), a lack of consultation with unions in public 
participation exercises, and no joint working or support on health issues and health 
and safety issues, outside of the internal structures of statutory agencies. This 
contrasts with increased statutory support for very modest voluntary agencies. The 
assistance ranging from funds to run small-scale health promotion events to support 
with infrastructure costs granted in part because the organisations were seen to 
promote social capital.
Electoral turn-out
Despite differences of opinion on the importance of a fall-off in Labour Party 
membership and the consequent drop support at elections, all the councillors were
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concerned about low turnout in local elections. In recent by-elections turnout had 
been “barely above 10%”. A ‘New’ Labour councillor believed that the development 
of the post of directly elected mayor should help to increase turnout, saying - “If we 
modernise the way we run the government in Lewisham, if we change the way that 
people are elected, if we change their responsibilities, if we make them more 
accountable, if we make them more known, then you might actually start getting to 
the stage where we get bigger turn-outs.”.
Unsurprisingly, the Socialist Party councillor saw the situation differently. He said 
that the reason for the low turnout was that:
“There is massive disillusionment in the political parties, people are not rude, 
but say ‘you’re all the same’. And ...many people would not have heard very 
much of us, and [it is hard] trying to convince them that we are different....The 
party that they have known, that they almost automatically went out to vote 
for, is not there any more.”
Statutory and non-statutory staff also referred to low turnouts. One senior 
regeneration officer believed that if more money was spent in local areas -
“...politics would start to reinvigorate.If, no matter what they complain 
about, nothing happens, it is not responsive, so you sort of say, ‘I am not going 
to play this game, I won’t vote.’ With local management and local money 
coming in, turn-out is much higher...”
Another council officer, with responsibility for public participation, argued in a 
meeting of the new public participation forum that the reason for low turnout was 
because people were generally happy with service provision.
Comparison between ‘Hubs’ and ward meetings
Despite the council policy of encouraging Hubs and the parallel decreased attendance 
at ward meetings by Labour Party members, many of the issues raised in the two 
forums overlapped. At least, it was unusual to find a Hub discussing an issue that 
could not be found to have been discussed in a ward meeting, but a ward meeting
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might discuss issues not thought suitable for a Hub. The issues of street cleaning, 
lighting, violence and racism had all been discussed in ward meetings and in the past, 
branch resolutions had been passed on these sorts of issues. The Hubs also had 
discussions on what could be done about violence, or education standards for 
example.
Councillors did not like specific items of casework being raised in Hub meetings, 
such as council tenants complaining about specific repairs not having been carried 
out. They saw the groups as attempting to be more strategic. “There is a danger of the 
Hub turning into a casework session, we try and stop that. ‘Grandma is having 
problems with the dustman’, we try to manage the discussion and avoid individual 
casework issues”. Exactly why these meetings should not be boring, when ward 
meetings are, was not explained.
Some topics tended to be referred to more than others in the Hubs. Despite the large 
budget for social services, issues such as support for children with special needs, were 
almost never raised. These problems were therefore filtered out of discussions among 
councillors about the Hub reports. All the councillors made asides suggesting that 
they really knew what issues the Hubs would raise. Some were more cynical about the 
process than others, but they all portrayed a certain scepticism about the ‘added value’ 
of the information gained through the process. -  “...every Hub comes up with the 
same issues -  perception of crime and the reality of crime, housing, roads, the 
cleanliness of the parks...”. Another councillor said: “...almost all the issues that come 
from the Hubs the council already knows about.” (Citing -  street cleaning, pavements, 
lighting, street-drinking).
Neighbourhood housing committees were also considered by one councillor to be 
frustrating, as they tended to move away from discussing national strategic questions 
such as: “-‘how we can attract more money into the housing service in Lewisham, and 
into our particular neighbourhood? How can we address the standards of care-taking, 
of repair and maintenance on a regular programme basis? How can we address the 
vacancies, the voids?’.” The housing representatives however, were said to discuss 
immediate issues about their personal housing experience, such as:
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“-‘Why is my light bulb not changed, why is my toilet still not flushing, why 
have the stairs of my block only been cleaned up to the fourth floor?’. - They 
are not the strategic issues that they should be talking about. They wait a 
month or six weeks before raising these issues, whereas the light bulb, toilet, 
the stairs issues should be addressed to someone on the day that it does not 
happen, not wait to come to a community forum....I just despair, because you 
know exactly what is going to be said - ‘My toilet is still blocked.’”.
Councillors were asked to consider at which meeting, a Hub or a Labour Party branch 
meeting, a Labour Party member would have more chance of being listened to. Thus, 
given competition for time, which meeting would someone be better off attending? A 
‘New’ Labour councillor thought that if someone was a member of the Labour Party 
that would not change the way they raised local issues, i.e., they should go to the 
Hubs. “But they [also] have an input at a ward meeting, or in the political context, to 
say ‘how does this square with national policy’.”
An ‘Old’ Labour councillor thought that residents would now have a stronger voice in 
a Hub. “Nowadays, you know about the closure of a school after it has happened, 
you’d read about it in the paper. Council officers are not obliged to do anything about 
what someone says in a Hub. You can’t stop things, the Hub is more of a talking 
shop.” However, the councillor saw more power as having rested with Labour Party 
members in the past. -  “If I did something [as a councillor] that was bad I could not 
be re-selected, or the ward could pass a vote of ‘no confidence’ in me.”. This was 
corroborated by another ‘New’ Labour councillor who said: - “I think you would 
probably get more results if you raised it at a Hub meeting, as a citizen, than if you 
raised it at a ward meeting, as a party member.”
However, this same councillor later indicated that, for issues of income inequalities 
policy, the ‘political route’ was more appropriate than the Hub. “...if you are talking 
about policy influence, that is where you start using the political route and the 
political system, and get involved in the political system and the political structures, if 
you are talking about say, addressing income inequalities.”
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The Socialist Party councillor supported the principle of trying to extend local 
democracy and wanted to see proposals “for something far more democratic.”. The 
Hubs, however, were “not going to have any real teeth because it is not going to have 
any budget towards it.” He saw local decision making as being weighted towards 
business and councillors: “I can’t really see what influence that Hub or anybody else 
can have when half the elected councillors are not having any say in what is 
happening.” The role he thought they had was as follows: “My suspicion is, as much 
as anything, it is just something to give the back-bench councillors something to do, 
now that they in effect have not got a role under the new cabinet system.”
Thus, there is considerable overlap between the Hubs and the pre-1997 Labour Party 
branch meetings.161 Also discemable is competition for people’s time between the two 
systems. While it may be that residents now have more ‘voice’ if they attend a Hub, 
on the basis of the former operation of branch meetings, they would previously have 
had a more powerful ‘voice’ at the branch.
There was also competition for Labour councillors’ time, between encouraging people 
to join the party and come to ward meetings and encouraging people to attend the 
Hubs. ‘Back-benchers’ were investing time in supporting the Hub and, according to 
one ‘New’ Labour councillor, -  “That is partly about rediscovering what is their so 
called ‘representational role’. Yes, you are elected on the Labour Party manifesto...., 
but as a councillor, after the election, you represent everyone, not just the ones that 
voted for you. I represent eight thousand in my ward, not the nine hundred and 
something that voted for me.” Although council services were not allowed to be 
‘party political’ and could obviously only encourage development of the Hubs, 
Labour councillors could also encourage party membership development. However, 
their time was diverted into the Hubs. Council officers supported elected members in 
this process and encouraged them to attend. One ‘New’ Labour member saw the new 
structures as giving councillors added responsibilities and new ways of being 
accountable. “In the past most of us [councillors] would have said attending a ward 
meeting to give your councillors report is more important than attending a Hub 
meeting, but now it should be given equal importance.”
161 Personal observation of a Community Network meeting in 2002 suggested that the social profile of 
meeting participants was very similar to that of the local Labour Parly in 1997.
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Inside the Hubs there were felt to be opportunities to promote the Labour Party, 
through being seen to be good councillors:
“...there are great opportunities there ...to promote party politics and 
policies...your intention is never to go to a Hub meeting ‘because I want to 
recruit ten new members to the Labour Party’, it is not as obvious as that. It is 
all indirect, it is like saying look what we are trying to do, we are tiying to do 
ABCD because we are Labour councillors and we are a Labour council or a 
Labour run or dominated council, and it is about promoting the Labour Party 
indirectly.”
There was disagreement concerning the best place for residents to spend any time that 
they might have to devote to ‘being involved’. Competition seemed to exist between 
the community council, voluntaiy organisations, the Labour Party and the Socialist 
Party. Clearly the advice of some NHS staff and workers involved in the community 
council was to some extent at odds with the advice of elected representatives, both 
from the Socialist Party and from ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Labour. However, the messages 
were mixed. On the one hand, a statutory sector (NHS) worker applauded and wanted 
to encourage (for reasons of increased social capital) one or two people meeting in a 
voluntary organisation on a Wednesday night. On the other hand, a councillor is 
dismissive of people meeting in the ‘voluntary organisation’ that is the Labour Party 
on a wet night and does not think such meetings are worth supporting because they 
are boring. Another CDW however, thought that there was a tendency for community 
workers to think that everything could be achieved through voluntary work, but, as 
has been seen, she considered that involvement in ‘the political process’, meaning 
party politics, was necessary.
Conclusion
A number of preceding findings justified the investigation reported in this chapter. 
Firstly, staff with a public health remit tended to think that a reduction in income 
inequalities would lead to a reduction in health inequalities.162 They might therefore
162 This view was founded on speculative, ideological and evidence-based reasoning.
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be interested in how people with poorer health, broadly determined by poorer 
economic circumstances, can influence those circumstances. Secondly, they showed a 
fairly widespread belief in the concept of ‘social capital* and in benefits to health 
from participation in civil society. Thirdly, there has been a major increase in NHS 
resources devoted to public and user participation over the last five years.
The findings show that little attention has in fact been paid by NHS staff to public 
involvement on issues concerning income inequality and to the relationship between 
current statutory public involvement activity and forms of involvement that might be 
suited to influencing this particular ‘wider determinant of health’. The reasons for this 
are multi-faceted and interrelated. NHS staff cannot promote a particular political 
party, they can only promote involvement in particular voluntary organisations. This 
is because of their duty to remain politically neutral. They are also part of a culture in 
which younger staff members are becoming less informed and involved in Labour 
Party activity. All those interviewed who were, or had been members of the Labour 
Party, were roughly over the age of forty.163 They take their cues on relations with 
local political parties from wider local and national political leadership and not simply 
from their individual opinions.
Staff tend to think, for the best of motives and quite understandably, that they should 
only invest time and resources into public involvement work where they have the 
power to oversee the changes members of the public might then request. However, 
decisions on income inequality within the country as a whole, and even within single 
local authorities, are not only controlled by people within discrete authority areas. 
Representatives of local areas, for example, trade unions, MPs and in the past Labour 
Party members, must negotiate on behalf of local people with representatives from 
other areas, in order to influence manifestos and policy. These negotiations may be 
fruitless. It cannot be guaranteed that if Lewisham residents, via some route or other, 
persuade their local MPs to support a reduction in income inequalities, that a 
reduction will take place. However, to support an ethos that recommends to local 
people, in deeds and words, that they should not participate in politics is, in effect, to 
make a political statement. So, even if NHS workers bypass political structures
163 Although one younger local NHS worker stood as a Labour Party councillor in the 2001 local 
elections.
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because they believe they have no right to be involved in them, they are still 
influencing their development or diminution. The fact that NHS workers, using staff 
time and budgets to promote involvement in community organisations, remain silent 
about, or hostile towards, involvement in political organisation, feeds into a state bias 
against party activism. This is not to say that other state processes might not support 
other levels of party development.
Referring back to the definition of (public) involvement provided by Lee and Mills 
(1982) and outlined in the introduction to this chapter, it can be said that many local 
staff aspired to work in collaboration with the public and that forms of participation, 
consultation and negotiation were all in evidence locally with regard to particular 
health improvement-related projects and public involvement forums. However, Lee 
and Mills’s definition tends to assume clear-cut topics and alternatives from which 
choices can be made. This thesis’s perspective has been broader, in that it has 
attempted to demonstrate that public involvement methods employed by state workers 
may affect the future availability of public involvement opportunities. Also, it has 
noted a tendency for some topics to be ‘out of bounds’, whether discussed in 
collaboration, participation, consultation or negotiation with state employees. The 
topic of income distribution was noted in this respect.164
Representatives of the Labour Party were divided on the extent to which they wanted 
to increase membership and to devolve power to the membership, compared to 
working with their wider electorate in new structures. Generally, though not 
exclusively, those classified as ‘New’ Labour (chapter 3) tended to emphasis 
‘listening to the whole population’, over ‘being held to account by the membership’. 
Voluntary sector workers involved in community development and public 
participation work have no ‘route in’, within their work roles, to supporting a 
strengthened Labour Party membership organisation and generally do not pay any 
attention to this form of public organisation. However, as the author has sought to 
show, the strengthening of non-party based public involvement is, in some senses, in 
competition with party based and more autonomous self-organising forms. 
Councillors devote time to Hub work, which is supported by statutory sector
164 This observation is similar to problems encountered with Lindblom’s theory o f ‘partisan mutual 
adjustment’ noted in chapter 4 (Hill, 1997a: 104).
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employees. But therefore, elected members now have less time, and are less 
supported, in building party organisation.
The time and attention of residents is also being competed for. On one estate, for 
example, the state funded and NHS supported, community council is vying for 
residents’ interest, with a small thorn in the local Labour leadership’s side, the 
Socialist Party. Some workers associated with the community council would 
positively not recommend involvement in party politics, as a method of affecting 
income inequalities. This directly challenges the work of the Socialist Party and 
undermines those ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour councillors who still believe in the merits 
of Labour Party membership. Another voluntary sector worker, associated with ‘New’ 
Labour, was unsupportive of trade union membership of the Local Strategic 
Partnership, saying that trade unions were ‘out for themselves’.
The actions and recommendations of NHS staff are linking with other forces, not least 
of all the Labour Party itself, in setting up vicious circles that are undermining the 
collective and representative institutions that may seek to influence income 
inequalities. The study has found ‘New’ Labour councillors themselves making no 
connections between community participation and the Labour Party; they saw little 
point in building the membership. A commentator known for his links with senior 
Labour figures, who has been generally sympathetic to the New Labour project -  the 
Director of the Institute of Public Policy Research - corroborates this situation. 
Matthew Taylor writes that, since 1997:
“Party membership has fallen by (at least) a third... Local Labour parties may 
not be wracked by political conflict but in many areas this is the silence of the 
grave....[For the New Labour ‘modernisers’]... Party members are seen as 
unrepresentative, poorly informed and only useful as campaign foot 
soldiers.. .ultimately they [the modernisers] hold out little hope that the party 
can be of much value to either the national government or local community. 
While no Labour politician would publicly subscribe to such views, they 
represent the implicit consensus in government and the opinion of most 
journalists...there is no modernisers’ blue print for the party...As the party 
withers it damages the whole project of representative democracy...New
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Labour’s leaders are aware of this but it is symptomatic of their pessimism 
about party renewal that their answer was the now largely discredited idea of 
directly elected Mayors” (Taylor, 2003).
The trend towards a “decline in relevance of parliament and party politics for the 
formulation and development of public policy” has been well reported (Held, 1987: 
217). However, that NHS staff and institutions might also support this process has not 
been so widely considered, excepting in debates around elected non-executive board 
members and trade union powers.
In contrast to one conception of the communitarian ideal, the state is now paying 
more for a service that was previously provided by free association between residents. 
Staff should be clear as to whether the system being developed is better for lower 
income groups, or whether more control over a potential party of government, would 
be to the longer-term advantage of the less well off.
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Chapter 7 CONCLUSION
Foreword
The hypothesis put forward in the thesis’s introduction was that work to reduce health 
inequalities at the local level would be affected by key political considerations and 
tensions within the new Labour government and party. Primarily these were tensions 
concerning policy on income distribution and linked to this - the balancing of central 
and local control. It was suggested that these tensions would play a part in affecting 
local policy implementation. Other factors influencing the pattern and speed of local 
reactions to the new policy were predicted to be among those listed in The Health o f 
the Nation -  a policy assessed (LSHTM, 1998). And it was suggested that local work 
would be influenced by the extent to which that assessment’s recommendations were 
adopted. Cross-referencing is made here with the key findings of the HOTN 
assessment. Appendix 7.1 provides a point-by-point comparison.
As this final chapter was being written the government published Tackling Health 
Inequalities: a programme fo r action (THI) (DoH, 2003). This provided a fitting end­
point for the research. The document is a plan for further operationalising existing 
evidence of how local services can work to reduce health inequalities. It summarises 
what is known and suggests steps that can be taken locally. Thus, a key observation of 
this research, that over a six year period little support was provided from the centre as 
to what actions should be taken locally, had finally been addressed.165
However, attention must be drawn to a diagram reproduced on page 12 of the THI 
report. This shows the impact of direct personal tax, benefit and expenditure tax 
changes since 1997. The poorest decile has gained by over 15% and the richest has 
lost by just under 5%. The data source is the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). The 
data are correct, but at the same time misleading. In a second IFS published diagram,
165 The need to provide local areas with support in the form of suggested work topics, as listed in THI, 
was still disputed within the DoH at the time of its drafting, with some, more strongly than others, 
holding the view that ‘local freedom and decentralisation* was the imperative. Evidence of the 
effectiveness of interventions and practical considerations helped to justify the provision of clearer 
guidance. (View of two civil servants provided to researcher).
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which is not reproduced in THI, income inequalities, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient,166 are plotted from 1979 onwards. The diagram shows that:
“Over the 1980s, there was a considerable increase in inequality... It stabilised 
in the early 1990s, and then fell slightly over the last Conservative 
government. Since Labour came to power, [it] increased once more. Indeed, 
despite the slight [statistically insignificant] fall in 2001-2, income inequality 
over the past two years has been higher than in any other period covered by 
our data.” (Shephard, 2003: 4).
The fact that the first IFS diagram was chosen for reproduction in Tackling Health 
Inequalities (THI) and the second was not, validates the view that there are 
government tensions in relation to the issue of income inequalities at the heart of 
health inequalities policy. The effect this tension has had on local policy 
implementation has been one of the main subjects of this thesis.
Local understanding, based on reading THI, of the extent to which income 
inequalities have increased or decreased, might influence local action such as, for 
example, the redistribution of services or the commissioning of ‘money advice’ in 
preference to other new provision. But a variety of other mechanisms, whereby 
Labour government tensions concerning income distribution may have affected local 
policy implementation, were considered in this thesis, these are discussed further in 
this chapter.167
At this concluding juncture an overview of the thesis is provided by way of a short 
chapter-by-chapter review. Then the chapter discusses in more detail the findings in 
relation to theory; in particular, central-local tensions and the question of the partisan 
state and income inequalities are discussed. Then are listed some further conclusions
166 coefficient is a popular measure o f income inequality. It collapses the entire income
distribution into a single number between zero and one; the higher the number is, the greater is the 
degree of income inequality.” (Shephard, 2003: 4)
167 The ways in which tensions over income inequalities may have influenced local implementation 
were suggested as follows, by affecting: 1. income inequality levels (which in turn may affect health 
inequalities). 2. organisations wanting to, or able to influence income distribution. 3. policy processes 
relating to income inequalities, because these are expected to be ‘joined-up’ and consistent with wider 
government policy. 4. staff perceptions and incentives, which may in turn impact on local 
implementation (introduction).
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relating to government learning and adaptation, and some policy recommendations 
based on the findings are provided before a summary to the chapter and the thesis.
An overview of the thesis
The thesis’s introduction set out the hypothesis, as reiterated above, and explained the 
key topics in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999) of relevance to the work168 and the 
relationship of these topics to issues and tensions in the Labour Party and government. 
In so doing, the author demonstrated the potential for a causal relationship between 
tensions in the party and government and the pattern of local implementation of 
policy to reduce health inequalities. This possibility existed, not only because of 
issues relating to the Labour Party, such as the fact that it was associated with 
redistributive policies by its membership, but also because the policy of reducing 
health inequalities was associated with income redistribution, and the ‘neutral’ NHS 
was unaccustomed to dealing with such a highly charged political issue.
The fact that there were disputes over income inequalities within the ranks of the 
Labour Party and government is clear, and examples of such tensions were provided 
in chapter 1. It is also the case that the government’s aims and record on combating 
income inequalities and child poverty were unpublicised and mixed (1997-2003). 
Those who argue that income and health inequalities are linked will consider that the 
result of this hesitant approach is likely to be less progress to combat the latter form of 
inequality.
Chapter 1 gave the thesis a theoretical background in political science, introducing the 
concepts of power, democracy, class, the neutral state and the partisan state. The 
thesis argued that issues affecting local implementation of policy to reduce health 
inequalities could be productively analysed using these concepts. The theoretical 
concepts were applied to organise and analyse the subsequent enquiry and are referred 
to in the next section, below.
168 These were: i. the link between poverty and health, and its implications; ii. decisions about 
centralisalion-decentralisation, and in particular the role of individuals and communities vis-a-vis the 
role of government; iii. and lastly, state-led public involvement and its ramifications.
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Chapter 2 investigated public health history and, using secondary sources, reported 
evidence of an association between collective action, among those with poorer health, 
and health improvement. Then it discussed in more detail the content of Saving Lives 
(DoH, 1999) and the literature relating to health inequalities. Listed were 
developments, which, from a reading of Saving Lives, one would expect to see if the 
policy were being implemented according to its letter, given other concurrent 
recommendations such as those in Acheson (1998). These points can be found just 
before the summary in chapter 2 and findings relating to them are included in this 
chapter.
The research methods employed were outlined in chapter 3 along with a justification 
for the case study approach adopted. Because of the wide range of factors thought to 
influence health and the argument put forward in the introductory chapters that labour 
movement organisation can also affect the wider determinants of health, local 
councillors, trade unionists, council and voluntary sectors workers, as well as NHS 
and DoH staff, were interviewed.
In chapter 4, the first of three findings chapters, institutional changes in local statutory 
services were investigated for their impact on implementation of policy to reduce 
health inequalities. This was in order to provide a realistic context to the thesis’s 
specific research topic. The institutional context was key to understanding the 
experiences of staff working to address the policy. The main conclusion was that 
formation of Primary Care Trusts diverted attention away from work to reduce health 
inequalities. Referring to the points made in chapter 2 on ‘local responses anticipated 
from a reading of Saving L ives\ the study found that partnership work to support 
health improvement was already well established in Lewisham and that the extent to 
which health improvement work was supported varied according to the year in 
question. There was a low point at around the time The NHS Plan (DoH, 2000) was 
announced. Having said this, funds for the Health Action Zone, Sure Start schemes, 
New Deal for Communities and other regeneration work did increase money for work 
relating to health improvement. But mainstream budgets for related services such as 
environmental health, the youth service and the health promotion service were not 
increased and in some years even declined. However, lack of financial resources was 
generally a greater problem in HOTN implementation (LSHTM, 1997). Because,
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post-1997, most health improvement money was effectively ‘ring fenced’, the power 
of general practitioners within primary care groups and trusts to argue for secondary 
prevention work over and above primary prevention was not as evident in the case 
study area as might have been expected.
Saving Lives’s requirement for local health authorities and trusts to set local targets 
for health inequality reduction was ignored and instead general priorities were agreed. 
The thesis also found that there was local confusion as to the most effective activities 
to support in order to reduce health inequalities and that, to a lesser extent, 
government hesitancy with regard to economic redistribution fuelled staff 
uncertainties. By July 2003 a strategy for local action to address health inequalities 
had not yet been agreed.169
The thesis can really only speculate that tight public expenditure constraints in 
Labour’s first term and Number 10’s reluctance to even talk the rhetoric of 
redistribution at this time had an impact on health inequalities policy. To be pinned 
down to a national target of reducing health inequalities, when many felt health and 
income inequalities were linked, was perhaps too much for a government that was 
keen to see that all its policies were consistent with each other and ‘joined-up’.
Respondents’ values in relation to health and income inequalities, NHS neutrality and 
trade unions were discussed in chapter 5. It was reported that staff strongly believed 
in an association between health and income inequalities and wanted both reduced. 
There were mixed views on the need for, and extent of, NHS neutrality. Also, 
generally, there was wide support for recognising the potential role of trade unions in 
public health practice.
Chapter 6 described developments in the institutions through which local people 
might influence upstream factors affecting the wider determinants of health, such as 
income inequalities, and it reported on views and values in relation to this issue. The 
roles and functions of those institutions were found to be unclear and in dispute. For 
example, there was a lack of consensus over the correct function of the citizens’ panel
169 This is not to say that successful work started post-1997 had not already been completed.
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in relation to influencing income inequality. There was no clear view from across the 
range of interviewees as to how local people might control the wider determinants of 
health. In particular, some councillors were found to have contradictory views on the 
role of the Labour Party in public involvement, a subject returned to later.
Having provided an overview of the findings we will now look at them in more detail 
in relation to the theoretical approaches provided in chapters 1 and 2.
Findings and their relation to theory
Introduction
The findings indicate that the impact of local staff views has been constrained by the 
national political framework outlined, in part, within the public health White Paper, 
Saving Lives (DoH, 1999). That is to say, local staff actions have not strayed much 
beyond the boundaries of the policy outline therein. Despite staff holding views 
advocating an increased emphasis on income redistribution and more support for trade 
union organisation, these opinions did not have an appreciable impact on the 
implementation process. No local work to involve trade unions in supporting health 
inequality reduction was carried out in the six-year period of the research, despite 
government requirements to target manual workers in order to improve their health 
fastest (DoH, 1999c). Little steer from central government was coupled with the fact 
that most key staff believed that health and income inequalities were linked and 
lacked trust or understanding of the government’s position on the latter. This 
produced uncertainty about exactly how local services could influence income 
distribution, and, ultimately, wasted time. This is demonstrated by the local Health 
Action Zone’s targets on reducing income inequality, for instance, - to instigate a “5% 
reduction of households with below half average income by 2005” (LSL, HAZ, 
2001:1). While this target was discussed and agreed, it was then ignored, due to its 
being outside of the control of the HAZ. The uncertainty generated delayed work. 
Local staff regarded national policy relating to the wider determinants of health as 
being of particular importance and were influenced in their enthusiasm for local work 
by what they considered to be supportive or unsupportive government action.170
170 A finding of this nature was also identified in The Health o f the Nation -  a policy assessed 
(LSHTM, 1998).
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The reporting of these findings is not intended to suggest that local NHS staff views 
would never divert the intentions of national policy makers in the way suggested by 
Pressman and Widavsky (1973). However, three factors in the research subject are 
considered to have led to staff compliance. Firstly, staff charged with implementing 
the policy were broadly supportive of it and pleased to see the change of government 
that had led to the change of policy. Secondly, there was no real staff organisation that 
was capable of planning an alternative professional strategy towards work aimed at 
reducing health inequalities. Whilst individual staff might hold views about the need 
to support organisations that assist lower income groups in influencing national 
policy, they had no effective forum in which to share these views. A review of the 
pervasive organisations and intense professional and non-professional public health 
lobby of the nineteenth century as outlined in chapter 2, shows current public health 
staff association to be comparatively feeble. Thirdly, whilst staff did not appear to 
generally believe that the way they worked was constrained by their employment as 
‘politically neutral civil servants’, some were, at the same time, in no doubt that 
‘speaking out’ might negatively affect their careers.
Central — local tensions
The roles of medical advances, public health interventions and individual behaviour 
change in population health improvement were discussed from a historical perspective 
in chapter 2 of the thesis. The Saving Lives policy (DoH, 1999) represented a 
synthesis of perspectives concerning mechanisms for health improvement. It balanced 
the desire not to behave as a ‘nanny state’ with the aspiration to not blame individuals 
for all their health problems. The policy emphasised the ‘wider determinants of 
health’, such as income inequalities and the need for public involvement in the issues 
that affect people’s health. This draws on the principles of the Ottawa Charter, as well 
as community development and social capital theory, described in chapter 2. This 
combination of upstream policy and local participation has been a focus of the 
research and, in particular, the work has been interested in the links between the two 
issues.
Saving Lives was regarded in this research as giving a clear message that distinguishes 
national government responsibilities, from the responsibilities of local workers. The 
problem with this approach was considered to be that connections between the local
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and the national are not referred to. The same criticism applies to the famous ‘social 
determinants of health’ diagram (Dahlgren and Whitehead, 1991) and to the Acheson 
report (Acheson, 1998). Acheson’s report was regarded, independently by two senior 
academic commentators (private information), as ‘typical of a civil servant’. This was 
because it has a ‘top-down’ approach, that is, it simply states that income 
redistribution is necessary, without considering social and political structures that 
might further the cause of redistribution. In particular, the influence of the trade union 
movement is ignored. Acheson’s (1998) report did not mention the possibility that 
union organisation might support lower income groups by encouraging income 
redistribution, supporting health and safety at work and encouraging social solidarity. 
If it had, then there is a possibility that reference to trade unions would not have been 
deleted in the move from Green to White public health paper. This, in turn, may have 
led to some more local work in the area of trade union support. But without any 
official backing, local workers did not use local autonomy to do what, individually, 
they generally supported.
Over the last six years institutional changes in the NHS organisations of Lambeth, 
Southwark and Lewisham have been substantial and have delayed the implementation 
of public health policy. The formation of primary care trusts (PCTs) was based on an 
understanding that changed structures would alter power relations. Family doctors 
would gradually come under greater state regulation and control, and would, at the 
same time, have more power to influence hospital services through directly 
influencing the contracting process. However, from the public health perspective the 
way the move to PCTs was constructed was also affected by central government 
relations with local government. The Health of the Nation assessment (LSHTM, 
1997) suggested the need to keep under review where the public health function 
should be placed. It was known in 1998 that the move to PCTs would mean co- 
terminosity with borough boundaries. It was nevertheless decided by the DoH to keep 
Health Improvement Programme (HimP) development at the Lambeth, Southwark 
and Lewisham Health Authority level until the first borough HimPs were produced in 
the autumn of 2002. Giving lead responsibility for the HimP instead to the local 
authority and requiring them to involve the NHS, would have speeded-up the process 
of planning to reduce health inequalities. However, this would perhaps not have sat 
well with Labour’s wider policy towards local government, which demonstrates
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tensions and disagreements. Labour appeared to be more trusting of a health authority 
that was about to be disbanded, than of a borough council that was to continue. The 
council, in practice, became the administrative lead for the first borough HimP. Given 
that staff felt the NHS did not have the strongest of roles in health inequality 
reduction, because of the importance of the wider determinants of health, this was 
quite acceptable to all local partners.
Compared to local distortion of national policy, delays in implementation are not 
traditionally seen as so important in studies of the local responses to national policy. 
In this case study, delays are of greater significance. This is because the government 
staked political credibility on being seen to bring in NHS improvements before the 
2001 election. As has been seen, the lack of support given by the DoH in providing a 
framework for local work to address health inequalities led to delayed 
implementation. Again, the HOTN assessment (LSHTM, 1998) found that a lack of 
guidance had also been an earlier problem for local managers. The local aspects of 
recommendations in the Acheson report were not developed into clear 
recommendations for local area work and no outline o f work that was thought to be 
most useful for local areas to pursue was provided. It was not until 2003 that the 
Department of Health released a concise precis of the key interventions required of 
the local NHS (DoH, 2003,b). Primary care commissioners and indeed public health 
consultants may have felt inundated with requirements to report on targets provided 
by the DoH on other areas of work. But small numbers of public health and health 
promotion staff were left without any framework for local work to address health 
inequalities. The mantra of the ‘need for local autonomy’ therefore worked against 
swift progress (Audit Office, 2002).
The way that public health issues were managed during the disbanding of health 
authorities and the move to PCTs caused unnecessary delays in public health work. 
Nevertheless, the move of public health departments to borough level and the 
resulting boundaries - coterminous with local authorities in London at least - may, in 
the long run, result in a more efficient integration of public health into local authority 
and primary care work.
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The need for central support in public health work is demonstrated by various 
examples of broad successes and failures in the field. Firstly, local areas were initially 
required to produce their own targets for health inequalities reduction. Whilst local 
target production had been a recommendation of the HOTN assessment, it was 
anticipated that this would take place within a framework of national targets, national 
support and institutional stability. Local health inequalities target setting was 
untenable between 1997 and 2002, given local staff resources, the vague and vast 
possibilities for local work, lack of national support and institutional changes. 
Secondly, Health Action Zone work was required to be locally planned and driven. 
Here, evaluations were found showing poor overall performance and value for money. 
Thirdly, however, within the area of the National Service Frameworks and the Sure 
Start initiative there is more evidence of local support and success. These two 
initiatives were provided with more appropriate support from the centre and 
recognised the limits of local capacity, but at the same time did not set up entirely 
new organisations side-stepping local structures, as did the HAZ.
The partisan state and income inequalities
The increased role of NHS staff in public and user involvement work around health 
improvement, coupled with their beliefs about the impact of income inequalities on 
health inequalities, led to an investigation of how NHS and other staff understand the 
role of public involvement in influencing income inequalities. State bureaucracies 
have been charged with strengthening community involvement in issues that affect 
health. But at the same time they are unable to be politically partisan and find it easier 
to encourage non-party methods of public involvement. The reluctance to endorse a 
party-political framework for local public involvement in national political issues was 
evident from individual opinions scattered between the Labour Party locally, civil 
servants and community workers.171 Although it was not the majority opinion, it was 
the one that held sway. The low profile of party politics and representative democracy 
meant that staff did not necessarily consider that local people would gain influence 
over income inequalities via party involvement. At the same time a vicious circle was
171 Reporting here is not intended to support or deciy this perspective.
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set up, in that local professionals did not signpost the public towards locally elected 
representatives to take up their grievances on a range of issues.172
The issues of bureaucratic neutrality were considered in chapter 1. The possibility that 
the state might play a partisan role, siding with the interests of particular groups in the 
population, needs to be considered when looking at state implementation of health 
inequalities policy. However, it is also the case that the state bureaucracy’s inability to 
play a partisan role may adversely affect outcomes in situations where partisan 
politics might help those whom policy is attempting to assist.
The key concept of ‘power’ and the possibility that elites might be able to construct 
agendas in the way portrayed by Lukes (1974) has been taken into account in analysis 
of the data. The distancing of public involvement work from local party political 
systems of public involvement has found some sympathisers among community 
development workers. However, the findings suggest that the Labour Party elite was 
prepared to ‘go along with’ and indeed, encourage this development. This was 
demonstrated in interviews with local councillors. The deletion of reference to the 
labour movement in the move from Green to White public health paper, mentioned 
previously, also provides fiirther evidence of this phenomenon.
At the national level media interviews with senior Labour Party officials corroborate
171the view that Labour the elite has deprioritised party involvement. At the local level 
there was a lack of funding, support and awareness of the labour movement’s 
potential role in health inequalities reduction, when compared to the role of other 
groups, such as ‘faith groups’. Historically this was not the case, for example, with the 
funding of trades councils by local authorities having been widely accepted practice in
172 MORI found that one fifth of voters would approach a councillor if  they needed help on an issue, 
such as, dealing with a noisy neighbour. However, the figure was lower in London (13%) (MORI 
Social Research Institute, 2002). The issue is, how should this data be interpreted and what policy 
recommendations might be drawn from it? The current consensus developed between Labour officials 
and voluntary and statutory workers appears to be geared towards finding new local institutions for 
residents to access, rather than reinvigoraling representative democracy.
173 For example, in a radio interview it was put to the chair of the Labour Party that New Labour did 
not want and could manage without an active Labour Party membership. To which he replied that 
Labour, as in the Labour Government, was investing heavily in inner-city communities. This again 
demonstrates the substitution of partisan political formations for state-led ‘non-political’ community 
involvement (Ian McCartney interviewed by John Humphrys, The Today Programme, BBC radio 4, 
May 2nd, 2003).
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the 1970s. The reason why the party elite was prepared to endorse less membership 
participation was because they wanted to maintain control of upstream policy issues, 
particularly around redistribution (Rose, 1984; Mule, 2001). The Labour mayor of 
Lewisham agreed with this reasoning in interview. Electoral success was not seen to 
be dependant on an active grass-roots membership (Epstein, 1980). Although the 
mayor was concerned that low turnouts might allow BNP (British National Party) 
successes.
The view of some, but not all, Labour Party councillors was that people should join 
the Labour Party if they wanted to play a role in influencing income inequalities. 
However, this view was coupled with a weak if not hostile message in relation to 
recruitment. No efforts had been made to recruit active members, and recognition that 
the activist base had melted away over the 6-year period in which the research took 
place was coupled with the suggestion that this was not necessarily a loss. It was clear 
that Labour Party councillors were uncertain as to what their role in relation to 
membership recruitment should be. It was also found that there was a potential for 
state-funded public involvement tools to compete with party and partisan self­
organised groups. This was especially since, for example, some, but not all, 
community development workers were hostile to any form of party politics.
Since power can be accrued via the use of resources, it follows that groups with 
greater access to resources will gain less benefit from democratic rules that drive 
down the costs of participation. To take a crude example, those without financial 
resources would have more control over transport policy in a situation where car use 
was determined by general voting, rather than by ability to purchase a car. Thus, 
different democratic rules imply different outcomes for different groups. This makes 
these rules an important component in consideration of health inequalities policy. 
Some community development workers appeared to believe that easily accessed 
community development groups and consultation are more democratic because they 
don’t require party political membership commitments. However, this ignores the fact 
that the political parties can wield power in the form of controlling local and national 
government. Other community workers however, believed, along with one Lewisham 
MP, that real influence lay in party organisation. As a result of the drift away from
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participation in an organised labour movement, lower income groups appear to have 
less power to influence the ‘wider determinants of health’ than they did in the 1970s.
The involvement of local councillors in influencing provision of health improvement 
work was minimal within the research period. However, the development of local 
government ‘scrutiny committees’ might increase their input in the future. The 
scrutiny process involves reviews of issues such as “public health, health promotion 
and health improvement (including tackling health inequalities)” (Hamer, 2003:4). It 
is not concerned with managing “the performance of the NHS but [will] concentrate 
on ensuring the health needs of local communities are being met.” (Hamer, 2003:4). 
The distinction between these two areas has the potential to cause confusion. Within 
the process it is suggested that: “local councillors can speak on behalf o f local people, 
raise local concerns, challenge the rationale for decisions, and propose alternative 
solutions.” (Hamer, 2003: 4). This thesis has identified deep-seated problems with 
the role of local councillors, in that their base in active party structures has been
174eroded. They are not held to account by the population, except through the three- 
yearly voting process, which contains no active dialogue and involvement. It therefore 
remains to be seen whether the new roles given to them in scrutiny will have a 
substantive impact on the difficulties local people have in playing a part in 
influencing the upstream, wider determinants of health.
Respondents appeared surprisingly confident about being unrestrained by the need for 
political neutrality. Staff generally did not appear to feel that there was anything that 
they couldn’t do because of the limits of their unelected office. However, when the 
question of the NHS supporting trade union organisation was raised, some 
respondents did say that this might be difficult. There seemed to be confusion about 
the rules surrounding this kind of work. Similarly, NHS staff expressed uncertainty as 
to when and how to involve elected members. Some voluntary sector staff saw these 
councillors as a useless and malign group. One or two interviewees also mentioned 
that careers could be affected by the voicing of opinion counter to the mainstream 
orthodoxy. Thus, the NHS had a problematic relationship with organisations that 
support lower income groups, particularly those that might affect income inequalities,
174 Scrutiny could also weaken partisan politics. Leach and Copus (2004) look at die relationship 
between party group behaviour and scrutiny committees.
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such as trade unions. For some managers, internal dealings with trade unions 
representing staff interests also made them weary and sense that if they encouraged 
growth in union membership they might be supporting their adversaries.
A cumulative process o f filtering out organised labour movement input took place. 
Central government did not endorse TU input and unions did not grasp opportunities 
to further their interests in this context. For example, the union Unison had developed 
a policy supporting trade union representation on local strategic partnerships (LSPs). 
However, staff at the local level did not know of this, and therefore even if  they had 
been able to influence LSP membership they were not encouraged to. It is remarkable 
that a Labour government should have constructed policy in which trade unions were 
not represented on Local Strategic Partnerships despite employer membership, 
especially given the fact that the partnership’s role was to support regeneration and 
play a part in the reduction of health inequalities. No local criticism of this situation 
was encountered outside of the interview settings. Generally, trade unions, 
particularly the public service union Unison, did not capitalise on the role they could 
have played in influencing policy implementation and the formation o f structures for 
public involvement. From the senior union official's perspective, this was partly 
because they were locked into disputes with NHS management in it its widest sense, 
for instance over the issue of PFI (the Private Finance Initiative).
To recap: one factor in the future success of the policy to reduce health inequalities, 
set out in Saving Lives and backed up by the Acheson report, is said to be the 
involvement of local people in the ‘wider determinants of health’ or upstream 
measures (Whitehead, 1992a: 438). Here are found unresolved problems. Increased 
NHS and local authority spending on public and service user involvement is coupled 
with declining active participation in the local Labour Party and trade union 
movement. In the case of the Labour Party, falling membership levels are also 
apparent. Between 1997 and 2002 there seems to have been no enthusiasm for 
addressing this situation among the local and national party elite. Certainly no work to 
encourage local recruitment was found. NHS staff and local authority officers are not 
in a position to address this issue, since it would mean entering into a politically 
partisan role. Local employees of state institutions find it much easier to support the 
development of local public involvement in regeneration projects, community groups, 
or even in religious organisations, basing their work on social capital theory.
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Staff often did not know how local people should get involved in national issues, so 
even if unrestrained by instincts to preserve the neutrality of the bureaucracy, they are 
not in a position to influence this kind of involvement. Like Acheson, they ignored the 
issue. The thesis suggests that this combination of state support for non-partisan 
involvement and its unwillingness to support partisan involvement, backed up by, at 
best, a lack of interest from the Labour Party itself in membership participation, all 
feeds party-partisan dealignment. Social capital theory sits well with systems that 
might encourage this partisan dealignment. Indeed new studies on social capital and 
health ignore partisan political organisation (Swann and Morgan 2002; Coulthard, 
Walker and Morgan, 2001).
The Local Strategic Partnership (LSP), according to some interpretations, is a further 
development moving power away from elected councillors175 and the labour 
movement. In Lewisham’s case the majority of councillors are Labour. Their 
diminished power means that, even if ordinary members had more intra-party power, 
it would not be of such significance in the new framework. Such bypassing of 
political institutions can have a partisan impact. The thesis argued in chapter 1 that the 
function of the Labour Party for lower income groups is different from that of the 
Conservative Party for better off sections of society. And, as has been suggested 
earlier, with less money and bargaining power to buy political influence, lower 
income groups can benefit more from mass organisation representing their interests 
(chapter 6).176 The system being developed and assisted by the Labour government 
and state may not be best suited to increasing the power and influence of lower 
income groups. For example, the inclusion of business representation on Local 
Strategic Partnerships and the exclusion of trade union interests is an extraordinary 
display of bias.
This research is now in a better position to respond to a question posed by Exworthy: 
“Can the intent and spirit of the Acheson report be maintained across the whole of
175 One interviewee stated that this was the opinion of the Local Government Association
176 The reasoning here draws on a variant of ‘rational choice theory*, this has been enhanced to take 
account of interests in collective action (Ward, 1997).
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government in the long term?” 177 The thesis has taken the view that party politics and 
especially the ability o f lower income groups to influence the Labour Party’s policy 
on redistribution, will be a factor in the long term drive to reduce income inequalities. 
It has worked with the assumption, although this is a disputed point, that health 
inequalities are affected by income inequalities. The response to Exworthy’s question, 
based on this reasoning, would be that at least three conditions are needed. Firstly, use 
of focus groups for political purposes develops to the benefit of lower income groups. 
A clarification of this point is needed. Given a strong Labour Party elite and a low and 
inactive membership, it still might be possible for lower income interests to be 
represented in the party via the findings of focus groups. However, this would require 
at the very least that group participants be asked unbiased and published questions 
and for the answers to be open to scrutiny. Secondly, membership levels could be 
driven up by various inducements and campaigns. This, according to Scarrow (2000), 
would require the strengthening of intra-party democracy. Thirdly, council seats could 
be reserved for non-party representatives so that those disillusioned with parties could 
still have access to a central site of power. The research points towards option two 
being the best to concentrate on, with elements of access to focus group research and 
the use of other opinion testing methods. Non-party representation should be 
increased only within this context. Option 2 with elements of 1 and 3 would allow 
more grassroots control and democratic accountability over issues affecting health and 
income inequality.
Referencing back to the core literature sources used in building the thesis’s arguments 
has been carried out and additions made, based on the research data, to that theory. 
The thesis makes an original contribution to research on the implementation of policy 
to reduce health inequalities because much of the literature has hitherto focused on the 
uptake of project work led by the NHS and the immediate effectiveness of measures 
to improve health or to engage with the public at a local level. The research has tried 
to step behind these developments to look at the local structuring of wider political 
involvement, which is likely to have long-term effects on the upstream wider 
determinants o f health. The study has established that it is legitimate to examine party 
political and trade union involvement in the context of NHS policy to involve the
177 Health Equity Network (HEN) conference, 2002 (.. ••).
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public. The subject of ‘inbuilt biases against party political involvement’ has been 
neglected in discussions of public involvement relating to health improvement and 
yet, as has been demonstrated by previous research, Labour voters tend to have poorer 
health (Davey Smith and Doriing, 1996). The perspective adopted also highlights the 
need to take into account internal party incentives because these can shape policy 
instructions given to state bodies. The work has also considered the problem of public 
involvement in issues which are outside the control o f single local authority areas, but 
which nevertheless are thought to have a real impact on health outcomes. In taking 
into account a wider political science framework the thesis has added to the mix of 
theoretical approaches that may be used to look at the subject. This study’s 
contribution has been different from others because a link has been established 
between Labour Party and trade union involvement and the work of the NHS in this 
policy area.
Briefly, a review o f ‘policy learning’ by government since 1997 is now conducted and 
then recommendations arising from the findings are discussed.
Learning through implementation
The production of Tackling Health Inequalities: a programme fo r action (THI) (DoH, 
2003) shows adaptability in the government’s approach to the policy and its 
implementation. At the outset there was no indication that further support, in any 
form, would be provided to local implementers. Indeed, at mid-point in the years of 
this research a number of staff felt the policy was being allowed to ‘fizzle out’ in the 
drive for reduced waiting times.
The later introduction of national targets for health inequality reduction, when none 
had formerly been planned, marked a change of policy that was quite momentous. 
Ministers specifically argued against national targets and then climbed down. The 
change of direction demonstrated a genuine ability to digest, interpret and react to 
mounting evidence and academic lobbying. The result was widely welcomed in public 
health circles.
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A desire to learn from the past is evident in the use made of The Health o f the Nation: 
a policy assessed (LSHTM, 1997). As the tables show, recommendations were not 
always taken up (Appendix 7.1). However, the key question of performance 
management was addressed and its impact on implementation o f aspects health 
inequalities work was noticeable at the aid of the research period. That is, central 
requirements to, for example, improve the uptake of breastfeeding were taken 
seriously at the local level, and staff time was allocated to them, in a way that had not 
happened previously.
An apparent temptation to propagandise and introduce irrelevant issues into policy 
programmes because they chime with other areas of current health planning did not 
diminish ova* the years of the research. This is a ‘downside* of the generally 
successful drive for ‘joined-upness’. Refaences to other issues the government 
wished to address become mixed up with clear ‘independent’ policy in one area. This 
is detectable in Tackling Health Inequalities (DoH, 2003), where it is apparent that 
the issues of ‘foundation hospitals’ and ‘choice’ are driving some of the text. This 
leads, for example, to the following comment, presumably relating to acute services: 
“Apparently uniform national services, what’s been called a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to health, education and local government, have failed to combat health 
inequalities.” (DoH, 2003:1). However, within the academic literature on health 
inequalities, provision of services such as childcare is prioritised over issues of choice 
between similar levels of provision and services.
Thus, it is possible to demonstrate areas of learning that led to significant progress 
and development in the successful implementation of the policy. At the same time, 
inconsistencies between public health policy and wider government policy, noted by 
staff in relation to the Consovative’s Health o f the Nation programme, never entirely 
disappeared from Labour’s strategy.
Policy recommendations
Here are listed various recommendations that emerge from the findings of this 
investigation. Given the production of Tackling Health Inequalities (DoH, 2003) and 
the earlier introduction of national targets for reducing health inequalities, some of the
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recommendations that would have been made have been addressed. This demonstrates 
the evolving nature of the policy. Thus, the following point has in many ways been 
dealt with by the publication of THI (DoH, 2003):
Core NHS work on reducing health inequalities may be more successful if 
national support is felt at the local level. Local public health departments do 
not simply require greater local freedom and autonomy. While they will 
obviously not want to be restricted in unhelpful ways, nevertheless, a great 
deal o f local time can be saved by appropriate national input. The format and 
status of the Acheson report meant that it remained an extremely influential 
document at the local level in the years of this investigation. However, local 
areas needed the report amended and tailored to meet their specific needs -  a 
‘customized* Acheson. This has now been provided by THI (DoH, 2003).
Whilst the remaining recommendations are numbered they are not in order of 
importance and may, to an extent, overlap. Suggestions are considered stemming from 
the question ‘what could be different?’.
1. The HAZ provided welcome additional resources for public health and health 
promotion. However, the attendant additional organisational structures were a 
distraction. The fact that more money for health improvement was not allocated to 
existing local government, NHS and voluntary sector departments and 
organisations suggests that there was an underestimation o f the effect ofpre-1997 
budget restrictions on the efficiency of these departments. In national policy 
development existing structures should not be blamed for shortcomings, without a 
proper assessment of the effect of previous budget reductions.
2. There is an impasse for the NHS and local government because, with 
considerable justification, they do not feel able to support partisan political 
formations. Public health practitioners should appreciate that statutory NHS and 
government systems are biased against granting trade unions and Labour Party 
members a role in influencing national income distribution policy. Also, Labour 
Party elites may have an interest in dampening public participation in the party.
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Local authorities should review their support for trade union organisation and 
should develop methods for informing the public about party political structures. 
Business representation on Local Strategic Partnerships should be balanced with a 
trade union perspective, particularly from those unions representing the less well 
off, such as shop workers. Local statutory and voluntary sector staff need to be 
kept up-to-date and informed about developments in party activity. The role of 
local councillors needs to be clarified for staff particularly for NHS staff who are 
not used to working with them.
Public health departments should make closer, routine and systematic links with 
locally elected members in order to hear the issues that residents have raised with 
them, to voice the concerns of NHS service users and to share evidence on the 
importance of issues relating to the wider determinants of health.
3. The possibility of set-aside places for elected non-party councillors drawn from 
various community interests should be investigated further. This is because the 
system currently allows parties ultimate control of all council votes, but at the 
same time, parties have lessening membership involvement. (As reported, there 
was some local hostility to elected party councillors, particularly from community 
development staff) Referral of Primary Care Trust decisions to borough councils 
for comment and ratification should be considered.
4. Historically, those classes most likely to gain from redistribution have played a 
role, even if in conjunction at times with the middle classes, in organising for 
improvements. In order for the recommendations of the Acheson report to be 
implemented, more consideration needs to be given to assisting those agents, such 
as party members and trade unions, who might be able to support this. NHS and 
state employees are not in a good position to comment on changes in the internal 
structure of the Labour Party. At a local level since 1997 public involvement in 
the party has very significantly diminished. At the same time state investment in 
public involvement has increased. The cost-effectiveness o f state-led public 
involvement initiatives should be researched further. Following Rose (1992), it 
should not be assumed that low participation is normal. In different situations
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there might be far more participation by lower income groups in labour movement 
structures and a far greater knowledge of how to influence national policy.
5. It appears that elite power is being consolidated by developments at the local 
level. The power of local residents to influence national policy has diminished. 
The Labour Party should recognise the part it might play in combating party- 
partisan dealignment by investing in higher profile member recruitment 
campaigns. These should be linked to more accountable methods of party member 
involvement. The party should aim recruitment campaigns at minority ethnic 
groups, younger people (15-30) and lower income groups. Focus group testing 
should not be taken as a substitute for efforts to recruit members; rather, accounts 
of focus group questions, methods and results should be available for the 
membership to use to form political judgements. While partisan dealignment may 
be taking place all over Europe, the process is not being challenged by the British 
Labour Party.
6. If Trade Unions wish to support a reduction in health inequalities, for the 
purposes of clarity, they need to publicise policy on income inequality aimed at 
public health staf£ local authority officers and lower income groups, for them to 
take-up at work. Health unions should review their role in co-ordinating the local 
staff constituency that supports redistributive policy. The Labour elite should use 
its media access to promote the benefits of TU membership.178
To answer ‘what could be different?’- Labour could aim to increase citizens’ 
understanding of, and their belief in, the social disadvantages of increasing income 
inequalities. This would entail recognition of the problem in a way that does not take 
place in THI (DoH, 2003), coupled with permission for democratic debate over fiscal 
policy change. However, local staff employed to support public involvement to 
reduce health inequalities should be alert to the possibility that New Labour’s 
interpretation of the political and economic demands of capitalism requires it to
178 More recommendations might be added. Whilst not addressed in this thesis, environmental issues 
w oe also neglected in Saving Lives and subsequent NHS work has largely ignored the links between 
public health and environmental standards and sustainability. The wisdom of this sidelining will no 
doubt be questioned in the future. Similarly, the role o f market pressures in influencing health 
inequalities is a subject worthy o f research, but it has not been feasible to cover it here.
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restrain certain forms of public involvement.179 These forms, e.g. trade unions, are 
those that are most effective in challenging income inequalities.
Conclusion
In 1997 “palpable excitement” was reported among public health professionals. This 
was generated by the prospect of ditching Conservative health policies and the 
ushering in o f Labour programmes, seen to be more supportive of public health 
measures (Butler, 1997). Between 1997 and 2003 the response, in Lewisham, to 
British Labour government policy to reduce health inequalities, came in the form of 
both opinion and action. Opinions were fairly consistent across a range of staff 
charged with implementing the policy in the NHS, local government and the 
voluntary sector. They held that income inequality affected health inequalities. 
Support also existed for trade unions, which were accepted as contributing to income 
inequalities reduction. However, these opinions did not appear to result in specific 
actions and only affected implementation in as much as they contributed to the 
slowing down of work.
An answer to the research question has been provided, in that it may be concluded 
that broad political considerations, issues and tensions in the party and government do 
indeed appear to have affected the pattern of local implementation of policy to reduce 
health inequalities. This is especially evident if a longer-term perspective is taken and 
the involvement of local people in issues affecting their health is understood to be a 
key component of the public health programme.
The thesis stakes a claim to have developed the literature in this area by showing the 
relevance o f an analysis that takes into account pressures within the labour movement 
and government, coupled with the higher import the policy to reduce health 
inequalities has for Labour-voting, lower income groups. The ‘neutral state’, in the 
form of the NHS, is designed to avoid conflicts over redistribution and is ill equipped 
to enable effective public involvement in this area.
179 It is not dear if New Labour concurs 111111 flic IMF’s prescription for Sweden -  that it increase its 
income inequalities (Artus, 2000).
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A number of recommendations have been listed. These are directed at the Labour 
Party, the trade unions and the NHS. The labour movement itself should address 
democratic involvement and participation issues if it is to increase the voice of lower 
income people and their power to influence issues affecting health. It is not possible 
for the neutral state on its own to effectively facilitate involvement on important 
upstream issues that are identified in the academic and policy literature as essential 
for health improvement. Whilst the NHS and local state may successfully move away 
from purely consultative forms of involvement and undertake valuable work, 
democracy is diminished if questions of income inequality are not also open to public 
control via democratically accountable, rather than purely consultative, labour 
movement arrangements. It may be that over the next few years the Labour Party 
attempts to revise its internal democratic processes to try to win back lost members, 
but the direction these developments will take is unclear given the Labour elites’ 
consolidation of political power over the last seven years. This is certainly not to say 
that the labour movement should be viewed as the only route to participation and 
control, there is a role for the development of non-party involvement within this 
model. It is recommended that planned reforms of the Labour Party explicitly plot the 
way in which members might affect redistribution. Labour councillors and trade 
union leaders have a role to play in politicising the experiences of lower income 
people and in raising a collective awareness of shared problems. Change is less likely 
if issues remain at the level o f individual experience and are not turned into issues of 
political choice. Grassroots pressure needs to be directed in such a way as to ensure 
that politicians have to ‘do something’ about issues. Political pressure can ensure that 
issues of crime, drugs, inadequate services and increasing income inequality are 
addressed. Access to political power cannot be ignored in any consideration of health 
improvement among different sections of society.
Trade unions should also promote their role in supporting the involvement of people 
on lower incomes whose health tends to be worse and in advocating explicitly 
redistributive economic policies. Aside from the development of ‘scrutiny 
committees’ it is recommended that the NHS pay more attention to developing links 
with elected councillors. Formalised systematic dialogue should be piloted and 
evaluated.
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Action on health inequalities was also slowed down by an apparent confusion at 
central government level about the proper balance between central and local 
functions. Small public health departments were given technically and managerially 
difficult tasks, such as developing local targets for health inequality reduction. At the 
same time, and in the context of NHS institutional upheavals, health improvement 
programme planning did not make use of local government capacity to lead the 
process at the borough level. Maintaining NHS control ova* the process at this 
juncture wasted time.
Local state-led public involvement programmes increased, while at the same time 
active membership of labour movement organisations, that might affect both local and 
national policy, declined. Thus, local community influence over national income 
inequalities became even remoter, and the power of government elites to control this 
upstream policy was strengthened.180
Thus, it was found that the wider concerns of the Labour Party elite, namely income 
inequalities and central versus local control, affected the public health policy’s 
implementation at the local level. A number o f recommendations flowed from these 
findings. However, these are not all actions that can be addressed by government. 
Instead the conclusion is that the labour movement itself, in the form of both the trade 
unions and the Labour Party, could do more to support collective activity affecting 
health inequalities.
180 Similar processes are reported internationally (World Bank, 2002).
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Appendix 1.1 
Going through Wolman’s (1981) stages in order, a critique is provided of issues 
relevant to this study.
Within his early ‘conceptualization and theory evaluation’ and ‘selection’ stages the role of those who 
will also play some part in later stages is absent This is a criticism made by Hill and Hupe (2003:475), 
although not specifically towards Wolman’s article. Regarding the health inequalities policy looked at 
in this research, early involvement from the policy community (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) was evident 
and may have helped to support later developments. For example, academics and senior Department of 
Health officials subsequently came to speak to local players at a borough based health inequalities 
conference reported on in this research. In doing this they continued to ‘sell’ the policy, albeit to a 
receptive audience.
Wolman believes that unspecified objectives can be the result of programmes requiring ‘support from 
diverse elements’. This does not apply to the policy considered here since in its initial stages, post- 
1997, it did not appear to significantly interest either diverse bodies or generate any hostile opposition. 
Rather, it is suggested hoe, tensions within one element, namely the party of government, affected 
implementation.
This thesis also highlights a gap in time between ‘conceptulization’ and the clarification of technical 
elements within ‘programme design’. ‘Authority leakage’ occurred not because ‘subordinates’ did not 
wish to do what their superiors wanted, but because they did not know or understand what was 
required. Wolman’s example of vague instructions is extremely pertinent to the present study, and is 
replicated in Saving Lives (DoH, 1999). He cites an American regeneration programme, which he says 
called for: “widespread citizen participation”.
Wolman’s concern that instructions may be “so complex and prolific that they conflict with each other 
or simply are so unwieldy that they are unusable in day-to-day decisions.” is applicable to the findings 
of chapter 4 of this thesis (Wolman, 1981: 452). Also relevant is the observation that ‘subordinates” 
actions will be detrimental to the programme if they “believe their superiors are not pursuing these 
objectives vigorously enough or in the most effective manner or if they believe their superiors are not 
themselves committed to the program’s stated objectives.” (Wolman, 1981: 453). The need to balance 
programme control with a nurturing of employee morale and creativity is also a stress evident in the 
NHS ‘targets culture’ (Wolman, 1981: 454). It is, nevertheless, important not to jump to too rapid a 
conclusion about the factors affecting employee morale. Careful observation and analysis is required to 
assess key pressure points.
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We should also be alert to the dangers of too ready an acceptance of Wolman’s suggestions without 
due consideration as to whether the correct circumstances apply. This is evident in his hypotheses that:
“Programs placed in new agencies are more likely to succeed (hypothesis 13); programs 
placed in existing agencies are more likely to fail if  they represent major deviations from 
programs previously administered or if they require the agency to change its perception of its 
mission or its traditional clientele groups (hypothesis 14).”
The Lambeth Southwark and Lewisham Health Action Zone was introduced as a discrete agency, in a 
context of great organisational turbulence, where existing and relevant structures already existed with 
similar values. The findings of this research suggest that this was an unnecessary move.
Wolman’s points on ‘program funding’ are apposite to debates witnessed locally on whether to target 
funds to the most deprived of the borough’s wards or to target in other ways, for example by client 
group. However, this thesis suggests that there is more to be said on the impact of funding. For 
example, it is of relevance to know the extent to which funds are non-recurring, are ring fenced, or are 
allocated within a context of - previous under funding, current budget cuts in other related services, or 
skills shortages in the labour market
Wolman’s view that “Inadequate feedback is probably one of the more common reasons for program 
failure.” is also relevant to this thesis. The findings suggest that feedback did occur at particular 
junctures and that this helped to keep the programme on track. However, it is also true that other 
feedback initiatives appear to have been started too early in the process, before ‘lack of knowledge’ and 
‘technical feasibility’ problems were resolved, with some serious implications for the programme.
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Appendix 1.2
Held’s Models of Democracy
In summary, Held’s models of democracy are: 1. the classical democracy of Athens 2. protective 
democracy (citizens requiring protection from each other and from governors) 3. developmental 
democracy, type a (citizens have equal political and economic freedoms); developmental (or 
representative) democracy, type b. 4. direct democracy 5. competitive elitism (a skilled elite is 
selected) 6. pluralism (governments mediate between demands of diverse interest groups. Neo­
pluralism is more circumspect) 7. legal democracy 8. participatory democracy 9. democratic autonomy 
(mixes direct participation and election of representatives. Equal rights and bill of rights. Overall 
investment priorities set by government but extensive market regulation of goods and labour.) (Held, 
1987).
The four forms of particular importance for the thesis (see chapter 6) are: (i) representative (Held’s 
type 3b); (ii) direct (Held’s type 4); (iii) legal (Held’s type 7); and (iv) participatory (Held’s type 8). In 
(i) representative democracy, "Participation in political life is necessary not only for the protection of 
individual interests, but also for the creation of an informed, committed and developing citizenry.” 
(Held, 1987: 102). The key features of the model include - popular sovereignty with a universal 
franchise, representative government (elected leadership, regular elections, secret ballot etc.), clear 
demarcation of parliamentary assembly from public bureaucracy, citizen involvement in the different 
branches of government through the vote, and extensive participation in local government, public 
debates and jury service. Moving to (ii) direct democracy, this includes the principle that “..only 
equality can secure the conditions for the realization of the potentiality of all human beings..” (Held, 
1987: 136). In this model public affairs are to be regulated by ...councils organized in a pyramid 
structure, public officers are to be paid no more than workman’s wages, and, in the communist variant 
of the model, consensus is the 'decision principle on all public questions’. For (iii) legal democracy: 
“The majority principle is an effective and desirable way of protecting individuals from arbitrary 
government .... Majority rule....must be circumscribed by the rule of law.” (Held, 1987: 251). The 
core features and general conditions of the model include - rule of law, minimal state intervention in 
civil society and private life, effective political leadership guided by liberal principles and 
minimization of the threat of collectivism. In (iv) the participatory model the following principles 
apply: “a society which fosters a sense of political efficacy, nurtures a concern for collective problems 
and contributes to the formation of a knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a sustained interest in 
the governing process.” The key features Held lists for this model are: “Direct participation of citizens 
in the regulation of the key institutions of society, including the workplace and local community, 
reorganisation of the party system by making party officials directly accountable to [the] membership, 
operation of ‘participatory parties’ in a parliamentary or congressional structure, and maintenance of an 
open institutional system to ensure the possibility of experimentation with political forms” (Held, 1987: 
262).
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Appendix 2.1
The Black Report’s Explanations for Health Inequalities
Artefact
'This approach suggests that both health and class are artificial variables thrown up by attempts to 
measure social phenomena and that the relationship between them may itself be an artefact of little 
causal significance” (Townsend et al, 1992:105).
Selection
“Occupational class is hoe relegated to the status of a dependent variable and health acquires the 
greater degree of causal significance. The occupational class structure is seen as a filter or sorter of 
human beings and one of the major bases of selection is health, that is, physical strength, vigour or 
ability.” (Townsend et al, 1992:105).
Cultural or behavioural
“These are recognisable by the independent and autonomous causal role which they assign to ideas and 
behaviour in the outset of disease and event of death. Such explanations, when applied to modem 
industrial societies, often focus on the individual as a unit of analysis emphasizing unthinking, reckless 
or irresponsible behaviour or incautious life style as the moving determinant of poor health status. 
Explanation takes and individual form....Others see behaviour which is conducive to good or bad 
health as embedded more within social structures; as illustrative of socially distinguishable styles of 
life, associated with, and reinforced by, class.” (Townsend et al, 1992:110).
Materialist
“Occupational class is multifaceted in “advanced” societies, and apart from the variables most readily 
associated with socio-economic position -  income, savings, property and housing -  there are many 
other dimensions which can be expected to exert and active causal influence on health. People at work 
for instance, encounter different material conditions and amenities, levels of danger and risk, degree of 
security and stability, association with other workers, levels of job satisfaction and physical and mental 
strain. These other dimensions of material inequality are also closely associated with another 
determinant of health, -education.” (Townsend et al, 1992:109).
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Appendix 3.1
Confidential, anonymous interviews
All of the local interviewees were presented with letters, to keep, confirming the 
confidential nature of the interview. Two exceptions to this were that the mayor of 
Lewisham’s letter stated that he would be identified in the thesis. The letter to Sir 
Donald Acheson about the PhD research did not say that the interview was to be 
confidential. These exceptions were made because, firstly, it was thought it might be 
of value to identify their individual opinions and, secondly, it was not judged that they 
would be likely to say more important things if the interviews were confidential. It 
was considered that interviewees’ greatest fear might be gossiping with other staff 
members over what the interviewees had said. Therefore, aside from the letter, a 
verbal reassurance was given that no disclosure of this nature would take place. The 
researcher did not reveal who the interviewees were to anyone, although interviewees 
themselves may have told others they were interviewed.
An example of the letter text is provided in the box below:
Dear ********
Confirmation of anonymised data
Thank you for agreeing to take part in an interview for my research mi health inequalities policy.
I confirm that I will ensure that you will not be identified by name or be identifiable in the text of the 
PhD, in any published articles resulting from the research, or in any discussions.
Yours sincerely
Jane Thomas
All the interviewees have been anonymised in the thesis text (aside from the one 
discussed below, plus the mayor and Sir Donald Acheson). Because a broad 
indication of job role is relevant to an interpretation of the data, where necessary, in 
order to both indicate job role and maintain confidentiality, job titles have been 
substituted for broadly similar titles. The details of this substitution are provided in 
table 3.1. Mustapha Bello, referred to on page 5, is a pseudonym.
Three of the interviewees said that they did not feel the need for what they said to be 
treated confidentially. These interviewees were 2 community workers and 1 
councillor. In writing the findings chapters it was decided that there was no advantage 
to be gained from identifying the community workers and that, in fact, this might be a 
distraction from a reading of the text. However, the councillor, Ian Page, said that he 
felt that what he said ought to be public information as he was democratically elected 
and Lewisham residents should have access to his opinions. He was one of two 
Socialist Party councillors elected in Lewisham at the time, and the other councillor 
was a woman, therefore to describe him in the text of the thesis as the Socialist Party 
councillor was to, in effect, identify him. (The sex of some other interviewees was 
changed in the text of the thesis as an extra insurance against recognition).
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Appendix 3.2
Interview schedule
Adapted for councillors, trade unionists and some voluntary sector staff.
1. Firstly, would you briefly outline the main responsibilities of your job?
Do your responsibilities cover work on health inequalities? (or did your responsibilities cover this 
when the latest public health policy was first introduced?)
Is it possible to say roughly what proportion of your time you would spend working on issues directly 
related to reducing health inequalities in an average month?
Would you say, in general, that you now spend significantly more time addressing this issue (than 
before 1998 when the new public health policy came out) or is it about the same?
2. In implementing the government's strategy to reduce health inequalities locally, what do you think 
the most important local actions have been so far?
And what have the difficulties been?
3. Could you describe how targets and priorities were set for the Health Improvement Plan/HimP at the 
health authority level, and at the borough/PCG level?
In your view were targets not included that should have been? What were these?
One PCG set a target around low birth weight babies -  do you have any views on that?
How likely is it that the targets will be achieved?
Who is really signed-up to the targets in a personal and professional way?
What are the barriers to achieving the goals?
What would be needed to raise the profile of health inequality in the local policy and professional 
community?
4. Do you think that local areas should set their own targets to reduce health inequalities (in terms of 
topics and expected improvement) or do you think that more direction should be given by the centre? 
Prompt -  how much.
(The review of the Health of the Nation strategy suggested that more freedom should be given to local 
areas to set targets, but that does not seem to have worked and now the government is looking at a 
more central target, do you have any views on this?)
5. The public involvement agenda is now seen as important; do you think there is anything more that 
could be done locally about how local people might influence national policy? (prompt for problems on 
this)
Do you think the Lewisham Citizen’s Panel could be asked to say what they think about income 
differentials in this country?
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Is it important for the NHS to be seen to be politically neutral?
6. Some academics think that there is really very little that can be done locally to improve health 
inequalities because national social policy affecting income differentials is the sole cause of health 
inequalities; while others would say there is a lot that we can do that will have an effect outside of this 
national economic framework -  where would you think you stand?
(How would you rank the impact that local health policy work has had on the strategy compared to 
national social policy, for example benefit changes. Say on a scale of 1-100, where would you rank the 
impact of national social policy, and local health policy?)
7. How much effective local work: to reduce health inequalities would you say lies within the scope of 
the NHS?
8. The Lewisham inequalities sub-group of Healthier Lewisham is going to be drawing up a 
programme of work and terms of reference for the group. What do you think that the group should 
include in its remit? (could this include using the media and statutory publications to inform Lewisham 
residents about the developments in income inequalities and the links between health and wealth 
inequalities?)
9. Stepping back from your work role -  can you say what you really think about income inequalities? 
(prompt -  can they be reduced, how would they be reduced, do you think this would be desirable, why 
are they lower in say Sweden ...)
10. Some people have said that as part of the process of the NHS addressing health inequalities changes 
in pay differentials within the NHS are needed, whereas others believe that the current differentials are 
needed in order to recruit staff. Would you have a view on that?
11. If I was a member of the public and I wanted to join an organisation that was doing something 
about income inequalities, where would you recommend I go?
How about the local Labour party in Lewisham?
12. Because trade unions have been shown to reduce pay differentials and reduce accident rates, 
some people think that the local NHS could/should work in partnership with the TUC or the GLA 
to increase trade union membership. What would you think of that?
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Appendix 4.1
A chronology of institutional changes and related policy documents
Date National Policy -  publications 
and Activity
Local Plans, Policy and Activity
Pre-
1997
The Conservative government’s 
Health of the Nation policy (DoH)
The Healthier Lewisham partnership
Health authority public health dept and community trust health 
promotion dept covering 3 boroughs
1997 Election of Labour government 
The NHS: modem dependable 
(DoH)
1998 The Green Paper -  Our Healthier 
Nation (Doll)
Community Health South London NHS Trust established 
(amalgamation of community trusts covering Lambeth and 
Southwark/Lewisham
Local responses made to Green Paper
Service and Financial Framework planning starts, LSLHA HimP 
planning also starts
1999 The Acheson Report and the White 
Paper- Saving Lives (DoH). 
National Service Framework for 
Mental Health (DoH)
Health authority and PCG strategic planning session at Mill wall 
stadium. Divisions on HimP process
DoH acceptance of Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham’s HAZ 
proposal
First Lewisham health inequalities sub-group of Healthier 
Lewisham formed
2000 The NHS Plan (DoH)
- production of national targets to 
reduce health inequalities.
The National Cancer Plan (DoH). 
National Service Framework for 
CM) (DoH)
Morley, A (2000) Strategic initiatives in Lewisham, mapping 
work on health inequalities, London, H.L.
Formation of North and South Lewisham Primary Care Groups
The Lewisham Health Inequalities Conference -  guest speakers 
include Sir Donald Acheson
2001 Shifting the Balance of Power 
(DoH)
Re-election of Labour government
Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham Health Authority (LSLHA) 
(2001) The Health of Lewisham -  everybody’s business, London, 
LSLHA
Primary care investment plans produced (see note 1 below)
Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham Health Authority (LSLHA) 
(2001) Health Improvement and Modernisation Programme 
2001-2004, London, LSLHA
First Lewisham Mayor elected
2002 Regional Health Authorities 
disbanded. Creation of South East 
London Strategic Health Authority
Investment, Expansion and Reform 
— the next 3 years: Priorities and 
Planning Framework 2003-2006
Lewisham Primary Care Trust (2002) Health Improvement and 
Modernisation Programme 2002-2005, London, Lewisham PCT
Lewisham HimP conference containing substantial element of 
programme on health inequalities
Formation of Lewisham Primary Care Trust Appointment of a 
Lewisham Director of Public Health. Disbanding of Lambeth, 
Southwark and Lewisham Health Authority
Local Delivery Plan targets include issues relating to health 
inequalities (autumn)
2003 Tackling Health Inequalities: a 
programme for action (DoH)
Community Strategy 2003-2013, London, Lewisham Strategic 
Partnership.
Notes:
1. . .PCTs will be expected to deliver Annual Accountability Agreement targets, play their part
in the Health Improvement and Modernisation Programme and deliver Service and Financial 
Framework Targets.” Primary Care Trusts: open for consultation (2001) London, Lambeth, 
Southwark and Lewisham Health Authority.
2. Details of further developments such as 'public-private partnerships’ are provided by Harrison 
(1998) and Appleby and Harrison (2001).
293
Appendix 7.1
A comparison of the key findings of The Health of the Nation: a policy assessed 
(LSHTM, 1998) with findings from the study area
The Health of the Nation (HOTN) -  a policy 
assessed.
Two reports (1998)
Our Healthier Nation (OHN) — local responses. 
Summary findings within the scope of the 
thesis — focusing on the policy to reduce health 
inequalities (2003)
1. Investing in Health ? - an assessment of the 
impact of the Health of the Nation, Universities 
of Leeds and Glamorgan Principal Findings pp. 
13-14.
2.1 “The HOTN was widely welcomed -  it was 
the first attempt to put in place a national health 
strategy based on WHO’s Health for All. It had an 
important symbolic role.”
OHN was welcomed by all staff encountered. It 
was seen as - the first national policy to aim for a 
reduction in health inequalities and as - 
recognising the significance of the ‘wider 
determinants of health’.
2.2 “The HOTN failed over its five year lifespan 
to realise its full potential and was handicapped 
from the outset by numerous flaws of both a 
conceptual and process-type nature. By 1997, its 
impact on local policy-making was negligible. It 
wasn’t seen to count while other priorities, e.g. 
waiting lists, balancing the books, took 
precedence. The need for a fresh start was 
stressed.”
Over a five-year period from 1998 to 2003 
administrative, or process problems, delayed the 
local policy response. The introduction of The 
NHS Plan (2000) refocused attention on waiting 
times. However, new aspects of the policy were 
still in the process of being implemented locally 
in 2003, eg, changes in performance monitoring
As at April 1997 staff anxiety for a change of 
policy could not easily be disentangled from their 
general desire for a change of government.
2.3 “The HOTN was regarded as a Department of 
Health initiative which lacked cross-departmental 
commitment and ownership. At local level, it was 
seen as principally a health service document and 
lacked local government ownership.
Shared ownership at all levels both horizontally 
and vertically was stressed as essential for 
success.”
Production of a health authority HimP continued 
this trend (2001). However, the first borough 
HimP (2002) achieved greater local government 
ownership.
Some increased vertical ownership was noted, 
particularly from within the voluntary sector.
2.4 “The HOTN did not change significantly the 
perspective and behaviour of health authorities 
and did not fundamentally alter the context within 
which dialogue between health 
purchasers/providers and other partners took 
place.”
Some increase was observed in the role of the 
public health and health promotion perspective at 
PCT level.
Purchaser/provider dividing lines changed, e.g. 
health visitors entered into employment in the 
‘commissioning agency’.
2.5 “The HOTN did not cause a major 
readjustment in investment priorities by health 
authorities. There was no relationship between 
resource use and outcomes and no evidence of a 
health economics perspective having been 
adopted.”
Additional ‘ring fenced’ funds were used. Public 
health and health promotion finances were less 
restricting to the policy’s local implementation. 
Although budget cuts to core services were still 
evident in 5 of the 6 years surveyed, special time- 
limited schemes such as the Health Action Zone 
compensated for this.
Adoption of a ‘health economics perspective’, 
defined as “..the extent to which it (policy) has 
broadened the health agenda beyond the 
conventional focus that health is the responsibility 
of the NHS..” (HOTN -  a policy assessed: 20), 
was noted. Outcome measurement was beyond 
the scope of the thesis.
2.6 “The HOTN reinforced the changing role of OHN and the introduction of co-terminus
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health authorities, providing a framework within 
which die commissioning role was to be judged.”
boundaries facilitated partnership working 
between public health and the local authority. Up 
to 2003 the policy’s links to PCG/T 
commissioning were achieved more through 
individual’s commitment to pubhc health 
principles rather than being driven by OHN.
2.7 “Some attempt was made to drive progress via 
the contracting process but it was minimal. The 
impact upon Trust and primary care teams’ 
performance has been slight”
Service change was slow to develop. But clear 
examples, such as, large increases in provision of 
smoking cessation support, which included some 
specific targeting towards disadvantaged 
communities, can be discerned.
The contracting process was not ‘used to drive 
progress’.
2.8 “The HOTN did not seriously impact upon 
primary care practitioners either as commissioners 
or providers.”
Some specific developments were noted, e.g. 
community nurses were drawn into the local 
public health network; GPs were felt by some 
interviewees to be more open to recognition of the 
need to address the ‘wider determinants of 
health’; specific projects were funded, e.g. two 
linking primary care to voluntary sector support.
2.9 “Community Trusts appear to have been most 
engaged via involvement in community 
development activities and health promotion 
programmes; acute Trusts have been largely 
untouched by the health strategy. The HOTN has 
been relevant only where it enabled pre-existing 
agendas to be furthered and/or as a source of new 
funds.”
Some developments in the public health role of 
acute trusts were noted, e.g., involvement of acute 
trust HR departments in a HAZ employment 
scheme; the increased health promotion role of 
the mental health trust Pre-existing partnerships 
were important in work to raise the profile o f the 
new policy. Without new ring-fenced public 
health funds and a diminishing of acute sector 
deficits, the implementation of the OHN policy 
would have been very different
2.10 “Local authorities in general perceived The 
HOTN to be dominated by 'medical conditions’ 
and heavily ‘medically led’. It was a cause for 
concern among those local authorities which 
believed that they contributed more to a health 
agenda in its broadest sense than health 
authorities.”
No concern from those in the local authority along 
these lines was noted. Comment was made that 
jargon and ‘cultural differences’ between services 
made communication difficult at times. Some 
differences in commitment to working for ‘health 
in its broadest sense’ was seen within the local 
authority, between departments. Those 
departments with less involvement blamed lack of 
staff resources rather than lack of commitment in 
principle. LA involvement tended to be strongest 
from the ‘health and social care’ directorate.
2.11 “Continual organisational turbulence 
frequently disrupted management teams and 
working alliances. It also contributed to lapses of 
corporate memory which hindered consistent data 
collection and recollection of events by 
interviewees.”
Continual organisational turbulence disrupted and 
delayed planning a local strategic response to the 
policy. Lack of clear leadership and responsibility 
for the policy up until the appointment of the PCT 
Director of Public Health in 2002 further hindered 
implementation.
2.12 “The different agendas/drivers and cultures 
of health services and local government were 
complicating factors.”
Although a difference in ‘cultures’ was noted by 
some staff, the strongest evidence for this was that 
some health and some local authority terms 
needed to be explained in joint meetings. Some 
evidence of different agendas in anti-poverty 
policy was also noted (see chapter 5). However, 
shared agendas in work to improve health and 
well being and their determinants, were greater 
than differences. Local authority ‘floor targets’ 
introduced post-2001 increased this shared 
agenda.
2.13 Pre-existing structures and challenges Pre-existing partnership structures did not appear
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heavily influenced the starting point for joint 
working. For example, where local government 
had responded to WHO’s Health for AD initiative 
and had formed relationships with health 
authorities there was already joint machinery 
upon which to build. In these circumstances The 
HOTN had been possibly unhelpful. Where no 
such activity existed, The HOTN provided a 
suitable spur to joint action.”
to find OHN unhelpful. However, the low 
integration of new HAZ machinery into existing 
partnerships possibly wasted resources.
2.14 “National targets were a useful ‘rallying’ 
point but local targets would have been welcomed 
within the national framework to reflect local 
needs.”
There was a significant local lobby for the setting 
of national health inequalities targets. These were 
issued in 2000/1, but did not fully arrive on local 
agendas until 2002/3. There was insufficient 
national support or local expertise to set local 
inequalities targets, especially within the context 
of ‘organisational turbulence. ’
2.15 “Approaches to the translation of national 
targets to local level varied considerably. There 
was a general wish for greater freedom both to 
add target areas to the menu and to adjust targets 
in the light of circumstances. There was criticism 
of the targets on technical grounds.”
Mixed, complex and at times contradictory 
responses were noted regarding local targets. (1) 
‘targets’ generally were associated with other 
central ‘requirements’, for example, on reporting. 
(2) staff made general statements about the 
desirability of local targets, but at the same time 
felt a lack of expertise and support in deriving 
local targets. (3) staff were keen to see national 
targets on health inequality reduction. (4) the 
HAZ monitoring process was felt by many staff to 
be overly bureaucratic. (5) staff were critical of 
the technical quality of LDP targets for 2002/3.
2.16 “The performance management process was 
heavily geared to short-term outputs, largely 
driven by the Efficiency Index/Patient’s 
Charter/financial management agendas and there 
was no extant performance management for 
strategic development and achievements for 
health as opposed to health services.”
It was not until 2002/3 that any shift in this 
pattern, detected by the HOTN policy assessment, 
was noted locally.
2.17 “Lack of management guidance and 
incentives at local level were seen to be major 
failings of the HOTN. Local agencies did not 
have their roles, tasks and responsibilities clearly 
spelt out with a timetable to ensure that agreed 
targets or milestones were met”
Lack of management guidance and early lack of 
performance monitoring was also a failing of 
OHN. Local agencies and partnerships, ‘did not 
have their tasks clearly spelt out’, at least until 
2003. One example of an exception being within 
the ‘National Service Frameworks’, but here tasks 
to reduce inequalities were not explicit Other 
clear task orientated work-plans were ‘fruit in 
schools’ and Sure Start.
2.18 “Strengthening the capacity to deliver on the 
health strategy was seen to be a priority.”
Public health training on aspects of the strategy 
was evident, e.g., funds were made available for 
Health Impact Assessment training. Increased 
ring-fenced funds also ‘strengthened capacity to 
deliver’. Staff shortages and difficulty in 
recruitment weakened implementation.
ImpDcations for Future Policy as 
recommended in The Health of the Nation -  a 
policy assessed: 14-15
Comments on the local response up to 2003
3.1 “There was a widespread desire for a fresh 
start and for new life to be breathed into the health 
strategy. The government’s commitment to 
produce a new health strategy, which would both 
build on The HOTN’s overall aims and objectives
In 1997, whilst there was a widespread desire for 
new public health policies, there was also a 
stronger and almost universal desire, among the 
local public health and health promotion 
community, to see a wholesale change of
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and extend and broaden these in an effort to tackle 
the poverty problem and the evidence of widening 
health inequalities, was welcomed.”
government These NHS staff wanted the 
Conservative government to lose the 1997 general 
election. Having said this, it is certainly true that 
the staff wanted OHN to ‘tackle the poverty 
problem and ...health inequalities’ and they 
became confused and at times cynical when 
government action to address poverty, income 
inequalities and health inequalities was discordant 
with their understanding of the commitments of 
the policy.
3.2 “There is a risk of ‘initiative conflict’ and 
overload as a consequence of a plethora of 
vehicles for collaboration which now exists. 
While offering rich opportunities to form and 
sustain partnerships, it is essential that die various 
initiatives are nested.”
Some evidence of confusion in the role of 
partnerships was noted in relation to the formation 
of the Local Strategic Partnership and local 
groups working on patient and public 
involvement However, generally health 
improvement partnerships led by statutory 
agencies were ‘nested’. However, there was still 
conflict over staff time between health projects 
and initiatives.
As described in the thesis, conflict also was 
discerned in relation to vehicles for public 
participation.
3.3 “In particular the government needs to:
■ Provide leadership by setting out clear, 
consistent ‘corporate signals’ and ensuring 
cross-departmental ownership”
Some local staff remained unconvinced of the 
consistency between government policy to reduce 
health inequalities and macroeconomic policy. 
Many local staff did not know of the national 
‘Cross-cutting Review’. However, there was 
increased joint ownership of policy to reduce 
health inequalities between the local authority and 
health services and this was driven by the 
requirements of the policy.
■ “establish shared ownership at all levels both 
horizontally and vertically and ensure that 
chief executives in health and local 
authorities are fully engaged and committed.”
Vertical involvement of staff was hindered by 
staffing constraints and lack of guidance over 
explicit tasks. High level commitment within 
health and local authorities existed and was 
increased due to the increased public health 
‘voice’ and the new performance monitoring 
arrangements. Some senior public health staff 
remained sceptical, however, of the long-term 
impact of health inequalities monitoring given the 
continued acute sector pressures.
■ “within a performance management 
framework, spell out as clearly as possible 
agency expectations, tasks and 
responsibilities.”
This recommendation was still being ‘newly 
implemented’ in 2003. Failure to act on it earlier 
produced delays in local implementation.
■ “consider carefully whether health authorities 
should have the lead role for delivering on 
the health strategy or whether this should not 
be a shared role between health and local 
authorities."
Given continued NHS ‘organisational turbulence’ 
granting more responsibility for the Health Action 
Zone and the Health Improvement & 
Modernisation Programme to the local authority 
might have sped up local implementation.
■ “stress the importance of joint targets and 
joint monitoring with each stakeholder 
playing to its particular strengths ”
Some NHS and local authority targets appeared to 
overlap more towards 2003. However, this was 
not made explicit. Joint projects, such as the 
HimP development and the health partnership 
board did strengthen statutory sector links.
■ “ensure that primary care practitioners are on 
board with the strategy”
Local efforts were made in this area, but they 
appeared to be more ad hoc than strategically led.
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IThe Health of the Nation -  a policy assessed. 
Evaluation of the Implementation of the Health 
of the Nation, London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine. Conclusions: 147.
The local response
“Seven key factors emerged as influencing the 
implementation of HOTN:
1.1 Lack of resources as a barrier to HOTN 
implementation was indicated by: (a) it was cited 
by one-third of interviewees as a barrier to 
implementation; (b) an analysis of individual 
health authorities* patterns of expenditure 
suggested that population-based health promotion 
may be a ‘soft target’ and may be reduced to 
achieve savings; (c) an increase in the share of 
total population-based health promotion funding 
spent on HTV/AIDS prevention activities, 
suggested that some HAs are using this ring- 
fenced budget to cross-subsidise other health 
promotion activities.
1.2. This raises the issue of the importance of 
ring-fenced resources in the implementation of a 
national health strategy
Lack of financial resources for local public health 
project work was not a top concern of staff 
throughout the period.
This was because of, what was in effect, the ring- 
fencing for funds via schemes such as the HAZ. 
However, wider concerns over the long-term 
funding of core council and NHS services were 
raised.
2. Structural features of local agencies can support 
or impede HOTN. Those which facilitate 
partnership working, which strengthen the 
importance of health improvement within 
agencies and which protect it from (the) resource 
demands (of) other functions of health authorities 
and local authorities are particularly important
Turbulence in the structures of local agencies 
hindered implementation. Whilst the HAZ 
ensured that public health funds were ring-fenced 
it also created a new bureaucratic structure of its 
own. However, existing partnerships supported 
the work.
3. Interviewees saw a national strategy as giving 
some support to implementation by giving 
legitimacy to action. However, many called for a 
statutory framework to enable key local 
participants to work intersectorally for health, and 
to protect the strategy from the demands of other 
functions and the loss of key staff.
The national strategy did not offer local staff 
enough support with respect to the tasks that 
partnerships should invest in.
4. The quality of partnership is viewed as 
important for implementation of a health strategy, 
and can be reinforced by a supportive culture and 
incentives to partnership such as those provided in 
the Single Regeneration Budget
Staff took advantage of existing partnerships. 
However, ‘technical difficulties’ over deciding on 
the most effective tasks, staff shortages and 
organisational turbulence lessened the support 
partnerships could offer.
5. Committed individuals can be important 
catalysts, and can be influential if they are in a 
senior position. Competing pressures from other 
responsibilities of organisations can account for 
lack of commitment by some organisations, or for 
commitment not being translated into action. A 
statutory framework for the health strategy would 
encourage development of commitment of 
individuals and organisations at every level.
Committed individuals drove and sped-up aspects 
of the policy’s implementation, for example, the 
borough HimP development.
6. Socio-economic features were reported as 
influential in strategy implementation A health 
strategy needs to acknowledge the importance of 
the socio-economic determinants of the health of 
the local population if it is to be credible with 
those responsible for implementation locally.
There was some dissonance between staff views 
of what central government should do and views 
on what it was doing with regard to macro- 
economic policy to support health inequality 
reduction. This in turn led to increased confusion 
at the local level as to what public health staff 
should do locally regarding the wider- 
determinants of health.
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I7. Local authority culture and political features 
may affect implementation of HOTN, although 
this was a stronger factor in some districts than in 
others. Local authorities which had a tradition of 
commitment to health promotion had better 
relations with their health authorities.
The thesis develops the theme that political 
features may affect public health policy 
implementation.
The Health of the Nation -  a policy assessed, 
Lessons learned for implementation of a 
national health strategy: 83.
The local response
1. A range of models of implementation of OHN 
should be supported to allow for variation in local 
circumstances and previous developments in 
health strategy.
The disestablishment of the health authority and 
creation of PCGs and then PCTs disrupted local 
circumstances and rendered out-of-date elements 
of previous developments in health strategy. The 
new HAZ bureaucracy did not anticipate future 
structural changes.
2. OHN should address underlying determinants 
of health and inequalities. A matrix model has 
many advantages, enabling explicit consideration 
of both disease and population-based models in 
health
Local staff had difficulty in discerning their role 
in addressing the underlying determinants of 
health and inequalities. While senior public health 
staff recognised the contribution of different 
services to the policy’s main aims, a strategy 
spelling out tasks in a matrix model had not yet 
been developed for local use by 2003.
3. There is an unresolved issue about where 
responsibility for the strategy should rest and the 
placement of the public health function should be 
kept under review in the light of changes in the 
NHS.
Overall responsibility for the strategy stayed with 
the health authority and then the PCT. Joint 
working on the health improvement strategy 
between the LA and the NHS improved with the 
formation of the PCT.
4. Regardless of the detailed arrangements within 
the NHS, communication needs to be improved to 
widen ownership of the OHN outside the NHS.
Communications were improved, but there was 
still scope for increased joint work.
5. If the momentum of the strategy is to be 
sustained, it needs to be firmly embedded in a 
performance management framework. This 
should include monitoring the process of 
implementation as well as the outcome, and 
should enable resources connected with the 
strategy to be identified, isolated and monitored.
Developments in performance management, 
supportive to implementation, were finally 
initiated in 2002/3.
Identification of resources allocated for specific 
schemes, such as fruit-in-schools was achieved. 
However, a proliferation of special schemes 
increased administration work. Monitoring of 
mainstream public health funds was complicated 
by the introduction of a new financial coding 
system in the same year as PCT and strategic 
health authority inauguration.
6. Targets are a necessary tool for prioritisation, 
but must be credible and local development of 
local targets should be encouraged.
Insufficient support was offered for the 
development of local targets to reduce health 
inequalities between 1998 and 2003. Local staff 
resources and expertise was not available to 
undertake this work to a high standard. The 
production of national targets 3 years after the 
policy was first released was welcomed although 
at the time the renewed focus on acute sector 
targets generated by The NHS Plan dampened 
enthusiasm.
7. There is a need for a statutory framework to 
encourage key local agencies, particularly local 
government, to work in partnerships for health. 
Other incentives for partnerships should be 
considered to support the commitment of 
individuals and organisations necessary for
Explicit policy statements and communications 
indicating the increased responsibility of the local 
authority towards health and well being helped to 
increase a sense of shared agendas. Co- 
terminosity between the PCT and borough also 
improved joint working. However, partnerships
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implementation. were functioning before the policy arrived.
8. Central government has a key role to play but it 
is essential that there is a consistent message 
across government that is in support of OHN. 
Central government should also foster the 
development and dissemination of an evidence 
base.
Little effective technical support was provided 
from the centre and there was a sense of a lade of 
co-ordination as to whose responsibility it was to 
support local public health services. For example 
between the DoH, the strategic health authority, 
the London Health Observatory and the Health 
Development Agency (H.D.A).
Staff detected an inconsistency between policy to 
reduce health inequalities and government policy 
on income distribution. The cross-cutting review 
had little local impact (up to 2003).
The R D A ’s publications began to provide 
helpful reference sources for local public health 
work by 2002.181 Although, there was littie 
effective involvement of local staff in 
recommending research and publications 
programmes that would be useful for die H.D.A to 
undertake.
9. It will be important to increase the role of key 
stakeholders, in particular the public, the private 
sector and those working in primary care.
Initiatives to involve the public were integrated 
into regeneration schemes which in turn also had 
health components. Public involvement in 
influencing the wider-determinants of health is a 
theme of this thesis.
Littie work was undertaken to involve the private 
sector at departmental level, excluding small 
initiatives such as ‘shopping for health’ (food 
awareness activities involving dieticians and 
diabetes patients ).
Primary care staff were key partners involved in 
areas of work relating to health improvement, for 
example in initiatives concerning sexual health, 
patient involvement in ‘healthy heart days’ and 
smoking cessation work. However, work was 
somewhat determined by individual staff and 
practice interests and commitment. It was noted 
by health promotion staff that those practices in 
most need of support in health improvement 
work, tended to be those least able to make use of 
such support
10. Consideration should be given to ring-fenced 
funding for die implementation of OHN in order 
to give priority to this activity.
Ring-fencing of funds was effective in providing 
a dedicated financial stream for public health 
improvement However, it was not necessary for 
the ring-fenced funds to be tied to new and 
distinct administrative and monitoring structures, 
as was the case with the HAZ.
181 The reduction in leaflet supplies formally provided by the Health Education Authority (HEA) was a 
source of annoyance to local primary care staff.
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